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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter sets out the focus of the thesis. Adopting a head office-centred approach, this thesis is
concerned with two aspects of HRM within Irish-owned MNCs, namely (i) the collective management
of non-managerial employees, that is the management of IR; and (ii) the management of non-
operational HR. that is the management of managers. Moreover, given the paucity of existing
empirical research into the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs this research is exploratory in nature.
Following an outline of the rationale that shaped the focus of this research, the structure of the thesis
is broadly summarised. This chapter concludes by briefly stating the main contributions of this
research.
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with HRM in Irish-owned multinational companies
(MNCs). For the purpose of this research, HRM is understood in its broadest sense
as encompassing the policies, processes and procedures involved in the management
of people within organisations (Sisson, 1989). Adopting a head office-centred
approach, this thesis specifically focuses on two dimensions of FIRM: (i) the
collective management of non-managerial employees, that is the management of
industrial relations (IR), and (ii) the management of non-operational human
resources (HR), that is the management of managers. Chapter four will outline in
greater detail the rationale for this focus. Finally, given the paucity of empirical
research into the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs and the broad leaning of the Irish
HRM literature towards the practices of foreign-owned MNCs based within Ireland,
this research is exploratory in nature.
This thesis seeks to first, examine the approaches adopted by Irish-owned MNCs
toward the management of IR and HR and second, assess the distinctiveness or
'particularity' of Irish-owned MNC behaviour. To this end, three distinct literatures
are identified as usefully informing this investigation. Firstly, there is an established
school of thought that works from the view that MNCs are increasingly restructuring
1
along global lines. In doing so, it is argued that MNCs shed their national identities.
At the core of this line of argument lies the contention that MNCs are involuntarily
and inevitably evolving toward a global form of organisation. The globalisation view
suggests that as MNCs move toward internationally integrated organisational forms,
power and strategic decision-making is dispersed across geographically spread sites.
This corporate restructuring and the transformation of production systems into
internationally integrated systems have given rise to renewed interest in the
challenge of managing employee relations on a transnational basis (Chaykowski and
Giles, 1998). Critics of this school of thought suggest that the adoption of
internationally integrated organisational forms results in the removal of IR decision-
making from local to international or global levels. Others highlight the
marginalisation of local trade unions and the erosion of local workplace influence as
the outcomes of this drive to globalism (Campbell, 1993). Ultimately, the adoption
of organisational-based employment systems is seen as a threat to the
'distinctiveness of national regimes of work relations' (Giles, 1996: 10).
In contrast, a different body of literature suggests that MNCs are far from 'stateless'.
Adherents to this particular school of thought argue that MNCs are essentially
national entities with foreign operations, whose 'home bases' remain their main
source of competitive advantage within international markets (Porter, 1990; Hu,
1992). While acknowledging the forces of globalisation, this perspective suggests
that MNCs continue to be shaped by a set of nationally defined characteristics,
particular to the country from which they originate (Ferner, 1994; Lane, 1995). It
therefore follows that the IR and 1-IR practices of MNCs from one country will differ
from those of another, a variance that is argued to reflect different national systems
of corporate governance, responsibilities of the State, labour market institutions and
forms of labour market representation (Whitley, 1992). The approaches adopted by
2
MNCs toward the management of IR and HR are thus shaped by (to borrow from
Whitley, 1992) the 'national business system' (NBS) from which they originate. As
a result, some aspects of IR and HR are more open to managerial 'shaping', while
others are more determined by particular historical systems or styles (Ferner, 1994;
Marginson et al., 1993).
Related to the NBS literature is a third body of writing that is potentially applicable
to an understanding of the Irish case. Following on from the NBS view, the 'small
countries' literature argues that the behaviour of MNCs from small countries is
largely shaped by factors particular to small economies. These factors include the
size of the domestic market, the proximity of actors and the inter-relationship with
financial institutions and the State. This literature argues that nationality effects,
evident in some MNCs, are attributable to the size of their country-of-origin.
Moreover, it suggests that MNCs originating in smaller countries are more
susceptible to changes in the competitiveness of domestic and international markets.
Inter-firms linkages are also thought to be critical for companies seeking to
internationalisation from a small economy or 'home base'. Furthermore, advocates
of this view suggest that the small size of the home country creates a specific
bargaining dynamic in the area of labour relations, a dynamic that encourages
corporati sm and centrali sed partnership arrangements (Katzenstein, 1985; Rui grok
and Van Tulder, 1995).
1.2 RESEARCH RATIONALE
The manner in which this research unfolded can perhaps best be seen in the light of a
gap that became increasingly apparent as this research developed - a gap between
what is purported to be happening in the international literature, and what is
reported, albeit in a somewhat anecdotal way, to be taking place within Irish-owned
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MNCs. The gap between this theoretical rhetoric and local reality led to a critical
look of MNC models and their application to the Irish situation. An initial
examination of the literature revealed a number of particular biases. First, despite
evidence suggesting that small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are becoming
increasingly internationalised (UN, 1993), existing literature focuses primarily on the
behaviour of large MNCs. As this research will demonstrate, while Irish MNCs are
large in national terms, they are small to medium sized when compared with their
European and North American counterparts. Second, existing typologies concentrate
on companies that are long established as international players. However, as Forster
and Johnsen (1996) have recently observed, the behaviour and managerial issues of
newly internationalised companies represents an underdeveloped field of research.
With the exception of one or two Irish companies who pioneered the route to
internationalisation during the 1970s, the majority of Irish-owned MNCs have only
recently diversified into overseas markets.
Furthermore, existing research tends to focus on MNCs from large andlor developed
economies. Correspondingly, little is known about the behaviour of MNCs from
small and/or newly industrialised economies (NICs), such as Ireland. What little
research that has been conducted suggests that the size of the MNC, and the stage of
industrialisation, plays an important role in the shaping of their behaviour. For
example, research by Forsgren and Johanson (1989) found Swedish MNCs to have
grown in a manner very different from other European MNCs. The establishment of
mainland European-based centres, through what they termed 'internationalisation of
the second degree', resulted in the development of distinctive structural forms within
these firms. Furthermore, Irish research suggests that the process of industrialisation
has led to the sectoral location of Irish-owned MNCs into 'non-traded' and 'naturally
sheltered' activities (O'Malley, 1992). Following an initial examination of the
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literature, it is therefore probable that small to medium sized MNCs from small and
late industrialised economies, such as Ireland, will exhibit characteristics and
experiences different from, for example, UK or US MNCs. The question therefore
remains as to whether there is an Irish, or small economy, or late industrialisation
model of an MNC that is distinctively different from the widely purported global
model?
In addition, no collective research has been carried out on the behaviour and form of
Irish-owned MNCs. The importance of foreign, as opposed to indigenous, MNCs in
the development of the Irish economy is borne out in the quantity of empirical
research conducted to date. Indeed, it has been suggested that the growth in HRM
research is largely the result of a growth in the number of foreign-owned MNCs
within the Irish economy (Dineen and Garavan, 1994). Hitherto, all Irish-based
research has either focused on the role of HRM within foreign MNCs (Gunnigle,
1992; Monks, 1996) or, alternatively, on the form and direction of 'convergence'
between the employment practices of foreign-owned and indigenous firms
(Enderwick, 1986; Kelly and Brannick, 1985; Turner et al., 1997; Roche and Geary,
1997; Geary and Roche, 1999). Consequently, there is a further knowledge gap
concerning the operations of indigenous Irish MNCs. In an attempt to redress these
imbalances, this research will focus on outlining some empirical findings concerning
the approaches of Irish-owned MNCs to the management of JR and HR.
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
This thesis seeks to investigate the extent to which the key expectations of the
literatures described above inform the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs toward the
management of IR and HR. As a result, this exploratory research will facilitate the
achievement of two aims. Firstly, to provide a picture of Irish-owned MNCs and
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their approach to the management of JR and HR; and secondly, to examine the
distinctiveness or particularity of Irish-owned MNC behaviour.
To this end, the thesis is structured as follows. The following chapter, chapter two,
reviews the literatures identified above in order to provide an understanding of how
each literature may inform the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs in their patterns of
internationalisation, their strategic and structural approaches and, ultimately, their
management of JR and HR. In the light of the NBS and small countries literatures
the expectation is that these processes are shaped by factors particular to Ireland. In
keeping, chapter three outlines the socio-economic context of Ireland. More
particularly, it provides an understanding of the main patterns of industrialisation
that have underlined the emergence of Irish-owned MNCs and the development of
current HRM models within Ireland. In the absence of any previous research into the
Irish national business system, chapter three brings together the rather piece-meal
published information regarding the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs.
Chapter four outlines the rationale for adopting a mixed methodology toward the
aims of this research. Firstly, given a lacuna of established empirical data and in
light of the fact that this research attempts to cover new ground, a questionnaire-
based survey was conducted in order to 'map out' the research terrain. This
facilitated the identification of broad patterns of Irish-owned MNC behaviour.
However, in an endeavour to uncover internal processes and practices that directly
shape their approach to the management of JR and HR, a case study approach was
adopted. Four Irish-owned MNCs, representative of key sectors, were selected for
further study. Adopting a head office based focus, interviews were conducted with
senior management across a number of functional areas and at a local level. These
perspectives were supplemented with a number of interviews with employee
6
representatives.
Chapter five reports on the findings of the survey. Apart from providing broad
demographic information on the total population of Irish-owned MNCs, the survey
also revealed for the first time two important findings that would inform the
remainder of the research process. First, that Irish-owned MNCs operating within
different sectors tended to exhibit different approaches. Second, that Irish-owned
MNCs to their routes to internationalisation and their strategies, structures and
control mechanisms were reflected in their approach to the management of JR and
FIR. Subsequently, the case studies reported in chapters six through to nine each
focus on four Irish-owned MNCs from sectors found to dominate within
internationally trading indigenous industry (i.e., financial services, print and paper,
food and clay, and glass and cement). And, following a brief discussion of the
historical evolution of each MNC so as to outline the context within which their
behaviour may be better understood, the case companies are examined across three
dimensions: their pattern of internationalisation, their strategic, structural and control
mechanisms, and their approaches to the management of JR and HR.
Chapter ten, the first of two analytical chapters, proposes key attributes of the Irish-
owned MNCs by reviewing and comparing the data presented in chapters five
through to nine. While each of the case companies exhibit differences of approach,
this variance is broadly explicable in terms of the timing of their internationalisation,
their specific historical context, and their sectoral differences. However, despite
these variations, chapter ten identifies a number of attributes common across the
case companies. The second analytical chapter, chapter eleven, takes these key
attributes and compares them against the literatures reviewed in earlier chapters so as
to investigate the extent to which their expectations are reflected in the Irish 'case'.
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This chapter argues that while the globalisation literature may account for some
points of similarity with respect to the structure and intemationalisation of Irish-
owned MNCs, it does not fully account for the distinct underlying rationale that
many of the case companies display. Hence, this research questions what is broadly
referred to as the 'globalisation thesis' - the notion that all MNCs are converging on
some standard form of organisation or set of practices. Having shown key points of
difference particular to Irish-owned, this thesis finds that the NBS and small
countries literatures, with their emphasis on the systems from which MNCs emanate,
appear to be more pertinent in explaining the nature of the Irish approach. However,
it argues that beyond these literatures there is a case for appreciating the particular
historical company and national context of Irish-owned MNCs, if one is to
understand the particular approaches they adopt to the management of their
employment relationships. In addition, given that each of the literatures reviewed is
shown to have highlighted certain aspects of the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs,
this research advocates an eclectic approach, whereby all the literatures reviewed in
this work are utilised in order to fully understand the development of MNCs. The
final chapter, chapter twelve, reflects back on the research process and summarises
the main findings of this research. Following on from an outline of the main
conclusions, it discusses the main implications of these findings for both theory and
practice and identifies trajectories for future research.
1.4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
In summary, the main distinctive contributions of this thesis are outlined as follows:
1. This thesis marks out a territory hitherto unexplored, namely the nature and
behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs and demonstrates that their approach to the
management of IR and HR is distinct from foreign-owned MINCs which have thus
far been the focus of attention. It develops a tentative framework of the behaviour
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of Irish-owned MNCs and their approach to the management of IR and HR, a
framework that can be built upon and developed in future research;
2. These findings add weight to a literature that questions applicability of the
'globalisation thesis' to the approaches adopted by MNCs to the management of
their employment relationships, particularly those originating from small
countries. Moreover, it posits that Irish-owned MNCs promote their national
identity, as a means of achieving the corporate benefits of globalisation without
meeting with the sort of resistance associated with MNC from larger countries
with more 'abrasive' management styles. It marks this out as an interesting area
for future research, particularly in terms of the HRM implications for MNCs from
small countries;
3. Finally, this thesis further adds to the literature by highlighting the importance of
historical factors, in particular significant IR turning points, in shaping an
understanding of current indigenous MNCs approaches to management of JR and
FIR and develops an analysis of the factors shaping the collective employment
relations and the management of managers in Irish-owned MNCs which can be
tested and built upon in future research.
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CHAPTER 2
FORCES SHAPING HRM IN MNCs
This chapter reviews the extant literature pertinent to an examination of the factors shaping FIRM
within MNCs. It focuses on three 'schools of thought'. The first, which is broadly termed the
'globalisation thesis', suggests that MNCs are becoming 'borderless' in the move toward
internationally integrated organisational forms and homogenous HRM systems. The second, the
'national business systems' perspective, argues in contrast that national contexts are resilient in the
face of globalisation and that it is the context particular to the country-of-origin that informs the
behaviour of MNCs. The third, the 'small countries' literature, which extends the NBS line of
argument, places particular emphasis upon the way in which MNCs originating from small countries
develop particular modes of internationalisation, structural forms and strategies, and, consequently,
distinctive 'small country' approaches to FIRM.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In examining emerging trends of MNC activity, Dunning (1993: 287) found that
'there can be no question that MNEs are not only assuming an increasingly
important and pluralistic role in the global economy but that. . . they are one of the
principle engines of its growth and development'. There is a great deal of research
that now substantiates this view. From an estimated 7,000 MNCs operating in 1970
(Franko, 1976), table 2.1 clearly shows the number of MNCs to have grown to
approximately 37,000, with 170,000 foreign affiliates by the beginning of the 1990s
(UN, 1995). Reports by the United Nations Centre for Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) (UN, 1993; UN, 1995) continue to highlight the ever-increasing number
of MNCs and their control of foreign direct investment (FDI) activities. By the mid
1990s, MNCs accounted for $7 trillion in sales, while the total holdings owned by
companies outside their home bases stood at over $3 trillion (UN, 1995).
Furthermore, research indicates that large MNCs from large developed economies
remain in control of the vast majority of foreign assets. Of the total number of
MNCs operating in 1992, 24,000 originated from just 14 developed economies (UN,
1993). This growth in MNC activity and numbers is reported to be accompanied by a
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widening of the participation of source countries in FDI, particularly Germany and
Japan (cf. Dunning, 1993). Despite the dominance of large MNCs the growing role
of small to medium-sized MNC in the world economy is also widely reported.
Similarly, UNCTAD note an increase since 1980 in the number of MNCs who
headquarters are located in less developed countries and in Central and Eastern
Europe. As Dunning (1993) highlights, there was a dramatic increase in FDI during
the period 1980-1990, particularly with respect to smaller countries such as Sweden.
In developed market economies, outward FDI grew from 4.8% of GDP in 1967 to
9.8% in 1990, thus highlighting an increase in the importance of MNCs in this
respect.
TABLE 2.1: NuMBER OF PARENT MNCs AND FOREIGN AFFILIATES (EARLY 1 990s)
Parent Corporation	 Foreign Affiliates
Based in Country	 Located in Country
Developed Economies	 33,500	 81,800
Developing Economies 	 2,700	 71,300
Central and Eastern Europe	 400	 21,800
Ireland	 30	 956
TOTAL	 36,600	 174,900
Source: UN (1995)
The proportion of global assets they hold outside of their home countries further
evidences the dominance of large MNCs. This was estimated to be $1.2 trillion in
global assets out of a total of $3.2 trillion in global assets (UN, 1993). By the early
1990s, it was broadly recognised that MNCs had overtaken international trade flows
as the main source of international economic exchange (UN, 1995, Marginson and
Sisson, 1994; Edwards et al., 1996).
Not surprisingly, the growth in the number and pervasiveness of MNCs has been
accompanied by a growth in the debate surrounding their role and importance.
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Dicken (1998) identifies two important indicators of the increased
internationalisation of economic activity in recent years: the changing map of
production and trade and a growth in the scale and complexity of international
investment. The MNC, for Dicken (1998: 47), is subsequently 'the single most
important force creating global shifts in economic activity'. 1
 He suggests that the
shape of economic systems are now 'sculpted' by the investment decisions of
MNCs. Their power, therefore, lies in their ability to control economic activities
across national borders, their ability to 'take advantage of geographical differences
between countries and regions in factor endowments' and their ability to switch
production between geographical locations. Similarly, Ferner (1994) regards MNCs
as 'disseminators' of particular versions of capitalism, implying that MNCs may be
proxies in the competition between the regulation and deregulation of employment
relations models. Moreover, Femer and Hyman (1998: xiii) present MNCs as 'the
dominant actors in the internationalisation process' and suggest that they 'act as
transmission belts' of country of origin practices which threaten national regulatory
regimes
This thesis is concerned with HRM within MNCs, particularly within those MNCs
emanating from Ireland. Given that MNCs are now widely regarded as one of the
main conduits through which international restructuring occurs, MNCs now stand at
the heart of the debate on international restructuring and the impact of this
restructuring on the future management of JR and HR. As Ferner (1994: 79) first
noted, and many have since reaffirmed in the light of statistics like those outlined
above, the study of FIRM in MNCs 'hardly requires justification' (cf. Marginson,
1994). Despite a vast literature on specific HRM issues arising from the
Dicken (1998) employs the term 'transnational corporation' in preference to the more widely used
'multinational corporations. He views it as a more flexible and generic term and suggests that while MNC
suggests operations in a substantial number of countries, the term transnational corporation' implies operations
in at least two countries, including the firm's home country.
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internationalisation of companies, such as the role of expatriates and the challenge of
repatriation, comparatively little is known of the impact of nationality on HRM in
MNCs. The majority of what has been written on this topic over the past fifteen
years has focused on the practices of large MNCs from large advanced economies,
that statistics have shown to be the most powerful. Their influence has been taken as
indicative of an advanced global model that smaller MNCs from smaller economies
will inevitably emu'ate. However, as recent research has suggested, as small to
medium sized countries intemationalise at an even greater rate than those who have
previously done so (UN, 1993), one might expect some differences in smaller MNCs
from smaller countries behaviour.
This is especially so in the light of a contrasting literature that challenges the
globalisation thesis. The national business systems (NBS) perspective counters the
notion of homogenisation of MNC behaviour, arguing instead that the national
contexts are resilient to gthbalisation and remain the influencing factors in MNC
behaviour. A further body of literature, which builds this view of national resilience,
may also aid an understanding of the case of Irish MNCs. Broadly termed the 'small
countries' literature, this perspective seeks to identify characteristics typical of
MNCs from those countries marginalised in much of the globalisation literature. To
this point, the small countries literature has been largely associated with
Scandinavian countries and, as with the broader NBS literature, its expectations have
not yet been directly applied to the study of Irish-owned MNCs. Reviewing these
literature thus provides further sets of expectations that may inform an understanding
of the management of IR and HR in Irish-owned MNCs.
Toward an understanding of these literatures and, more specifically, how they might
provide useful insight into the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs, this chapter begins
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by exploring the broad intentions behind globalisation and its implications for FIRM.
As stated earlier, the debate here centres on understanding the behaviour of MNCs
and their management practices though an exploration of the broad macro process of
globalisation posited to be shaping them. To this end, key developments in the
organisational form of MNCs as influenced by globalisation are then delineated in
terms of corporate strategy and structure, control and FIRM implications toward a
summary of key attributes.
Having outlined the growing criticisms mounting against globalisation the chapter
moves to a review of the NBS literature, identifying HRM expectations. This
literature review then goes on to review the small countries literature and its FIR and
JR expectations for a case like freland. Taking the case of a similar small country,
the chapter outlines an account of how Swedish MNCs have developed (this
provides the basis for analysis later in the thesis). The chapter concludes with a
description of the limits to small country effects. Based on these reviews, this
chapter argues that there are limitations to the degree to which the globalisation
literature may inform an understanding of the 'shape' of HRM practices within Irish-
owned MNCs. While suggesting that the NBS and small countries literature fall
short in taking account of the particular industrial relations histories of MNCs in
seeking to understand their management of JR and HR. this review still suggests that
these schools of thought may help facilitate an understanding of the behaviour of
Irish-owned MNCs. To this end, chapter three moves on to a review of the key
forces shaping the Irish context and influences on approaches to the management of
IRandi-IR.
2.2 TuE GLOBALISATION 'THESIS'
It is reported that the world economy has changed significantly during the twentieth
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century and that 'globalisation' is the process to which much of this change has been
attributed (FT, 3/15,1996). Similarly, much credence has been placed on the 'forces
of globalisation' and the role of MNCs as key components in that process. Factors
such as the liberalisation of financial markets, the international integration of
production, technological advancements, the deregulation of trade and the growth in
mergers and acquisitions have all been cited as factors contributing to the process of
'globalisation'. While there has been much written of the changing shape of
globalisation, there has been little research into the impact on HRM. As Ferner
(1994) highlights, the debate on globalisation has largely been one of semantics,
while little has concentrated on an assessment of its impact on HRM. The first
section of this literature review is an attempt to redress this by exploring the
literature's expectations with regard to the globalisation of the firm, the consequent
evolution, form and key attributes of MNCs, and then examining the HRM
implications of these attributes. However, in order to do so, it is pertinent to first
outline the broad meanings of the term itself.
2.2.1 Globalisation: Understanding the Jargon
Despite a long history, 'globalisation' has only recently become 'academically
significant'. In a short time (since McLuhun's (1962) articulation of the idea of the
'Global Village') the concept has come to pervade much of Western academe to the
point where globalisation, as a concept, has itself become 'globalised' (Waters,
1995: 2). Notwithstanding its wide usage, globalisation is largely criticised for the
absence of any systematic examination of its meaning (Giles, 1996). Despite a vast
and diverse literature, a number of dominant views are discernible. Outlining these is
an important step toward untangling key aspects that tend to be grouped and termed
the 'forces of globalisation' and examining their impact on FIRM behaviour of
MNCs.
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Dunning (1991; 1993) defines globalisation in terms of its depth or degrees of
intensity. For example, he suggests that in its shallowest form, globalisation occurs
when a corporation engages in 'arm's length' trading of a single product with a
corporation in another country. In contrast, its deepest form involves the transactions
of a larger number of economic entities from other nations, across a network of
value-added chains. With deeper forms of globalisation, Dunning (1993) suggests
that the exchanges are highly co-ordinated and consist of a variety of transactional
forms. The deeper forms of globalisation thus offer a free exchange of people, goods
and services demands. Similarly, O'Connell (1997) views globalisation as a process
involving the repositioning of domestic operations onto an international arena. In
keeping, O'Connell (1997) suggests that the process of globalisation involves the
search for new product or service markets across international borders while
simultaneously developing the capabilities to service those markets. Underlying
these perspectives is the contention that, as a process, globalisation is 'involuntary',
'inevitable' and 'irreversible'.
In contrast to these homogeneous and linear perspectives, Ruigrok and Van Tulder
(1995) regard globalisation as occupying five distinct forms. The first, the
globalisation of finances, they argue, refers to the deregulation of markets and the
internationalisation of capital flows which has resulted in a greater movement of
capital across borders. The second, the glohalisation of competition and the firm,
relates to the geographical convergence of economies and the changing international
organisation of MNCs themselves. Relatedly, it is the third form - the globalisation
of technology that facilitates the globalisation of the firm and competition. The final
two forms of globalisation, the globalisation of regulatory capabilities and the
globalisation of Nation States, respectively relate to the role of supranational
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institutions and the notion of a general movement towards political unification.
In a critical contribution Giles (1996) similarly delineates globalisation as occupying
three main forms: the globalisation of markets, the globalisarion of production and
the globalisation of the Nation State (cf. table 2.2). Giles suggests that advances in
technology, declining transportation costs, the homogenisation of consumer demands
and the removal of trade barriers between nations have led to a greater integration of
markets and mobility of people and products across national borders. This he terms
the globalisarion of markets. Following on from this, Giles identifies a second form,
the globalisation of production, which refers to the international integration of
production systems across borders in the search for some degree of economies-of-
scale. In defining globalisation in terms of internationally integrated production
systems, it is the MNC and its operations that link nation states. The final form that
Giles outlines is the globalisation of socio-political regulatory structures. This
refers to the reshaping of political structures and policies to take account of
international production systems. Through the establishment of supranational
institutions an international system of regulation, markets and production is
extended across national borders.
TABLE 2.2 FORMS OF GLOBALISATION AND HRM IMPLICATIONS
Forms of Globalisation
Globalisation of Markets
Globalisation of Production
Globalisation of Socio-political regulatory
structures
Source: Giles (1996).
Impact on HRM
• Pressure on national industrial relations
to adapt to 'new order'.
• Reassessment of industrial policies.
• New inter and intra-firm arrangements.
• HRM defined by globally-defined.
• Reduction in local representation on the
organisation of production.
• Loss of representations of key
institutions in decision making process.
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These typologies highlight the diversity of forms that globalisation assumes. While it
could be argued that each 'form' of the process deserves the specific attention
afforded it across a diverse range of disciplines (such as sociology, history,
geography and architecture - cf. Harvey 1990), the focus of this particular research is
the impact of the globalisation ofthe firm on HRM within MNCs. Informed by Giles
attempts to bring the terminology behind these terms down to the level of practical
HRM implications, it is to that focus that this literature review now turns.
2.2.2 The Globalisation of the Firm
For some commentators the globalisation of the firm refers to the changing
international organisation of MNCs (Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995). Others,
however, view it specifically in terms of the international restructuring of production
systems (Giles, 1996). Within the last two decades, MNCs are reported to have
transformed their production processes through the international integration of
overseas units into one singular manufacturing system. In such a system products are
assembled from components originating from several countries and dispersed world-
wide. As a result, the design, manufacturing and marketing of products or services
are divorced from domestic economies. Given such developments questions are
raised as to how the organisation of the MNC changed? Moreover, what are the key
attributes of these restructured organisational forms and, more pertinently given the
scope of this thesis, what are the implications of this restructuring process on the
management of JR and HR? The following paragraphs examine the evolutionary
models of MNCs and changes in the corporate strategy and structure of MNCs.
Beyond this, the section turns to outlining the HRM expectations of globally
orientated MNCs.
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Influenced by Levitt's (1983) dictum 'think Global, act Local', there is an underlying
assumption within the literature that, due to increasing complexity and convergence
of markets, all MNCs increasingly seek similar forms toward the achievement of
economies of scale. Subsequently, theories regarding the globalisation of the firm
and indeed many recent organisational typologies work from the premise that MNCs
all pursue some form of cost-reduction strategy. For much of the past decade the
literature has advocated the balancing of a tension between a need for local
responsiveness and pressures to centrally co-ordinate integrative forces. In other
words, to manage the need for central control and co-ordination in a manner that
does not mitigate against local autonomy. In short, the literature broadly advocates
the movement of MNCs towards a combination of centralised and decentralised
approaches. However, these objectives, are by their very nature, contrary to one
another. As a result, the challenge facing MNCs is the achievement of an optimal
balance or 'equilibrium'. The ability to gain synergistic economies on a global basis,
without impeding on the attainment of local financial economies has been described
by ABB as 'multi-local' and by Sony as the strategy of 'global localization' (Ohmae,
1990). Through the creation of vertical and horizontal links across sites, a more
centralised approach is obtained and a particular skill or competency exploited.
FIRM policies that seek to promote such synergistic benefits include managerial
networking, best practice models, staff transfer and team-based approaches to
decision-making.
The route to globalism by MNCs is said to be influenced by the type of economies
that MNCs pursue (Marginson et al., 1995). In the second company level industrial
relations survey (CLIRS), Marginson et al. (1993) found two routes towards
globalism common among MNCs: one based on synergy and another on financial
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economies. 2
 In seeking financial economies, MNCs were found to impose financial
penalties on those units that failed to reach their targets. Furthermore, they found
that in pursuing a financial economies route, a stronger emphasis was placed on
budgetary controls and other financial control mechanisms, than on co-ordination
processes. Similarly, recent work by Edwards et a!. (1996: 53) has found that many
MNCs transfer capital in the search for short-term profit exist in addition to global
firms that seek economies of scale based on the exploitation of a skill or
competency. Consequently, they are that:
The model of the global and transnational firm assumes that there is one
route to globalism, namely, the route through synergistic economies. Our
results suggests that there are also other means to this end, and hence that
globalism has a number of forms'.
Edwards and associates identify that the two routes to globalism - financial and
synergistic, co-exits rather than represent opposite positions. Subsequently, they
(1996: 42) point out that while: 'globalism is certainly an active trend... routes to it
are more varied than is often thought and hierarchy and accountability remain
strongly in evidence'.
2.2.3 The Evolution and Form of MNCs: 'Capturing Proteus'
While the behaviour of MNCs is a well-trodden field of inquiry (Wilkins, 1970;
Tugendhat, 1971; Franko, 1976), the emergence of new organisational forms (not to
mention their impact on FIRM) is a relatively unexplored area of research (Ferner,
1994). Widely believed to have originated with the expansion of US industry after
the Second World War, embryonic forms of MNCs were traced to the Sumerian
2 The second company-level industrial relations survey (CLIRS) was conducted at the University of Warwick in
1992. It addressed two issues: the effect of multinationality of large UK companies on their IR policies and
practices within the UK and secondly, ramifications of financial budgeting and control mechanisms used by
many large companies on the conduct of IR. Building on the results of the first CLIRS survey conducted in
1985 that found decision-making to be more decentralised in highly diversified companies and financial
responsibility to be devolved to lower levels than in single business companies, the second survey found that
the approach to lR and HR to be issue-driven and largely shaped by the form of control employed.
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merchants in 2500 BC (Wilkins, 1970), and to the Assyrian Kingdom of 2000 BC
(Moore and Lewis, 1996). However, it was only with the growth of American
corporations during the 1960s that research into their behaviour and form gained
momentum. Seminal works by Chandler (1962) and Perimutter (1969), which traced
the evolution and form of large enterprises, firmly established this field of
investigation. By the 1970s, emerging regional trading blocs and agreements shifted
the focus to internal management processes and challenges (Vernon, 1971; Stopford
and Wells, 1972). Increasing complexities and a need to manage growing diversities
during the 1980s saw a further shift to issues of control (Doz and Prahalad, 1981;
Baliga and Jaeger, 1984), the changing form of MNCs (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989),
and their interrelationship with the 'global' economy (Porter, 1986). The importance
of 'culture' also came to the fore, as the means of ensuring cohesion within
emerging organisational forms (Hofstede, 1980).
Three 'waves' of international expansion with respect to the form of MNCs in the
twentieth century have been identified (Kumar, 1997). The first concerns the
behaviour of European MNCs. During the inter-war period, European MNCs gained
access to markets by establishing local self-contained subsidiaries. Differences in
consumer tastes meant that many MNCs pursued product specialisation strategies.
Relationships between head offices and subsidiaries were constrained by weak
transportation and communication infrastructures. As a result, in an attempt to
ensure consistency and profitability, corporate control was managed through the
redeployment of key personnel on overseas expatriate contracts. The development of
these self-contained subsidiaries and associated control structures led to the
emergence of what is now termed Euro-specific 'mother-daughter' structures.
Following the Second World War, a second wave of corporate expansion took place,
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largely driven by American MNCs capitalising on the post war destruction of Europe
and Asia. In contrast to the first wave of expansion, advances in transportation and
communication enabled a greater expansion of American MNCs. Capitalising on
market conditions, they invested in high-volume manufacturing units with
differentiated distribution channels. The internationalisation of American MNCs led
to the emergence of functional and multi-domestic organisational structures. \Vithin
those structures corporate control was generally maintained through the formation of
a large 'cadre' of internationally mobile home-country managers.
The third wave of international expansion involved the expansion of Japanese
MNCs (Kumar, 1997). Faced with the liberalisation of international trade,
guaranteed foreign market access and lower tariffs, Japanese firms remained
domestically located and served foreign markets through exports as opposed to
developing overseas production facilities. Rejecting notions of national diversity, the
underlying philosophy of the Japanese MNCs was to provide high quality, low cost
products that would lead to the homogenisation of consumer tastes and preferences.
Advances in technology enabled Japanese MNCs to maintain low production,
communication and transportation costs. In preference to organisational integration
strategies, Japanese MNCs opted instead for integration and centralised structures
that emphasised efficiency. Finally, Kumar (1997) suggests that a fourth wave of
MNC organisation is presently taking place. The redrawing of Capitalism,
developments in information technology (IT) and innovation are amongst the forces
leading to pressures on MNCs are impacting on the management of employment
relationships. There is much speculation surrounding this phase of expansion and
there is little consensus as to the patterns of growth, structures or forms of control
that will result.
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2.2.4 Key Attributes of MNCs
Attempts to classify MNCs according to their management styles were first made by
Perlmutter (1969) who identified three distinct approaches or MNC orientations:
ethnocentric, polycentric and geocentric. 3 In brief, Perlmutter (1969) argues that
MNCs adopting an ethnocentric approach tend to have a home-country focus. As a
result, overseas operations are managed as cultural extensions of domestic
operations. Ethnocentric MNCs pursue a centralised approach to decision-making,
determining and standardising practices at head office level, which are then
communicated to subsidiaries, often in the form of guidelines. MNCs adopting an
ethnocentric approach tend to view themselves according to their nationality and fill
key overseas positions with domestic or home-country managers. In contrast, MNCs
adopting a polycentric orientation are more host-country orientated and are thus
more likely to adapt to local practices. With a polycentric approach, decision-making
is decentralised to local management, who tend to be locally recruited. The
geocentric MNC treats the head office and subsidiaries as part of a world-wide
entity. Practices are thus determined by both local and global considerations, while
the location of the head office is seen to reflect the history of the organisation.
MNCs with a geocentric approach tend to fill key management positions on the basis
of merit, irrespective of nationality.
Building on this typology, Heenan and Perlmutter (1979) later identified a fourth
approach which they termed regiocentric. Regiocentric MNCs have strong regional
head offices whose focus is on the managerial staffing and the regional optimisation
of functions, such as manufacturing. The parallel between Perlmutter's (1969)
evolutionary model of development from ethnocentric to geocentric approaches and
The indices of measurement that Perimutter (1969) employed included the proportion of nationals in different
countries holding equity, the number of foreign nationals in senior positions and the overall orientation
towards non-nationals in various positions across the organisation.
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Porter's (1990) premise that MNCs grow from multi-domestic to global structures
has often been drawn. Increasingly these models are presented, not in terms of
structures, but in terms of differing foci: home, overseas, regional and global.
Presented in an evolutionary manner, their end state represents the management of
both global and local pressures.
Beyond the work of Perlmutter (1969), perhaps the most widely referenced
classification of MNC types is that of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989). In common with
Porter's (1990) 'home base competitive advantage thesis', Bartlett and Ghoshal
(1989) regard MNCs as pursuing an evolutionary path of development. They
delineate four different 'types' of MNC, each with an associated source of
competitive advantage. Their typologies include the multi-domestic, the global, the
international and the transnational MNC. The first, the multi-domestic or
multinational firm, is structured as a decentralised federation of local firms, that are
held together by a web of personal controls. The strength of the multi-domestic
MNC lies in its ability to respond quickly to local environments. In contrast, the
global firm adopts a more globally integrated and centrally controlled approach.
While the home country produce standard products, the overseas operations become
the delivery points with which international markets are accessed. The strength of
the global firm is said to lie in their opportunities for scale efficiencies and cost
reductions. The international finn adopts the form of a federation and co-ordination
occurs through sophisticated management systems. The strength of the international
MNC lies in its ability to transfer knowledge and expertise to less advanced
environments. Finally, the increase in the complexity of operating within
increasingly international markets that led to the development of what Bartlett and
Ghoshal (1989) regard as the apex of the evolutionary path: the transnational firm.
The transnational comprises of a network of differentiated units, where
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collaboration and the collective implementation of corporate strategy is assumed. In
contrast to the international MNC, the strength of the transnational lies in its ability
to combine local responsiveness with global efficiencies, while also transferring
knowledge. Control and co-ordination is thus managed through such mechanisms as
formalised and institutionalised control mechanisms and socialisation processes.
Responsibilities for different corporate functions are assigned on the basis of market
strength and skills, and not on the basis of nationality.
While much credence is placed on the transnational MNC, the form represents
something of an ideal type and its rarity among international organisations, as
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) themselves admit. Despite the lack of exemplars, most
commentators accept that there has been a broad movement from the national to
transnational MNC. For others the transnational represents more of an 'approach'
than an actual structural form. For example, Edwards et a!. (1996) suggest that given
that there is little agreement in organisational terms on the definition of the global or
transnational MNC, perhaps it is more appropriate to frame discussions in terms of
key attributes of 'global approaches'.
Despite the diversity of labels, a number of MNC attributes are readily identifiable
(cf. table 2.3). Key to the architecture of the global MNC is the shift from a
hierarchical structure to a more flexible and horizontally orientated heterarchy
(Hedlund, 1986; 1994). Inherent in the movement to a flatter horizontal form is the
dispersion of core functions across geographical sites and global co-ordination,
(Forsgren, 1990; White and Poynter, 1989). Autonomy and decision-making are thus
dispersed across a network of units that are linked together through lateral decision
processes and criss-crossing lines of communication. The 'lifeline' of the global
archetype is therefore information and the ease its flow through the system. To
overcome geographical distances and facilitate the dispersion of decision-making,
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MNCs are reported to be technologically networking their operations. This has given
rise to images of global firms as 'holographic organisations', in which information
about the whole is stored in each part (Hedlund and Rolander, 1990).
TABLE 2.3: MODELS OF GLOBAL FIRMS
Hedlund	 Hedlund &	 White & Poynter	 Ohmae
________________	 (1994)	 Rolander (1990)	 (1989)	 (1990)
Organisational	 Network-like	 Heterarchy	 Flexible and	 Borderless
Structure _________________ Horizontal 	 _______________
Geographical	 Geographical	 Geographical
dispersion of	 diffusion of core	 dispersion of
___________________ knowledge
	
strategic activities functional units 	 ________________
Decision	 Lateral	 'Holographic'	 Lateral	 Criss-cross lines
processes__________________ ___________________ ___________________ ________________
Role & Structure Knowledge	 Diffusion of HQ	 Reverse Matrix	 Decomposition
of the 'Centre'	 creation &	 functions	 into regional
transfer___________________ ___________________ HQs
Corporate 'Glue' Shared Cultures	 Normative control Shared business 	 Universal value
mechanisms -	 values and formal system and
corporate culture,	 approach to	 shared
___________________ __________________ style and ethics
	
socialisation	 languages
Role of HRM	 Critical at lower	 Create shared	 Create country
levels in lateral	 values & facilitate	 neutral HR
___________________ dialogue 	 ___________________ lateral processes 	 systems
Source: Compiled from various sources.
The movement towards flatter vertically integrated structures is posited to involve a
reduction in the reporting and management layers and a shrinking of the head office.
This raises questions as to the now played by the 'centre' in MNCs. The shift from
polycentric to geocentric approaches is argued to result in the decomposition of the
head office into a number of geographically-spread centres and the replacement of
the traditional hierarchy with a 'heterarchy' that signifies the devolution of
operational and financial responsibility to divisional levels (Hedlund, 1986). In
short, as MNCs move towards globalism, the size and importance of the head office
is reduced through the removal of layers of bureaucracy and its disintegration into
constellations of profit centres (Campbell, 1993). Adherents to the global
perspective subsequently herald the operation of a 'new logic' within MNCs. Reich
(1991), for example, argues that traditional nationally focused MNCs will be
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replaced with a 'global web' of operations that operate according to just such a 'new
logic'. This, he (1991: 80) suggests is reflected in the role of the head office:
the location of headquarters is not a matter of great importance; it is not even
necessarily in the country where most of the company's shareholders or
employees are. Headquarters for the new global web can even be a suite of
rooms in an office park near an international airport - a communications
centre where many of the web's threads intersect.., the global web may have
several world-wide headquarters.
Similarly, Ohmae (1990) argues that the location of the 'centre' will no longer
reflect the nationality of the organisation, ownership base or location of majority
employees. Instead, he argues that as MNCs become global, they 'shed their national
identities' and create a number of different centres that are largely dependent on
market or technological conditions. In contrast, Porter (1990) argues that it is the
national identity of the firm that provides the competitive advantage of the firm.
Forsgren et al. (1992: 488), while disputing the premise that MNCs shed their
national identity, found the emergence of overseas 'centres' among Swedish MNCs.
Unlike Ohmae (1990), however, they suggest that the movement of divisional head
offices overseas is the result of a bargaining process between sites who seek to shape
corporate strategies in an attempt to support their own. Either way, it seems clear
that MNCs are no longer characterised by vertical chains of command but by
'flexible horizontal networks accompanied by lateral decision processes'
underpinned by a set of 'shared values' (White and Poynter, 1989: 55).
These developments reflect a need to centralise co-ordination while maintaining
devolved operational responsibility. This has led to an enhancement of the control
and co-ordination modes employed by MNCs. Doz and Prahalad (1991) suggest that
organisational control is gained through 'the development of an organisational
context'. The importance of an organisational context, or corporate culture, as the
'glue' in managing the tension of global and local pressures is a recurrent theme in
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the literature (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993). This is often presented in the form of a
common vision or shared set of values. Another form of 'enhanced control' is
claimed to be the creation of management development programmes where newly
appointed managers are assimilated into shared business values through a formalised
system of socialisation (Ferner, 1997).
In conclusion, examining the frameworks of the widely purported global model
identifies a number of key MNC attributes or expectations. These include
geographically discrete units linked together by a horizontal network and decision-
making processes that are dispersed along lateral lines that are 'held' together
through a set of normative social and cultural control mechanisms. Also, through a
process of decentralisation, the size and the role of the head office is diminished and
the role of HRM becomes heightened in MNCs. In similar vein, Edwards et al.
(1996) identified a number of 'measures of globalism' and found that a third of their
sample companies were organised along global lines and over a half have integrated
their production systems along international lines.4 In fact, global approaches were
found to be common in any situation where board members had responsibility for a
business function, communication was technologically networked, profits were
repatriated and management were internationally mobile. However, Edwards et al.
also found that the global typologies described above had no real approximates to
reality. While no global model may approximate the complexity experienced by a
MNC, globalisation would seem to be having an impact on the way MNCs organise
themselves.
' Edwards el a!. (1996) outline seven measures concerning the structure of firms. These include: the structure of
the firm, trading relationship, reporting relationship, downward monitoring, market penetration, profit
repatriation, technological networking; organisational measures included the responsibility of board members,
responsibility for geographical territories, frequency of HR managers meetings, determination of local
management pay systems. In addition, they identify three measures of managerial mobility and career
development.
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2.2.5 HRM Expectations and Implications of Global MNCs
While the classification devised by Perlmutter (1969) is useful in its differentiation
of MNC models, it has also been employed to account for variation in HRM
approaches (Marginson, 1994; Ferner, 1994). Extending Perimutter's analysis,
Ferner (1994) suggests that MNCs who adopt an ethnocentric approach tend to be
'innovators' of HRM practices. He goes on to cite research that has shown US
technologically-based MNCs, in their tendency to introduce such sophisticated 'soft'
HRM techniques as performance-related pay to overseas operations, as examples of
this approach. In contrast, he suggests that polycentric MNCs are 'adaptors' of local
HRM practices. Ferner (1994) claims that British firms exemplify this approach
given their tendency to retain existing management structures and decentralise HRM
to subsidiaries with few guidelines. As a result the head office HRM function in
polycentric MNCs becomes more focused on the recruitment of senior executives. In
contrast, geocentric approaches were found to result in the centralisation of HRM.
Devised at corporate levels, the implementation of HRM at local levels occurs
through clearly defined international guidelines and procedures.
Ferner (1994) suggests that each of these approaches is associated with different
fiRM strategies. For example, with a polycentric approach responsibility for the
recruitment of management is delegated to the local subsidiaries. In contrast, with a
geocentric approach the basis of managerial recruitment is 'cultural fit', as opposed
to 'national fit'. Moreover, given the centralised approach of geocentric approaches
the recruitment, selection and development of management tends to remain a head
office core function. Inherent in geocentric approaches is the notion of interplay
between local responsibility and global integration. In examining the impact of such
an approach on HRM practices, Caligiuri and Stroh (1995) recommend that local
responsiveness be incorporated into global strategies, so as to ensure consistency
29
between HRM practices and the overall corporate strategy.
Despite the semantic debates currently being conducted with regard to globalisation,
evidence suggests that MNCs are restructuring, adopting new organisational forms
and moving from procedural to behavioural forms of co-ordination and control
(Ferner, 1994). In its broadest sense, the FIRM expectations of geocentric approaches
include centralised approaches to the management of workforces, where policies are
devised at the centre and dispersed across sites through clearly defined international
guidelines. In an attempt to 'manage diversity', geocentric MNCs devise 'country
neutral' HRM systems. Furthermore, the need to facilitate lateral decision-making
processes places a greater emphasis on the technological networking of sites, the
importance of the 'management of managers' and group-wide project groups.
Moreover, the movement towards normative social and cultural control mechanisms
suggests a stronger leaning towards initiatives that encourage managerial
networking, 'best practice' models and benchmarking.
As outlined above, the movement to globalism at the very least involves a process of
divisionalisation, and, as Marginson (1985) argues, divisionalisation is generally
accompanied by greater decentralisation of HR and IR decision-making. One of the
main implications of this decentralisation in MNCs is said to be a loss in local
autonomy and institutional regulatory powers in the global reshaping of policies.
Ferner (1994: 84) writes that:
Divisionalisation is likely to be accompanied by greater decentralisation of
FIRM and industrial relations issues to business divisions. Personnel policies
are thus likely to be defined more by the characteristics and requirements of
business divisions at regional or global level.
As the loci of JR and HR decision-making shifts to divisional levels, decision-
making processes are moved from national boundaries to international or global
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levels. Moreover, IR and HR policies become defined by the requirements of
regional or globally structured divisions than by local or national concerns. Related
to this, Marginson (1994) argues that a further HRM expectation of such
developments is the ability of MNCs to engage in comparisons of sites on the basis
of IR and HR performance levels. The findings of the second CLIIRS survey suggest
that those performance comparisons are often inputted into investment and
divestment decisions. In essence, the movement of MNCs toward global structures is
posited to be accompanied by a greater emphasis on labour factors, for comparative
purposes. One of the main implications for local management is therefore that
autonomy becomes dependent on, not just their ability to generate profits in
quantifiable bottom-line terms, but also to continually improve on those
contributions. As a result, strategic resource allocation decisions become based on
predictions that exclude such contingencies as national differences or managerial
practices. Consequently, Marginson et al. (1995) found that the existence of
devolved structures, combined with technological developments, meant that the
'potential for central direction, co-ordination and control at an international level' is
enhanced, often in the form of performance control. Subsequently, there is evidence
to suggest that the monitoring of JR performance now occurs at both national
(Marginson et a!., 1993) and international levels in MNCs (Mueller and Purcell,
1992; Frenkel, 1994).
With the exception of research by Marginson (1985; Marginson et a!., 1988) and
Armstrong et a!. (1998), the impact of divisionalised structures on HRM is a field of
research that has largely been ignored. Much of the work conducted suggests that the
divisionalisation of British organisations during the 1960s and 1970s could have
been driven by a desire to centralise collective bargaining to divisional levels and in
doing so circumvent trade union strength. The results of the second CLIRS survey
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suggest that in times of weak trade unionism collective bargaining shifts back to
local levels allowing local management to obtain concessions and prevent trade
unions from leveraging in their search for comparability claims. As Armstrong et a!.
(1998: 10) write:
In [weak trade union] circumstances, the divisionalized company offers
advantages in maintaining outline control of a devolved bargaining process.
In the 1990s, therefore, divisionalization is more likely to be associated with
bargaining at the level of the establishment than that of the division.
Armstrong et a!. (1998) subsequently suggest two equally prevalent forms of
devolved pay bargaining in MNCs: one where bargaining is confined to local levels
and accompanied by strict head office control; and another where formal and
complete devolution of pay bargaining is accompanied by autonomy.
There has been considerable debate in recent years concerning the behaviour of
MNCs on national systems of industrial relations (Marginson and Sisson, 1994;
Ferner and Hyman, 1998). One such impact concerns the homogenisation of HRM
practices within MNCs. Marginson and Sisson (1994) argue that while MNCs
traditionally gave subsidiaries the autonomy to respond and adopt to local industrial
relations regimes, the adoption of new integrated forms has resulted in the adoption
or introduction of common patterns of employment relations across borders. This
has led to the emergence of, what Marginson and Sisson (1994) have termed,
'company-based employment systems'. With a geocentric approach, it is the head
office of the MNC that exerts high levels of control over operating units. In short,
the need to ensure consistency in these globally integrated structures has led to the
introduction of standard approaches to HRM across borders. These often take the
form of global strategies or as 'best practice' models (Marginson, 1994). Marginson
and Sisson (1994) argue that the growth of these organisation-based employment
systems threaten sectoral level multi-employer bargaining, a system which has
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traditionally dominated in many European countries. Furthermore, they suggest that
such standard approaches are more likely within single product or vertically
integrated MNCs. As Femer and Hyman (1998: xii) suggest, 'rather than the British
or Swedish models one would be forced to talk about the GM or Ford model'. The
introduction of organisation-based systems is thus claimed to threaten existing
national JR systems, reduce the role and power of local trade unions and undermine
the national regulatory systems.
Another implication of the movement away from traditional bureaucratic
administrative controls towards informal behavioural mechanisms is the ability of
MNCs to engage in 'coercive comparisons' (Coller, 1996; Coller and Marginson,
1998; Fenier and Hyman, 1998). Recent work by Coller (1996) and Mueller and
Purcell (1992) suggests that despite considerable autonomy at site level, many
MNCs circumvent that autonomy through 'indirect' or 'coercive' means. Through
the introduction of such HRM initiatives as managerial networking and
benchmarking, MNCs 'gently' introduce conformity across borders. As Coller
(1996: 163) writes while:
Apparently, managers are free to implement whatever practice they consider
appropriate to improve their plants... it seems that the centre of the MNC
provides a set of specific practices that are considered successful in other
plants, encouraging moves towards uniformity.
Similarly, Femer and Hyman (1998) argue that the ability to engage in 'coercive
comparisons' involves the imposition of common standards and threats of
divestment. The implication is that these comparisons often circumvent local
environments and undermine national regulatory institutions. In keeping, Edwards et
al. (1996) dispute the assumption that a movement towards globalism necessarily
involves a shift away from traditional control mechanisms. Furthermore, Marginson
and Sisson (1994) argue that the emergence of international forms of organisations
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removes decision-making from the scope of national jurisdictions, while Ferner and
Hyman (1998) see their ability to engage in social dumping as a major threat to
national IR regimes.
2.2.6 Criticisms of Global Models
As earlier sections have made clear, inherent in most MNC typologies is the premise
that MNCs evolve towards 'transnationality'. As Edwards et al. (1993: 41) write:
The transnational is characterised by differentiated contributions from each
national team, with knowledge being shared and responsibility dispersed.
Instead of centralised command, responsibility is devolved, and co-ordination
is attained not through instruction and monitoring but through co-operations,
teamwork and shared values.
While this assumption underlies much of the work within this area, there is little
consensus with regard to the 'end point' of transnationality. As Berggren (1996: 136)
notes: 'the truly transnational corporation, so eloquently described by researchers in
international management... is still a rather slippery animal to catch'.
While much has been written on the inexorable growth of the 'global firm', there is
no universally accepted model and even less assent as to its key attributes. While
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) have defined the global firm as a transnational firm,
Forsgren (1990) refers to it as the multi-centred organisation, while Hedlund and
Rolander (1990) term it the heterarchy. For Hedlund (1994) it is the N-form
organisation and for White and Poynter (1989), it is the horizontal organisation. For
Ferner and Edwards (1995) the global firms can take any of four forms. These
include the financial control firm, the integrated international company, the
decentralised network and the federation, each with differing patterns of control and
authority relations. Their findings suggest that MNCs can be global in focus without
necessarily assuming all the key attributes of transnationality such as being
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'networked', 'power sharing' or 'multi-centred'. Furthermore, they suggest that
being global does not preclude MNCs from adopting traditional administrative
controls and monitoring systems.
As singular definitions of 'global models' are shown to be overly simplistic in their
attempt to capture the particularities of different MNCs, the number of criticisms
levelled at these MNC typologies is correspondingly on the rise (Ferner, 1994;
Edwards et a!., 1996). Firstly, existing typologies or frameworks have been criticised
for their 'structural deterministic' nature (Edwards et al., 1996). As research by
Marginson et a!. (1993) has found, MNCs tend not to cluster around ideal types but
rather adopt a number of attributes simultaneously. Besides highlighting their
prescriptive nature, Edwards et al. (1996) also point to the preoccupation of these
models with predicting the organisational form of the 'future', often to the detriment
of a rigorous assessment of the dynamics surrounding existing models. One of the
main difficulties with measuring ideal types is in identifying measures that capture
the differences between those types. As has often been highlighted MNCs do not fit
neatly into pre-determined cells. This is particularly the case with the 'transnational
structure'. Furthermore, Ferner (1994) criticises these typologies for their failure to
account for historical legacies in their classification of structures and strategies.
2.2.7 Summary
Despite the limitations of these typologies, as Edwards et al. (1993: 44) write: 'the
implication is not that typologies are worthless, for they identify important
tendencies; the error is to assume that those tendencies are necessarily opposites'.
Indeed for all its apparent shortcomings these typologies provide the start point
within which to assess changes within MNCs and their impact on HRM. Despite the
criticisms, the broad premises of the global model have, either explicitly or
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implicitly, become the start point of a number of critical analyses on the impact on
HRM within MNCs (cf. Edwards et al., 1996; Ferner, 1997; Marginson et a!., 1995).
This thesis employs global frameworks in a similar vein. While it is easy
(particularly in the light of mounting criticisms against it), to dismiss the simplistic
notion of a generic homogeneous model of the MNC, there seems little doubt that
the socio-political and economic types of globalisation described in section 2.2.1 are
influencing MNCs. In addition, while global models may be disproved, the
motivations that underlie its construction seem to be widely accepted. This research
therefore bears the forces of globalisation, its rhetoric, underlying aims, routes and
motivations, in mind in its examination.
In conclusion, this literature, with its underlying notions of convergence and
associated HRM expectations, implies that MNCs are converging on or evolving
into one structural fon-n - the global MNC. Such approaches further suggest a
number of generic HRM practices. These include the centralisation and
homogenisation of HRM; the shaping of practices by international or global
concerns; the erosion of local workplace influence; and, the subsequent
marginalisation of local trade union influence (Campbell, 1993). Related to the focus
of this thesis, this review of the literature begs the question: are Irish MNCs moving
towards the global forms as outlined in the above literature and if so is this resulting
in the FIRM approaches outlined above? Before outlining the Irish case and
examining this question in greater detail, the following sections outline further
bodies of literature which dispute notions of globalisation. Literatures that,
developing upon the emerging criticisms outlined in section 2.2.6, argue instead that
indigenous MNCs retain specific features of nationality.
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2.3 THE RESILIENCE OF NATIONAL CONTEXTS
As the previous sections outline, the globalisation literature can broadly be divided
into those that view globalisation in terms of a supra-national process and those that
regard it as an cnd-state, in structural terms. However, a third view of is also evident
from the literature - one which argues that globalisation is largely a myth or fallacy
(Bromley, 1996; Doremus, et al., 1998). As Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995) write:
'the persistence of the globalisation myth seem to be based on a lack of information
and confusion about international restructuring'.
Commentators who dispute globalisation do so on two counts. First they question
the not ion of a global firm, arguing instead that its incidence is very rare (Hirst and
Thompson, 1996; Hu, 1992). Hence, based upon research into one hundred MNCs,
Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995) failed in their endeavour to identify a single truly
global or borderless firm. Secondly, commentators question the notion of 'a rapid
and recent process of economic globalisation' suggesting that the world economy of
1997 is no more global than it was in 1913 (Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 1).
There is also increasing commentary that questions the notion that globalisation
results in the equating of capital across nations. Inherent in the globalisation
literature is the contention that globalisation results in an equating of world
economies as capital moves from advanced to developing countries. In disputing this
premise, Hirst and Thompson (1996) draw upon the UNCTAD (1993) to
demonstrate that FDI is highly concentrated within advanced industrial economies
which results in a marginalisation of Third World countries. While noting an
increase in FDI inflows (40% from 1994 to 1995), they found recent flows of
investment to be uneven and confined to a small number of firms from a few
advanced economies operating within a nanow range of industries (UN, 1993). In
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addition, while the notions that investment flows from richer to poorer and less
developed economies was found to occur, it was found to do so only in a selective
manner. UNCTAD's report suggests that FDI inflows are biased towards Asian
countries, with African countries lagging significantly behind. Similar to Ruigrok
and Van Tulder (1995), Hirst and Thompson (1996) argue that what is presently
occurring in the global economy is more akin to a process of 'triadisation' rather
than of globalisation. In effect, they suggest that the recent growth in international
trade has been limited to three countries - the US, EC and Japan and not on a global
basis, as is widely purported.
In addition to these statistical analyses with regard to the economic and social spread
of globalisation, there is an increasing body of literature that questions the
globalisation thesis' expectations with regard to MNCs and, subsequently, their
management of HR and IR. The second half of this chapter examines two related
'schools of thought' in this respect: the national business systems perspective and
the small countries view; outlining their strategic, structural and control
implications, their expectations with regard to FIRM and their respective limitations
with regard to understanding the Irish case.
2.3.1 The National Business Systems (NBS) Perspective
Paralleling the critiques of the actual extent of globalisation described above is an
growing body of literature that argues that international companies remain embedded
within a national base and therefore influenced by home country characteristics
(Whitley, 1992; Ferner, 1997; Doremus et a!., 1998). For instance, Hu (1992) argues
that most internationally trading companies remain financially embedded within
their home bases. He argues that it is the national financial regimes from which
MNCs emanate that prevent the rise of truly stateless companies. Similarly, Ruigrok
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and Van Tulder (1995) suggest that MNCs remain national for three reasons: firstly,
their financial embeddedness, secondly, the propensity of MNCs to keep their
research and development activities within domestic borders and finally, the
tendency for senior management boards to remain national, as opposed to
international.
Recent research increasingly demonstrates that the behaviour of MNCs varies along
a number of trajectories. For instance, Chang and Taylor (1999), in examining the
factors that shape the degree and type of control used by American and Japanese
MNCs in their Korean subsidiaries, found the ownership of the MNC and the
nationality of the head offices to shape the amount and type of control exerted.
Similarly, Frenkel and Peetz (1998), in examining the impact of globalisation on
industrial relations in China, Malaysia and the Republic of Korea, found the extent
and impact of globalisation to vary between countries. They (1998: 305) concluded
that globalisation is 'part of the historical process of industrialization that directly
influences industrial relations', which at the workplace reinforces tendencies toward
management unilateralism as the main procedural system and suggest that the
pressure for joint regulation gathers pace with industrialisation.
Variations in MNC behaviour can be attributed to a number of factors. These include
strategic/structural effects, institutional and cultural perspectives. Strategic and
structural variables include the organisational form, strategy, co-ordination and
control form, history of internationalisation, nature and growth of market and sector
and the role of corporate culture. In accounting for variation between MNCs one
school of thought disputes the premise that MNCs are 'stateless' and thus
converging on a particular organisational form and behaviour. As Doremus et a!.
(1998: 3) writes:
Despite intensifying international competition, MNCs are not promoting the
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ineluctable convergence and integration of national systems of innovation,
trade and investment, nor are they forcing deep convergence in the national
economies in which they are embedded. They cannot do so because they
themselves are not converging toward global behavioural norms.
While acknowledging the forces of globalisation, adherents to this body of literature
argue that MNCs are embedded within a set of nationally specific characteristics that
shapes their approach to labour relations. This perspective suggests that MNC
behaviour and approaches to HRM are directly or indirectly influenced by the
intenelationship of major social institutions, their historical evolution and the culture
of any given nation. As a result, HRM practices vary according to the nationality of
the MNC.
Thus, despite increasing internationalisation there is mounting evidence to suggest
that national MNCs remain distinctive and moreover reproduce systems of economic
organisation that are nationally distinctive. A growing number of studies have
emphasised that variation in MNC behaviour can be accounted for through different
'national business systems' (NBS) This school of thought holds that 'clusters of
national institutional variables' shape and inform the behaviour of MNCs rooted
within them (Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998: 714). Much of this literature has been
classified into two main camps: the 'institutionalist' and the 'culturalist' schools of
thought (Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998). While the former places an emphasis on the
social and institutional determinants of business organisation, in order to explain the
logic of configuration and behaviour in different contexts; the latter focus on the
cultural distinctiveness of a nation and its influence on the behaviour and style of
management in any given MNC. More recently, commentators have suggested that a
'pluralistic and integrative framework' be introduced which would take account of
the diversity of institutional and cultural factors that shape MNC behaviour (Mtar
and Quintanilla, 1997). The following paragraphs briefly outline each of these two
perspectives.
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Institutionalist approaches view variations in MNC behaviour as embedded within
the social and economic institutions that support the continuation of traditional
values and practices. Earlier pioneering studies by Dore (1967) and Maurice and
Sellier (1979) presented trajectories of economic development as shaped by patterns
of institutionalised behaviour. Maurice et al. (1986) argued that a strong relationship
exists between the organisation of work at the micro-level of the firm and the
national institutions at a macro-level. More recent work within this field has been
labelled 'new institutionalism' (Loveridge, 1997). The 'new institutionalist' camp
can be traced to the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who highlighted the
interrelationship between organisations and the institutional environment in shaping
internal structures. At the core of this approach is the notion of 'isomorphism' which
holds that organisations assume similar structures and processes when within the
same environment. It is from this premise that much of the more recent work on
country-of-origin effects can be located.
In contrast, the culturalist camp argues that variation in MNC behaviour is largely
attributable to cultural variables. Much of this school of thought centres on
Hofstede's notions of culture. Hofstede (1980) measured culture around a number of
stereotypical attributes such as 'uncertainty avoidance', 'masculinity' and
'power/distance' ratios. However, the culturalist perspective, and in particular the
work of Hofstede, has been criticised for their treatment of cultural variables as
ahistorical and static 'rather than as dynamic and emerging characteristics linked to
patterns of historical development and distinctive national institutions' (Ferner and
Quintanilla, 1998: 714). In contrast, Ferner and Quintanilla (1998: 711) promote the
view that forces of globalisation lead to the adoption of HRM practices typically
associated with US and UK MNCs, a process they term Anglo-Saxonisarion. They
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suggest that, in response to the tension between the needs of globalised operations
and characteristics adopted from the home country, MNCs pursue 'adaptation
strategies' that largely converge on a 'model of international operation typical of
highly internationalised British or US MNCs'. While their research found evidence
of Anglo-Saxonisation, it was also found to occur in a nationally distinctive manner.
From both of these perspectives variation in dominant national institutions is posited
to result in different types of firms, pursuing different growth patterns. According to
Whitley (1992), British companies were found to operate through financial
procedures and reporting systems, while French and German companies tend to be
more centralised and employ more integrated forms of planning. US companies, in
contrast, were found to have a market-like relationship between parts of the
organisation, while Japanese companies were found to be more unified and
interdependent in their modes of organisation, with greater use of function-based
structures. Lane (1995), in charting the changing patterns of industrial organisation
in Britain, Germany and France, similarly argues that it is the particular national,
sectoral and organisational contingencies (what she terms the industrial orders) that
shape the reactions of organisations to globalising forces.
Implicit in both the notion of NBS and the notion of industrial order is the
assumption that characteristic clusters of national institutional variables inform the
behaviour of MNCs embedded within them. In brief, the NBS of a given country
refers to the patterns of economic organisation that develop interdependently with
the main institutions of those particular market economies. These consist of
integrated systems of economic co-ordination and control. Whitley (1992) proposes
that the more cohesive and reinforcing the institutions, the more homogenous the
business system and, conversely, the less tightly integrated dominant institutions the
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less cohesive the business system. He suggests that countries may develop a number
of different kinds of economic organisation, which overlap and differ across a
variety of issues. One of the main criticism levelled against Whitely (1992) was the
heavy reliance he makes on such pluralist countries as the US and UK to illustrate
his point.
According to Whitley (1992), national business systems have three major
components: the nature of firms as economic actors, the nature of market relations
between firm, and the nature of co-ordination and control systems within firms. The
first relates to the economic action that controls and allocates resources through
authority structures. Important aspects of the first component include patterns of
ownership, the nature of resource control and how economic agents develop and
manage risk and uncertainty. The second deals with the nature of market
relationships across economic actors. The third and final component focuses on the
'internal' co-ordination and control of economic activities, that is the dominant
pattern of work organisation, control, employment relations and management. These
three components have a number of characteristics that vary between market
economies.
Whitley (1992) summarises these characteristics into sixteen key dimensions on
which business systems are believed to differ across institutional contexts (cf. table
2.4). lIe suggests that these characteristics are shaped by background social
institutions (trust, loyalty and authority relations) as well as proximate social
institutions (including business relations with the state, financial system, education
and training system, unions and other professional organisations) and uses this
approach to account for differences in firm organisations across different
geographical and national blocs.
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TABLE 2.4: CHARAcTERISTICS OF NATIONAL BuSINEsS SYSTEMS
The nature of economic actors
The nature of market
organisation
Interdependence between financial owners, controllers
and firms
Delegation of control to salaried managers
Extent to which economic actors co-ordinate production
chains
Rate of change in resources and activities controlled by
economic actors
Extent to which growth and size are dominant as
objectives and standards of performance
Extent to which firms form obligation networks and
alliances
Degree of collective organisation within industries and
sectors
Extent to which transactions are governed by informal,
collective actions
The nature of co-ordination and Organisational integration and co-ordination
control systems
	
- integration and interdependence of organisational
units
- centralisation of control over organisational units
Employment and personnel policies
- employer employee interdependence
- employee differentiation
Task structure and supervision
- specialisation
- closeness of task supervision
- distance between superordinates and subordinates
- discretion of superordinates
Source: Whitley, 1992.
Building on notions of national difference and corporate governance, Marginson and
Sisson (1994) identify two distinct modes of corporate ownership and control: the
Anglo-American 'outsider' system and the continental European 'insider' system.
The insider model is further differentiated into the 'Latin', the 'German-Nordic' and
the 'Japanese' system. The 'outsider' system is characterised by: 'dispersed
networks of shareholdings, a high degree of institutional share ownership, highly
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developed stock markets, an active market for corporate control and an emphasis on
short-run financial returns backed up by intensive internal monitoring and
performance evaluation' (Marginson and Sisson, 1994: 29). Financial control is
managed by a variety of interests rather than being exerted by financial institutions.
As a result, growth strategies are seen to be driven by short-term financial criteria, as
opposed to long term industrial performance. In contrast, the 'insider' system is
characterised by networks of corporate, institutional and family shareholdings, with
an emphasis on long-term performance. Sheltered from hostile take-overs, it
operates within less developed stock market and a financial system that is based on
long-term bank credit. In an 'insider system' growth strategies are longer-term in
focus, with a stronger commitment to asset development. In outlining the HRM
implications of these systems, Marginson and Sisson (1994) argue that within the
insider system employees are seen as assets who, in some cases, are a company's
'competitive advantage'. In contrast, with the outsider system where the focus is on
their minimisation, employees are more likely to be regarded as costs or liabilities.
Under the insider system the management of employees generally remains the
responsibility of operating units.
2.3.2 HRM Consequences of NBS Perspective
Work by Ferner and Hyman (1998) regarding the impact of internationalisation on
FIRM practices disputes the globalisation thesis. They argue, in contrast, that the
traditional 'stumbling bloc' to notions of convergence is the existence of strong
national regulatory institutions. Their research suggests that increased European
regulation leads to increased diversity within national systems and increased
convergence between national systems. While Ferner and Hyman (1998: xv)
acknowledge the 'reality' of internationalisation pressures they believe that such
pressures are 'neither unilinear nor overwhelming in their industrial relations
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consequences'.
Applying this perspective to the study of HRM in MNCs, Ferner (1997) found that
the nationality of MNC ownership is a significant determinant of MNC behaviour;
and moreover, that nationality manifests itself to a greater extent with respect to
some issues than with others. For example, he suggests that such 'rank and file'
industrial relations issues as wage determination, hours of work, job contracts and
redundancy procedures, are likely to display 'local isomorphism' while other issues
such as work organisation, training, and employee participation are determined by
local regulation and therefore more open to a country-of-origin effect. Ferner (1997:
23) writes:
Differences in phases and patterns of internationalisation, organisational
structures etc, may themselves be typical of different 'national business
systems'. Late multinationalisation is a reflection of a constellation of
elements of the Japanese model of development, including late
industrialisation, reliance on an export model of internationalisation and
relative economic isolation.
Ferner (1997: 23) goes on to note the difficulty in untangling the 'nationality'
variable and warns against the danger of treating and presenting factors as static and
unchangeable. He writes:
The need, precisely, is to untangle 'layers' of differences according to how
deeply they are lodged in fundamental formative episodes and experiences in
national development. In short, it is imperative to take into account the
dynamics of nationality as a factor affecting the behaviour of MNCs.
Ferner's work (1997) also identified the linkages between elements of NBS and
MNC behaviour to be the national system of corporate governance, national systems
of corporate control, national models of management development, the structure of
work and the nature of the HR function.
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Following this research, Ferner (1997) examined the 1-IRM consequences of a
number of key aspects of MNC behaviour. These included the impact of corporate
strategy and structure, the sector and market, country of origin and country of
operation, on HRM. Working from the perspective that the approach of MNCs to JR
and FIR is influenced by national systems of corporate governance and corporate
control, forms of financial control, the role of the State, labour market institutions
and forms of labour representation, and looking at the national variability of MNC
behaviour, he asks 'how can we explain the variation?'. Ferner (1997) concludes that
the NBS and the management style must shape the approach of MNCs to JR and HR
within overseas operations.
2.3.3 Limitations of the NBS Approach
Institutional approaches have been criticised for the functionalist nature of their
explanations and their 'essential stacicity', in other words their inability to
incorporate change within their analysis (Loveridge, 1997). O'Reilly (1996: 5)
subsequently criticises these approaches for their tendency to produce static models
of industrial organisation: 'whilst it draws attention to the way institutions are
shaped, and how this is linked to the historical development of the society under
observation, [Whitley's] analysis leaves little room for change'. She argues that
while there is a real sense of the historical legacy of the institutions and social
relations, there is little sense 'of the people occupying them'. Indeed, as with any
structuralist outlook, people tend to be reduced to fatalistically determined units who
can only respond to the contexts within which they find themselves. Consequently,
little stock is placed on managerial agency or on the ability of individuals to be self-
reflexive and choose to 'use' the surrounding structures in different ways.
Just as the globalisation literature falters on its tendencies towards generalisation,
47
another of the main criticisms levelled against NBS has been its tendency towards
static and unchanging generalisations. Further criticisms are directed against its lack
of supportive detailed anthropological or empirical evidence. While a further
shortcoming cited is that few researchers have managed to operationalise or further
theorise the NBS taxonomies of Whitley (1992). Loveridge (1997: 1052) writes that
this is:
one of the major problems with the NBS frame of explanation. Caught in the
double-bind of the reflexive nature of causality, the [new institutionalist]
theorists tend to resort to fuzzily located 'systems' explanations of behaviour.
Empirical causality is, however, always present and underlies most of the
broad generalisation contained within the national archetypes and, more
particularly, within the more detailed taxonomical structures created by
Whitley.
It is also worth noting one final shortcoming of the NBS approach which extends
Ferner's (1997) call for the 'untangling' of national variables, is that much of the
empirical work to date is biased towards large MNCs from advanced economies. As
a result little is once again known of the factors shaping small or medium sized
MNCs from smaller less developed economies. However, a third strand of literature
with regard to MNCs is now beginning to fill this gap.
2.3.4 The' Small Countries' Literature
Following on from the NBS arguments, another corpus of literature suggests that
factors such as the size of the domestic market, the closeness of actors, their
proximity to financial institutions and the State shape the behaviour of MNCs.
Emanating from work by Forsgren et al. (1995) who extended research by Porter
(1990) on national identity as a source of differentiation and competitive advantage,
this body of literature argues that the small size of the domestic market shapes
MNCs from small countries to behave in a particular manner. In short, it is argued
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that MNCs from small economies exhibit a 'small-country effect'. 5 Given the size of
the Irish economy (population 3.5 million) this is a literature that one might expect
to be particularly informative in attempting to understand the behaviour of
indigenous MNCs. The following paragraphs review the small countries literature
and the implications for HRM and explores the much quoted case of Sweden in
greater detail.
While the majority of research regarding the restructuring of MNCs concerns itself
with the behaviour of MNCs from large industrialised countries, for a number of
reasons it is worthwhile focusing more particularly on the behaviour of MNCs from
small countries. Indeed the validity of hypotheses based on the experience of MNCs
from such large economies as the US has been questioned on the grounds that it
exhibits size differences. Research by Swedenborg (1979) disputes the contention
that larger firms have a higher propensity to produce abroad. Furthermore,
Andersson et al. (1996) demonstrate that in recent years a number of small
economies have increased their share of outward FDI. Similarly, Ruigrok and Van
Tulder (1995: 160) found that companies originating from small industrial systems
had shown the highest degrees of internationalisation 'in every functional area of
management'.
The small countries literature works from the premise that the impetus to
internationalise for indigenous companies is the size of domestic markets
(Andersson et al., 1996). In keeping, research by Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995)
found that Swiss and Dutch MNCs internationalised at an early stage due to the
smallness of their domestic market and the impact of colonialisation. They suggest
that firms from small industrial system have the largest degree of
Marceau (1992) defines small industrial countries as nations with fewer than 25 million inhabitants.
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internationalisation, which they attribute to small domestic markets, narrower supply
bases and a tendency to opt for high vertical integration or advanced forms of
international division of labour. Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995: 162) argue, contrary
to general belief, that the world's most internationalised companies tend to originate
in small industrial systems. Andersson et al. (1996) also suggest that, given the
smallness of domestic markets, the ability of firms from small countries to pursue
synergistic routes to globalism is directly related to the form of internationalisation
and the 'pre-requisites for international trade'. Moreover, they suggest that MNCs
from small countries are likely to be more susceptible to domestic and foreign
market fluctuations than those from larger countries. Finally, they propose that
linkages between firms are a key factor in the development of MNCs within small
countries.
Similarly, Marceau (1992), in examining small country business systems, compared
Australia with Denmark and Finland. She works from the premise that small-
industrialised countries' business systems not only enable the development of
MNCs, but also underlie both opportunities for and constraints to future economic
success. Unable to influence international markets, Marceau suggests that smaller
economies offer a combination of free trade and domestic compensation to those
disadvantaged by changes in the international restructuring of markets. In response
to their inability to influence international markets, it is posited that smaller
economies are more likely to develop domestic corporatist political arrangements.
Equally, it is argued that companies from small economies are more susceptible to
the 'small country squeeze', a process whereby small countries increasingly lose
their share of domestic markets. In short, the problems Marceau (1992) found small
industrial countries to face include the dominance of large technology companies
from large countries, who produce products within which smaller industrial
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countries are embedded; and secondly, that smaller industrial countries tend to be
susceptible to 'small country squeeze'.
2.3.5 HRM Expectations for MNCs from Small Economies
Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995) suggest that firms from small industrial countries
operate within a particular a set of dynamics (these include small domestic markets,
narrow supply bases and tendencies to pursue advanced forms of international
division of labour) that have led to a 'bargaining dynamic' in the area of labour
relations. A high concentration of power within a few firms is argued to create the
impetus for trade unions to organise on a sectoral and national basis, thus
encouraging centralised bargaining. Building on work by Katzenstein (1985) on
countries such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria and the Nordic
countries, Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995: 161) suggest that 'this bargaining
dynamism ultimately forged a coalition-oriented domestic bargaining arena, in
which core firms gradually saw much of their initial bargaining position evaporate'.
In a similar vein to Katzenstein, they suggest that MNCs from smaller economies are
more likely to develop corporatist political arrangements in their domestic
arrangements. Investigating the case of Sweden (the country upon which much of the
small countries research has focused) in greater detail, will enabling the outlining of
this HRM expectations in greater detail.
2.3.6 MNCs from Small Countries: The Case of Sweden
Perhaps the most widely cited case in terms of a small country effect is that of
Swedish MNCs. Given its dominance within the literature, and the commonalities
with Ireland (a north European country, a strong tradition of State intervention, a
close proximity to much larger economies), this research reviews the case of
Swedish MNCs so as to provide a greater understanding of the type of characteristics
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that one might expect to be influencing the management of IR and FIR in Irish
MNCs
Charactensed by an over reliance on a small number of large and highly
international firms, the majority of Sweden's EDT is conducted by a small number of
Swedish MNCs, most of which have been multinational for the last three decades
(Andersson et at., 1996). Employing over half of the total domestic workforce,
Swedish MNCs also account for over half of the country's exports (Olsson, 1993). In
order to understand the current structures of Swedish MNCs, Olsson (1993) argues
that, it is necessary to outline the evolution of export industries and the reasoning
underlying their motivation to becoming MNCs. Swedish industrialisation began as
early as the 1870s, with another period of increased acceleration during the 1890s. It
is the advanced export industry that Sweden established prior to the 1870s that is
broadly regarded as the main catalyst for industrialisation. By the beginning of the
twentieth century, Sweden had two groups of export industries, one based on raw
materials and another consisting of a modern engineering industry. Olsson (1993:
102) writes: 'the difference in size of the home markets significantly influenced the
development of small country MNCs as compared to, for example, their American
counterparts'. Swedenborg (1979) similarly found that the small size of the domestic
market shaped their high propensity to export, while the cultural ties, political links
and geographical proximity shaped the geographical distribution of foreign
investment by Swedish companies.
The emergence of Swedish engineering MNCs has been traced to the beginning of
the 1900s, at a time of high international industrial protectionism (Swedenborg,
1979; Olsson, 1993). In tracing their evolution, Lundstrom (1986) notes that the
origins of Swedish MNCs can be traced back to the early 1870s when
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industrialisation in Sweden began. Despite the presence of high protective tariffs,
Olsson (1993) demonstrates that Swedish MNCs continued to engage in export
markets. Lundstrom (1986) found that due to the small size of domestic markets and
scale economies, most Swedish MNCs faced obstacles to exporting and as a result
took the decision to manufacture abroad. A need for international expertise and
financing in order to achieve this drove many of these early MNCs to establish
strong relationships with domestic banks. Thus, it was not just the small size of
domestic markets but also the role of indigenous banks that drove the
internationalisation of Swedish industry (Lundstrom, 1986). It was through the
establishment of a number of indigenous MNCs, by an international consortium of
Swedish banks, that Swedish MNCs began to grow substantially (Olsson, 1993).
Olsson (1993) suggests that the First World War reinforced 'nationalistic' influences
on the structures of Swedish MNCs, which placed a greater importance on
establishing units inside markets, due to physical barriers of hostilities to trade. With
the Russian revolution, export markets disappeared and it was not until the 1920s
and 1930s that the Swedish economy emerged from recessionary conditions. As a
result, there was a decline in the establishment of indigenous MNCs occurred during
the 1930s and 1940s. In keeping, Forsgren (1990) argues that the majority of
acquisitional growth strategies by Swedish MNCs continue to be into countries
where operations already exist. In tracing the subsequent evolution of Swedish
MNCs, Ghauri (1990) argues that the growth of 'early' MNCs was facilitated by
three factors: the neutrality of Sweden throughout the Second World War, the
removal of trade restrictions immediately following the war, and Sweden's ability to
capitalise on post-war demands. Ghauri (1990) thus identifies two groups of MNCs:
the pre World War I 'early internationalisers' and the post World War II 'late
internationalisers'. In investigating their routes to internationalisation, Ghauri (1990)
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found that Swedish MNCs moved firstly into adjacent markets and then Southeast
Asia. Similarly, Lundstrom (1986) identified the first phase of MNC development in
Sweden as occurring between 1900-30. He found a similar geographical route
toward the proximal markets of the UK, Russia and France in the first instance.
Aggarwal and Ghauri (1991), in their examination of the evolutionary path of MNCs
from small countries, found that during the 1950s and 1960s there was an increase in
the internationalisation of Swedish firms. However, they also found that when the
nature of competition changed in the 1970s and 1980s, Swedish MNCs had to
increasingly engage in FDI in an attempt to protect their markets, as their ability to
serve foreign markets by exports had declined. Olsson (1993) notes an acceleration
in FDI in two distinct waves, one prior to 1977 and another in the 1980s when there
was a shift away from forestry toward engineering and the production of finished
products. This he attributes to an industrial crisis that occurred within the 1970s and
from which export industries moved toward more specialised products.
Swedish MNCs increased their pace of intemationalisation during the late 1980s,
firstly into the US and then into the EC (Andersson et al., 1996). Acquisitions were
found to be the predominant mode of entry into new markets and their growth
strategies were found to be dependent on the skills of the investing company. For
example, they found that MNCs with technological capabilities tended to favour
greenfielding, while others with the ability to synchronise existing technology
generally favoured acquisitional growth strategies. With the move towards greater
European integration during the 1980s a shift occurred in the behaviour of Swedish
MNCs toward vertically integrated units within EU. Trade liberalisation on a
regional basis enabled Swedish MNCs to shift toward international specialisation
across borders, which resulted in a reduction in the volume of domestic operations.
Consequently, Olsson (1993) claims that current MNCs can no longer be understood
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in terms of evolutionary models but as a process of strategic management decisions.
The particularity of this historical context has led to Swedish MNCs exhibiting a
number of distinctive characteristics. In contrast to US MNCs, Swedish companies
have a more 'parent-child' relationship with subsidiaries, reporting direct to their
corporate head office with no special international divisions (Olsson, 1993). Other
particularly Swedish characteristics include greater autonomy for subsidiaries and
integration through informal, personalised relations reinforced by intensive
international rotation of personnel. It is also claimed that the technological
innovations of Swedish MNCs are long established, with the gradual transfer of
knowledge running in tandem with international growth prior to the 1970s. Lastly,
this literature suggests that Swedish MNCs are characterised by strong ownership
connections, between themselves and themselves and the Swedish banks. This has
led to a clustering of MNCs into integrated groups of industries. While Swedish
MNCs have traditionally operated a 'parent-child' relationship with subsidiaries,
research in recent years however has shown that they have leapfrogged through the
traditional international process, primarily through acquisitional growth strategies,
and are now becoming more dependent on foreign markets. As a result, overseas
'centres' have emerged, as many are reported to have moved from hierarchical to
heterarchical patterns of organisation. Ghauri (1990) found new structural forms
presently emerging amongst Swedish MNCs. Subsequently, he has predicted that
regional subsidiaries will becoming more independent and influential in Swedish
MNCs, becoming the 'centre' for a number of surrounding subsidiaries. In keeping,
Aggarwal and Ghauri (1991) also argued that MNCs from small economies alike
Sweden are now more likely to develop independent centres sooner than MNCs from
large economies. It was found that while Swedish MNCs are not shedding their
national identity it is becoming easier for them to 'cut loose' their source country.
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In examining the emergence and role of these foreign centres, Forsgren et al. (1992)
found the role and relationship of foreign subsidiaries to be dependent on the stage
of internationalisation. They found that as internationalisation increases, the
subsidiaries adopt a leading role that gives rise to a number of centres located in
countries, other than the head office. This they term 'internationalisation of the
second degree' and found that not only are Swedish MNCs highly internationalised
but that they have now also 'internationalised' their management structures by
placing divisional head offices overseas. In the case of Swedish MNCs, they suggest
that internationalisation and movement towards SEM increased the importance of
subsidiaries and led to the emergence of 'multi-centres', thus producing a relative
power shift in resources overseas. Forsgren et a!. subsequently show that with many
European concerns, the subsidiaries have changed their role from being the 'long
arm' of head office to a situation where they presently function as the 'centre' for a
particular product or function. In short, they predicted that the corporate head offices
of Swedish MNCs could even eventually move to Continental Europe.
In conclusion, it can be seen that the Swedish model of managing subsidiaries is
characterised by early internati onali sation, organic growth strategies, overseas
centres, autonomy for subsidiary managers, extended personal networks, informal
personalised control, low product diversity and competition through technology,
pricing and product (Hedlund and Aman, 1984). In effect, in the Swedish case the
theory of direct investment is ultimately a theory of size and growth of firms
(Swedenborg, 1979).
In examining the role of Swedish MNCs in shaping national JR practices a number
of characteristics are discernible. As a nation, Sweden has traditionally been pointed
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to as an exemplifer of social achievements and harmonious labour markets. In the
field of industrial relations, the 'Swedish model of IR' refers to the unique
configuration of social and economic policies (Visser, 1996). Based upon the
foundations of what Visser (1996: 176) terms 'bargained corporatism', the model
pivots on a centralised agreement - Saitsjöbaden Agreement, reached between the
Swedish trade union confederation (LO) and the Swedish Employers' Federation
(SAF) in the 1930s. Recognising the basic right by management to manage and the
basic principle of collective representation of workers, it removed state intervention
from JR concerns (Mabon, 1996). It was from within this environment that a number
of major Swedish manufacturers, such as Ericson and Volvo grew. During the 1970s
the introduction of employment legislation and a growth in the strength of large
Swedish MNCs saw the eventual collapse of the solidarity wage policy, and a
questioning of the Swedish model (cf. Kjellberg, 1998 for a fuller discussion). Key
to these changes was the role played by Sweden's leading MNCs in deflecting from
central bargaining arrangements. Unable to recruit or retain skilled employees, these
companies in 1983 and again in 1991 broke away from the wage constraints of
centralised agreements. Through their representative body, the SAF, this group of
companies drove the campaign to decentralise collective bargaining. As a small
country that is highly dependent on its large transnational companies, Sweden is at a
'cross-roads' between centralised and decentralised bargaining.
2.3.7 Limitations of the Small Country Thesis
While the small countries literature offers insights more sensitive to the
particularities of MNCs from small countries, critics note that even a more specific
grouping like this can conflate cases that are quite distinctive. While the Swedish
case highlights the early internationalisation of indigenous firm, other research
suggests that in contrast most European MNCs were late internationalisers. While
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certain European companies were multinational before the Second World War,
Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995: 130) suggest that the majority of European
companies only began large-scale overseas production during the 1970s.
Furthermore, despite identifying a number of key factors from the small countries
literature, research comparing 'typical' firms of similarly-sized nation-states also
revealed significant differences (Lilja and Tainio, 1996; Kristensen et al., 1996).
Even between two small-developed countries such as Denmark and Finland, the
'types of relevant social actors, typical firms and institutions' were found to differ
systematically (Lilja and Tainio, 1996: 186). Of similar size and stage of
development, both the Danish and Finnish business systems differed in terms of the
degree of State control and time horizons. While the Finnish case highlighted the
predominance of centralised approaches, due to the large size of the 'typical firm',
the importance of State intervention and the proliferation of the typical firm model,
the Danish situation highlights greater decentralisation, characterised by a bottom-up
system of development, maintained by a system of social ties and shared history.
Differences are again evident along a temporal axis. The time-scales for change were
found to be significantly longer for the Finnish rather than the Danish case. As Lilja
and Tainio (1996: 189) write:
The difference in the relevant time horizon of the typical Danish and Finnish
firms is strongly correlated with the structural shape of the business systems
and is reflected in many of the industrial institutional dimensions.
These limitations should lead us to be cautious of inferring that Ireland's MNCs
would show characteristics that would ncccssarily follow the expectations that flow
from the Swedish or any other small country context.
2.3.8 Summary
This section has demonstrated that despite all the globalising factors shaping the
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intemationalisation of firms, MNCs should perhaps still be regarded as 'essentially
national' entities (Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995). Despite its limitations, the NBS
framework re-emphasis the contextual analytical references which had largely been
lost through successive attempts to decontextualise the organisational structure of
the firm in the globalisation literature (Loveridge, 1997). Informed by this
perspective, it thus follows that an understanding of fish MNCs and their
subsequent HRM must be located within the specifics of the fish economy and its
developments in addition to the increasingly global markets in which they operate.
Furthermore, given the emphasis in the NBS and the globalisation literatures, the
insights provided by the small countries literature may provide some guidance in
terms of understanding the Irish context. As Marceau (1992: 156) writes: a
'comparison of the business systems of small countries reveals not only that they
differ quite considerably from those of their larger counterparts, especially in
Europe'. And she suggests that small European nation-states may have to 'rethink
their public welfare and industrial policies' in the light of this. However, Marceau
(1992: 156) also points out that small countries 'differ quite considerably among
themselves'.
It is important, therefore, to bear in mind that the small countries literature is largely
dominated by Scandinavian studies and that little is known of other small European
countries such as Belgium, Luxembourg or Ireland. In addition, what little research
there is on small-country MNCs has either centred on the foreign operations of firms
from small-developed economies or on the foreign operations of firms located in
developing countries. Thus, as Aggarwal and Ghauri write (1991: 248): 'few of these
studies have focused on the development of a conceptual framework that be useful in
understanding the evolution of multinational firms from a small developed
economy'. Moreover, the literature that does exist on small countries such as
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Sweden is similarly dominated by relationships between small size of the home
country and the internationalisation process, largely within the remit of international
business, while little is known of the FIRM implications of a small-country effect. In
conclusion, while the expectations that one may develop from the NBS and small
countries literature enable us to question the globalisation thesis and highlight
aspects that we should bear in mind when examining the nature and particularity of
the management of IR and I-fR in Irish-owned MNCs, it is clear that a fuller
investigation into the Irish context may be necessary to understand this behaviour.
2.5 CoNcLusioN
This review of the literature was conducted in order to frame an understanding of the
influences on the management of IR and I-JR within Irish-owned MNCs, and the
extent to which these may be distinctive. Three relevant schools of thought were
identified and reviewed. While the globalisation 'school' argues that nationality no
longer matters, the NBS and small countries 'schools' suggest that nationality
remains the defining factor in shaping MNC behaviour. By way of conclusion these
perspectives are summarised as follows.
There is now an established school of thought that argues that MNCs have become
or are becoming 'stateless' or 'borderless' and therefore disengaged from their
national origins. MNCs, according to this 'globalisation thesis', are evolving toward
a 'global model', a process that involves the shedding of their national shackles.
Consequently, MNCs are claimed to be characterised by trans-national management
structures, dispersed power and control mechanisms, and integrated production
facilities. These structures lead to the integration of structures and the
homogenisation of HRM. As a result the distinctiveness of national regimes of work
relations are threatened, local workplace influence is eroded as practices become
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shaped by global or international concerns.
In contrast, much has been written to disprove the idea of a global model of MNCs.
As a body of literature, the national business systems view argues that MNCs are far
from stateless. Despite globalisation, they argue that MNCs continue to be shaped by
the set of characteristics specific to the country from which they originate. It follows
that the HRM practices of MNCs of one country will differ from other MNCs from
other countries. This variance is argued to reflect differences in national systems of
corporate governance and control, the role of the State in industry, labour market
institutions and forms of labour market representation. In other words, MNCs differ
subject to the 'national business system' and subsequent management style of their
country-of-origin. Finally, there is a third stream of literature potentially applicable
to understanding the Irish case. Building upon the NBS school of thought, the small
countries literature focuses on one particular aspect and argues that the nationality
effect is shaped by the size of the economy from which MNC emanate. Such a view
holds that the ability of MNCs from small countries to pursue routes toward
globalism is directly related to the form of internationalisation and their home
countries' 'prerequisites for international trade'. Moreover, it argues that the
organisational practices of MNCs originating in smaller countries are more
susceptible to changes in the competitiveness of domestic and international markets.
Inter-firms linkages are also critical for companies seeking to internationalisation
from a small 'home base'. Conespondingly, advocates of this view suggest that the
small size of domestic economies creates a specific bargaining dynamic in the area
of labour relations, a dynamic that encourages corporatism and centralised
partnership anangements.
This literature review subsequently provides three frames of reference and three sets
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of expectations with which the object of this study may be examined. However,
given that these schools of thought do not concur, this research will question the
ability of each to inform the case of Irish-owned MNCs at a later stage. While one of
the main weaknesses identified within the NBS and small countries literature is that
it is underdeveloped in terms of providing frameworks with which to understand the
FIRM behaviour of MNCs, they present a strong case for seeking to understand the
particularities of the Irish context before examining the extent to which Irish-owned
MNCs are distinctive. Chapter three reviews the relevant literature toward this aim.
In light of the major weakness identified with both the NBS and small countries
literature, it attempts to do so with a specific emphasis upon a deeper understanding
of the historical factors that lie behind the national context of Ireland.
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CHAPTER 3
THE IRISH CONTEXT: 'LATE INDUSTRIALISATION REVISITED'
The previous chapter reviewed three bodies of literature that may inform this research. While both the
NBS and the small countries literature promote the importance of the national context, neither
indicate factors which many argue are key to an understanding of the development of the Irish context
and its indigenous industry. In light of this, chapter three examines the socio-economic context of
Ireland and places Irish-owned MNCs within their national context. The chapter outlines the
development of Irish industry, tracing the structure of organisational forms through patterns of Irish
Industrialisation. The objective is to demonstrate the manner in which economic developments have
shaped the structure of Irish industry. To this end, this thesis 'revisits' the 'late industrialisation'
thesis, in light of the 'revival' and internationalisation of Irish industry. The chapter then turns to an
examination of FIRM models within Ireland and, in particular, the notion that the recent and rapid
internationalisation of the Irish economy has led to the 'fragmentation' of FIRM models.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter two reviewed three bodies of literature whose expectations may inform the
study of HRM within MNCs. Following the importance placed on the national
context by both the small countries and NBS literature, this chapter outlines the
wider context within which Irish-owned MNCs have emerged. In reviewing this,
attention is paid to the influence of late industrialisation and the internationalisation
of the Irish economy on the organisational forms of Irish companies, and,
subsequently, on their approaches to the management of JR and HR.
In the absence of a body of literature that specifically links the development of Irish
industrialisation patterns with the management of JR and FIR in Irish-owned MNCs
this chapter takes the rather piecemeal nature of existing research and attempts to
draw linkages between the development of Irish industry, changes in industrial
policy and the emergence of Irish-owned MNCs. More specifically, this chapter
examines a number of factors that may be influencing the management of JR and HR
within Irish MNCs by drawing on two notions or contentions. Firstly, that the
sectoral location and subsequent behaviour of Irish MNCs can best be understood in
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relation to the 'late industrialisation' thesis. As O'Malley (1992: 31) writes: 'the
nature of freland's relatively late industrialisation has been rather different to that of
earlier developers and the structure of industry in Ireland today differs from that of
more advanced economies'. Key commentators on the development of Irish industry
have, consequently, argued that the 'lateness' with which Ireland has industrialised
and internationalised has led to the emergence of distinctive structural factors within
Irish business environments (O'Malley, 1985). Secondly, in keeping with the
premise that variations in organisational forms are related to differences of national
characteristics, such as patterns of industrialisation (Kristensen, 1996), it has been
posited that Ireland's industrialisation is closely linked to the overall ecology of Irish
organisational forms. For example, Leavy (1993: 143) argues that: 'co-operatives,
state-owned enterprises, public limited companies and state agencies are all
important elements in the overall ecology of Irish organisational life.' While this in
itself is not unique, he goes on to suggest that: 'what is most characteristic of the
Irish experience is the way in which all of these organisational forms have come to
the fore in the overall process of national development, and how their roles have
changed over time.' This chapter works toward examining these current debates and
their impact in shaping the approaches of Irish MNCs to the management of IR and
HR. The objective is therefore to privilege notions of divergence and the
distinctiveness of local practices.
To this end, this chapter is structured into three sections. Section one sketches the
development of Irish industry and 'revisits' the 'late industrialisation' thesis as a
defining influence on the configuration of Irish industry. The aim of this section is to
broadly outline the main developments in Irish industrialisation, highlighting the
dominance of particular organisational forms at different phases of industrialisation.
Following this, the internationalisation of the Irish economy and the emergence of
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Irish-owned MNCs are outlined. The final section places current HRM debates
regarding the impact of MNCs on the national system of industrial relations, within
this context of late industrialisation and internationalisation. The chapter concludes
by outlining a recent HRM framework that depicts a picture of fragmentation. More
particularly, it posits that Irish-based companies are presently pursuing fragmented
approaches to the management of JR and FIR.
3.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRISH INDUSTRY
Ireland is frequently referred to as a 'late industrialising' country, given that the
process of industrialisation began just over six decades ago (O'Malley, 1992;
Kennedy, 1992). From the foundation of the Irish State in 1921, three phases of
industrial development are readily identifiable. The first phase of industrialisation
began in the 1930s, with the introduction of protectionist policies by the State. Under
the leadership of the then president, Eamonn de Valera, a vision of economic self-
sufficiency and the recovery of cultural distinctiveness was implemented. To this
end, import-substitution policies were introduced which placed constraints on
imports in an attempt to facilitate the development of indigenous industries. A
second phase of industrialisation occurred in the 1960s with the abandonment of
isolationist policies of self-sufficiency and the adoption of outward looking, free
market policies. This was to result in an influx of foreign direct investment (FDI)
into the Irish economy. Since the beginning of the 1990s, a third phase of
development is increasingly becoming apparent. In the wake of an emphasis on the
attraction of EDT and the under-performance of indigenous industry in comparison, a
shift in policy has occurred in an attempt to address the differentiation between the
development of the indigenous and foreign-owned sectors (cf. Industrial Policy
Review Group, 1992). This has led to a redefinition and broadening of industrial
policy to encourage the international competitiveness of indigenous development. As
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will be seen, while these phases are distinct, they are also interrelated. While each
may be seen as a new development, they may equally be seen as a response to the
problems emerging out of the phases that preceded it.
3.2.1 From Colonialisation to Self-Sufficiency (1930-1960)
The process of Irish industrialisation did not begin, as many believe, with the
establishment of the Irish Free State in 1921 but with the introduction of strong
protectionist popularised Keynesian policies in the late 1930s. Favouring the use of
tariffs and other import restrictions, these policies were designed to encourage the
competitiveness of domestic products against foreign imports. The underlying
rationale was to reduce levels of importation through policies of import substitution
and, in doing so, develop new indigenous industrial bases and invigorate those that
had been neglected during previous administrations. The effect of these policies was
a doubling of manufacturing employment during the period 1931-1951 and rapid
industrial growth within protected domestic markets (although this was not matched
with movement by domestic markets into exporting markets). Moreover, O'MaIIey
(1988) posits that these protectionist policies enabled indigenous firms to overcome
'barriers to entry' into less complex types of industries. Barriers to entry which
included the presence of large established firms with technological capabilities and
marketing strength and significant economies of scale. Despite the obstacles,
O'Malley (1988) notes the strong performance of indigenous industry within 'non-
traded' sectors. In other words, sectors that were either concerned with the basic
processing of local primary products, or, by their very nature, offered some degree of
natural or national protection against overseas competitors and tended not, therefore,
to engage in international trade.
Relatedly, Leavy (1993) suggests that the development of the Irish economy has
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largely been associated with the promotion of specific organisational forms. With the
establishment of the State in the early 1920s, and the introduction of protectionist
policies in the 1930s, Leavy (1993) suggests that 'co-operatives' became firmly
established as part of freland's economic structure. He writes (1993: 128) that:
'when private capital was slow to invest in industrial projects, in spite of the
incentives offered by the new policy's protectionist measures, Lemass had little
hesitation in using the resources of the State' •6 One such way in which national self-
sufficiency was sought was through the existing co-operative movement. Introduced
by Sir Horace Plunkett into Irish agriculture in the early 1890s, the Irish co-operative
movement advocated the sharing of financial benefits between the producers and
their communities, in an attempt to consolidate their economic power over the value
of the produce. The inability of Irish farmers to raise above subsistence level was,
according to Plunkett, the main impediment to the development of the economy as a
whole (Bolger, 1977). As an organisational form, the co-operative was originally
intended to extend to all spheres of Irish industrial activity, however, it remained
largely confined to the agricultural arena. The interconnectedness of this form of
organisation and the wider social fabric of rural Ireland has been well documented as
formative in the creation of a rural social structure and the creation of Irish managers
(cf. Leavy, 1988).
With the introduction of protectionist policies in the 1930s, State-owned enterprises
(SUE) superseded co-operatives as the dominant organisational form when the State
emphasis shifted to the development and protection of indigenous industries. As
Leavy (1993: 137) writes these State-owned enterprises 'were the primary engine of
early industrialisation in the 1930s and 1940s and played a formative role in the
6 Sean Lemass was Minister for Industry and Commerce within the De Valera government. He is largely credited
as being the 'architect of Irish industrialisation', through the introduction of strong protectionist policies in the
1930s and, when as Taoiseach, in the 1960s with the introduction of outward-looking industrial policies. As
the later chapters will highlight Lemass was to play a key role in the formation of a number of Irish MNCs.
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emergence and early development of a modern techno-managerial class in Irish
society'. Hastings (1994: 30) also suggests that the establishment of SOEs occurred:
'to fill a gap in the provision of vital goods and services which was not being catered
for by the private sector'. Rather than being based on any ideological predisposition,
Hastings (1994) suggests that the emergence of State-owned companies grew out of
a sense of pragmatism. During the period 1932 to 1948, the number of State-owned
bodies quadrupled from six to twenty-four, as the State invested in industries
deemed strategically important for securing national sufficiency and where private
investment was slow to venture.7 The creation and establishment of State-owned
enterprises accelerated the process of industrial development, secured controlling
interest for national security and revitalised strategically important industries where
private investment had not been forthcoming. By the 1930s, both the State-owned
companies and the co-operatives were firmly established features of the structure of
Irish industry, providing many of the organisational forms from which a number of
current Irish-owned MNCs have evolved.
However, after three decades of protectionist Keynesian economics and establishing
national self-sufficiency, a number of economic problems were becoming readily
apparent. While the first phase of Irish industrialisation saw consolidation and
marked increases in employment levels and the performance of 'non-traded' sectors,
these gains were not matched in other areas. The self-sufficiency industrial policies
of the 1930s and 1940s had, in effect, failed to generate sufficient employment
increases to offset rising emigration rates, so that by the 1950s industrial growth had
effectively ceased to exist. While many capital and material inputs grew to a level
that exceeded the cost of imports, import substitution still only occurred only within
particular industries and this combined with the borrowing of successive
Hastings (1994) notes of the twenty-four SOEs, listed by Sweeney (1991), six have since passed into private
hands either through privatisation or closure.
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administrations led to a Balance of Payments (BOP) problem. It was the BOP crisis,
along with a lack of employment generation and rising employment that signalled
the cessation of protectionist and import-substitution policies. In short, by the late
1950s the first phase of Irish industrial development had run its course.
3.2.2 From Self-Sufficiency to an Outward-looking Ireland (1960 - 1991)
After a decade of increasingly acute economic problems, the prevailing view by the
end of the 1950s was that the costs of protectionism, borne out of the drive toward
self-sufficiency, outweighed the benefits. The prolonged economic crisis of the
1950s led to the adoption of outward-looking policies, the result of which was a
dramatic increase in inward foreign direct investment (EDI) levels. As a result, a
movement towards 'outward-looking', free-market policies ensued. This was fuelled
by domestic and foreign investment to encourage the production of goods designed
for export markets. As a nation, Ireland is regarded as 'distinctive' among late-
industrialising countries in this shift from inward- to outward-looking strategies
through trade agreements with advanced countries during the 1960s (O'Malley,
1998). These outward-looking policies were based upon the attraction of foreign
investment. The underlying rationale was that through a system of grants and tax
concessions, EDT would promote export industries and attract further foreign
investment, thus accelerating the industrialisation and modernisation of the Irish
economy. Foreign projects were targeted to complement rather than replace domestic
industries and ensure a 'more diversified export-orientated economy' (Leavy, 1993).
The change in approach resulted in a dramatic increase in inward levels of capital
during the 1960s.
The 'opening up' of the Irish economy in the 1960s led to an increase in the entry of
foreign MNCs, mainly large North American MNCs. These changes in the Irish
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industrial landscape were accompanied by the establishment of non-commercial
State development agencies, in areas such as agricultural, industrial, management
training and development and economic and social research. 8
 One of the leading
agencies established to spearhead the attraction of foreign investment was the Irish
Development Authority (IDA). 9
 Motivated by tax concessions, grants, low wage
costs and access to European locations, foreign-owned MNCs contributed
substantially to industrial growth during the 1960s and 1970s. The entry of Ireland
into the European Economic Community in 1973 further encouraged the second
phase of Irish industrialisation. Export-led, free market policies led to steady
industrial growth, manufacturing employment and exports. With a growth in
manufactured outputs, the diversification of industry into technically advanced
products occurred. This heralded Ireland's arrival as an 'advanced industrial state'.
By the late 1960s, foreign investment entering Ireland had shifted from mature
labour intensive industries to the targeting of high-technology capital intensive
industries, such as electronics and software. Even though there has been a recent
shift in Irish industrial policy towards the development of internationally trading
indigenous industries, the attraction of foreign MNCs to Ireland remains a key
component. In addition to the policies that attracted the first MNCs into Ireland,
these companies also sought to also take advantage of Ireland's highly educated
population and relatively low wage structures for skilled workers given traditionally
high unemployment levels. This trend would gain greater pace in the 1970s and
1980s and continue to resonate in the composition of Irish industry in the 1990s.
Forty such agencies were established between 1960 and 1980 as the State continued to raise its direct role in
development.
The businesses which IDA Ireland seeks to win are internationally mobile projects which can operate
competitively and profitably from Ireland. This covers a range of sectors such as electronics, pharmaceuticals
and healthcare, engineering and international and financial services. IDA Ireland markets Ireland as an
attractive location for overseas investment through its network of offices abroad, emphasising the stability and
growing competitiveness of the Irish economy, the favourable tax regime, financial incentives, the outstanding
skills base and our active participation in the new Europe.
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While employment in foreign-owned manufacturing companies had declined from
1980 to 1987, output for the same period continued to grow. By 1992 foreign-owned
MNCs were well entrenched and accounted for 41% of manufacturing employment.
However, research by this time was also beginning to suggest that this growth,
driven by the FDI or foreign MNCs, was confined to a small number of sectors that
purchased a low proportion of materials from the economy, while continuing to
repatriate high levels of profits out of Ireland (Turner et al., 1997).
3.2.3 In search of Equilibrium (The 1990s)
Irish industrial policy in the last decade constitutes a redefinition and broadening of
the export-led free market policies introduced during the 1960s rather than a
fundamental change in direction. This has been conducted in an attempt to obtain
some form of equilibrium between the performance of indigenous and foreign firms.
The international recession of the 1980s resulted in a significant decline in Irish
manufacturing employment between the years 1979 to 1987, resulting in the
retrenchment of a number of Irish industries. This decline was coupled with a steady
increase in industrial growth, recorded as among the highest in any OECD country.
O'Malley (1992: 38) suggests that this high rate of industrial growth has been
influenced by major structural changes and a widening in the gap between the
'experience and performance of Irish indigenous and foreign-owned multinational
firms'. Indeed, O'Malley (1992) goes so far as to claim that the poor performance of
Irish indigenous industry up to the mid-1980s may be explained by the structural
emphases on non-traded sectors. Since 1987, Ireland has witnessed rapid growth,
stable inflation, improved employment, export and balance of payments
performance, coupled with high unemployment rates, resulting in a GNP growth rate
of 3.4% by 1992. Recording among the highest growth rates in the EC, by the 1990s
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the Irish economy had become known as the 'Celtic Tiger'.
A number of reports commissioned by the Government in the late 1980s
recommended renewed emphasis on indigenous development. As a result, Ireland's
approach to industrial development began to be viewed in a somewhat different
manner. 10
 The recommendations of these reports included a greater emphasis on the
evaluation and monitoring of grant-aided firms; a renewed emphasis on the
promotion of indigenous enterprises through the creation of 'industrial clusters'; a
shift in the emphasis of State aid from grants to equity; the reorganisation of related
government agencies; and finally, investments in the infrastructure (Government
Publications, 1994). By 1992, the Government adopted a new plan for industrial
policy which involved 'an adaptation rather than a reversal of the policy of attracting
foreign investment' and where indigenous industry was to be given 'greater attention
and support' (OECD, 1994: 28). The change in policy arose from a recognition of a
gap between a rapidly expanding foreign-owned sector and a slower growing
indigenous sector comprised of small- to medium-sized firms (Industrial Policy
Review Group, 1992).
This latest 'phase' of industrial development is characterised by a two-pronged
approach: firstly, to widen the indigenous supply base for the foreign sector; and
secondly, to increase the scale of established internationally trading indigenous
industries. Such a reorientation involves a shift in focus from grants towards equity
and a refocusing of industrial promotion towards 'industrial clusters', where the
'° In 1982 the Telesis Report recommended that greater emphasis be placed on indigenous development. In 1984
the White Paper on Industrial Policy highlighted new directions for industrial policy through research,
technology, indigenous company development and greater linkages between foreign and national firms. The
Culliton Report in 1992 highlighted Ireland's over dependence on overseas-owned enterprises in its industrial
base and recommended the need to develop an indigenous enterprise sector. It also recommended a broader
approach to industrial development through the improvement of investment conditions, the improvement of
the infrastructure, enhanced competition, reform of the tax system, and greater training and education. This
was followed by the Moriarty Report in 1993 that recommended the implementation of the Culliton Report.
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State provides direct support for a limited number of potential niches regarded as
possessing some degree of competitive advantage. The Culliton report" of the early
1990s recommended that industrial policies be directed towards the development of
'clusters' of related industries, in an attempt to build sustained competitive
advantage. Influenced by the 'Diamond' model (Porter 1990), the underlying
rationale was one of directed assistance to inter-connected sectors such as food.
While the intent was one of equating the focus between both foreign and Irish
industries, recent reports by the OECD (1994: 31) suggest that it is: 'clear that the
[Irish] government is becoming more selective regarding the types of foreign
projects receiving grant aid, and is concentrating on projects which are likely to
become closely integrated into the Irish economy'.
Accompanying the 'redefinition' of industrial policy was the restructuring of State
development agencies into two separate autonomous bodies.' 2
 Following the
reorganisation of State agencies, the IDA, who was traditionally responsible for the
promotion of both indigenous and foreign enterprises, became responsible for the
attraction of internationally mobile investment into Ireland, while the newly
established Forbairt was given responsibility for the development of Irish-managed
indigenous industry.' 3
 These two separate and autonomous agencies, each with
independent management boards, were created under the aegis of Forfas.' 4 The
impetus for the redirection was the recognition of the differing needs of foreign and
"The Report by the Industrial Policy Review Group in 1992 is also known as the Culliton Report.
12 In 1993 the Department of Industry and Commerce and the Department of Employment merged to form the
Department of Enterprise and Employment, responsible for the formulation and implementation of industrial
policy.
D Enterprise Ireland brings together the key marketing, technology, enterprise development and business
training initiatives through which the Government supports the growth of Irish industry, It combines the
resources of the former Irish Trade Board, Forbairt and the in-company training division of FAS.
14 Forfás is the policy advisory and co-ordination board for industrial development and science and technology
in Ireland. It is the body in which the State's legal powers for industrial promotion and technology
development have been vested. It is also the body through which powers are delegated to Enterprise Ireland for
the promotion of indigenous industry and to IDA Ireland for the promotion of inward investment.
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Irish enterprises and for a greater focus on the development of indigenous industry.
As industrial policy shifted to re-emphasis indigenous growth within international
markets, the organisational form that came to the fore in the 1990s was the public
limited company. According to Leavy (1993: 139) both indigenous and foreign
public limited companies 'are the leading institutions in the country's economic
structure and in the development of Irish management and organisation. Most
innovations in organisational structures and processes, and in management practices,
now tend to diffuse out from this sector to the rest of the economy'. He suggests that
many of the industries that developed under the economic self-sufficiency policies of
the 1950s have remained small scale and focused on domestic markets, showing
little ambition to move outside of domestic markets.
In contrast, O'Malley (1992: 45) argues that many of the indigenous firms presently
operating are 'either the survivors of many years of intensifying competition or
relatively young companies which were established in a competitive environment'.
However, while questions may now be being raised about the theoretical basis of the
third phase of Irish industrial development, it seems that the organisational forms
being shaped by the policies will continue to influence the composition of Irish
industry. According to Leavy (1993: 140), the promotion of 'industrial clusters' has
encouraged two main organisational trajectories: to 'widen the indigenous supply
base for the foreign sector and to make the country as vertically integrated in the
manufacture of high technology products', and to build-up in scale indigenous
companies. He (1993: 141) goes to suggest that: 'national industrial strategy aims to
have at least ten L1B Irish multi-nationals by the year 2000'. Thus, it is likely that
the internationally trading indigenous enterprise or MNC could dominate in the
future, given the renewed emphasis on the development of the indigenous sector.
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In conclusion, while recent research into the relevance of 'industrial clusters' as a
major plank of fish industrial policy suggests that while the model of clusters
offered by Porter (1990) has been regarded as good starting point in identifying the
parameters in which Irish competitiveness can be addressed, it is now being
challenged. Indeed, given, in Clancy et al's (1998: 22) words 'the serious questions
raised about the general applicability of the model and given the specific nature of
Irish economic/industrial conditions, it is now necessary to search for an alternative
model for Irish industrial development'. However, it is clear that with renewed
emphasis in recent years on the development of indigenous industry, one group of
organisations that will continue to shape the landscape of Irish industry, however
Government policy may shift, are Irish-owned MNCs. The following section,
building on the economic context of the 1990s outlined above, outlines the extent to
which and manner in which the Irish economy has internationalised. By doing so the
chapter focuses more specifically on the emergence of Irish-owned MNCs.
3.3 THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF THE IRISH ECONOMY
Another aspect of Ireland's industrial context that is particularly unusual is the
recency with which the economy was 'internationalised' (O'Malley, 1992; Kennedy,
1992). Only since the introduction of outward-looking industrial policies in the
1960s, the Irish economy has embarked on a route toward internationalisation and
modernisation. As outlined above, a key component of the industrialisation and
internationalisation of the Irish economy has been the attraction of FDI. Since the
establishment of the State, foreign MNCs have played an important role in the
development of the Irish Economy. While foreign MNCs were evident prior to the
foundation of the State in the 1920s, it was not until a return to free market policies
that EDT recommenced. It was during the 1960s that foreign MNCs gained a strong
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foothold in the Irish economy. As the Irish economy internationalised, Irish industry
diversified and the share of the domestic market held by 'traditional' indigenous
sectors of industry decreased from 66.5% in 1980 to 47% in 1996. Foreign-owned
companies, accounting for 45% of manufacturing employment, dominated the
modern high-technology and pharmaceutical sector of industry by the mid-1990s.
Despite the more recent refocusing of industrial policy, the attraction of foreign
MNCs remains a key component of Irish industrial policy. In examining the structure
of Irish industry in the 1990s, a broad dichotomy between 'modern' sectors
dominated by foreign-owned MNCs and predominately indigenous-owned
traditional sectors is now apparent.
3.3.1 The Development of Indigenous Industry
While the importance and growth of foreign investment and foreign-owned MNCs
has fared well, the performance and contribution of indigenous industry has
continued to disappoint, despite successive attempts to stimulate it. From the mid-
1960s to the late 1970s no employment growth occurred within the Irish-owned
sections of Irish industry. During this time, domestic demand rose to compensate for
the loss of market share to competing imports and indigenous industry managed only
to maintain overall employment levels. The pace of change and promise of economic
expansions led to a series of industrial disputes whose size and protracted nature led
labour historians to term it 'the decade of upheaval' (McCarthy, 1973).
The 1960s were characterised by rising population and living standards, in which the
Irish economy transformed from a predominantly agriculturally-based industry
serving a largely static protected domestic market, toward an internationally
competitive economy (ESRI, 1969). Despite the revival in economic terms, as
McCarthy (1973: 25) wrote:
The sixties began in a mood of rising expectation, of increased confidence in
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our ability to develop; it began with a taste of affluence in our mouths for the
first time and a heady feeling for the future; but it began as well with a swirl
of stress and tension in industrial relations.
Against a background of radical social and political change, which included a build
up of unrest in Northern freland, and political scandals of gun-running by
Government ministers, there was the promise of economic expansion and
expectations began to rise. It was during the seventh wage round, which dominated
collective bargaining within freland at the turn of the new decade, that large groups
of clerical and salaried workers negotiated settlements that provided for increases
significantly larger than those obtained in previous rounds. What followed was an
upward spiral in comparability claims for large groups of workers. Increasingly large
groups of workers resorted to industrial action in their attempt to secure wage
increases and improved working conditions. As table 3.1 shows by the mid-1960s
the number of industrial disputes had reached record levels. As McCarthy (1973: 28)
concluded: 'during the sixties the question of industrial disputes, of strikes and
pickets became a central problem in industrial relations and indeed in economic
development'.
TABLE 3.1: IRISH STRIKE STATISTICS (SELECTED YEARS 1960-71)
Year	 No. of Strikes	 Days lost ('000s) No. of workers involved
1960	 49	 80	 5,865
1961	 96	 377	 27,437
1964	 87	 545	 25,200
1965	 89	 552	 38,900
1966	 112	 784	 52,200
1967	 79	 183	 20,900
1968	 126	 406	 38,900
1969	 134	 936	 61,800
1970	 134	 1,008	 28,800
1971	 133	 274	 43,783
Source: McCarthy, 1973.
By the 1980s, domestic demand had weakened and employment levels fallen
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considerably (employment fell by 27% during the period 1980-1987). By this time,
fish indigenous industry was dominated by large-scale enterprises that occupied
much of the foreign-owned sector. There was little indigenous activity in sectors
where economies of scale prevailed, which tended to be dominated by large firms
from more advanced European economies (O'Malley, 1985 - cf. table 3.2). Despite
the lacklustre performance of indigenous industry during the 1980s, a 'revival of
indigenous industry' has been reported in the last decade (O'Malley, 1998).
TABLE 3.2: RANK[NG OF TOP INDIGENOUS FIRMs IN THE EARLY 1980s
Company	 Sales	 Total	 Manufacturing Sector
£m	 Employment
Smurfit Group	 491.7	 11207	 Paper & Printing
Cement Roadstone 	 354.5	 7493	 Clay, Glass & Cement
Guinness (Ireland)	 352.6	 6000	 Drink & Tobacco
Carrol Industries 	 219	 1451	 Drink & Tobacco
Waterford Glass	 190.3	 7009	 Clay, Glass & Cement
Cork Co-op	 154	 960	 Food
Mitcheistown Co-op
	
149.5	 2100	 Food
Avonmore Creameries 	 143.6	 1300	 Food
Irish Distillers	 132.1	 1050	 Drink & Tobacco
Waterford Co-op	 127.9	 1200	 Food
Golden Vale Co-op	 110.1	 1219	 Food
Ballyclough Co-op	 105.5	 1020	 Food
Anglo Irish Meat	 102	 700	 Food
O'Flaherty Holdings	 92	 722	 Metals & Engineering
Kerry Co-op
	 87.7	 1000	 Food
Cantrell and Cochrane	 73	 1540	 Drink & Tobacco
North Connaught Co-op
	 68.8	 260	 Food
Clover Meats
	 67.4	 950	 Food
Premier Hughes
	 65	 1950	 Food
Youghal Carpets
	 63.6	 2662	 Textiles
Source: O'Malley, 1985.
Note: Figures and ranking figures to Guinness (Ireland) only.
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Since the beginning of the 1990s, Irish industry has demonstrated strong growth
performance, compared to that of previous decades and compared with other
industrial countries. This revival has largely been attributed to two main factors: the
growth in FDI and the overall improvement of Irish indigenous industry. According
to the employment survey, conducted by Forfas between the years 1988 and 1996,
total manufacturing employment has increased by 12.6%, with indigenous
manufacturing employment increasing by 6.5% over that same time period. This
improvement marked a stronger performance than that of the EU average, which was
shown to decline by 14.5% over the same period (O'Malley, 1998). During this time
the value of indigenous manufacturing exports also increased by 163%. In sum,
indigenous industry has fared well in the past decade, both in comparison to
previous Irish employment and export performance statistics and international
standards. This success is largely seen to be related to the policies introduced since
the mid-1980s (Clancy et al., 1997).
The two-pronged approach of attracting FDI and the development of indigenous
industry has seen the Irish economy perform well in the last decade (Forfas,
forthcoming). Much of this success is evidenced by the rise in GDP rates. As table
3.3 highlights, Ireland's growth rates now exceed that of the EU average.
TABLE 3.3: GDP ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE
EU15
	
Differential
	3.4	 0.5
	
1.2
	
3.5
	2.3
	
6.1
Ireland
	1986-89	 3.9
	
1990-93	 3.5
	1994-97	 8.4
Source: Forfas (forthcoming).
Accompanying these growth rates has been an increase in the numbers employed
within Ireland (cf. table 3.4). Recent estimates show that the manufacturing sector
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120,169
93,266
213,435
4,135
5,482
9,617
	
129,230	 139,687	 +16.2
	
110,666	 124,480	 +33.5
	
239,896	 264,167	 +23.8
	
7,705	 14,881	 259.9
	
15,001	 31,441	 473.5
	
22,706	 46,322	 381.7
has been the main driver of this growth. While commentators have attributed much
of freland's industrial development over the last decade to foreign-owned companies
table 3.4 suggests that the Irish-owned sector is also now contributed significantly.
In the last decade, manufacturing employment has grown from 213,435 in 1989 to
264,167 in 1998. While foreign-owned firms account for the majority (61.5%), Irish-
owned companies have provided a significant proportion (38.5%).
TABLE 3.4: TOTAL ENTERPRISE EMPLOYMENT (1989, 1995, 1998)
1989	 1995	 1998	 89-98(%)
Labour Force
Total at Work
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Irish
Foreign
Total
Internationally-Traded Services
Irish
Foreign
Total
	
1,310,500 1,442,700 1,646,600	 +25.6
	
1,113,200	 1,267,400	 1,521,600	 +36.7
	
172,000	 145,800	 136,000	 -20.9
IFSC Component of above	 394	 2,758	 5,367
Source: Forfas and CSO.
As a recent Forfas report highlights, and O'Malley (1998) confirms, indigenous
industry has undergone a revival in the 1990s. This can be seen in rapid growth in
sales, higher levels of spending on research and employment levels compared
against those of Foreign-owned manufacturing employment in Ireland (cf. table 3.5
and 3.6).
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TABLE 3.5: hUSH-OwNED MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT 1989-1998
Irish-owned Manufacturing	 1989	 1995	 1998	 1989-98%
Non Metallic Minerals	 9398	 8397	 9232	 -1.8
Chemicals	 3291	 3749	 4266	 29.6
Metals and Engineering	 25653	 30281	 35641	 38.9
Food	 33111	 36763	 38135	 15.2
Drink & Tobacco	 2050	 1704	 1754	 -14.4
Textiles	 5017	 4661	 4244	 -15.4
Clothing, Footwear & Leather	 10101	 7731	 6666	 -34.0
Wood & Wood Products	 4415	 4694	 5477	 24.1
Furniture	 4468	 4534	 5365	 20.1
Paper & Printing	 12793	 12745	 13478	 5.4
Misc. Manufacturing 	 5531	 8496	 9458	 71.0
Plastics and Rubber	 4341	 5475	 5971	 37.5
Irish-owned Manufacturing 	 120169	 129230	 139687	 16.2
Source: Forfas Employment Survey, 1998.
TABLE 3.6: FOREIGN-oWNED MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT 1989-1998
Foreign-owned Manufacturing	 1989	 1995	 1998	 1989-98 %
Non Metallic Minerals	 2957	 2292	 1949	 -34.1
Chemicals	 11818	 16137	 19497	 65.0
Metals and Engineering	 42589	 59315	 72362	 69.9
Food	 9797	 9006	 8979	 -8.3
Drink & Tobacco	 6019	 4976	 4581	 -23.9
Textiles	 7142	 6210	 4500	 -37.0
Clothing, Footwear & Leather	 4378	 3249	 2340	 -46.6
Wood & Wood Products	 490	 459	 842	 71.8
Furniture	 17	 6	 5	 -70.6
Paper&Printing	 2134	 2163	 1801	 -15.6
Misc. Manufacturing 	 1939	 2750	 3146	 62.2
Plastics and Rubber	 3986	 4103	 4478	 12.3
Foreign-owned Manufacturing
	 93,266	 110,666	 124,480	 33.5
Source: Forfas Employment Survey, 1998.
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3.3.2 The Emergence of Irish-owned MNCs
Playing a large role in the improved contribution of Irish-owned industry have been
the newly developing Irish-owned MNCs. Indeed, while there is much anecdotal
reportage of Irish companies becoming increasingly international, the evidence also
suggests that the pace of overseas business expansion by Irish companies has
accelerated in recent years. Research, conducted on an annual basis, shows that the
acquisitional activity levels of Irish companies have been rapidly increasing since
1990, reaching record levels in 1996 (Chapman Flood, 1996). As figure 3.1
highlights, most acquisitional activity amongst Irish companies is located in overseas
markets. In 1996, sixty percent of completed acquisitions by Irish companies were
outside domestic markets - the UK accounting for the largest proportion, followed
by the United States and Other European countries. The growth of Irish MNCs
through acquisitions has placed increasing challenges on their existing structures,
reporting lines and managerial resources. What remains unknown is the influence
that the size of these companies, the size of their home markets, their recency and
pace of growth will have in shaping the behaviour of Irish MNCs and in particular
their approach to the management of selected IR and HR issues. This research
specifically addresses these issues.
Figure 3.1: Acquisitional Activity of Irish Companies
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Source: Chapman Flood, Annual Acquisitional Surveys, 1993 -96.
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3.4 THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONALISATION ON IRISH INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Not surprisingly, given the history described above, the main focus of empirical
research on IIRM in MNCs within freland over the past three decades has been on
the impact of increasing foreign investment on the national industrial relations
system. More specifically, the focus has wholly been placed on examining the
impact of foreign MNCs on indigenous practices. Much of the debate can be
grouped into two schools of thought which, for simplification purposes, may be
termed the 'conformance thesis' (Kelly and Brannick, 1995; Enderwick, 1996;
Turner et al., 1997) and 'non-conformance thesis' schools of thought (Roche and
Geary, 1997; Geary and Roche, 1999). The 'conformance' school is further divided
into an 'old conformance thesis' and 'new conformance thesis'. A brief review of the
debates follows.
The 'conformance thesis' promotes the view that foreign-owned MNCs conform to
the practices of host country institutions. This view, which was popularised during
the 1980s, worked from the notion that there was little variation between the
employment practices of foreign-owned MNCs and indigenous firms. Kelly and
Brannick (1985), in examining the impact of foreign investment on Irish IR, found
no evidence to suggest that the practices of foreign MNCs were materially different
from those of home-based companies. Moreover, they found it unusual for foreign
MNCs to overtly contest the legitimacy of the trade union within the workplace.
They concluded that the lack of legal obligations, specific to foreign firms,
facilitated such a convergence. Similarly, Enderwick (1986), in examining the
impact of foreign MNCs on the patterns of Irish labour relations, found the picture to
be one of conformity by foreign MNCs to local practices. While recommending the
periodic updating of data due to its changing nature, he concluded that foreign
MNCs had little impact on domestic JR practices and that the practices of foreign
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MNCs converged with those of domestic companies.
Combining these two studies a dominant view of IR in Irish MNCs was established
which was in keeping with the broad academic thinking and the approach adopted by
the State agencies concerned with attracting foreign investment at that time. The
industrial relations policy adopted by the State from the 1960s onwards advocated
that incoming foreign MNCs concede to trade union recognition and adapt to local
JR practices. For the most part this approach resulted in foreign MNCs concluding
single-union recognition deals through 'pre-employment agreements'. These
agreements resulted in the signing up of trade union members prior to their
employment. This approach of support for trade union recognition and convergence
to local practices was pursued until the 1980s. With the entry of non-unionised
foreign MNCs into the high-tech electronic sectors during the 1980s, the State
development agencies relaxed their approach toward trade union recognition. It was
this change in policy by State agencies that many commentators believe led to the
introduction of sophisticated union avoidance strategies by foreign MNCs during the
1980s (Roche, 1995).
The 'conformance thesis' remained in situ until a recent rekindling of the debate by
Turner et a!. (1997) and Roche and Geary (1997, 1999). Attributing much of the 'old
conformance thesis' to a consensual view held during the 1980s, these commentators
questioned notions of convergence and divergence, in light of emergent empirical
data. The current debate broadly centres on the question as to whether an over-riding
country-of-origin or country-of-operation effect has occurred within Ireland. In
simple terms, a country-of-operation effect, also known as 'host-country' effects,
refers to the conformity of foreign-owned MNCs local practices. In contrast, a
country-of-origin effect, or 'home-country' effects, refers to the divergence of
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practices of foreign MNCs from local practices and the adoption of practices from
the country where the MNC originated. The orientating question in the recent debate
has become whether a country-of-operation or a country-of-origin effect has
prevailed within Ireland.
Roche and Geary (1997) revived this debate when they questioned the premise that
foreign MNCs conform to host country JR and HR practices. In contrast to earlier
debates, they argue that variation between the JR practices of foreign MNCs and
Irish companies have been evident since the 1960s. Taking a number of JR issues
they argue the case for a country-of-origin effect. Taking for example the issue of
trade union recognition, Roche and Geary (1997) suggest that up to the 1980s
foreign MNCs were willing to pursue trade union recognition strategies. However,
they argue that since then differences have occurred in the form of union recognition
strategy pursued. Firstly, while multiple trade unionism has prevailed within Irish
companies, there has been a higher preference for single union representation within
foreign MNCs. Furthermore, since the 1980s they argue that there has been an
increase in the number of non-unionised foreign MNCs entering Ireland, more
notably within the high-tech electronics sector (Roche and Turner, 1994). Citing
research that demonstrates a growth in the resistance to trade union recognition
(McGovern, 1989; Gunnigle, 1992), the authors suggest that while Irish management
have tended to pursue such traditional techniques as union avoidance or union
suppression, foreign MNCs have favoured more sophisticated union substitution
strategies. This, they suggest, indicates a decline in host country influences.
With regard to collective bargaining and wage policies, again Roche and Geary
(1997) note that differences between the practices of foreign and Irish companies
have been evident since the 1970s (Murray, 1984). They argue that it is only with the
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return to centralised negotiations in 1987 that there has been compliance by foreign
IvlNCs to national settlements. Prior to that foreign MNCs deviated from national
pay norms, often making above-average pay settlements. Despite the current
adherence to wage norms, Roche and Geary argue that on the whole foreign MNCs
tend to pay higher wages than Irish companies. Finally, in relation to HR practices,
Roche and Geary (1997) suggest that research conducted in the 1980s clearly
highlights variation in the practices of foreign companies from their Irish
manufacturing counterparts. In particular, they posit that research has shown
American MNCs to have distinctive HR policies. In conclusion, they suggest that the
practices of foreign MNCs have had a 'spill-over' effect onto Irish JR practices and
institutions. They argue that not only are Irish companies experimenting with such
new HRM policies as single-union and pre-production agreements, but that there is a
readiness of Irish unions to co-operate with the diffusion of these new employer
strategies. In challenge to the 'old conformance thesis' position, Roche and Geary
(1997) suggest that the JR practices of indigenous firms are converging towards the
practices of foreign owned MNCs and not vice versa.
However, questioning the 'non-conformance' view that country-of-origin effects
override host country effects, Turner et al. (1997) argue that no statistical evidence
exists to suggest variation between the HR practices of Irish and American
companies. Drawing on the results of the Price Waterhouse Cranfield survey
conducted in 1995, they compare the collective institutional arrangements and
human resource practices of Irish and US owned companies. Using such JR
indicators as union recognition, union density and the presence of a joint
consultative committee or works council, they found (1997: 96): 'no statistically
significant difference between Irish and US companies on any of the available
institutional measures'. Differences were, however, noted by the authors in relation
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to the use of performance-related pay and the level of job flexibility, with higher
incidences of performance-related pay recorded within American companies. While
HR variation was noted, the authors question the translation as this into a 'new
orthodoxy', citing factors such as the intensification of international competition and
the length of time established as more indicative of the variation between indigenous
and foreign practices. Turner et al. conclude (1997: 100) that: 'there is no evidence
of a dominant effect of American multinationals on the industrial relations practices
of indigenous firms'.
In response, Geary and Roche (1999) refute what they term Turner et al's 'new
conformance thesis', contending that key differences do exist between the
employment relations practices of foreign and those of Irish workplaces. Drawing on
the results of the recent national workplace survey, Geary and Roche (1999) conduct
two analyses: one comparing the proportion of foreign-owned and Irish-owned
workplaces adopting a composite list of practices; and another contrasting the
practices of Irish workplaces with those of American and other foreign-owned sites.
Using a variety of IR and HR indicators, including new reward systems, voice
mechanisms and flow management, their results suggest that (with the exception of
work organisation) foreign-owned workplaces were more likely than Irish
workplaces to have adopted such practices. In particular, American MNCs were
found to be more likely to have a designated personnel specialist with representation
at board level, greater communication with employees, higher usage of employee
involvement initiatives, and greater incidences of profit sharing and share
ownership. Similar to their earlier contention in 1997, Geary and Roche found
American MNCs to differ little from Irish firms in their approach to union
recognition, but when the data was further restricted to unionised workplaces, Geary
and Roche (1999) again found variation between foreign and Irish workplaces. In
87
particular, they (1999: 15) suggests that 'representative structures and negotiating
arrangements are less complex in foreign-owned workplaces', where single-union
recognition agreements are more likely to prevail. In sum, they found a clear
American country-of-origin effect with respect to human resource practices and,
from the 1980s onwards, with respect to trade union recognition.
In short, Geary and Roche found the JR and FIR practices of American MNCs to
stand apart from those of indigenous firms. They write (1999: 16) that: 'MNC's
approach to personnel issues would seem to have been more consistent with a
human resource management approach than that of Irish-owned workplaces'. Given
this, they suggest that while differences in HR practices between overseas and
indigenous workplaces are apparent, the JR practices 'could arguably be portrayed as
a more formal and rationalised version of what might be termed traditional practice'.
In conclusion, they restate their original contention of a 'spill-over-effect' of HR
practices from foreign to Irish workplace, confirming the premise that convergence
is likely from 'host country practices' towards those of foreign companies.
3.4.1 The Fragmentation of Irish Industrial Relations?
The system of Irish industrial relations is largely based upon the British tradition of
Voluntarism. By the 1920s and the foundation of the Irish Free State, Irish trade
unions shared with their British counterparts a collective bargaining approach that
was labelled 'traditional adversarialism'. With the establishment of the Irish Labour
Court in 1946, the 'canons' of traditional adversarialism, that is collective
bargaining, union recognition and adversarialism, were firmly established within an
Irish context. The eventual professionalisation of Irish management, the
establishment of State development agencies and the growth of industrial relations as
a discipline within management education, all served to reinforce this model of
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traditional adversarialism during the 1960s and 1970s. With a further wave of EDI
and an influx of foreign MNCs into freland during the 1980s, new HRM managerial
theories were introduced which some posit has questioned, but not fully supersede,
the prevailing ideology of adversarialism (Roche, 1995).
Commentators in the field of Irish industrial relations suggest that while the 1980s
were characterised by 'continuity and change' (Gunnigle et al., 1994), the 1990s
have witnessed 'profound fragmentation and divergence' (Roche, 1998). While
Gunnigle et al. (1999) suggest that the Irish system of IR in the last decade is
characterised by 'continuity and change', Roche (1998) argues that approaches to
HRM have become highly fragmented. Despite the emerging debate with regard to
the constituents of the change, consensus exists that the picture of Irish JR has
changed dramatically since the beginning of the 1980s. One factor that has been
shown to effect such change was the influx of foreign MNCs into high-tech growth
sectors in the 1980s, accompanied with the introduction of sophisticated non-
unionised approaches (McGovern, 1989). However, Irish companies, by contrast, are
still regarded as operating approaches to HRM that have remained largely unchanged
since the 1950s and thus characterised by traditional adversarialism, although more
recent research suggests that public sector companies to be experimenting and
moving towards notions of partnership (O'Dowd and Hastings, 1998).
While there are no established models that totally captures the current Irish JR scene,
there has however been a recent attempt to frame this emerging picture of 'Irish IR',
in light of the dramatic changes of the last two decades (Roche, 1998). This
framework attempts to reflect the diversity of Irish workplace practices following
two decades of great influx and change within four models of HRM. These are
identified as: the 'sophisticated non-union human resource' model, the
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'deregulation' model, the 'partnership/new IR' model and lastly the 'traditional
adversarial' model.
FIGURE 3.2: THE FRAGMENTATION OF IRISH JR MODEL
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As figure 3.2 highlights the key features of the sophisticated non-union model,
characteristic of foreign MNCs in the high-tech electronics sector include: highly
developed grievance procedures; highly developed communication and problem-
solving systems; favourable terms and conditions of employment; performance-
based pay; profit sharing and share ownership; new approaches to performance
management; and innovative work structures. The underlying rationale here is one of
union substitution. It is posited that companies adopting this model place a premium
on flexibility, accompanied with high investment in training and the recruitment of
'adaptable' workforces.
The second model, Partnership/New JR. is based upon a premise of 'jointism' or
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'mutual gains'. Manifest through institutional arrangements, this approach advocates
the involvement of trade unions in operational and business decision-making
processes. Conditions in which the partnership approach is likely to be found include
situations where the basis for competition shifts from price to quality and
innovation, where change has occurred through a competitive crisis, where further
investment has been secured, where trade union de-recognition is not a feasible
option and in greenfield sites characterised by a young workforce. According to
Roche (1998: 115) this model represents the 'conjuncture of competitive pressures
and pre-exi sting IR arrangements'.
The third model, managerial unilateralism and deregulation, refers to the
reassertion of managerial prerogative and demands for maximum flexibility in HR.
Under this approach, management seek the minimum regulation of their action and
of labour markets. There is a broad resistance to trade union recognition through the
curtailing of trade union influence on the terms and conditions of employment. The
underpinning managerial ideology is one of 'a right to manage without outside
interference'. Other means through which the influence of trade unions is curtailed
here include an increase in the employment of flexible part-time casual staff.
Conditions under which this model appears include: where 'buffer workforces' have
been developed and where core workers are managed in accordance with other
models. The aim is to complement a partnership model with 'flexibilities made
possible by rigorously delimited regulation'. Frenkel and Peetz (1998) suggest that
glohalisation will reinforce these tendencies toward management unilateralism, as
the dominant procedural system at workplace levels. As industrialisation gathers
pace, they believe that there will be an increase in pressures for joint regulation.
The final model, adversarialism and piecemeal innovation, refers to the introduction
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of change or innovation in a piecemeal manner and which has little impact on
existing collective bargaining arrangements. Companies adopting such an approach
are likely to selectively introduce 'softer' or more 'innovative' HR strategies, in a
non-coherent manner.
TABLE 3.7: KEY FEATURES OF CURRENTS MODELS OF IRISH IR
Non-union HR
	 New IR Model	 Managerial	 Adversarialism and
Model	 Unilateralism and	 Piecemeal
De-regulation	 Innovations
Soft 1-IR policies	 Partnership	 Managerial	 No change to existing
Unilateralism	 collective
arrangements
Union Substitution Mutual Gains	 'a right to manage	 Incremental change
Union Substitution
	 without interference'
not an option
High Competition,
high innovation
Highly developed
grievance,
communication and
problem-solving
systems
Favourable terms
and conditions
New approaches to
reward and
performance
management
Innovative ways of
structuring work
Source: Roche (1998).
Shift from price to
quality and
innovation
Institutional
arrangements that
involve unions in
operational and
decision-making
processes
Training &
Development of
'adaptable'
workforce
Little regulation
Curtailing of trade
unions through terms
and conditions of
employment
Increase in 'buffer'
workforces
Greater flexibility
Protected industries
with weak
competition, mature
industries
Little cohesion
between policies
Selective adoption of
HR policies
Research by Gunnigle et a!. (1994) has found that changes in the approach to
employee relations among most fish companies tends to be piecemeal and
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incremental, rather than widespread. According to Roche (1998), such approaches
are more likely to occur to companies within protected industries where competition
is weak, or in mature markets and with older workforces, or where there is little
pressure to change the IR practices. This model represents the co-existence of new
innovative HR policies, alongside tradition arrangements. Table 3.7 summarises the
main characteristics of these models, which remain to be fully tested.
While the debates with regard to Irish JR outlined in this section indicate many of
the influences shaping approaches to HRM, there remains a lacuna with regard to
research into Irish-owned MNCs themselves. Despite a recent acceleration in their
growth and scope, little systematic research has been conducted into the collective
behaviour of Irish MNCs or their management of HR and JR. Despite the debate
with regard to the constituents of the change and the extent to which change is taking
place, there exists a consensus that the Irish picture of IR and HR has changed
dramatically since the beginning of the 1980s. This research both addresses the
lacuna described above and seeks to add to an understanding of the nature of the
changes in Irish IR and HR.
3.5 CoNcLusio
In conclusion, this chapter has outlined the particular historical, social and economic
context within which Irish industry and Irish MNCs have evolved, paying particular
attention to the impact of late industrialisation and internationalisation. A review of
the patterns of Irish industrialisation suggests that the late industrialisation and
internationalisation of the Irish economy has exerted a dominant and distinctive
influence on the development of indigenous industry and, subsequently, the HRM
practices of companies. In addition to the factors identified in a review of the
literature in chapter two, this chapter has pointed to a further set of influences that
93
may be informing the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs.
As shown, there remains a wide gap in the Irish literature with regard to the
behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs and, more particularly, in relation to their
management of JR and HR. It is with this gap that this thesis concerns itself. The
following chapter outlines the research process and methods employed in exploring
the management of JR and HR within Irish MNCs. More particularly, it outlines the
case for employing a mixed methodology toward a greater understanding of the JR
and HR practices of Irish-owned MNCs.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter outlines the research design and mixed methodology employed in this thesis. The nature
of the object of this research informs the method of analysis employed. Encompassing both
quantitative and qualitative approaches, each of these components constitutes a distinctive 'phase' in
the research process. The first phase employs a questionnaire-based survey that identifies and collates
background information on the study population - Irish-owned MNCs. The second phase builds on
the results of the survey and, through a qualitative case-based approach focusing on four companies,
examines the internal processes and factors shaping the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs with
particular regard to JR and HR.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The focus of this research is to investigate, from a head office perspective, the
collective management of non-managerial employees, that is the management of JR
and the management of non-operational FIR, that is the management of managers,
within Irish-owned MNCs. In addition, this research seeks to examine the
distinctiveness of Irish-owned MNC behaviour. Chapters two and three identified
literatures that can inform such an analysis. While highlighting a number of
expectations likely to shape the behaviour of MNCs, an examination of the four
literatures reviewed in those chapters also identified a number of gaps that this
research seeks to address.
While the globalisation literature highlighted the adoption of new organisational
forms and the shedding of national identities, the NBS literature proposed that
MNCs are essentially embedded within and shaped by a set of factors particular to
the national context from which they originate. The small countries literature builds
on this proposition, through its contention that the behaviour of MNCs can be
attributed to the size of the domestic economy from which they emanate. The fourth
and final literature reviewed examined key features of the development of Irish
industry and Irish-owned MNCs. This indicated that factors such as the late
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industrialisation and internationalisation of the fish economy might shape the
behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs. While expectations from these literatures may
serve to inform the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs, they also appear in many
respects to be contradictory. Furthermore, a review of the literature highlighted a
'gap' in existing empirical research with regard to the particular object of this study.
While a number of key expectations of HRM behaviour within Irish-owned MNCs
can be drawn from these literatures, the subject of employment relations in Irish-
owned MNCs, and indeed the nature of Irish-owned MNCs themselves, remains
uncharted territory. This chapter outlines the research design and methods employed
in addressing this gap.
4.2 OvERvIEw OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS
This section demonstrates how the nature of the object of this research - Irish-owned
MNCs, has informed the methods of analysis chosen to investigate this study's
research questions. As Brannick and Roche (1998: 3) write: 'research methodology
is essentially a decision-making process. Each decision made is affected by, and in
turn, influences every other decision. [However, t]he one decision that focuses, and
to a large extent drives all the rest, is the definition of the research questions'.
Shaping the methodology employed in this research are two broad questions: what is
it that needs to be known?; and, how is it that this can be known? In other words,
what is the object of the research? and what are the methods that can best examine
that object?
For the purpose of this research, the unit of analysis is taken to be 'the Irish-owned
MNC'. As the previous chapter demonstrated, as a group of companies, Irish-owned
MNCs are ranked among the largest fish employers. Moreover, in light of Ireland's
industrial policy, this is the indigenous organisational form that is expected to
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dominate the Irish industrial landscape over the next few decades. However, as an
object of research, there is surprisingly little known about the behaviour of Irish-
owned MNCs. In light of this, it was clear from the outset that this exploratory
research is concerned with theory-building not theory-testing. Toward this end, this
research employs a mixed methodology encompassing both quantitative and
qualitative approached, each of which occupies a distinct phase in the process. The
quantitative phase involves a questionnaire-based survey conducted on the entire
study population; while the qualitative phase encompasses more in-depth case-based
analysis of four selected Irish-owned MNCs. This was supplemented with a review
of published data and other secondary source data on the case companies. Given that
the core focus of this research centres on the approaches of Irish-owned MNCs to the
management of IR and HR and the factors shaping that relationship, a head office
level perspective was adopted.
In light of the lacuna described above, it was first necessary to construct a data set of
Irish-owned MNCs and collate a range of information regarding their operations. To
this end, a questionnaire-based survey was conducted on a constructed data set of
Irish-owned MNCs. The survey highlighted, in keeping with the development of
indigenous industry outlined in chapter three, a concentration of Irish-owned MNCs
into particular industrial sectors. While the survey was effective in providing
demographic information in relation to key patterns of Irish-owned MNC behaviour,
this method of analysis failed to reveal the underlying rationale for the approaches
they were adopting. More particularly, the survey did not provide insight into the
internal processes and factors at play in shaping approaches to the management of JR
and the management of HR. In other words, while the survey was a necessary first
step, the nature of the object of inquiry could not be fully known by quantitative
means. In light of this, a decision was taken to adopt a more qualitative approach in
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the form of a case-based analysis. Reflecting the sectoral concentrations that
emerged from the questionnaire-based survey, four Irish-owned MNCs were
selected. The behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs can be seen from a number of
perspectives. While the primary level of inquiry was head office, the case research
enabled the incorporation of a wider range of 'stakeholders' so as to enable a fuller
understanding of the 'landscape'. In addition to head office managers, in-depth
interviews were also conducted at subsidiary level, in Irish-based companies and
UK-based companies within groups, details of which will be outlined later. In
addition, an employee perspective was obtained through in-depth interviews with
trade union officials. The four cases were further supplemented with an extensive
review of published and archival data, a fuller description of which is outlined in the
following sections.
The structure of this chapter broadly follows the path summarised above. It begins
by examining the exploratory nature of this research and choice of methodology.
Section two describes the first phase of the research process, incorporating an
account of the identification of the population researched, the research instrument
and the analysis of the data. This is followed by an outline of the second phase of
this empirical research - the case-based analysis. This section describes the selection
of, and issues encountered in accessing and researching the selected case companies.
The use of secondary source data is then outlined and an account of the analysis of
the qualitative data given. A final section summarises an outline of the methodology
employed and methodological issues encountered and sets the scene for the reporting
of the results contained in chapters five through to nine.
4.3 RESEARCH 'IN' AND 'ON' MNCs: THE CASE FOR MIXED METHODOLOGIES
As stated in chapter one, this research is largely exploratory in nature. As Brannick
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(1998: 7) states: 'exploratory research is used to answer "what" type questions and is
undertaken when one is seeking insights into the general nature of the problem.
There is typically little prior knowledge on which to build and research hypotheses
are either vague or do not exist at all'. In keeping, this thesis is concerned not with
theory testing but rather with theory building. In other words, it is more concerned
with establishing the foundations from which further research can be based than with
testing a set of defined hypotheses.
Eisenhardt (1989), building on the 'grounded' approach of Glaser and Strauss
(1967), outlines eight steps in the development of a 'theory building' approach.
These comprise: the initial start up phase, the selection of cases, the crafting of
instruments and protocols, entry into the field, the analysing of data, the shaping of
hypotheses, an enfolding of the literature and finally the reaching of a conclusion.
This approach, in effect, involves the continuous comparison of data and theory,
with data collection as the starting point. Whilst, in its strictest terms, a theory
building or grounded theory approach advocates entering the field with little or no
framework, it is broadly recognised that such a position is impossible to achieve.
Rather, Eisenhart argues that it is quite common for the investigator to have some
prior knowledge and expectations about the field under investigation and that this
should be acknowledge. Hence, this study is informed by the expectations outlined
in the literature review chapters that preceded this.
Informed by these views, the methodological approach undertaken in this research
combines elements of both qualitative and quantitative methods. Adopting a similar
approach to that of Brannick and Roche (1998), this research begins from the
position that quantitative and qualitative approaches represent differing modes of
analysis that may inform exploratory or theory building research, rather than
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opposing methodological strategies. While the former presents numerical
information that can broadly 'mark out' the territory, the latter provides contextual
perceptions of reality. In this particular investigation, the triangulation of both
qualitative and quantitative approaches is largely shaped by the nature of the
research aims and, as will be outlined, each mode occupies a separate stage in this
research process. A process that provides a planned and systematic approach and
ensures that all aspects of the research project are consistent with one another.
There are two levels of the object of inquiry that need to be known in this research.
The first is the nature of Irish-owned MNCs as a whole. As stated above, this
necessitated the construction of a study population and secondly, a survey to obtain
broad information on the form and behaviour of these companies. The second level
of inquiry is the approaches adopted by Irish MNCs to the management of JR and the
management of HR. At the centre of this research is a focus the internal processes
and factors in Irish MNCs that influence the management of their employment
relationships. To this end, case-based research methods were also chosen as a second
mode of analysis more suited to examining the internal processes at play within
MNCs. As the chapter two has informed us, one might expect that such shaping
factors would include, the structure and diversification of MNCs (Marginson et a!.,
1993), the micro-political processes (Ferner and Edwards, 1995) andlor,
alternatively, the national systems or institutions from which these MNCs emanate
(Ferner, 1997). However, the extent of the influence of such things on the behaviour
of Irish-owned MNCs remains to be discovered.
The two phases outlined above relate to two distinct stages of the research process.
However, these stages are inter-related in that the survey serves to inform the
selection and focus of the case studies. Having identified, through the survey, broad
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patterns of behaviour, these patterns then inform the themes and selection of cases
for the second phase of the research process - an examination of the internal
processes and relationships. It is to a more detailed outline of the first stage of the
research process that this chapter now turns.
4.4 THE QUANTITATIVE COMPONENT
4.4.1 Identification of the Irish-owned MNC Population
From the outset of this research it was clear that the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs
was a largely untrodden field of inquiry. As a result, little was known or could
indicate the size or constituents of the study population. Indeed, no research had
previously identified this group of companies as a unit of analysis. Existing
empirical research was either confined to single case studies of different aspects
within particular Irish MNCs (usually in the form of unpublished postgraduate
dissertations); or, encompassed within the broad grouping of 'indigenous
companies' (as is evidenced in existing debates on the convergence of foreign and
Irish HRM practices outlined in chapter three). In light of this 'gap', it was decided
that a survey of the entire population of Irish-owned MNC was required, before an
analysis of their behaviour could be developed.
Consequently, identifying the population of Irish-owned MNCs became a crucial
initial task. Upon examination it became clear that the definition of MNC was in
itself a question on which there was little consensus. While writers such as Bartlett
and Ghoshal (1989: 14) defined an MNC in terms of its 'portfolio of multiple
national entities', other commentators such as Hendry (1994: 72) in reference to
Vernon (1967) define an MNC as 'having production assets in at least six countries
and at least 25 per cent of [their] profits and £100 million of sales abroad'. Neither
provided the width of definition that would capture a group of companies which
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were, relative to their US or UK counterparts, small in size. Therefore the definition
of a European MNC, employed by the EU in the European Works Council (EWC)
directive, was adopted.
Within this directive, MNCs are defined as 'enterprises employing 1,000 or more
employees in the EEA (excluding the UK), with at least two operating sites within
Europe, employing 150+ people'. In applying the strict criteria of this definition a
population of five Irish-owned MINCs was derived. The decision was therefore taken
to apply a derivative of the EWC definition so as to identify a broader range of
companies toward a more generalisable sample. To this end, the strict criterion of
employing 150 or more people in overseas sites was eliminated. The definition
subsequently applied, for the purpose of this research, became wholly Irish-owned
firms (i.e., those companies with over 50% shareholding within Ireland) employing
1,000 or more employees world-wide and with at least two operating sites within
Europe - one of which could be within Ireland. Furthermore, a minimum
employment level of 1,000 people world-wide was taken on the basis that companies
employing 1,000 or more people are more likely to possess attributes pertinent for
this investigation - attributes such as a formal HR function and divisionalised
structures.
A number of secondary sources were also examined in the formation of a data set of
Irish-owned MNCs. The Business and Finance Top 1,000 Irish company listings
were identified as a key data source) 5
 These listings, which are published annually,
contain publicly quoted Irish-based companies, ranked according to turnover and
profit levels. More importantly, it contains the total group employment figure, which
was a key selection criterion in this research. Other data listed includes the main
15 This listing has since been extended and presently ranks the Top 1,500 Irish-based companies.
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business activities and contact details of the companies. As others have pointed out,
the main advantage of these listings is that they provide the necessary information
for the companies listed to be classified into broad size and sectoral categories,
factors that are important for most surveys of firms (Murphy, 1998).
The data set gathered was then cross-referenced with other published listings from
the Sunday Business Post Top 50, to the Irish Times Public Company listings and
the Irish Press Top 50. Produced annually, these listings facilitated a check on the
consistency and reliability of the set to this point. The Irish Press Top 50 proved
particularly useful in providing information on overseas locations, another key
defining criterion in the selection of the study population. Electronic databases, such
as those produced by Dun and Bradstreet (1994), provided further means by which
to identify and cross-check companies that employed over one hundred employees
overseas. This database also provided indications of the size of overseas sites and a
list of Irish parent companies and their subsidiaries. Further electronic databases
examined included Microextract and Fame, both of which provided information with
which to identify Irish companies employing over 1,000 people world-wide. While
this produced some overlap, it also indicated some new potential companies on the
basis of activity areas, especially those privately owned indigenous companies. The
IDA and Forbairt, who, as chapter three outlined have recently undergone a
restructuring of their roles and responsibilities were also consulted. These agencies
were contacted for lists of Irish companies that were trading on an international
basis. However, it soon became apparent that the lists held by these agencies only
contained information on foreign-owned and indigenous companies who had sought
their advice, financial aid andlor assistance. Neither of the agencies could, at that
time, provide comprehensive employment figures for those companies. Moreover, at
that time a restructuring of the State development agencies was been undertaken, and
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there was still significant overlap in their client listings. For example, the Guinness
Group emerged on the listings of both the IDA and Forbairt. Given these
limitations, it was decided to construct the initial sample of companies from the
information contained in the published and the electronic data sets mentioned above.
TABLE 4.1: IRIsH-OWNED MNCs ACCORDING TO SIzE AND SECTOR (1994)
Name	 Main Activity	 Total Enzpyment
Jefferson Smurfit Group plc
	 Paper, Print & Packaging	 34,500
AIB Group plc	 Financial Services	 16,000
CRH plc	 Building Materials 	 14,000
Bank of Ireland Group plc 	 Financial Services
	 12,000
Kerry Group plc	 Dairy & Food
	 9,500
Waterford Wedgewood plc	 Clay, Cement & Glass	 9,000
Independent Newspapers plc	 Paper, Print & Packaging	 9,000
Avonmore Foods plc*	 Dairy & Food	 6,348
Aer Lingus Group	 Transportation	 5,556
Fitzwilton plc	 Industrial Holding	 5,000
Glen Dimplex	 Electrical Engineering	 4,800
Waterford Foods ple*
	
Dairy & Food
	
3,224
Fyffes plc	 Dairy & Food	 3,000
Clondalkin Group plc
	
Paper, Print & Packaging 	 2,340
An Bord Bainne	 Dairy & Food	 2,300
Golden Vale plc	 Dairy & Food	 2,250
James Crean plc	 Industrial Holding	 2,185
Greencore Group plc
	
Dairy & Food	 1,840
IWP International plc
	
Industrial Holding
	 1,828
Unidare plc
	
Industrial Holding	 1,413
Totals	 20	 146,084
Source: Donnelly (1996) - as compiled from Business and Finance 'Top 1,000' (1994); The Sunday
Business Post 'Top 50' (1994); The Irish Press 'Top 50' (1994) and databases including
Microextract, Fame and Dun and Bradstreet.
* Avonmore Foods plc and Waterford Foods plc have since merged to form Glanbia plc.
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Applying the selection criteria to the above outlined databases and data sets, and
having cross-referenced for accuracy of information, a set of twenty Irish-owned
MINCs was finalised (cf. table 4.1). These were ranked by sector, size and European
locations. This does not represent an exhaustive list or even a large sample, as it
excludes those MNCs whose overseas operations are located exclusively outside of
Europe and those companies, such as small Irish high-tech companies, who generally
employ less than 1,000 people world-wide. However, it does represent a slightly
larger population than the seventeen indigenous small-to medium-sized
transnationals identified as operating in Ireland by the UN in the early 1990s (UN,
1993). 16
4.4.2 The Research Instrument
Brannick (1998) identifies a number of factors that 'frame' the rationale for a chosen
approach. These include the accuracy of data collected, the complexity of data
required, the flexibility sought and other time and cost constraints. Specific to this
research there were a number of factors that influenced the type of instrument
chosen, the level of access targeted and the approach taken to its administration. The
influence of each is briefly outlined in the following paragraphs.
For the purpose of this research a detailed structured questionnaire was developed.
The need to obtain standard demographic information with regard to these
companies shaped the decision to employ a structured questionnaire. Moreover, the
nature of the information sought largely shaped the design of the structured
questionnaire. As outlined above, given the lacuna of empirical data with regard to
these companies this research sought broad demographic information with regard to
16 SMEs were defined to be any enterprise with a home base (head office or parent firm) in a developed country,
with at least one affiliate in another country and whose employment level in its home country is fewer than
500 people.
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the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs. To this end, three broad areas of focus were
developed. These were:
• Organ isational Structures and Business Activities - ownership, structural and
strategic characteristics of these MNCs, overseas geographical locations,
production integration.
• Structure of Employment - total employment figures, distribution of
employment, employment size of head office.
• Approaches to the management of selected JR and HR issues - the structure, size
and role of the FIR function, HR board representation, approaches to the
management of selected JR and 111k issues (domestic and overseas), the
frequency and role of employee consultation meetings (domestic and within
European operations), the frequency and role of managerial meetings (domestic
and group-wide), levels of unionisation, trade union recognition, membership
and role of employee association (domestic and overseas), the type and purpose
of information collected by head office from sites (domestic and overseas).
These areas, and the subsequent question content and phasing employed by the
survey, were informed by the approaches used by the second company level
industrial relations (CLIRS) survey, conducted by the University of Warwick in
1992. This addressed two key issues, namely the effect of multi-nationality of large
companies on their JR policies and practices within the UK and the impact of
financial budgeting and control mechanisms on the conduct of JR. The results
highlighted a range of structural and HR aspects of globalism. For example, it was
found that homogenous or common approaches are more likely within single product
or vertically integrated MNCs. Furthermore, CLIIRS found that the higher the degree
of product/service integration the greater the importance of labour costs and
performance indicators, particularly with respect to investment and divestment
decisions. In short, key to the results of the CLIRS survey was the impact of strategic
and structural characteristics in shaping approaches to the management of JR.
A number of the key issues addressed by this research lay at the core of the second
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CLIRS survey and, subsequently, the findings from CLIRS have influenced this
work (cf. Donnelly, 1996). Hence, respondents were questioned with regard to the
character of decision-making on a range of IR and HR issues at home and in
overseas sites. Issues were chosen to reflect different degrees of managerial
intervention. Responses were measured on a scale that ranged from complete
intervention by head office to complete autonomy to local sites, these included
instructladvise guidelines and autonomy. Given the overlap of focus between what
this thesis seeks to investigate and the results of the second CLIRS study, a number
of key questions were adopted from the CLIRS questionnaire and modified to the
Irish context. This provided the advantage of employing questions whose wording
and format had been previously tested and adjusted.
Given the small size of the study population and the type of information required,
personal direct interviews were chosen as the method of administering the survey.
The structured questionnaires were therefore administered through in-depth personal
interviews. As the information sought was of a group-wide nature, a head office
focus was adopted. A further factor that shaped this approach was the need to make
contact with key decision-makers, in order to elicit their co-operation and probe the
issue of participation in the second phase of this research process - the case-based
analysis. To this end, the highest level of access at head office was sought. In the
first instance the level of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) was targeted. In their
absence, the responses of senior FIR directors or chief financial officers were sought.
In order to secure a high level of access within these companies, a 'gatekeeper' was
identified. In this case, a senior executive on the management board of the Graduate
School of Business at University College Dublin was approaches. Having kindly
agreed to support this research, the 'gatekeeper' contacted the CEO of each of the
companies contained in the population and requested their co-operation and
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participation in this research (cf. appendix 2). This informal and personalised
approach proved to be highly successful, particularly given the size of the sample
and the size of the business environment within freland. Responses for fifteen out of
a total of twenty Irish MNCs (75% response rate) were obtained.
A combination of open-ended, multiple choice responses and dichotomous questions
were included (cf. appendix 5). This served to gather both 'factual' or numerical data
and more qualitative information. Often the dichotomous questions were 'twinned'
with multiple choice questions to cross-check the accuracy of information. A number
of information-specific and open-ended questions were also included and designed
to elicit information of both a formal and informal nature. The positioning of
questions was also a key concern with more factual and less sensitive questions
placed to the front of the questionnaire and more sensitive questions placed towards
the later parts of the questionnaire. For questions requiring data of a numerical
nature and/or requiring time to collate, a shortened version of the questionnaire was
sent to respondents prior to their interview. While facilitating the collection of more
detailed information, this also indicated the broad thrust of the research to the
respondent (cf. appendix 4).
4.4.3 Analysis of the Quantitative Data
Given the size of the sample obtained it was clear that an integrated software
programme such as SPSSx PC for Windows, which is designed for large data sets,
was not applicable. Given that the focus of this research was concerned with broad
demographic information, the data was coded and inputted into an Excel
spreadsheet, which facilitated the calculation of frequencies. As chapter five will
highlight, the data collected suggested a concentration or 'clustering' of companies
into certain industrial sectors. However, and importantly, while patterns of JR and
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HR behaviour were identified, this quantitative approach did not reveal the inter-
relatedness of variable or contextual influences. As a result a qualitative case-based
approach was subsequently pursued toward addressing the research questions posed.
4.5 THE QUALITATIVE COMPONENT
4.5.1 Case-based Research
As stated above, the core focus of this research concerns the approaches adopted by
Irish MNCs to the management of JR and HR. To this end, and in light of the
limitations of the quantitative research, a second stage of this research was
developed to examine the internal management processes and factors shaping the
approaches adopted by these Irish MNCs. This took the form of an inductive case-
based approach. Yin (1994: 13) describes such the case-based approach as an
investigation of a phenomenon 'within its real life context'. Similarly, Eisenhardt
(1989: 534) describes it as 'a research strategy which focuses on understanding the
dynamics present within single settings'. The rationale for adopting such an
approach in this research was threefold. Firstly, the research question necessitated an
examination of a variety of levels within each MNC. Case-based research provided a
more flexible approach toward the achievement this aim. Secondly, given the nature
of some of the information sought, responses from management and trade union
interpretations of corporate strategies were required to identify some of the more
salient dynamics 'in play'. Lastly, such an approach provided a certain degree of
flexibility that enabled the modification of the research tool as the research process
proceeded. Case study analysis was, therefore, chosen as the optimal method of data
collection for the second phase of this mixed methodological approach.
For reasons advanced in chapter three, a historical approach towards the case studies
was adopted. As Phelps Brown (1986: 18) writes: 'by-gone affairs were not
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transacted on another planet: the motives, reactions, and propensities displayed in
them are the same as those in play around us now. By studying them we enlarge and
sharpen our knowledge of them'. In order to identify factors that shape the
management of employment relationships, it was first necessary to first trace the
historical evolution of the companies and place them within a national and
competitive context. Such an approach attempts to obtain an 'interactive' and
'contextual' perspective. This approach, which is both structural, historical and
analytical, encompasses the historical and contingent nature of the processes, which
facilitates an examination of the underlying shaping forces. By attempting to fix
meaning through circumstances, as described in the paragraphs above, the approach
taken in the second phase of this research may be categorised as 'contextual'.
Tsoukas (1994: 767), drawing on Pepper's 'World Hypotheses', argues that historic
events, the 'root metaphor' of a contextual approach, 'always have a certain quality
and texture which continuously initiate into something novel over time'. Therefore,
what the contextual approach lacks in its contribution to universally applicable
theory, he argues is redeemed by its ability to provide 'loose frameworks [within
which] rich portrait[s] of change episodes may be painted' (Tsoukas, 1994: 769).
4.5.2 The Selection of the Case Companies and Nature of the Cases
Eisenhardt (1989: 537) states that the 'goal of theoretical sampling is to choose cases
which are likely to replicate or extend the emergent theory'. In keeping, the case
study companies chosen for the second phase of this research were selected from the
sectoral clustering of Irish-owned MNCs as highlighted by the survey results in order
to extend the examination of the finding highlighted in chapter five. To this end, one
case company was selected from each of the clay, cement and glass; dairy and food;
financial services; and, print and packaging sectors. At the same time, the selection
of the case companies represents a cross-section of the differences revealed by the
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survey with regard to size, product diversification and approach to selected IR and
FIR issues of Irish MINCs. The AlE Group, for example, provides a 'contrast case' in
terms of product diversification and approach to JR and HR dimensions.
Consequently, a set of four companies was selected for the case analysis phase of
this research. It was necessary to attempt to capture this degree of diversity in the
case companies if a tentative picture of Irish-owned MNC behaviour was to be
drawn in the later chapters.
Roche (1998b: 106) suggests that, in choosing cases and developing a case design,
the logic should be 'closely associated with the type of theory or the level of
theoretical development, or with the theoretical purpose'. Roche provides a
categorisation of approaches based upon this logic. It is reproduced here in figure
4.1.
FIGu 4.1 THE LOGIC OF SELECTING RESEARCH CASE STUDIES
Types or Levels of Theory
C)	 C)	 C)
-1
nsetaphors/	 hunches and conjectures	 loosely related propositions
	 Set of propositions	 integrated models
	 deductive
analytical schemes
	 models
FormalI	 Exploratory
Theory	 Explanatory	 I
I heory
Research Designs
Exploratory	 focused on
Research Designs	 Confirmation/
Falsification
	C)	 C)	 C)	 C)	 C)
	
exploratory case(s)
	 bounded' case(s)
	
'variable range' cases and	 'synthetic' case reviews	 systematic multiple
'critical cases
	 and case surveys	 case designs
Types of Case Study Designs
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Given that this research is exploratory rather than explanatory in nature, and that the
cases seek to advance the 'hunches and conjectures' from the literature and 'loosely
related propositions' from the survey toward a more 'grounded' set of propositions,
the cases presented here are 'bounded cases'. As Roche (1998b) explains, there are
limits to the generalisations that can be abstracted out to the entire population of
Irish-owned MNCs from such 'bounded cases'. Hence, while these case analyses do
not claim to fully represent the population of Irish-owned MNCs as a whole and thus
to provide 'formal explanatory theories', they do attempt to work toward some
propositions enabling a fuller understanding of the internal operations of a number
of Irish-owned MNCs. As such, the findings outlined in chapters ten, eleven and
twelve add to the literature and provide the foundations for further research in this
area.
4.5.3 In-depth Interviewing
As outlined above, the second phase of the research process is concerned with an
investigation of the internal processes and factors that shape IR and FIR approaches
within the selected case companies. To this end, semi-structured questionnaires were
administered through in-depth interviewing of a number of different stakeholders
within selected companies. This section outlines the details of these toward the
development of the cases.
As stated earlier, this research is primarily head office focused. However, given that
a core objective was to examine the internal processes and practices, two levels of
the organisational structure were addressed within each case: head office level and
local subsidiary level. Within the head offices of each case, three functional areas
were targeted - the HR function, the corporate finance function and the corporate
112
in each of these functional areas, across each case company. Where possible, in-
depth interviewing was also conducted with divisional managers for product areas or
geographical regions. Moreover, within some of the cases the head office HR
function was further divided into IR and HR departments. In those cases interviews
were conducted with senior management in each department. At a local level, in-
depth interviewing occurred with managing directors of both Irish-based and a UK-
based subsidiaries in an attempt to examine differences in the approaches adopted by
Irish-owned MNCs at home and overseas. With some cases it was also possible to
obtain the responses of financial managers at local levels.
In addition, the perceptions of employee representatives with regard to the
development of these companies were also sought. In-depth interviews with trade
union officials from both 'white-collar' and 'blue-collar' unions were carried out.
Access to blue-collar or trade union representatives proved was difficult however,
with the case companies tending to refer the author to white-collar trade unions.
Hence the interviews were skewed somewhat toward white-collar representatives.
As a result, the employee representative perspective was supplemented by interviews
with key trade union officials at Congress level and from SIPTU. This data was also
augmented with interviews with 'key informants'. These included individuals who
were employed by the company at key turning points in its development and retired
managers who provided a more longitudinal account of the Group's development.
A total of thirty-nine interviews were conducted between 1994 and 1996. In three of
the cases chosen, ten responses were obtained and in the fourth case nine responses
were obtained. More exploratory and reflexive than the survey interviews, these
interviews lasted for approximately two hours. In some cases follow up discussions
occurred with both the HR directors/managers and trade union officials in the years
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Clondalkin Group Head Office Level
Group Finance Director
Group Corp. Development
Head of Irish Operations
Head of UK Operations
CRH Group Head Office Level
Group HR Director
Group Financial Manager
Group Corp. Development
Head of Irish Operations
from 1997 to 1999, which enabled the clarification and further probing of key points
(cf. table 4.2).
TABLE 4.2: CASE RESPONDENTS BY COMPANY AND LEVEL
Subsidiary Level
	 Subsidiary Level
Managing Director (Ire.) 	 Managing Director (Ire.)
Managing Director (UK)	 Managing Director (UK)
Finance Manager (Ire.)
Employee Reps.	 Employee Reps.
MSF Shop Steward
	 SIPTU Official
ICTU Representative	 ICTU Representative
Key Informants
	 Key Informants
Retired Executive	 Retired Local Man
Greencore
Group Head Office Level
Group HR Director
Group Financial Manager
Group Corp. Planning
Worker Director
Subsidiary Level
Managing Director (Ire.)
Managing Director (UK)
Finance Manager (Ire.)
Employee Reps.
SIPTU Official
MSF Official
AIB Group	 Head Office Level
Group HR Director
Group Staff Relations
Group Corp. Planning
Group Financial Manager
Group Training & Devel.
Subsidiary Level
Branch Manager (Ire.)
FIR Manager (UK)
Employee Reps.
Senior IBOA Official
Key Informants	 Key Informants
Retired Union Official 	 Branch Managers (x2)
Given that this research sought to investigate in greater depth issues identified in the
survey, a more reflexive approach was adopted. However, in order to maintain
consistency with the structure of the survey, while at the same time enabling more
probing of issues indicated by respondents, a partially structured questionnaire was
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employed. The focus of the semi-structured questionnaire differed somewhat with
respect to the information sought. The areas addressed in these interviews included:
• At head office level: issues addressed included the determination of IR and HR
strategies, the role of the head office function, the approach to the management
of JR and HR in Ireland and overseas.
• At divisional levels: - issues addressed concerned the role of the division in the
management of IR and FIR issues, the role of the 'centre', levels of corporate
control, the approach to the management of operations.
• At local subsidiary level: - issues examined included the degree of local
autonomy, the role of the 'centre', the management of JR and HR issues,
financial and non-financial controls.
• At employee representative level: - issues explored concerned the approach of
the company to the management of IR and HR issues, key JR turning points in
the development of the group, levels of trade union density, collective bargaining
structures, employee involvement and participation.
The main method used in the cases was in-depth semi-structured interviews, which
May (1997: 94) refers to as providing 'qualitative depth by allowing interviewees to
talk about the subject in terms of their own "frames of reference". This allows the
meanings and interpretations that individuals attribute to events and relationships to
be understood [and] provides a greater understanding of the subject's point of view'.
The interviews sought to reveal the meaning underlying management actions and
approaches rather than to standardise the information. In the interest of
confidentiality and in order to protect the individual respondents, direct quotations
are used in the preceding analysis to give emphasis to key points, but individual
respondents are not identified.
4.5.4 The Use of Secondary Data Sources
The case-based research component of this thesis drew extensively from a number of
published data. However, given the recency with which these organisations have
evolved there was a paucity of archival data concerning the development of some
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cases. While they would have proved extremely useful for this study, longitudinal
trade union density figures for across sites and employee categories were not
obtainable. At neither trade union nor management levels are such figures recorded
in Ireland. In lieu of these figures, respondents provided estimates of current
percentages where possible. Despite these limitations, the following secondary data
sources were examined: company annual reports, in-company newsletters, company
websites, newspaper articles, Government and company archival data, personal
correspondence of key business people held by the National and other university
libraries, stockbroking reports (such as InvesText), trade union publications, internal
company documents (internal strategic documentation and papers presented by
senior management at conferences), the IRN and ERR, labour court submissions,
industrial consultancy reports, and unpublished theses. The data obtained from these
secondary sources was largely used to supplement existing interview data and was
found to be particularly useful in validating a number of key points. Furthermore, at
times the secondary source data highlighted key IR turning points in the histories of
these companies. This facilitated a retrospective 'revisiting' of key IR events in light
of current approaches.
4.5.5 'Inter' and 'Intra' Case Analysis
The case study analysis occurs at both 'intra' and 'inter' case levels. 'Intra' case
analysis, or what Eisenhardt (1989) refers to as 'within-case analysis', was firstly
addressed so as to place each case company within their given context, each telling
its own 'stand-alone story'. As Eisenhardt (1989: 540) writes:
Within-case analysis typically involves detailed case study write-ups for each
site. These write-ups are often simply pure descriptions, but they are central
to the generation of insight because they help researchers to cope early in the
analysis process with the enormous volume of data.
Thus, in order to identify factors that shape each company's 'story' with regard to
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their approach to IR and HR. it was necessary to trace the historical evolution of the
companies. These findings are reported in chapters six through to nine.
Following this, the analysis turned towards 'inter' case analysis or what is referred to
as cross-case analysis. This stage of analysis attempts to identify 'cross-case'
patterns. For the purpose of this research, key attributes or features across a number
of Irish MNCs were assessed. Categories and dimensions that emerged from the
survey were chosen and the cases were examined as a group to identify similarities
and inter-group differences (i.e., within-group similarity and across-group
differences). The results of this stage of analysis are reported in chapter ten. In this
manner, chapter ten addresses the primary research question: an examination of the
approaches adopted by Irish-owned MNCs to the management of JR and to the
management of HR.
Having defined a set of common patterns and variations across cases, the next stage
was to compare those patterns with key premises contained in the literature, in order
to identify points of variation and particularity. As Eisenhardt (1989: 539) writes,
'analysing data is the heart of building theory from case studies, but it is both the
most difficult and the least codified part of the process'. This process is a largely
iterative process comparing data and theory, comparing the merging concepts with
the extant literature so as to uncover the underlying rationale or logic for the
similarities and differences. By identifying and relating the key attributes common to
the case companies examined to broad literatures, features particular to the Irish case
are identified. In so doing, chapter eleven addresses the secondary research question:
the extent and degree to which the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs is distinctive or
'particular' to the Irish case.
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4.6 CoNcLusioN
This chapter has outlined the main methodological issues encountered in this
research process and the approaches subsequently chosen toward a greater
understanding of IR and HR within Irish-owned MNCs. Given the gap with regard to
the nature of the object of inquiry, this thesis is not so much concerned with
generalisable theory as with uncovering and understanding a novel object of
research. Hence, the research reported on in the following chapters is of an
exploratory rather than explanatory nature. It is largely a theory building rather than
a theory-testing exercise and it consequently adopts an inductive approach.
A multi-method approach, combining a 'first phase' of a quantitative questionnaire-
based survey and a 'second phase' of qualitative cases-based analysis was employed
in this research. The main criticism often levied at case study analysis centres on
issues of representatives and generalisability. While accepting the limitations of the
case study approach in general, this method allows for the examination of internal
variations in management processes. While bearing in mind the main criticisms
leveled against exploratory qualitative research, the method outlined here works
toward a number of tentative propositions with respect to the primary and secondary
research questions identified. At the same time, it addresses a gap in our knowledge
with regard to the behaviour of these companies and provides a firm basis for
trajectories of future research. Informed by this chapter, chapter five now reports on
the results of the first quantitative phase of the research - the questionnaire-based
survey.
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CHAPTER 5
SURVEY RESULTS: IRISH-OWNED MNCs IN PROFILE
Chapter five, the first 'results' chapter, reports on the findings of a questionnaire-based survey into the
behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs. The chapter begins by setting out the broad demography of these
companies. More specifically, it outlines the internationalisation strategies, size, sectoral location, the
organisational forms, degree of integration and approaches adopted by Irish-owned MNCs towards
the management of selected IR and HR issues, at home and overseas. Drawing on the approach of the
second CURS survey, this research selects seven JR and HR issues from which to assess the
approaches of Irish-owned MNCs. Similar to previous research, these results suggest a concentration
of Irish-owned MNCs within a small number of traditional or resource-based sectors. The chapter
concludes by highlighting a number of sectoral models found to exist among Irish-owned MNCs.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Given the paucity of empirical research regarding Irish MNCs, this thesis was driven
by a need to establish a profile of Irish-owned MNCs. To this end, a questionnaire-
based survey was devised and a sample population defined. Given the lack of
knowledge with regard to the behaviour of these companies and following on from
the results of the second CLIRS survey, three broad areas of focus were identified.
These were the broad demography of the structure and composition of these
organisations, their distribution and structure of employment and lastly their
approach to the management of selected IR and HR issues. Of a wider concern was
establishing the disparity between the management of JR and the management of HR
at home and within European operations. This chapter reports on the findings of this
exploratory survey.
This chapter is structured into five sections. Prior to reporting on the results of the
survey, section one outlines the main expectations arising from the second CLIRS
survey and briefly restates the main tenets of this survey of Irish-owned MNCs.
Section two sketches a broad profile of the composition of Irish-owned MNCs, their
internationalisation strategies, organisational forms, sectoral locations, and size,
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particularly addressing the inter-relationships between these factors. The third
section describes the management of selected IR and HR issues within Irish-owned
MNCs and the collection and utilisation of local performance indicators. The chapter
concludes by outlining a number of issues for further examination in the case study
analysis.
5.2 THE SURVEY APPROACH
While chapter four outlined the research process and methods employed, it is worth
briefly restating the main tenets of the questionnaire-based survey, prior to reporting
on the results. To recap in brief, using the defining criteria of a European-scale MNC
as adopted from the EWC Directive, a conservative sample population of twenty
Irish-owned MNCs was identified. Given that the focus is firmly placed on the
approaches adopted by Irish-owned MNCs to the management of IR and the
management of HR, this research is primarily head office focused. To this end, the
survey sought information concerning the group as a whole and the approaches
promoted at a head office level towards the management of IR and HR. In light of
breath and depth of information required, and in order to identify potential case
companies, the most senior levels of these companies were targeted. Failing access
to the chief executive level, the response of the head office HR director was sought.
In their absence the most senior manager responsible for the employment
relationship was targeted. As table 5.1 highlights, that responsibility was often
within the remit of the chief financial officer. In total responses for fifteen Irish-
owned MNCs were obtained. Of the fifteen Irish MNCs surveyed, thirteen are
wholly Irish-owned, while the remaining two have shared ownership between the
UK and Ireland. Table 5.1 outlines the breakdown of respondents according to their
role and responsibilities. The findings from the questionnaires administered to these
individuals are presented in the sections that follow.
120
TABLE 5.1: PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS
Position	 Number
HR Director/Manager 	 9
CEO/Regional or Divisional Head
	 5
Finance Director/Manager 	 1
Total
	
15
As earlier stated the focus and content of this survey has been guided by the results
of the second CLIRS survey (cf. chapter four for a brief description). Its findings
indicated an inter-relationship between the strategic and structural characteristics of
large companies and their approach to the management of JR and the management of
HR. In short, the findings of the CLIRS survey highlight a number of key
expectations that result from the organisational form and composition of MNCs. In
other words, it was found that the form of divisionalisation and the degree of
diversification shape the approach adopted by MNCs towards their employment
relationship and that such approaches were largely issue-driven.
More specifically, the results of the second CURS survey suggest that the degree of
production integration is a 'key factor' in shaping the degree of centralisation of JR
decisions (Marginson et al., 1994). The degree of production integration and the
centralisation of JR decision-making were found to be positively related - the greater
the degree of diversification the more likely the existence of common JR policies
and the degree of centralised JR decision-making. A key expectation is thus that a
centralised approach is more likely within dominant or single businesses and,
conversely, that a decentralised approach is more likely within related and
conglomerate businesses. The degree of divisionalisation is another factor purported
to exert a 'key influence' on the conduct of JR (Purcell and Ahlstrand, 1994). One of
the main consequences of divisionalised organisational forms is the decentralisation
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of JR and FIR decision making to divisional or local levels. In short, the
organisational form, divisionalisation and the degree of diversification was found to
inform the management of JR and HR within MNCs.
5.3 IRISH-OWNED MNCs IN PROFILE
Perceptions of Irish-owned MNCs within Ireland tend to be of large long established
national success stories, rather than of small or medium-sized multinational
companies with substantial employment overseas (O'Malley, 1998). This is not
surprising given, as chapter three highlighted, the smallness and recency of the
internationalisation of the Irish economy. To counter this dated perception and place
this research in a broader context the following sections provide background
information arising from the survey on the domestic and overseas operations of
Irish-owned MNCs.
5.3.1 Size and Distribution of Employment
Despite their recent entry into international markets, Irish-owned MNCs are ranked
among the Nation's largest indigenous employers (Business and Finance, 1994). As
table 5.2 illustrates, most Irish-owned MNCs (n=1 1) employ between 1,000 and
10,000 employees group-wide, with over a third (n=6) employing less than 5,000
people. The four largest Irish MNCs - employing over 10,000 people worldwide -
are either located in the financial services sector or were among the first indigenous
companies to internationalise during the 1970s. In contrast, the smallest Irish-owned
MNCs (n=6) are located in the food sector or are industrial holding companies.
While employment figures suggest that Irish-owned MNCs are large in domestic
terms, they are small to medium sized employers relative to their European or
international counterparts.
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TABLE 5.2: EMPLOYMENT SIZE OF IRISH MNCs (1994)
	
1+	 100+	 1,000+	 5,000+ 10,000^
Top 1,000 Companies	 412	 517	 48	 6	 8
Irish MNCs	 -	 -	 6	 5	 4
Source: Business and Finance (1994)
In 1994, Irish-owned MNCs collective employment represented roughly 10% of the
total Irish labour force. However, this picture of Irish-owned MNCs as large
indigenous employers changes dramatically when the employment distributions of
these companies are examined. The survey revealed that most (n=1 1) Irish-owned
MNCs employ significantly numbers outside of Ireland. Less than a third of all
people employed by these companies is located in Ireland (cf. table 5.3). The UK
was found to account for the largest percentage of overseas employees, almost as
large a proportion as the Irish-based share.
A large proportion of Irish-owned MNCs (n=11) have operations located in
mainland Europe, although most (n=8) employ less than 20% of their total
employment base there. On average, Irish-owned MNCs employ a third (29%) of
employees within Ireland, a quarter (26%) within the UK and less than a tenth (9%)
within mainland Europe. Of those Irish-owned MNCs without European operations,
American operations (n=3) account for the remainder of their employees. One Irish-
owned MNC was found to have employees solely located within the UK and Ireland.
Irish-owned MNCs with large domestic employment bases (n=4) were found to be
either in the financial services sector or State-owned. Irish-owned MNCs within the
financial sector were found to be the largest domestic employers, while the smallest
domestic employers are industrial holding companies and those MNCs within the
Print, Paper and Packaging sectors. Irish industrial holding MNCs have significantly
larger employment bases located within the UK than in Ireland.
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TABLE 5.3: EMPLOYMENT DISTRIBUTIONS ACCORDING TO SECTOR (1994).
Main Activity	 Total Group	 % in	 % in UK % in other
Employment Ireland	 European
Food &Dairy	 3,000	 17	 67	 1
Food & Dairy
	
6,348	 49	 40	 5
Food & Dairy	 2,250	 33	 50	 17
Food&Dairy	 1,840	 92	 1	 7
Electrical & Engineering	 4,800	 15	 60	 16
Financial Services
	
16,000	 50	 6	 -
Financial Services
	
12,000	 70	 12	 -
Clay, Cement & Glass	 9,000	 17	 78	 -
Clay, Cement & Glass	 14,000	 22	 23	 29
Industrial Holding
	
5,000	 10	 90	 -
Industrial Holding
	
1,828	 12	 65	 23
Print & Packaging	 34,500	 6	 13	 9
Print & Publishing	 9,000	 17	 2	 18
Print & Packaging	 2,340	 22	 10	 21
Transport	 5,556	 76	 16	 2
Total	 127,462	 36,915	 32,791	 11,247
Overall percentages 	 (29%)	 (26%)	 (9%)
In short, the employment distributions of Irish-owned MNCs suggest a size and
sectoral effects.' 7
 Large Irish-owned MNCs operating in the manufacturing sector
(n=2) have a small proportion of employees located within Ireland and a large
proportion located in mainland Europe. Large Irish-owned MNCs operating within
the service-sector (n=2) are large domestic employers and have no mainland
European operations. However, small Irish-owned MNCs tend to engage in
manufacturing activities and employ a larger proportion of employees in the UK
than in Ireland. Medium-sized Irish-owned MNCs are more likely to have the
" 
'Large' MNCs are defined as employing over 10,000 employees group-wide, 'Medium' MNCs as employing
between 5,000- 10,000 group-wide, and 'Small' MNCs as employing between 1,000- 5,000 group-wide.
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7
4
3
2
2
1
1
20
28,462
10,426
45,840
28,000
23,000
4,800
5,556
146,084
Food and Dairy
Industrial Holding
Print, Paper & Publishing
Financial Services
Clay, Cement & Glass
Electrical and Engineering
Transport
Total
majority of their employees within Ireland and the UK, with few or no mainland
European sites.
5.3.2 Sectoral Location
Table 5.4 outlines the sectoral location of Irish-owned MNCs, clearly highlighting
their concentration within such diverse sectors as, Food and Dairy, Print and
Packaging, Clay, Cement and Glass, Electrical Engineering, Financial Services and
Transportation. In addition, a substantial proportion (n=4) operate as industrial
holding companies. Across the sectors, ten Irish-owned MNCs where found to be
involved in manufacturing while the remaining five operate in service sectors. These
results suggest the sectoral concentration of Irish-owned MNCs in what Lynch and
Roche (1996) define to be 'traditional' or 'resource-based' industries.' 8 They also
reaffirm earlier findings by O'Malley (1985), who found indigenous industry to be
clustered in sectors that afforded some degree of national or natural protection, such
as Food, Clay, Cement and Glass, Paper and Printing, and Drink and Tobacco. This
survey found that Irish MNCs broadly remain located within similar sectors. They
have not emerged within what are generally seen as the more dynamic, modem or
technological sectors where foreign MNCs tend to operate in Ireland (cf. table 5.4).
TABLE 5.4: SECTORAL LOCATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF IRISH-OWNED MNCs
Main Sector	 Number	 Total Employment
18 Lynch and Roche (1996) define 'traditional' sectors as long established mature industries and 'resource-
based' sectors as those concerned with low value-added processing of local resources.
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5.3.3 The Internationalisation of Irish-owned MNCs
Table 5.5 demonstrates that acquisitional growth strategies are the most prevalent
means of internationalisation among fish MNCs. After organic growth strategies,
mergers and joint ventures are the least popular means of growth. In keeping with
the findings of O'Malley (1992), this research indicates that Irish companies have
become multinational predominately through the acquisition of foreign entities. It
confirms that acquisitions are the preferred means of promoting corporate growth
and that the UK and mainland Europe are the preferred locations for overseas
locations. The sectors found to dominate acquisition activity are Food, Financial
Services, Construction and Property, and the Packaging and Paper sectors - sectors
that Irish companies have traditionally gravitated toward.'9
TABLE 5.5: GROWTH STRATEGIES OF IRISH-OWNED MNCs
Type of Growth Strategy 	 Most Prevalent (n=)
Acquisition of local companies 	 10
Merger or Joint Ventures	 2
Investment in Greenfield Sites 	 3
Total
	 15
In addition to locating in the UK, Irish MNCs tend to acquire operations in Northern
European countries. As table 5.6 illustrates, all Irish MNCs have operations within
the UK, while most (n=1 1) have operations in mainland Europe. Within mainland
Europe, Irish-owned MNCs locate, in order of popularity, within Belgium, Germany
and the Netherlands. While Eastern Europe has recently emerged as a new growth
Sectors found to dominate acquisitional activity levels included Food and Agribusiness, Financial Services
(13%), Construction and Property (10%) and Print and Packaging (6%) sectors. Irish acquisitional activity was
found to be concentrated within the UK (44%) and other European countries (15%).
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region for fish-owned MNCs, there appears to be a lack of interest in locating in
Scandinavian countries.
TABLE 5.6: PREFERRED EuRoPEAN LOCATIONS OF IRISH-OWNED MNCs
Country
	
	 Number of MNCs	 Number of sites
with sites located in those countries (with 100+ employees)
Belgium	 7	 1
Germany	 6	 3
Netherlands	 6	 4
France	 4	 2
Spain	 4	 1
Eastern Europe	 3	 -
Switzerland	 2	 -
Denmark	 1	 -
Italy	1 	 -
5.4 STRATEGIC AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF IRISH-OWNED MNCs
Having sketched a profile of the demography of Irish-owned MNCs, this chapter
now turns to an examination of the inter-relationship between their organisational
forms and their degree of production or service integration. To this end, the
divisionalisation and diversification of fish-owned MNCs are firstly outlined. To
briefly reiterate, the main finding of the second CLIRS survey was that the strategy
and structures of companies exert an important influence on the approach of MNCs
to the management of their employment relationships.
5.4.1 Divisionalisation Structures and Diversification Strategies (Ireland)
The process of divisionalisation is posited to be a structural response to
diversification (Chandler, 1962), to rising transaction costs (Williamson, 1975) and
even institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). It is also seen as a
'key influence' on the conduct of JR and I-JR (Purcell and Ahlstrand, 1994).
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Divisionalised forms of organisation have predominated among large companies in
the Anglo-Saxon world, notably those originating from the UK and the US.
Divisionalisation refers to the disaggregation of operations into quasi-independent
units and organisation into structures that correspond to market segments or
geographical regions. The devolution of financial accountability and operational
decision-making to these semi-independent units, while maintaining co-ordination at
head office is a key part of this process.
In assessing the degree to which the process of divisionalisation has occurred within
Irish-owned MNCs, respondents were asked to identify the basis for the organisation
of their domestic businesses. As table 7 shows, the domestic operations of most
Irish-owned MNCs (n=8) are not divisionalised. In only seven cases were
divisionalised structures found to prevail along product and/or territory lines.
TABLE 5.7: ORGAMSATIONAL STRUCTURES OF IRISH-OWNED MNCs (IRELAND)
Basis of Divisionalisation	 Number of MNCs
Stand alone units (no divisions)	 8
Divisionalisation along Product Lines	 5
Divisionalised along Product and	 2
Territory Lines
Total
	
15
For the purpose of this research, diversification is taken to refer to the expansion of
an existing firm into an industry that it has not previously been involved in. Using
measures of product diversification defined by Channon (1973), it was found that
most Irish-owned MNCs operate within either related (n=8) or dominant businesses
(n=6). 2° No Irish-owned MNCs were found to operate as conglomerates and only
20 This measure for diversification asked respondents whether they operated in a single business (where one
business accounted for 90% or more of total sales); a dominant business (where any single business accounted
for between 70-90% of total sales); a related business (where no one single business accounted for more than
70% of sales); or as a conglomerate (number of unrelated businesses).
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one defined itself as a single business company (table 5.8). Moreover, neither
employment nor size were found to be defining characteristics in the nature and
extent of MNC product diversification. Large Irish MNCs are not more likely to
operate in unrelated businesses, and smaller MNCs are not more likely to operate in
single, dominant businesses. Indeed, some of the larger MNCs were found to operate
in dominant businesses.
TABLE 5.8: DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES OF IRISH MNCS (CHANNON MEASURE)
Diversification Measure	 Number
Single (one business accounts for 90% or more of total sales) 	 1
Dominant (any one business accounts for between 70-90% of total sales)
	 6
Related (no one single business accounts for more than 70% of total sales) 	 8
Conglomerate (number of related businesses) 	 -
However, a clear division was found between service and manufacturing MNCs.
Irish-owned service industry MNCs were found to operate within dominant
businesses whereas manufacturing MNCs tend to operate within related businesses.
A sectoral effect was noted in that Food MNCs were found to operate within related
businesses, while Financial Services and Industrial Holding companies tend to
operate within dominant businesses.
In order to assess the influence of the degree of production integration and
geographical dispersion on the conduct of IR and HR. the spatial diversification of
Irish MNCs was also investigated. 21 Most Irish MNCs (n=9) were found to have
little production integration and were more likely to produce different goods at
different sites. Only three MNCs were found to integrate their production systems or
operations, producing the same goods or services at the same sites, and a further
21 Respondents were asked if sites produced different products/services at different sites, produced the same
products/services at the same sites or produce the same products at some, but not all sites.
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three respondents produce the same goods or services at some but not all sites. Table
5.9 shows that service sector MNCs are more integrated in the provision of their
services than manufacturing MNCs. Size and integration were also found to be
positively related. More specifically, it was found that the larger the MNC the more
likely that production is integrated across sites. This also suggests a sectoral effect,
with the larger integrated MNCs found to be located within the financial services
sector. The nature of the business appears to influence the degree and extent of
integration within Irish-owned MNCs. MNCs in the finance sector were found to
have higher degrees of production integration than those in the food and print and
packaging sectors.
TABLE 5.9: INTEGRATION ACCORDING TO SECTOR
Main Sector
Food & Dairy
Industrial Holding
Print, Paper & Publishing
Financial Services
Clay, Cement & Glass
Electrical & Engineering
Transport
Total
Same
2
1
3
Different
3
2
2
2
9
Same at some
1
1
1
3
5.4.2 Divisionalisation Structures and Diversification Strategies (Overseas)
Turning to the international structures of Irish-owned MNCs, table 5.10 illustrates
that most (n10) are organised according to product lines, either in the form of
international business divisions or as SBUs. Few Irish-owned MNCs (n=4) have
separate stand-alone international divisions. The survey findings suggest that Irish-
owned manufacturing MNCs are more likely to organise along business lines while
those located in service sectors tend to organise along geographical lines. While
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there is strong evidence to suggest that fish-owned MNCs have adopted
divisionalised organisational forms at this stage the extent to which this structuring
has been accompanied by the devolution of financial and operational responsibility
remains unclear.
TABLE 5.10: INTERNATIONAL STRuCTUREs OF IRISH-OWNED MNCs (OVERSEAS)
Basis of Divisionalisation	 Number
International product-based organi sation 	 10
(includes international business divisions, international SBUs)
Separate 'international' division (stand-alone)	 2
Mixture of International product-based and separate
	 2
international divisions
Other	 1
Total
	
15
5.5 THE NATURE OF HRM IN IRISH-OWNED MNCs
This section examines the nature and size of the 'centre' or head office of Irish-
owned MNCs, the structure of their FIRM functions and where these functions exist,
and finally FIR representation at board level as a measure of the corporate emphasis
placed on HRM. As table 5.11 outlines, most (n=10) fish-owned MNCs have
designated head-office 1-IR functions. Size is positively related to the provision of
HRM in Irish-owned MNCs. The larger MNCs (in employment terms) the more
likely that there is a I-JR function at head office level. Irish-owned MNCs employing
over 5,000 worldwide are more likely to have a designated FIR department at head
office. The HR functions of Irish-owned MNCs at head office tend to be small with
most (n=7) employing less than ten people. The remaining three MNCs with HR at
head office employ between 20 and 61 people. A strong sectoral effect is evident
from the results. It was found that MNCs in service sectors tend to have large
corporate I-JR departments. Of those MNCs without head office designated HR
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functions (n=5), two are industrial holding companies, two are in Print and
Packaging and the other in the Electrical Engineering sector. Moreover, it was found
that in all except the privately owned Electrical MNC, specialist managerial staff
spent a significant proportion of their time dealing with FIRM issues.
TABLE 5.11: PROVISION OF FIR RELATIVE TO TOTAL EMPLOYMENT
Employment Size	 HR Department	 No HR Department
1,000 —4,999
	 3	 3
5,000 - 9,999	 3	 2
10,000+	 4	 -
Total
	 10	 5
Furthermore, the size of HR departments was found to be related to overall head
office size. Irish-owned MNCs (n=9) tend to have small head offices (employing
less than 50 people) relative to their international counterparts. Of the remainder,
three have medium-sized head offices (employing between 50 and 500 people), and
three have large head offices (employing between 500 and 5,000 people). No
correlation was found between the overall head office size and the MNC itself.
However, a sectoral effect did emerge, with industrial holding and food MNCs
tending to have the smallest head offices and those engaging in service industries the
largest. As table 5.12 illustrates, most Irish-owned MNCs with small head offices
tend not to have a FIR function as compared with those MNCs with larger head
offices. In all of the MNCs with small head offices and a HR function (n=4), their
departments employed less than three people. Of those with small or medium-sized
HR functions (n=7) five are diversified into related businesses. The survey results
suggest that the larger the Irish-owned MNC the greater the head office designated
HR function.
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TABLE 5.12: PROVISION OF FIR RELATIVE TO THE SIzE OF THE HEAD OFFICE
HQ Size	 No HR Dept Small	 Medium	 Large	 Total
	
(1-3)	 (4-9)	 (10+)
Lessthan50	 5	 4	 -	 -	 9
50-499	 -	 1	 1	 1	 3
500+	 -	 -	 1	 2	 3
Despite the provision of HR at head office level among Irish-owned MNCs, FIRM
representation on management boards was not found to be common. In most Irish-
owned MNCs (n=11) 1-IRM was not represented at board level. Of the four
companies with representation, most (n=3) had a specialist HR function at head
office.
Results of the survey show that Irish-owned MNCs have levels of unionisation that
are higher than the average within Ireland. As table 5.13 illustrates, over half of the
respondents have between 75% and 100% unionisation within Ireland. Given this, it
is not surprisingly that most Irish-owned MNCs (n=12) have the majority (if not all)
of their home operations unionised, while only one was found to be non-unionised.
All Irish MNCs surveyed recognise trade unions for the purpose of negotiating pay
and working conditions and it was found that there has been no change to this policy
in the last five years. Most Irish-owned MNCs (n=13) belong to the Irish Employers'
Association (IBEC), who primarily adopt an advisory role. In only one case was
IBEC found to pay a representative role in local negotiations.
TABLE 5.13: UN1ONISATION LEVELS IN IRISH-OWNED MNCS
Level of Unionisation	 Number of MNCs
0-24%
	 2
25-49%
	 2
50-74%
	 3
75 - 100%
	
8
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In assessing the nature and degree of head office involvement with respect to the
conduct of IR and HR, respondents were questioned about the role that head office
adopts toward a number of IR and HR issues. Following CLIRS a number of issues
were selected, some heavily regulated by state legislation and others more openly
defined by managerial choice. 22 Possible responses ranged from complete instruction
to total autonomy. With regard to domestic operations, Irish-owned MNCs were
found more likely to 'instruct' on issues concerning pay negotiation and redundancy
terms. Moreover, they were found more likely to 'advise' on issues relating to trade
union recognition, employee consultation and involvement and membership to
employer associations. In contrast, Irish-owned MNCs are more likely to devolve
complete 'autonomy' to local levels on issues such as the design of the payment
system, numbers employed and the length of the working week (cf. table 5.14). This
suggests that Irish MNCs devolve greater autonomy with regard to IR and HR issues
that are more open to managerial discretion and less to issues governed by national
legislation.
TABLE 5.14: APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF IR AND HR (IRELAND)
Issues	 Instruct/Advise/Guidelines Autonomy
Member of Employer Association 	 8	 5
Trade Union Recognition 	 9	 4
Design of Pay Systems	 9	 5
Numbers Employed	 8	 5
Consultation & Involvement 	 9	 4
Negotiation of Annual Pay 	 12	 3
Terms of Redundancy 	 12	 3
Length of Working Week 	 9	 6
However, a much more decentralised approach is adopted toward overseas
operations. The findings clearly indicate that Irish-owned MNCs are more
22 Possible responses ranged from 'instruct', 'advise', 'issue guidelines', and 'grant autonomy' or 'other'.
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decentralised in their approach to the management of IR and HR issues in their
overseas operations than domestically (cf. table 5.15). Again it was found that fish-
owned MNCs adopt a more instructive role on such financially related IR issues as
the terms of redundancies, pay negotiation and the design of the pay systems. With
regard to other issues such as consultation and involvement structures, membership
to employers association and trade union recognition in overseas sites, Irish-owned
MNCs are also more likely to issue guidelines than advise.
TABLE 5.15: APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF IR AND HR (OVERSEAS)
Issues	 Instruct/Advise/Guidelines Au
Member of Employer Association 	 5	 8
Trade Union Recognition 	 6	 8
Design of Pay Systems	 6	 9
Numbers Employed
	 5	 9
Consultation & Involvement 	 6	 8
Negotiation of Annual Pay 	 7	 8
Terms of Redundancy 	 7	 7
Length of Working Week	 6	 9
Approaches to JR and HR were found to be strongly related to the nature and degree
of integration between sites. More particularly, fish-owned MNCs with no trading
relationship between sites are more likely to be decentralised in their management of
JR and FIR issues. Of those MNCs (n=8) that adopted a highly decentralised
approach to overseas sites, none were found to have trading relationships between
sites. In contrast, of those companies whose products/services are integrated within
Ireland, the majority (n=7) adopt a more interventionist role with respect to IR
issues. No strong correlation was found with respect to either divisionalisation or
diversification strategies. Similar to other aspects already reported on, a sectoral
pattern was again found. Irish MNCs in the food sector are more likely to adopt a
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more centralised approach to home operations and grant more autonomy to overseas
sites (where operations are not networked). MNCs in the financial services sectors
were found to adopt more centralised in both home and overseas operations. In
contrast, holding companies were found to be decentralised in their approach to both
home and overseas operations. Other manufacturing MNCs varied across home and
abroad sites in no definitive way.
Most Irish-owned MNCs (n=1O) were found to have some form of consultative
arrangement between management and employee representatives in their domestic
sites. These formalised arrangements either occur on a needs-driven basis or more
than twice a year. The main purpose of the meetings was found to be simply the
exchange of information (n=6), with few MNCs using them to define issues or
policies (n=3). Despite the existence of formalised consultative arrangements within
Irish-owned MNCs, there is little evidence of transnational, consultative processes
among employees and management. Meetings between employee representatives
across European operations were found to occur in only one MNC.
Although not a common practice, the regular 'networking' of management was
found to be emerging across Irish-owned MNCs. Of the nine MNCs found to operate
with formalised meetings, most (n=7) have meetings that occur more than twice a
year. The purpose of these meetings is to define policy, or to share information.
However, fewer Irish MNCs network their management levels on an international
basis. Only six Irish MNCs have formal meetings between HR managers from
Ireland and overseas. These meetings were found to be needs driven and confined to
the reviewing of policies. Irish-owned MNCs regularly collect performance-related
indicators from their home and European sites for the purpose of conducting internal
comparisons of site operations (cf. table 5.16).
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TABLE 5.16: TYPE OF INFORMATION COLLECTED FROM EUROPEAN SITES
Type of Information	 Number of MNCs
Overall Labour Costs	 12
Numbers Employed	 11
Labour Productivity	 10
Training Received	 9
Movements in Rates of Pay 	 8
Strikes & other forms of industrial action	 7
Absenteeism	 7
Accidents & Injuries 	 7
No. of Resignations and Nos. Recruited	 6
Gender Composition of Work-force 	 6
Overtime Working	 5
Dismissals and Disciplinary Cases
	 3
Age Composition of Work-force
	 3
Occupational Health	 4
Other	 2
Information is collected by Irish-owned MNCs from European sites to input into
investment decisions, to evaluate managers' performance and to compare across
sites. The main difference in their approach to European sites is that greater
importance is placed on using this information for comparing sites and making
investment decisions (cf. table 5.17). Consequently, the European operations of
Irish-owned MNCs appear to enjoy more autonomy than their Irish counterparts but
are subjected to similar systems of data collection.
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TABLE 5.17: PURPOSE OF INFORMATION COLLECTED FROM EUROPEAN SITES
Purpose of Information 	 Number
Compare operating sites	 14
Investment decisions	 10
Evaluate Site Managers	 10
Divestment decisions	 5
Evaluate IR/HR function	 4
Information to JR/HR function 	 2
5.6 CoNcLusioN: 'IRISH-OWNED MNCs - AN EMERGING FORM'?
A number of features concerning the nature and character of Irish-owned MNCs are
evident from the results of this survey. The key aspects of these are summarised in
table 5.18. To summarise, Irish-owned MNCs are among the main players in Irish
business. When compared with their European and international counterparts, Irish
MNCs are small to medium-sized. Clustered into traditional and resource-based
sectors, they tend not to be highly diverse. Despite the local perception of Irish-
owned MNCs as large indigenous employers, Irish-owned MNCs have on average a
larger proportion of employees located overseas than domestically. Having
predominantly expanded overseas through the acquisition of foreign interests, most
Irish-owned MNCs have small operations in mainland Europe. Perhaps not
surprisingly, given Ireland's geographical position and history, the UK is an
important location for Irish-owned MNCs and accounts for the most significant
proportion of overseas employment. Structurally, indigenous Irish-owned MNCs are
divisionalised, with small head offices.
Irish-owned MNCs are highly unionised within Ireland, with all recognising trade
unions for the purpose of collective bargaining. Most Irish-owned MNCs have a
separate designated head office HR function, but few have HRM board
representation. These HR functions tend to be small in size, with many employing
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less than three people. The approach of Irish-owned MNCs to the management of JR
and HR is mainly issue-driven. Head office intervention is greater with respect to
'hard' JR issues that are less regulated by national legislation, notably pay
determination, redundancies and union recognition. Irish-owned MNCs adopt a more
decentralised approach to the management of overseas employment relationships.
TABLE 5.18: KEY GENERIC FEATURES OF hUSH-OWNED MNCs
Irish-owned MNCs generally tend to be....
Small to medium sized (SMEs) MNCs, with small head offices,
Located in traditional or resource-based sectors,
Small domestic employers, with over half of total employees located outside of
Ireland,
Divisionalised along a mixture of product and geographical lines,
Highly unionised and recognise trade unions for the purpose of negotiations,
Not highly diverse. Irish MNCs are either manufacturing MNCs within related
businesses or service MNCs within dominant businesses,
...and have...
Large UK operations and small mainland European operations,
Expanded overseas, predominantly through acquisitions,
Small specialist HR functions located at head office with little representation on
main boards,
Links with employers associations, mainly for the purpose of obtaining advice,
A more decentralised approach to the management of JR and HR in overseas
operations,
Approached the management of JR and FIR in an issue-driven way, with more
head office intervention with regard to hard JR issues that are more open to
managerial discretion,
Shown little evidence of transnational consultative process amongst employees
and management, despite formalised consultative arrangements,
Small incidence of HR managerial networking for the purpose of policy
formulation and definition.
The results also suggest the emergence of possible 'sectoral models' within Irish-
owned MNCs. For instance, Irish-owned MNCs within the food sector tend to
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operate within related businesses, with divisionalised structures organised along
product lines. Producing different products at different sites, sites supply one another
in competition with external suppliers or through internally administered price
structures. These MNCs are also more decentralised in their approach to JR in
overseas operations than at home. In contrast, Irish-owned MNCs in the financial
services sector tend to operate in dominant businesses, produce the same service
across sites, integrate their operations and adopt a highly centralised approach to the
management of JR and HR across all of their local and overseas operations.
The findings presented in the sections above suggest that Irish-owned MNCs are
distinctive in a number of respects. Firstly, Irish-owned MNCs tend not to
concentrate in what Porter (1990) describes as 'global' sectors, but rather, in 'multi-
domestic' sectors. The sectoral locations of Irish MNCs suggest a concentration in
traditional or resource-based sectors. Secondly, while a large proportion of those
employed by Irish-owned MNCs are located overseas, their employment tends to be
regionally concentrated in the UK and in mainland Europe. Furthermore, Irish-
owned MNCs differentiate their control and management processes between home
and overseas, indicating a lack of international integration. Overseas operations are
differently managed from the local Irish sites in that they appear to have greater
autonomy.
With respect to emerging practices within global MNCs, Irish-owned MNCs again
appear distinctive. In keeping with the expectations of the globalisation literature
outlined in chapter two, these results suggest that Irish-owned MNCs regularly
collect financial information for internal benchmarking and investment decision-
making purposes. Also, while discernible in only some Irish MNCs at this stage,
international managerial networking of HR managers for the purpose of
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implementing and defining HR policies appears to be emerging. However, unlike the
global models, the survey reveals little evidence of the divisionalisation of Irish-
owned MNCs on an integrated international basis. This, coupled with the tendency
of Irish MNCs to differentiate control between domestic and overseas operations,
would suggest that IR and HR decision-making is being maintained within national
contexts. While the survey findings may indicate the existence of a number of key
distinctive features of Irish-owned MNCs, a number of issues been revealed that
requiring further investigation in order to obtain a more substantive and clearer
picture. More particularly, while the survey data suggests that Irish-owned MNCs
are divisionalised, it is still unclear as to whether divisionalisation has resulted in a
'real' or 'apparent' decentralisation of decision-making, particularly with respect to
the conduct of IR and HR. Furthermore, the survey falls short of examining the role
of these designated head office HR functions in the management of suggested
autonomous approaches.
While the survey results provide some indications of structural and behavioural
patterns amongst Irish-owned MNCs, as chapter four outlined case study analysis is
needed to further investigate the factors shaping the behaviour of these companies
with regard to their management of JR and HR. The following chapters present in-
depth investigations into four Irish-owned MNCs. By examining particular
companies in greater depth and expanding the analysis to incorporate wider
historical and competitive market conditions these distinctive features indicated here
will be further illuminated. By comparing across these cases and incorporating the
survey findings presented here, chapter ten will postulate as to the common
characteristics of the Irish-owned MNC, with particular regard to the management of
JR and HR. Chapter eleven will then compare these characteristics against the
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expectations of the literatures outlined in chapters two and three to examine the ways
and extent to which these practices are distinctive.
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CHAPTER 6
CR11 GROUP PLC.
CRH plc is a highly decentralised MNC whose rapid internationalisation in recent years has led to a
number of key HRM issues. These issues have been matched with the recent establishment of a HR
function at head office level. This has occurred against a backdrop of a traditional adversarial
approach to JR. Given the nature of CRH's core businesses, coupled with a highly localised approach,
the Group have reinforced their decentralised approach to the management of IR through the
development of specific structural arrangements. Having grown predominately through the acquisition
of owner-operated businesses, CRH have managed to overcome a number of obstacles normally
experienced by latecomers to internationalisation.
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This first case study illustrates the case of an Irish-owned MNC whose response to
rapid internationalisation has resulted in the re-evaluation of their approach to the
management of IR and the management of HR. CRH plc, a highly decentralised,
'federated' organisation, has grown rapidly in the last two decades through
acquisitions. Driven to internationalise by rising dependencies on a shrinking
domestic market, this firm was one of the first Irish companies to exit a largely
sheltered domestic market during the 1970s. Given a lack of international
experience, the Group targeted developed regions that were broadly similar in
culture and language. In the US, the CRH Group was fortuitous in acquiring owner-
managed businesses that were experiencing succession difficulties. This growth
strategy was crucial in affording the CRH Group the opportunity to gain a foothold
in highly localised markets and thus overcome the problems traditionally associated
with late internationalisation.
Rapid growth has given rise to a number of HRM issues for the CRH Group. These
include a lack of repatriation opportunities, expanding managerial skill bases,
succession problems and a lack of syliergies. In response, CRH have recently
established a HR function at head office level whose role is to 'professionalise' and
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manage an increasingly diverse collection of managers without impinging upon
existing decentralised approaches to the management of employment relationships.
Toward these aims, CRH have adopted a centralised approach to the management of
managers and reinforced their traditional, decentralised approach to the collective
management of non-managerial employees. By doing so, they have placed recent
'piecemeal' developments alongside existing traditional adversarial approaches.
Developments in the broader structural and control spheres of the company reflect
this mind-set. Given the nature of their core businesses, the maintenance of local
autonomy is seen by CRH as vital to their continued success. However, as a rapidly
expanding entity, there ase obvious benefits to be gained through further financial
economies and the exploration of synergies. In an attempt to maximise this newly
acquired collective strength, without adversely undermining local initiative, CRH
have supplemented financial co-ordination and control mechanisms with a number
of personal and social co-ordination initiatives. These are designed to encourage
'best practice' sharing and 'benchmarking' without impacting on autonomy. Recent
HRM developments are best understood in light of the Group's historical and
structural evolution. To this end, the case study begins with a brief description of
CRH plc and its evolution. This is followed by an analysis of the Group's approach
to their employment relationship in light of their current structures. The final section
describes the manner and form in which CRH has internationalised, identifying
factors that have shaped this growth.
6.2 COMPANY PROFILE
CRH plc is a leading international manufacturer and supplier of building materials.
Headquartered in Dublin, this company was among one of the first Irish firms to
internationalise during the 1970s. In less than three decades the Group has grown
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from a workforce of 5,400 within 55 locations in 2 countries to employing 30,000 at
over 950 locations across 12 different countries (CRH Annual Report, 1998). In that
period, Group sales have grown from IRE±21 million to over IRE±4,000 million
(The Irish Times, 12/4, 1996). The majority of CRH's employees are located outside
of Ireland (over 90% in 1998). More evenly distributed in the early 1990s, the
distribution of employment across sites has become more concentrated in recent
years toward the Americas (cf. table 6.1). Outside of Ireland and the UK, the greatest
concentration of CRH employees is based in the Netherlands (The Irish Times, 8/5,
1996). However, the Group's operations are highly fragmented, with 2,577 workers
situated across 191 operations within Ireland, 3,637 workers across 160 operations in
the UK and 5,447 in Mainland Europe located across 276 plants, stores and branches
(CRH Annual Report, 1998).
TABLE 6.1 TOTAL EMPLOYMENT BY MAJOR LOCATION
Ireland
Britain & NI
Mainland
Europe
The
Americas
Total
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
2703 2560 2510 2573 2569 2451 2521 2595 2577
4020 3673 2048 2703 2831 3035 3370 3432 3637
2544 2652 3716 3246 3387 3713 3999 4343 5447
2479 2337 2278 3229 3229 6132 9294 12338 15642
11746 11222 10552 11751 13691 15331 19184 22708 27303
Source: CRH Annual Reports, 1990-98.
6.3 THE NATURE OF COMPETITION
The largest indigenous supplier of cement and building materials, CRH operate
within a highly cyclical and traditional industry. Domestically the building materials
industry is currently enjoying an upturn. Since the late 1980s, the Irish construction
industry has entered a 'period of sustained output growth after a prolonged period of
decline' (Government of Ireland, 1989: 2). In 1985, the Irish construction market
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saw a rise in cement volumes for the first time in nine years (Riada, 1997). Fuelled
by EU funding and overall economic growth, output in the construction sector grew
steadily, rising from 7% to 15% by between 1989 and 1990 (Lynch and Roche,
1995). Between 1993 and 1996 the industry grew by almost 40%. This boom is
expected to continue, due mostly to a buoyant tourism sector and continued recovery
in the agricultural and commercial sectors (The Irish Times, 5/13, 1997). Further
growth in the construction industry has been forecast for the late 1990s
(Euroconstruct, 1999 - cf. table 6.2).
TABLE 6.2 TOTAL CoNsTRucTIoN OUTPUT (1996-2000)
1996	 1997
	
1998	 1999(1)	 2000(1)
Ireland	 9.6	 10.8
	
11.9	 13.4
	
14.6
Western Europe (EC-15)	 736.3	 742.9	 748.9	 767.2	 783.7
ANNuAL GROWTH RATES (%)
Ireland	 17.5	 12.7	 10.1	 12.6	 8.9
Western Europe (EC-15)	 -0.3	 0.9	 0.8	 2.4	 2.1
Source: Euroconstruct, 1999.
CRH plc operate within an industry that is characterised by fluctuations in demand
and high logistical costs. The key forces driving change in their industry include
technological developments, industry and market requirements, environmental
concerns and shifts in world trade (Lynch and Roche, 1996). The Irish construction
industry, which includes 'the activities of enterprises and individuals engaged in the
building and civil engineering industries', is thus highly cyclical - a cycle that
broadly operates on a four to five year time span (Government of Ireland, 1989).
Sensitive to fluctuations in interest rates and levels of public expenditure, it is a
sector that is largely dependent on national economic growth rates. However, despite
movements towards EMU, the cyclical nature of these markets is not synchronised
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across Europe.
Another important aspect of the construction industry is that the cyclical nature of
demand has a varying impact on the industry's different sectors. The sectors most
affected by macro-economic cycles include the industrial, commercial, and
residential sectors, while those least affected tend to be improvement and repair
maintenance. As a result, businesses involved in infrastructural development are
more dependent on factors such as the long-term policies of Government and EU
funding. The current cyclical upturn of the Irish construction industry is in contrast
to the 'lacklustre performance' of most other European construction sectors. Planned
investment, assisted by EU funding, and a forecast upswing in private business
investment and private housing, augurs well for this sector at the end of the 1990s.
Indicators suggest that while volume growth within Ireland will be lower than that
those experienced in recent years, it is likely to be above rates in the construction
sector of other European economies (The Irish Times, 12/4, 1996 - cf. table 6.3).
TABLE 6.3: CONsTRUCTION INDUSTRY OUTPUT IN SELECTED COUNTRIEs 1993-5
Construction Output	 1993	 1994f	 199Sf
(% Volume change per @)
Belgium	 N/A	 1.5	 2.5
Germany	 3.1
	
4.0	 4.00
Ireland	 -1.1
	
6.1
	
6.0
Netherlands	 -4.0
	
0.0	 1.5
Spain	 -8.1
	
1.0	 1.5
UK	 -2.5
	
2.0
	
2.5
US	 -1.0
	 5.0	 3.0
Source: Department of Environment (In.), Euroconstruct, National Council of Building Material
Producers (UK), Dodge (US), 000dbody Stockbrokers.
Improvements in the construction industry have led to increases in the sales of
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building materials (Construction Industry Review, 1995). The building materials
sector in freland is relatively open, compared with other European countries, even
allowing for differences in size and in the extent of land frontiers. The UK accounts
for the highest proportion of construction imports and exports. In 1986, the UK
accounted for 49% of Irish construction material imports and 63% of exports. By the
1990s, the proportion of construction materials exports had risen to 66% (Lynch and
Roche, 1996).
The nature of competition has changed for this Group both domestically and
internationally. Internationally, there is increasing exposure to imports from Eastern
European countries at artificially low prices and, subsequently Eastern Europe
represents a rising proportion of imports (13% of EU consumption and 30% of
World Trade). Despite an opening up to competition of its core domestic markets,
CRH still operate a virtual monopoly, particularly within the Irish cement market
(The Irish Times, 14/2, 1997). Despite changes to domestic markets, the Group
regard themselves as controlling up to 80% of the Irish cement market. Fined in
1996 by the European Commission for its participation in a European price fixing
cartel, the Group was found to operate a price fixing agreement in Northern Ireland
between 1985 and 1992 (The Irish Times, 26/3, 1996). Commentators suggest that
cost structures and the achievement of economies of scale are central to its ability to
compete in future export markets (Lynch and Roche 1996).
In short, while the nature of competition has changed, CRH still holds a strong
position within domestic and overseas markets - markets that traditionally enjoyed
sheltered protection within Ireland. In its core businesses CRH operates within a
traditional sector which is, by nature, relatively protected from competitive forces.
Despite this, commentators suggest that central to its future competitiveness are
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strong cost structures and the achievement of economies of scale.
6.4 THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CRH PLC.
The origins of CRH can be traced back to the foundation of the Irish State in the
1930s. As a nation abundant in limestone, shale, clay and gypsum, the establishment
of an indigenous cement industry was proposed as part of a vigorous Irish drive
towards industrialisation. The passing of the Cement Act (1933) was the first step
toward the development of an Irish cement industry. This paved the way for a series
of negotiations between the Government and a British cement company, whose
Danish parent was one of the world's largest manufacturers of cement machinery
(Brady, 1973). In keeping with the ideology of that time, the Government engaged
overseas experts as consultants to oversee the industry's establishment. They were to
provide much of the technology and management skills that ultimately formed the
industry's basis. The first Irish cement firm was established in 1936 and operated
under the name Cement Ltd. Under Danish management, the first deliveries of Irish
manufactured cement were made in 1938. This newly formed company effectively
operated as a monopoly, with full trade protection. As a senior executive remarked:
'CRH was set up in difficult times as a barely economical proposition in the 1930s.
That was the culture [of the place]'.
At the same time, two young brothers from Dublin formed a sand and gravel haulage
business - Roadstone Ltd. This company, along with the support of a quarrying and
sand business from Cork, was launched onto the Irish Stock Exchange in 1949.
Despite experiencing difficulties with the deterioration of the Irish economy during
the 1950s, their business expanded from primary into secondary materials. When the
Irish economy began to recover during the 1960s, Roadstone established a network
of quarries and plants across Ireland and the North of England. At the same time the
149
company reorganised itself in line with management thinking from America and
hired a number of young professional executives, some of who quickly rose through
the ranks to the highest executive level (The Sunday Times, 6/11, 1999). Paralleling
Roadstone's growth, Cement Ltd. continued to increase its capacity. By the 1970s,
Cement Ltd. was freland's largest industrial public, while Roadstone, for whom
Cement Ltd. was a major supplier, was the third largest (CRH Contact, 1996).
Towards the end of the 1960s, Roadstone investigated the building of a cement
manufacturing plant. However, this proved unsuccessful on cost grounds. The
company changed tack and made a bid for Irish Cement in 1970. At the time,
Cement Ltd. was experiencing a highly acrimonious industrial dispute. This action
had come at a time when the economy was booming and the demand for cement by
the construction industry was at an all time high. In an attempt to meet such
demands, construction industry leaders attempted to smuggle cement in from the
UK. Such moves resulted in the acceleration of industrial action and the picketing of
Irish ports by cement workers. The succeeding months were increasingly
acrimonious. Industrial action resulted in severe disruption not just within Cement
Ltd. but within the construction industry as a whole. In 1970, the cement industry
lost approximately 88,200 work days (or 126 days per worker) through strike action
between the months of February and June.
The action arose from a claim for wage increases on the grounds that since worker
efforts had led to higher profitability levels, Cement Ltd. could afford to pay a
productivity bonus. In response, Cement Ltd. offered to make improvements that
they claimed were 'at least as good as any improvements made under the current
round of [wage] increases'. However, they stated that they were not prepared to pay
exceptionally high increases due to their difficult profit position. Negotiations broke
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down and industrial action ensued. It was only after the strike had been in operation
for twelve weeks that both parties agreed to refer the dispute to the Labour Court.
However, when a recommendation was issued, the workers groups rejected it and the
action continued for a further seven weeks. Reports of the time speak of how
workers sought to block the entry and exit of cement into the country at ports
resulting in severe disruptions for the whole Irish construction industry and the
dispute was finally settled after the personal intervention of the Irish Minister for
Labour (The Irish Labour Court, 1970).
This highly acrimonious and protracted action had a severe and adverse effect on the
industry as whole, industries that relied upon cement and Irish Cement Ltd. in
particular. Despite depressed share prices, Roadstone's bid for Irish Cement was
initially rejected. In an attempt to prevent Roadstone gaining control of the cement
supply, a British competitor - Readymix Concrete (now the RMC Group), also made
a bid for Irish Cement Ltd. In full recognition that such a move would result in over
a third of the Irish cement market being owned and managed by a British company,
the main Irish financial institutions put pressure on Roadstone and Irish Cement to
merge (Riada, 1997). As a senior executive at head office related, this pressure
amounted to: 'a shotgun held by the main Irish institutions who had invested in
them'. The two companies eventually merged to form Cement Roadstone Holdings
(CRH) plc in October 1970. It was agreed that each company would have equal
representation on the main board.
However, Roadstone and Irish Cement Ltd. each had a distinctive culture. While
Irish Cement Ltd was 'highly professional, technically excellent, with a reputation
for efficiency and product quality, but unsympathetic to its customers', Roadstone
Ltd. had a 'reputation of being young, brash, low tech, but entrepreneurial and
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customer orientated' (CRH Contact, 1996). After the merger, each company
continued to operate independently and for a time retained their identity and culture,
for a time. With an improvement in the construction industry during the 1970s, both
groups were able to expand but in a manner which, 'scarcely acknowledged the
existence of the merger' (CRH Contact, 1996). However, with a change of senior
management in 1974, the Group entered a period of consolidation 'in which the two
sides learnt to work together'. As a retired senior executive explained, it was the
eventual coming together of these two distinct cultures that led to their federal ethos,
a distinguishing feature of the Group: 'The best thing that happened was that each
side retained their own culture and it is still maintained [to an extent]. It has
probably softened a little since then, in that they are much more in tune with the
market and customers'. The subsequent history of CRH is a story in three parts:
uninterrupted growth in profit from 1970 to 1981; a sharp decline in the years 1982
and 1983; and spectacular accelerating recovery from 1984. To trace the evolution of
the Group each phase will be briefly outlined.
By 1970 and the formation of the Group CRH were over-dependent on domestic
markets, from which almost all of CRH's earnings (98%) came (Address by Barry,
1991). Despite a booming Irish economy at this time, a number of disturbing
patterns were emerging, in particular a rising inflation rate, a weak balance of
payments, high unemployment rates, and increasing industrial unrest. For example,
the number of working-days per annum lost due to industrial disputes in 1969 and
1970 was approximately a million as compared with an annual average of 400,000
during the 1960s (Kennedy et al., 1988). With indications of a further deterioration
of the Irish economy given and following the acrimonious national-level strike
described earlier, CRH made the decision to expand overseas. As the Chief
Executive at that time stated: 'it was neither the desire for position on the social
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ladder nor management boredom that motivated CRH management in setting out on
the acquisition trail overseas. Corporate survival was the motive' (Address by Barry,
1991). Limited by a shrinking and highly cyclical domestic market, the Group
embarked on a dual growth strategy - a low-cost producer strategy within domestic
markets, combined with expanding geographically into overseas familiar sectors. In
effect, CRH exited a sheltered yet shrinking domestic market for survival reasons.
As one another senior executive explained: 'CRH exited Ireland because in trying to
get value for money, it had to exit Ireland and go overseas'.
CRH's Initial expansion overseas was largely unplanned. In full recognition of a
need to formalise their growth strategy, senior management formulated a
development policy in 1975. This consisted of three separate but related strands.
First, it recognised that Ireland was the 'home base' and that domestic investment
must not be overlooked. Second, the Group felt it had a social duty to create
employment by investing more widely within Ireland. (This became the impetus for
the later diversification of the Group outside of their core businesses.) Finally, the
Group decided to expand overseas primarily through the acquisition of businesses
similar to its Irish core business in developed countries. At the same time, rigorous
procedures were put in place for evaluating acquisitions across CRH. As a senior
executive at head office explained: 'at the same time structures being put in place in
terms of a planning process, as were quite rigorous evaluation procedures for
determining whether investment meets our criteria and whether to go ahead with it
as part of our acquisitional policy.'
To minimise risk in its pursuit of acquisitional growth overseas, CRH targeted
potential growth regions where the language and business cultures were familiar.
The UK and US were identified as potential regions of growth: the UK due to it
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experiencing a sustained period of growth and the US due to it having experienced a
period of cost-driven rationalisation. Having identified this, a number of key
managers were dispatched overseas with the brief to 'acquire good companies with
good management'. Initially employing brokers, it soon became apparent to the
Group that their proposals were being 'hawked around'. In response, key personnel
were dispatched to targeted areas and began to personally 'cold call' potential
companies. This direct informal approach and the networked family deals that arose
from it is a strategy that has remained a keystone of CRH's development.
In the US, the Group particularly targeted family-run businesses that were
experiencing succession difficulties. CRH's first US Company was acquired in
1978. CRH entered into 'reciprocal arrangements' which allowed owner-
entrepreneurs to realise their capital while remaining with the business they had
created as managers. At the same time, inroads were being made into the UK market
with the acquisition of a building merchants that was also experiencing in-house
succession difficulties. Following the establishment of UK and US 'beach-heads',
CRH sought to enter mainland Europe. The Group's entry here was essentially by
default. Their first acquisition in Netherlands was originally their agent for stone
products and was acquired in order to keep the agency operational as it neared
liquidation. Approached by the company itself, CRH were under the impression that
they were buying a concrete business with a building merchant attached. When the
concrete side of the business failed to make a return, the Group divested out of
concrete and focused on the building merchant side of the operations. The
Netherlands soon became the base for European growth as CRH diversified into new
product markets. To this end, a senior CRH executive was relocated to 'turn' the
business around and manage the European base. The Netherlands was seen as a good
cultural 'fit' for the Group. As a senior executive at head office explained:
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We found Holland to be a good place to do business in. They are traders and
willing to sell businesses we are in and join in with us in the same way as we
have done in other places. We have not been able to do that so well in
Germany - they are much more chauvinistic, whereas the Dutch are much
more business orientated and willing to work to maximise the mutual
benefits rather than maximise their own.
The culture was seen to be largely similar with minimal linguistic problems given
that most of the Dutch people involved had a good command of English. This was
particularly important given the Group's lack of in-house language skills.
By the early 1980s, CRH plc was the second largest Irish private sector
manufacturing company (OMalley, 1985), a position that it maintained until 1998
when it became Ireland's largest indigenous company (Business and Finance, 1998).
Expansion in the 1980s occurred in its main geographical markets of the US, Britain
and mainland Europe in an attempt to spread the risk and cyclicality of their main
markets. By 1988, CRH earned 22% of its profits in Ireland, 30% in the US, 24% in
Britain and 24% in mainland Europe. The Group confronted a watershed in 1980
when cement deliveries unexpectedly fell by 12%. Prior to 1980, the Group had
begun a modemisation programme in its cement operations to increase productive
capacity. This took three years to complete, in which time the consumption of
cement had declined by 33%. This downturn was to have an adverse effect on the
Group and lead to a drop in profit levels (pre-tax profit of 1RE9.lm in 1983 down
41% from 1982). During this time, cement imports hostile to the Irish market, began
to enter Northern Ireland.
Cement consumption continued to fall (12% in 1980 and 18% in 1982), due to the
culmination of a number of factors: fuel prices rose, US construction industry
entered a sharp recession, UK markets were still feeling the effects of a recession
and an increase of the Company's tax rate from 1% to 21% (Riada, 1997). In 1984,
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profits rose dramatically aided by an upturn in the American, Dutch and Irish
markets. Recovery continued, particularly in European and US markets, as
acquisitions began to make returns. This composition changed slightly in 1986, with
a recovery of the Irish and UK markets. In 1987, the Group entered Spain with one
of its largest acquisitions. The recession of the Irish economy was weathered with
the more favourable performance of overseas markets. By the late 1980s, mainland
Europe was CRH's star performer, with strong market conditions in their DIY
markets.
The most dynamic chapter in the history of CRH has occurred in the last decade.
Embarking on a rapid acquisitional programme, the Group spent nearly (IREI)500
million on acquisitions between 1988 and 1998, one of the most aggressive
expansion programmes in the European buildings materials sector. The 1990s have
seen a significant increase in the Group's growth through acquisitions (Barclays De
Zoete Wedd Securities, 1996 - cf. figure 6.1). In 1996 alone, the Group spent over
£415 million on acquisitions, a significant increase in spending. Since then, the pace
of international growth has decreased while the size of acquisitions has increased.
For the most part, CRH have pursued acquisitional growth strategies abroad in
preference to the establishment of greenfield sites. As a senior executive involved in
business development explained: 'Greenfielding takes a lot longer in order to get
your money back because of the planning process. You are constructing and
breaking against the market. We found it much easier and quicker to actually go off
and buy an existing business'.
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Figure 6.1 Acquisition Costs (1988-96)
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Source: Barclays De Zoete Wedd Securities, 1995.
CRH's current growth strategy is to target small to medium-sized companies. These
are at times augmented with larger acquisitions that offer a leadership position
within a particular market. The aim of the Group is to 'seek leadership positions at
either regional, national or niche levels' through the acquisition of well-managed
companies, with management retention in their core businesses (Address by Hilliard,
1998). To this end, corporate development is devolved to a number of
entrepreneurial development teams who 'generate a continuous flow of acquisitions
and capital projects' (CRH Annual Report, 1998). These teams work in conjunction
with divisional management and functional teams, who together are seen to possess
the necessary skills to evaluate, negotiate and integrate new acquisitions. There is an
informal general rule of thumb, which, according to a senior manager, is that: 'a new
place, new industry equals bad news. A new place, old industry is okay.
Combinations thereof we get very nervous'.
A crucial part of the internationalisation of this Group is the retention of owner
entrepreneurs. This has been key to their development in the US where growth
occurs through 'word of mouth'. The approach, which senior CRH executives see as
distinctive among MNCs, is such that 'if management do not want to stay, we do not
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want to buy the company'. Once acquired, the financial reporting and information
technology systems are immediately introduced. As the head of one of CRH's
business divisions explained: 'There would be two things that we would do in most
situations in acquisitions: we would change the finance systems, they have to fit in
with our consolidation systems and we would look at the IT systems. The finance
system is a must. They have to align with our own systems'.
The autonomy of the newly acquired acquisitions is dependent on the size of the
acquisition, the larger the acquisition, in that the more likely that it will be run
independently. Line management usually manages the integration of the acquisition.
This approach of devolved development is seen internally by management as
distinctive to CRH. As a senior UK-based manager explained: 'We have got 600-
odd people and full-time development teams developing businesses. I know of no
other group in the world that does that - they have centralised teams, everything is
very closely held and not devolved'.
To summarise, a number of factors have been key to the internationalisation of CR11.
These include the establishment of specific acquisitional criteria, the targeting of
well-managed companies with a strong local franchise, the pursuit of small-to-
medium sized acquisitions, a concentration on core businesses and the retention of
local management. Table 6.4 summarises the key events in the internationalisation of
CRH against its wider historical evolution.
TABLE 6.4: KEY EVENTS IN THE EVOLUTION AND INTERNATIONALISATION OF CRH
Key Dates Event
1936	 Formation of indigenous cement industry
Formation of family-run sand and gravel business
1950s	 Expansion of sand and gravel business within Ireland
1960s	 Establishment of network of quarries and plants in Ireland and Northern UK
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Increase in capacity by cement company
1970	 Strike action in cement company
Bids from gravel company and UK competitor for cement company
Intervention by Irish financial institutions
Merger of two companies to form CRH
1973	 First attempts to integrate two companies
New CEO
First acquisition in mainland Europe
1974	 New CEO
Rising inflation - decision to expand overseas
1975	 Internationalisation policy formulated
US & UK targeted
Senior executives send overseas to manage internationalisation process
1978	 First acquisitions in the UK and the US
Overseas Policy formulated
1979	 Reinvestment into Domestic operations
Product diversification domestically
1980	 Fall in consumption of cement in Ireland
Hostile cement imports enter Ireland
Reorganisation and integration of Irish operations
Decline in US and UK markets
1985	 Recovery of UK and US markets
1987	 Peak in acquisition record with large Spanish acquisition
1988	 The golden scenario profit in four geographical regions followed by high
volatility
1990	 Full recovery back to profitability
Major rationalisation and restructuring of UK & US
Product divisionalisation introduced in US
1995	 Decline in international growth but increase in size of acquisitions
6.5 STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND CONTROL
The approach of CRH to intemationalisation and the influence of this approach on
the management of IR and the management of HR may be understood in greater
detail by examining the overall Group structures, co-ordination and control
mechanisms. Recent changes to the structure of the Group highlight the routes being
taken toward globalisation. At first sight, CRH plc resembles other large
internationally trading MNCs. It has a multi-divisionalised, flat structure with a high
degree of decentralisation and a small head office team that provides overall co-
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ordination and strategic direction (CRFI Annual Report, 1996). Up until 1997, CRH
was organised along product and geographical lines thus reflecting differing
approaches to the management of operations.
From its initial operations in the US, CRH has operated a highly decentralised
regional structure. In 1991, the US operations were reorganised into four main
product groups: Materials, Precast Concrete, Glass and Architectural Products. In
contrast, the European operations were structured along geographical lines with
separate divisions for freland, the UK and mainland Europe. Reporting lines thus
differed between the US and other operations. Within the US there was a direct
reporting line from each operating company into respective product group
presidents, into the US holding company and back to the main board in Ireland.
Whereas in the European and South American operations local management
reported directly to operational regional management, who reported back into the
main board. As the pace and rate of growth accelerated, the main challenge for the
Group became the maintenance of this organisational form. The paces of growth led
to a tension between the need to co-ordinate across borders and maintain local
autonomy. As the HR director explained: 'the real question we kept asking was how
can we sustain this type of structure'.
Designed to support a decentralised organisation and encourage independence, there
was an initial reluctance to move from geographical lines towards a pan-European
product-based structure. Such a structure was seen as a threat to their a highly
localised approach. Moreover, the diversity of languages and cultures was also seen
as a major obstacle. This reticence was eventually overcome and in 1998 a pan-
European product-based structure was introduced. Presently all of their European
operations are consolidated into three product divisions mirroring the structure of
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CRH Group plc.
European Products
_i	 & Distribution
Products	 I I Distribution IRep. of Ire land
Northern Ireland
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Concrete
Products
Clay
I	 Products
Building
Products
Poland
__________	 Europe
Spain
US operations (cf. figure 6.2). This pan-European structure is seen to provide the
Group the opportunity to obtain economies of scale and managerial synergies. As the
current Chief Executive explained: 'This stimulus to growth creates further
opportunities for managers across national boundaries and helps us build a European
organisation, tailored to country, product and cultural differences' (CRH Annual
Report, 1998).
FIGuRE 6.2 ORGAMSATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CRH PLC.
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6.5.1 Group Strategy: 'Lots of Local Businesses, Managed by Local People'
CRH operates a highly decentralised and localised approach to the management of
their operations, unchanged since the early 1990s. CRH management describes their
approach as highly evolved: 'Our decentralised organisation creates a high degree of
local operational autonomy and motivation. Overall co-ordination, control and
strategic direction is provided by a small team at corporate headquarters' (CRH
Annual Report, 1991). The Group consists of over 600 profit centres, each
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responsible for its performance, markets, products, customers and strategic plans.
The senior management of each business runs that company's strategy, with plans
developed from the 'bottom-up'. As the head of the European Materials division
explained:
CRH plc is an entirely bottom-up driven business. A lot of MNCs will tell
you that but it is not true. CRH plc genuinely is. If the managing directors of
businesses do not drive the business, they do not get driven. There is no
centralised think-tank that sits there thinking away about brilliant new ideas.
Divisional management present their five-year plans to the main board annually.
These plans are then subject to review. As the head of one division explained:
'People tear them to pieces and make some very valuable inputs. You then go away,
rethink it and put it back together. This is then presented to the board on a rolling
programme'.
The approach adopted by CRH has largely been shaped by the nature of their
products and markets. The Group operates within traditional sectors where the
markets are largely localised. Their core products are, by nature, long established
and 'mature' and thus incur high transportation, logistical and labour costs. As a
result, CRH's core businesses do not readily lend themselves to exporting. In
response, the Group has entered markets by acquiring companies with an established
market presence. Production is not integrated and the transfer of products across
borders is confined to one or two specialist group companies (EWCB, 1996). Thus,
proximity to markets is a major competitive weapon that shapes the Group's growth
strategy.
There are a number of structural arrangements reinforcing this highly decentralised
and localised approach. Rather than imposing a generic Group identity like some
larger MNC's, CRH maintain the local identity of their operating companies. As a
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result, employee loyalty is fixed firmly at a local level. As a senior executive
explained: 'employees have tended to maintain their identity with the company who
hired them because the name is still there and very often the boss is still there. They
are aware but they are not that conscious we are a huge Group'. The advantage for
CRH is that 'local managers deal with people in the industry who have known them
forever and who trust them'. Consequently, market loyalty is maintained and local
knowledge capitalised upon. Moreover, financial economies are gained by localising
budgets. In keeping with this approach, advertising budgets are decentralised
expensive national or international campaigns avoided. One of the implications of
this approach is that it prevents inter-group trade union linkages forming.
Maintaining the local identity of companies isolates conflict, particularly industrial
action. As a manager of an Irish subsidiary explained: 'if you have a local row it
does not impinge upon the other companies because they are under different names'.
Despite this highly decentralised approach, the role of the 'centre' remains key to the
management of the Group as a whole. Small in size since its formation, the head
office of CRH employs a total of 30 people. As CRH has grown, this 'centre' has
increased in both size and role while devolving functions to local levels. One such
function that has been largely devolved in the process is business development. As
the Group internationalised, it became increasingly apparent that new businesses
needed to be sourced locally. As a result, business development teams were
established and located on a regional basis. Other functions such as marketing,
purchasing and IT have also been devolved to local levels. At the same time, certain
functions were created at the centre with a view to adding value to operations. As
will be illustrated later, the HR function is a case in point.
CRH describe themselves as a federal group. While sharing a common value system,
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its different businesses have 'dual citizenship' - being responsible to both the Group
and local markets (CRH Annual Report, 1994). This approach arose, according to a
senior executive at head office, from a tension between 'global integration and local
responsiveness which ha[d] come more to light with the quick pace of international
growth'. As a result, decisions such as the allocation of resources or the appointment
of key senior personnel are made at the centre. The centre is thus required to take
responsibility for the global strategic direction of the company, acting on behalf of
the parts. However, despite a decentralised and federation-like approach there are
limits to the local autonomy. While each operating company is responsible for its
financial affairs, the movement of funds and the total financial function is managed
at the centre. Decisions concerning the strategic direction and co-ordination of the
Group also remain at the centre.
6.5.2 Control Mechanisms
The highly decentralised approach described above is managed through extensively
reinforced financial parameters. Despite what head office define to be a highly level
of devolved authority to the management of operations, there are limits or
constraints to that decentralisation. These are most evident in the financial
arrangements. Part of the shared value system is a strong focus on results. As the
finance director explained:
There are no manuals apart from the finance manual. You start from the
principle that by defining and controlling finances, you are effectively acting
as a loose, holding company but with good strategic direction. The two things
are very carefully thought through, extreme care in thinking and strong
financial controls.
CRH consequently defines itself as a 'results-driven company'. Autonomy is
dependent on the delivery of bottom-line results. As the finance director explained,
failure to deliver can result in a change of management. Furthermore, in the case of
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non-conformity he explained that: 'the ultimate is that you would change the
manager. However, it very rarely happens. If they go for help, it is usually given
willingly, which is perhaps why people are not so reticent about going for help'.
While allowing for some national differences, the Group reporting system is
standard and largely homogenous. The finance manuals, referred to internally as the
'bluebooks', contain monthly results for each operating unit by country. Through the
bluebooks, each business unit is kept financially informed of the performance of the
Group's other companies. Rather than insisting that profit centres measure head
office defined parameters, the Group adopts a more 'coercive' approach. Rather than
devolving performance appraisal to operating companies completely, CRH have
introduced the concept of 'performance management', where the implementation
and form of reward is left to local managers to define but this must be fed back to
head office at regular intervals. As the finance director explained:
We do not have any guidelines saying what each company must have in
terms of performance measures. We do it in a slightly different way. We say
you are required to provide an annual plan and that needs to cover five years
ahead and we would like to see non-financial performance measures in them,
and we would like to see what your plans are for improving those.
Exerting the greatest limits on local autonomy are CRH's capital expenditure
controls. While a certain amount for capital expenditure is embodied within annual
budgets, any plans for expansion or other major investments require the approval of
head office. In order to conform to tight guidelines, individual companies are
requested to prepare a submission that contains detailed research of the market,
plant, operating costs and the impact on other parts of the Group. Dependent on the
amount sought, the request goes to the board andlor the CEO for approval.
Overseas managers describe the Group as being 'typically Irish' in their careful and
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conservative approach to acquisitions and their reticence or reluctance to divest.
Where divestiture occurs, head office would tend to divest 'lock, stock, and barrel'.
As a senior overseas manager explained:
Our job is to deliver better returns to shareholders but the principal issue on
strategy is the group will not enter or persist with a position where they
cannot achieve a substantial market position. If the position is not
sustainable, long term, then we consider divestiture. CRH plc is not a great
cleaner of the edges, not too good at that.
Local agendas are influenced in a more 'coercive' manner, by engaging in
benchmarking. Internal competition is created through the use of league tables and
balance score sheets that rank companies according to financial performance indices.
The internal 'competition' is described by local management as 'fierce but fun'.
Often it forces the Group to engage in trans-border comparisons towards trans-
border strategies. Movements to such practices have also been influences by external
pressures as major customers increasingly request pan-European deals. Again,
however, the Group sees limitations to the use of such practices as benchmarking.
The challenge, according to a senior executive at head office, is 'how to make it
better without losing the local drive'. Local managers see the difficulty of comparing
across different product markets and businesses and the loss of local autonomy. As
the manager of an Irish subsidiary remarked: 'It is okay doing direct comparisons of
machines here, there and everywhere, but if you start to put in place that somebody
is going to measure or compare it, it is no longer your business. You have got a
trade-off'.
The ability to benchmark, in the words of one senior executive, is also difficult
across national borders:
It is okay within one group in the USA where they all speak American, it is
okay in the UK where we are doing similar things. But we try and compare
one business in Britain with another in France or Holland, we then have
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different cultures, different languages, different iT, different measurements.
Supplementing the tight financial controls are a number of personal and cultural co-
ordination mechanisms. Their recent introduction represents a significant shift in the
strategy of the CRH as a whole. Prior to their recent organisational restructuring, the
Group was primarily focused on pursuing a highly localised and decentralised
approach through the pursuit of financial economies. Following unprecedented
growth rates in recent times the Group has shifted its attention to the achievement of
best practices. As a recent annual report explains:
The Group's strategy is [now] based on building leadership positions in its
core businesses in regional markets; adding value through best practice and
deep industry knowledge; within an organisation that encourages strong local
autonomy while sharing a common culture and values (CRH Annual Report,
1998).
As a result, a great deal of emphasis has recently been put on the development of
best practices, while 'trying to ensure that we are not re-inventing the wheel'.
According to the Chief Executive, 'those who are performing very well [now] have
an obligation to share their success with others'. One way in which this 'sharing' has
become formalised is through the introduction of annual managerial 'get togethers'.
These are formally designed to formulate strategy but also to informally enable
managers to develop local networks. As the FIR director explained: 'of equal
importance is getting to know one another better, so that a manager can pick up the
phone and call or visit a colleague, if he has something new to teach or to learn'.
Similarly, product focus groups have been introduced to facilitate and encourage the
sharing of best practices across borders. Through the use of product task groups,
managers working on similar products are brought together from across borders to
focus on the sharing of practices and processes. Key to CRH's approach is their
ability to accommodate differing styles and people. A UK-based senior executive
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recounted a story to illustrate this:
I remember at a management conference, two years ago, where I saw two
people stand up together and they were arguing quite violently about
something. One was wearing a very smart evening suit, dark pin stripe, and
the other was wearing cowboy boots and an open-necked shirt. What they
were arguing about was the definition of return on net assets. That said more
about CRH plc than anything else, that is was able to focus people on a key
measurement parameter in a business even though the businesses were very
different. They accommodate the different styles, and cause them to relate.
In keeping with its localised approach, CRH do not try to impose standardised
practices across companies. Given high transportation costs and a highly
decentralised approach, the standardisation of policies is not seen to be appropriate.
For example, CRH see themselves as distinct from those engaged in food
manufacturing, who have to ensure conformity to quality standards regardless of the
country of operation. As a divisional head recounted, it is their avoidance of a
standardised approach that has enabled CRH to grow by acquisition:
I worked for the world's best benchmarkers. They employed clones. There is
no way that they could have grown by acquiring private companies or coped
with the culture. Everybody would have had to have changed. So no private
company would sell to them.
This 'coercive' and 'devolved' approach is also apparent in CRH's approach to the
measurement of performance. Once again, while policies are not issued, every CRH
company is requested to have a certain number of performance measures operating,
which are contained in their annual financial and strategic plans. Rather than
imposing the introduction of performance appraisals, CRH have opted for a more
general emphasis on the concept of performance management. As the HR director
explained: 'Our interest is in getting people thinking about measuring performance
and leaving them by and large to determine themselves what they measure. This
works from the belief that when they start looking at it, they will do something about
it. So, if you can persuade them to come up with measures, that they think are
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appropriate for them, then that's fine, let them do it. They are better able to gauge.
To summarise, CRH is attempting to implement a very particular approach from that
purported in the literature - an approach that seeks to encourage the development of
synergistic measures without impinging upon local autonomy. High transportation
and logistical costs have placed constraints on the extent to which synergistic
economies are sought. Similar to the other case companies discussed in the chapters
that follow, CRH's current approach is driven out of past difficulties with inter-
company trading and enforced integration. As a senior executive explained: 'We had
at one stage two different companies operating on the same site. There was intense
acrimony between the two sides. Eventually we had to put each site in charge of one
man. It has worked like that ever since and we tend to do that now'.
6.6 APPROACHES TO THE MANAGEMENT OF JR AND HR
CRH plc pursues a dual strategy to the management of employees: a highly
decentralised, traditional, adversarial approach to the collective management of non-
managerial employees combined with a highly centralised approach to the
management of managers. This dual approach is reflected in the development of
their HRM structures. In keeping with the Group's overall approach to the
management of operations, CRH adopt a highly decentralised approach to the
management of JR. As a result, there are no group-wide corporate guidelines or
policies as these are seen to impinge upon the Group philosophy of devolved
responsibility. However, as this section will highlight, there are limits to this
decentralised approach.
Up until the mid-1990s, the provision of HR departments was, according to the HR
169
director, very uneven across CRH. From the Group's foundation, HR has been
treated as operational issue and as such devolved to line management. The presence
of HR departments in some of the companies reflected, in part, the degree to which
JR issues were to the fore of the histories of those companies. Where HR
departments did exist, they were mostly administrative or concerned with collective
bargaining issues. With the introduction of pensions there was an attempt by senior
head office management to centralise HRM. To that end, a new HR function was
established but was largely seen, in the words of the HR director, to be 'advisory
with a relatively low profile and supportive function'.
By the mid-1990s, the impact of rapid growth on the management structures came to
the fore. Succession problems arising as the senior managers from the 'first wave' of
CRH's internationalisation approached retirement and an increase in the skills
required by local management led to a refocusing of the HR function. In 1992, a
designated head office HR function was established at head office 'with a higher
profile and much higher level job to do' (HR director). Largely focused on
managerial staff, the introduction of this centralised function was, in the words of the
FIR director, an attempt 'to bring some focus to some of the professional aspects and
then transfer the knowledge to the regions'. By doing so, the. Group have focused on
management-orientated issues at head-office level. Being a newly established
centralised function, HR has had to adopt a 'somewhat different role' to other
functions, according to the HR Director. Given a highly decentralised approach and
devolved autonomy, the onus was placed on the central HR department to sell itself
and its initiatives to divisional management. In the words of the current HR director:
'we do not use clout to get results. It needs a good deal of selling. Because there is a
strong dislike of bureaucracy we try to design something that is light on paperwork,
with the minimum of meetings'. Adopting a small and simple structure, the HR
170
function aims to focus on the management of senior management. However, as their
stance towards the EWC will highlight further on in this chapter, their non-
involvement in local IR issues is not so clear cut.
Recent head office initiatives include the introduction of performance-related pay,
the training and development of senior management, the development of mobile
managers and ensuring future managerial resources. In contrast, the management of
non-managerial employees is highly decentralised and localised, an approach that is
unchanged since the 1980s. The maintenance of this is reflected in the reporting
lines. For example, local management report not to the Group HR function but to
divisional heads. On the surface, there would appear to be no formal HR reporting
lines between head office and local levels.
6.6.1 Management Development
As CRH expanded overseas, their managerial pool became more diverse. Indeed,
CRH regard their mix of different managers as a crucial aspect of their competitive
advantage. This 'mixture' includes owner-entrepreneurs, 'grass-roots' managers and
business development professionals. In the words of the Chief Executive:
A mix of independently-minded owners, professional managers and
development professionals ensures a genetic variety in our management that
keeps CRH young and vital and gives us an organisational advantage that is
difficult to replace (CRH Annual Report, 1998).
The acquisition of privately owned companies within the US ensures a continual
influx of owner-entrepreneurs. These were generally men in their fifties during the
first wave of CRH's intemationalisation who had been offered the opportunity to
realise their capital while maintaining a working involvement. Many of these
managers have now reached retirement age which, given CRH's lack of a 'cadre' of
international managers brought issues such as succession planning and management
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development to the fore. Given the rate and scope of growth experienced by the
Group, ensuring the future FIR needs of CRH are met is now a crucial concern of the
FIR function. As the FIR director explained:
One of the problems of the form of growth we have is to ensure that there are
people behind of similar calibre. And also that we are recruiting enough
graduates in order to keep up with the flow of development both at plant
level and also just in maintaining the rate of development.
As the large gap in future managerial resources has been recognised, the
identification and development of senior management has been seen as vital to the
future success of the Group. As the FIR director explained: 'CRH will have only one
third of the current employees at those levels in ten years time. Two-thirds will have
retired, so it is quite a significant issue'. To this end, a classical 'gap analysis' with
future senior managerial needs matched against current resources was undertaken.
The process began with the piloting of an approach to managerial 'competencies'.
Having identified fifty-seven separate competencies, programmes were developed
that focused on the development of such skills as planning, decision-making, team
work, communication and creativity. As a local manager noted:
The average manager requires a skill set that is not normal. They require
acquisition skills, negotiating skills etc., and it gets harder to find people like
that. I think that one of the problems that we do face is the actual human
resources of the Group. The skills base that people need is substantial and
training for that in the future is very important.
Furthermore, in recent years CRH have entered sectors that require skills not
traditionally necessary within the Group. This has led to a further need to invest in
training. To this end, the HR function has recently devised a formalised 'leadership
plan' programme. This was developed through a process of identifying core
competencies in the form of managerial behaviours in an attempt to predict the likely
success or failure of a manager as a leader. Senior people were asked which
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behaviours or 'best practices' led to success and what led to failure. From this a
picture of the necessary leadership competencies was formed. Moreover, the change
in skills required has tightened the availability of eligible managers, which has led to
pressures on the HR function to train and develop existing managers. Consequently,
one of the current challenges for the Group is the maintenance and availability of
training and development programmes.
CRH's overseas management situation also echoes the managerial shortfall
described above. Management in the UK perceive a large skills gap emerging in
their operations within the next ten years. Given the perception of the building
materials industry as unsophisticated, they have had difficulty attracting good young
recruits and have had to establish undergraduate placement programmes in order to
ensure the future supply of skilled people. However, schemes such as these coupled
with their decentralised approach and the organic approach to acquisitional growth is
now beginning to increase CRH's managerial skill base and provide a more diverse
mix of managers.
While CRH would argue that it does not operate a formalised Group-wide
management development programme, there is a cultural formality to the way in
which new managers are socialised into the Group. When qualified professionals
enter CRH, they are assigned to the position of 'business development executive'
where they 'internalise' the culture of the Group through engaging in acquisitional
activities and developing their ability, to CRH's liking, in this respect. As part of the
process they have to sell CRH to potential buyers and explain their style of
management. As the HR director commented:
This has proved to be a very good way of recruiting people in, seeing how
they settle in, getting them to understand the way the organisation works.
They are closely involved in the acquisition process, which involves
explaining to the owner why it is they should do a deal with us as opposed to
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anyone else, what he can expect to happen after the values of the organisation
and the culture.
Rather than establishing a large cadre of indigenous internationally mobile
managers, CRH have opted to employ a small mix of Irish and host country
managers. Operating on a 'need-by-need' basis, the Group tends to use Irish
managers only to fill overseas managerial gaps, this was particularly found to be the
case with in the UK. Their ability to do this is aided by high profile the group enjoys
within Ireland, and what the FIR director terms a natural 'wanderlust' among Irish
managers, which ensures that CRH can get such managers when they need them. As
a senior executive explained:
A lot of people join the company because they want to leave Ireland. They
see it as an international group. It's very well known and has a high profile
and they see it will give them a career overseas. Now, that is very Irish and it
is not normal.
Initial management training for this group of mobile managers occurs within the host
country, through a system of coaching and mentoring. Largely responsible for the
sourcing and evaluation of acquisitions, they work closely with divisional managers.
If successful, they are then placed into line management positions and are eventually
given the opportunity to run one of the businesses they have previously acquired.
The general practice is that new Irish managers are sent overseas on home country
contracts. However, recent geographical diversification into developing and difficult
regions such as Poland has seen a shift toward using more experienced expatriates.
One of the main issues currently facing CRH's HR function is the difficulty of
repatriating mangers. Low turnover rates amongst senior management, lean
management structures, high growth rates and low levels of managerial mobility
have given rise to difficulties in providing the repatriation opportunities that Irish
managers may have expected when they left. The localised nature of CRH's
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businesses and the particular skills required to run them has further compounded this
difficulty. The situation is particularly acute for more senior managers. While initial
mobility is not an issue, increasingly managers are finding that requests for a return
to Ireland, usually for family reasons, cannot be fulfilled.
To summarise, a long tradition of employing local management has given rise to
concerns regarding the transferability of CRH's management skills across borders. In
effect, given their highly localised approach and short-term ability to fill overseas
gaps with domestic managers, there is no real immediate need for CR11 to develop
the large cadres of international managers that many larger MNCs currently do.
Their ability to socialise professional management through an 'on-the-ground'
training style, has enabled CRH to largely avoid introducing a formalised
development programme. Remuneration issues for managerial staff are also largely
outside the realm of the HR function. Senior managers' pay is determined at board
level and linked to issues of local business performance. Divisional heads, as
opposed to the FIR director, are involved at board level in establishing incentive
plans. Pay levels are deliberately kept competitive and relative to particular
conditions as this is seen to be crucial to ensure the continuity of managerial
mobility.
6.6.2 The Management of IR
CRH adopts a highly decentralised and traditional approach to the management of
IR. It is an approach that may be best understood by reviewing the role of key IR
turning points in the Group's development. Since the cement strike in 1970s, and the
Group's merger at the end of that dispute, the management of IR has been treated as
a local line management issue. This is an approach that has been reinforced through
certain structural arrangements. Apart from centralised national pay agreements, all
175
bargaining occurs locally. There are no collective agreements operating within the
Group. Furthermore, each individual site has a separate pay structure geared to its
local environment. As a result, pay and conditions vary across regions and there is
no explicit or direct attempt to align them. National level discussions are actively
avoided by head office, which refuses to meet and enter discussion with trade
unions, citing the localised nature of operations. As the FIR director explained: 'we
do not operate any agreements in Ireland, for instance, as 'CRH plc'. That is done at
a company level. We avoid national discussions and that would be the pattern
everywhere we operate'.
The main trade unions involved see two factors as having shaped this decentralised
approach to the management of JR. particularly within Ireland. In 1976, the Group
restructured its operations into discrete units. One company in particular was
disaggregated into four separate regionally organised businesses, each with its own
separate management team. The unions believe this decision was taken in the light
of JR 'environment'. At the same time, CRH moved to introduce the subcontracting
of drivers, cleaners and maintenance workers. This, combined with technological
developments, resulted in a large reduction in staff, many of whom were unionised.
According to the trade union this substantially reduced union power. While, the
unions can theoretically represent the subcontractors under the subsequent Irish
Industrial Relations Act, management may choose to refuse to meet union proposals
on the grounds that subcontractors are not employees of the company. As a trade
union official explained: 'They [CRH] have managed to break the hold of the unions
by breaking up the companies and encouraging staff to go the subcontracting route'.
As described above, reinforcing the localised and decentralised approach to JR is the
maintenance of local company identities. By maintaining the local identity and
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resisting the tendency to impose a generic group name, head office have 'localised'
employee loyalty, isolated conflict and maintained their stance with regard to
refusing to negotiate on collective issues. CR1-i's approach suggests a bifurcation
between the management of managerial and non-managerial staff. It is clearly in
CRH management's interest to maintain as low a group-wide role in the
management of IR as possible - the approach supports it strategy of a localised but
hard financially or cost driven control. In keeping, there are limits to the
decentralised approach adopted by head office to JR. While the actual negotiation
and resolution generally remains the remit of local management, the unions
representatives interviewed see the intervention by head office in the event of
threatened strike action as a very real likelihood. JR issues are only dealt with locally
in the first instance. Head office gets involved if problems remain unresolved.
Head office intervention gained a more public viewing with the recent introduction
of the European Works Council (EWC) directive. In response to its introduction,
CRH adopted a hard-line approach, initially availing of the UK 'opt-out' clause and
bypassing the main Irish trade unions (ERR, 1996: 7). They targeted the
introduction of a European information and consultation procedure (EWCB, 1996:
5). The Group adopted a 'minimalist' stance and secured a low-grade procedure
arrangement despite active trade union opposition. The rationale offered by senior
management at that time was that such structures were not appropriate to their
organisational structures or the nature of their core businesses (The Irish Times,
30/6, 1996). The EWC directive was seen to sit uneasily within their operations,
given their structure and localised approach. A divisional manager complained that:
In fact, we have been very uncomfortable with it because we don't organise
our management like that, we don't manage our companies that way, so why
be organising to be meeting people that way? We don't transfer production
between countries.
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Under their current EWC arrangements, CRH need only hold meetings when the
changes being considered affect at least 3 per cent of its entire EU workforce or 10
per cent of those directly affected by the changes in plants in at least two countries.
Subsequently, there have been no meetings held since its introduction. There was
speculation that the EWC directive might increase the speed with which CRH
introduces meetings for HR managers. Even though EWCs do operate within some
of their European operations, these are seen by the Group to be 'low grade'.
6.6.3 Trade Unionisation
Levels of trade unionisation levels vary across CRH sites and national operations
with a stark difference between home and overseas unionisation levels. As an annual
report in the early 1990s stated:
The majority of the Irish employees of the Group and less than 20% of the
employees outside of the Republic of Ireland are members of unions. The
Group believes that relations with its employees are satisfactory (CRH
Annual Report, 1992).
UK-based management also report low levels of unionisation in their operations.
This is against a background of high-unionisation levels across the industry in the
UK, suggesting that high levels of trade unionisation may be being avoided in
overseas acquisitions. One head office manager attributed the variation in trade
union levels to CRH's 'benignly paternalistic' approach. Given the diversity of JR
regimes across European operations, from the heavily unionised plants in Spain to
the highly institutionalised works councils in the Netherlands, CRH is exposed to a
number of different experiences of JR regimes, and due to its strategy of
decentralisation chooses not to operate Group-wide standardised JR policies.
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6.7 CoNcLusioN
CRH plc operates a highly fragmented approach to the management of their
employment relationships. On one level the management of non-managerial staff is
highly decentralised to local management. This is an approach that the Group has
maintained through particular structural arrangements. Specifically through the use
of subcontracting, the retention of identity of local operating companies and a refusal
to negotiate directly with trade union representative bodies or engage in Group-wide
discussion, CRET has largely been able to maintain a highly localised approach to the
management of JR.
Layered on top of this decentralised approach has been the recent introduction of a
head office designated HR function. This development represents a shift in the
Group towards a centralised approach to the management of mangers. It is a role that
has grown in its strategic intent from its origins as a administrative function to a
more interventionist entity following the introduction of European works council
directive. The head office FIR function is now focused on issues such as
management development, succession planning and leadership training. This
distinction between the central management of managers and local autonomy with
regard to non-managerial staff has, however, become blurred in recent times with the
head office adopting an increasingly interventionist role with respect to the
introduction of the European Works directive. Given the recent adoption of pan-
European structures by the Group, it will be interesting to monitor the changes in
their approach to the management of JR.
The culture of CRH has been shaped by its history. The Group internationalised out
of what they saw as a need to spread their risk beyond the Irish context so as to
ensure their long-term survival. Diversification through intemationalisation appears
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to have been sparked by an acrimonious national industrial dispute, and their
approach to the management of employment relationships has been greatly
influenced by this and other particular contextual factors, including the rate of
internationalisation achieved by the Group in the past and a traditional resistance to
negotiate on the basis of profitability. CRH has grown quickly since their initial
decision to 'go international', and this case study shows how an MNC with a highly
decentralised approach may very successfully follow a strategy that seeks to
supplement traditional IR arrangements with softer FIR approaches geared toward to
management of managers. However, CRH's recent stance towards the introduction
of European Works Councils, raises questions as to whether the Group's approach is
this clear cut. One might surmise that this stance indicates a move toward the sort of
'managerial unilateralism' advocated by the globali sation literature.
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CHAPTER 7
GREENCORE GROUP PLC.
The Greencore case depicts an example of a recently internationalised MNC and examines the impact
of this recency on their approaches to employment relationships. Differentiating this case company
from the other three cases is the transitory 'position' that the Group presently occupies between a
highly centralised approach that characterised the Group prior to its privatisation and a more recent
decentralised approach to the management of IR pursued post-privatisation. It is the management of
this transition that appears to be shaping Greencore's current approach.
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The internationalisation of the Greencore Group is underpinned by a number of key
factors. Similar to the CRH case, internationalisation has occurred by default rather
than the result of any 'grand design'. Despite this similarity, what sets Greencore
apart from the other cases is the 'recency' with which the process of
internationalisation has occurred. In an attempt to engage in international markets,
the Group has recently undergone a number of organisational restructurings. This
has resulted in the movement toward a greater decentralisation of the management of
IR and away from traditional centralised approaches. As with the previous case, this
has been accompanied by the recent establishment of a HR function at head office
level. In short, the current approach of Greencore represents a juncture between a
traditional highly centralised approach to the employment relationship and a more
recent decentralised approach the management of IR. What this case also reveals is
the role that historical fish JR issues have played in the shaping of Greencore's
current strategies, particularly locational decisions.
Hence, these developments can best be understood in light of the Greencore's wider
historical and social context - in particular, the change in ownership and
privatisation of the Group. Many of the current structures and approaches are
reflected in this event. More specifically, as the case discussion will demonstrate,
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Greencore's approach to the management of employment relationships is still being
shaped by attempts to break away from their legacy of state ownership and JR
agreements that arose at the time of privatisation.
7.2 COMPANY PROFILE
The Greencore Group emerged in the early 1990s amid a considerable degree of
public debate and controversy. It arose from a former state-owned enterprise (SOE)
into a commercially driven 'major supplier of primary foods and related products,
food ingredients and prepared foods to industrial and consumer markets' (Greencore
Annual Report, 1995). Operating within freland, the UK, the US and Mainland
Europe, the Group employ 2,300, the majority of whom (90%) are located within
Ireland. In its short existence as a commercial entity, operating profits have increased
steadily from IRE28.1m in 1991 to IREE56.5 in 1998 (cf. table 7.1).
TABLE 7.1 OPERATING PROFIT (199 1-98) IREM
1991	 1992	 1993	 1994 1995	 1996	 1997	 1998
28.1	 36.7	 40.0	 40.5	 45.2	 49.9	 45.6	 56.5
Source: Greencore Group Annual Reports, 1991-98.
TABLE 7.2 GROUP TURNOVER BY SECTOR (%)
1991
Agribusiness	 33
Sugar	 39
Food	 28
Source: Greencore Group Annual Reports, 1991-98.
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Similarly, turnover has grown from IRE326m in 1991 to IRE592m in 1998, albeit
with a shift in direction from sugar production toward the higher value-added end of
their business - Food Ingredients (Greencore Annual Reports 199 1-98, cf. table 7.2).
Overall employment levels declined steadily in the 1980s but have fluctuated
broadly around the same level throughout the 1990s (cf. table 7.3). This is reflected
in the distribution of employment that has shown a steady decline in the Sugar
business in recent years, with a corresponding growth in the agri-business and the
food divisions employment levels (cf. table 7.4).
TABLE 7.3 TOTAL EMPLOYMENT BY DivisioNs (1990-95)
1990
Agri-business	 255
Sugar	 926
Other Food	 576
Total	 1757
1991	 1992	 1993
331	 404	 356
902	 895	 868
641	 704	 704
1874	 2003	 1928
1994	 1995
337	 345
788	 691
649	 685
1774	 1721
Source: Greencore Group Annual Report 1990-95.
FIGURE 7.1 IRISH SUGAR EMPLOYMENT (1980-1995)
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7.3 THE NATURE OF COMPETITION
The nature of competition for this Group has changed dramatically over the past
decade. Greencore operate within markets whose focus has changed from being
regional or national to pan-European or global (Greencore Annual Report, 1994).
Cost-rationalisation and the emergence of 'centres of excellence' and 'designated
production centres' have contributed to a fundamental shift in the nature of
competition for the Group. However, despite these changes and unlike food
industries in many other countries the Irish food industry extends from 'tiller to
table'. The Irish food processing industry is largely an indigenous one, controlled
and owned by companies that are large in a local context but relatively small in
international terms. With the opening up of the Irish economy in the 1960s the Irish
food industry broadly fared well in resisting import penetration and increasing net
employment. As O'Malley (1985: 18) suggest, their strong performance of this
sector is explicable in terms of the nature of the sector which 'consists largely of
activities which are not subject to the constraints imposed on latecomers by barriers
to entry'. In short, while the economy has opened up to external competition, the
Irish food industry has continued to operate in markets that are naturally protected, a
shelteredness that is due to high transportation or logistical costs, the closeness to
source materials and the non-traded nature of the sector. In O'Malley's words (1985:
21):
The indigenous Food industry...includes products.. .which are virtually non-
traded. But its relatively successful performance has probably been due to the
fact that it consists mostly of low value-added, basic processing of
commodity type products.
Within these market forces, the Irish food industry has radically reorganised in the
1980s and early 1990s (Lynch and Roche, 1996). As an industry traditionally
dependent on a system of intervention and the export refund mechanism of the
Common Agricultural Policy, reforms in the early 1990s were introduced to change
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from what was perceived to be an over dependence on subsidies. The opening up of
national borders and Ireland's entry into the EU increased the competitiveness of the
Irish food industry by expanding the scale and geographical scope of its businesses.
The drive towards scale economies has resulted in an acceleration of the acquisition,
merger and alliance activities concerning food companies within Europe, trends that
have led to the consolidation of the European food processing industry. The
emergence of Eastern European countries as low-cost producers has opened up new
supply channels and markets for Irish producers but at the same time threatened
Ireland's comparative advantage as a low-cost producer. Eastern European countries
have become increasingly competitive as new economic and farming systems replace
traditional systems of collective farming. Furthermore, the internationalisation of the
'big' food MNCs, such as Cadburys, to overseas markets has increased the pressure
on Irish producers to follow their large customers. Commentators believe that for
Irish food companies operating within consolidating and globalising markets, the
dependency on commodity products will remain a problem. Subsequently, an
extension of their scale and geographical scope is seen to be critical to the survival
of Irish food companies (The Irish Times, 12/11, 1996). At the same time, it is
thought that the future competitiveness of Irish companies in the industry lies in a
movement from low-tech commodity type products to high-technology, high-value
added products aimed at the upper end of the market (Lynch and Roche, 1996).
Within Ireland, the biggest change has been the movement from the traditional
practice of suppliers (i.e., farmers) negotiating their contracts at the point-of-sale, to
pre-determined contractual relationships, where the price is agreed prior to delivery.
This has resulted in the emergence of a number of large processors like Greencore
and a consolidation of the food processing industry itself, placing larger processors
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in stronger negotiating positions. In response, suppliers have organised together into
national organisations under commodity groupings.
7.4 HisToRicAL EVOLUTION
Despite Greencore's recent emergence, many of its main constituent companies can
be traced back to the foundation of the fish State and the subsequent drive to
industrialisation, most notably the formation of the Irish Sugar industry (Address by
Murphy, 1993). Prior to the foundation of the State, attempts to create an indigenous
sugar industry proved unsuccessful. However, in 1926 the Irish Sugar Company was
successfully founded. By 1933 the industry was experiencing difficulties. As with
the CRH case, the Government took control of the fish sugar beet industry through
the intervention of the Minister for Trade and Industry, Sean Lemass. Comhlucht
Sitiicre Eireann Teo (CSET) was duly established as a State-owned enterprise (SOE)
to operate as a manufacturing and trading concern, in the same way as private
enterprise companies, under the Companies Acts. CSET became a key component of
the State's industrialisation programme and, in effect, the vehicle for pioneering and
accelerating rural industrialisation (cf. http://www.irish-sugar.ie ). As Hogan (1997:
87) writes:
The final policy tier of the nineteen-thirties was the extension of the system
of state companies, which came under the aegis of Lemass's department and
were inaugurated in line with his declared policy of providing state
investment to generate employment and economic growth in areas where
private enterprise had been slow to embark on initiatives.
Based on the philosophy of the co-operative movement, it was designed to serve the
needs of local beet growers and farmers. Hence, due to the potential employment
benefits, the location of each production site became the focus of intense political
lobbying, involving senior Church and political representatives. Location decisions
were to result in fierce opposition and industrial relations problems when the
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decision to rationalise was taken in the late 1970s. As in the CRH case, while initial
State investment was focused on the creation of an indigenous base, key personnel
were sent overseas and foreign managers with their technical and managerial
expertise were brought in to manage the early development of CSET. However, with
the onset of the Second World War, foreign managers returned home and CSET
became fully resourced with Irish management as the focus shifted to the
achievement of self-sufficiency (Leavy, 1988).
Under the direction of a new Chief Executive, General Costello, attention was
placed upon the modernisation of facilities, investing in research and development,
improving the quality of raw materials and disseminating information to farmers,
CSET's main suppliers. In order to ensure an adequate supply of raw materials, the
Group embarked on a campaign to entice farmers to change to the production of
sugar beet. This was largely successful and by the end of the 1950s domestic
requirement was fully met. However, with little prospect for export overseas due to
the domination of world markets by UK and US companies, there was soon a
saturation of domestic markets. This coupled with an inability to enter the 'free
market', drove the company to diversify their product portfolio beyond the food
processing sector.
Despite the development of a new product line and some technical successes, within
five years the newly acquired food processing company was accumulating
substantial losses. Amid a highly public power struggle and a change of leadership,
the group refocused on food processing as CSET entered into a joint venture with
the large food group, the Heinz Corporation. Another change of leadership saw the
reintegration of the food 'project' and the consolidation of organisational structures.
By this time, the Group consisted of two very different businesses: one operating in a
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sheltered monopolistic environment, the other in a highly competitive climate. This
led to the co-existence of two distinct ideologies: one developmental, the other
commercial. By the late 1960s, State development policy has shifted from traditional
concerns toward the attraction of foreign investment, and with that, the notion of
CSET as an indigenous 'engine of growth' was undermined. As previously
highlighted, accompanying the shift in State industrial policy was a rapidly changing
external environment. With freland's entry into the EU and the introduction of a
quota system, the organisation shifted their focus toward marketing issues and a
major modernisation programme, funded by its main shareholder, the Government.
By the 1980s, accumulating losses coupled with a growing debt deficit and a
tightening of public finances, brought the role of SOEs and the viability of
privatisation to the fore of public debates. The Irish economy was now experiencing
a recession largely due to the impact of the second oil crisis. The State's strategy of
stimulating the economy through consumer demand leveraged against foreign
borrowings was dependent on continued growth in the world economy and a
willingness by Irish workers to accept lower wage increases, and neither had
occurred. Exports and imports declined while foreign borrowings continued to rise.
This led to problems of public finances and increasing pressure for Government
investment into public sector enterprises. The Government subsequently established
a review body to examine the role of SUEs. The committee feared that
unemployment costs and tax revenue losses would be greater in the event of a
closure than through sustaining the operations (IRN, 3, 1981). Their
recommendations for CSET called for a radical rationalisation of the sugar
operations, with a loss of 520 jobs, coupled with greater State subsidies to maintain
operations until alternative sources of employment could be found. The
recommendation and eventual decision to close two processing plants, was to be one
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of the most contentious decisions in freland's industrial relations history and a
watershed for the Group as a whole. The closure of the plants became a national
issue that took five years to complete. As one director explained:
It became political. It was difficult to close the factories down because you
had to deal with the bishop and local politicians. With the emergence of a
new Chief Executive, he took on the bishop, the unions and eventually
reduced the sugar factories from four to two and the industry became
efficient.
The seeds of privatisation had been sown. With the appointment of a new Chair to
the board in the early 1980s, the notion of commercialism was translated into
structural forms and the first steps towards privatisation were undertaken. From
1989 to 1991, the Group was focused on identifying alternative sources of equity.
Funds obtained were subsequently spent on redundancy payments in the closure of
the processing plants. By the late 1980s, the fish Government took the decision to
privatise CSET, based on a belief that this was the best way to fund the equity
necessary to modernise operations and to compete in a globalised food producing
industry. Consequently, the floatation of the newly named 'Greencore Group plc'
took place in 1991.
As Greencore was floated, it faced limited expansion opportunities within low
growth markets, increasing EU regulation and a lack of scale to compete
internationally. This was further marred by the replacement of the entire top
management team within twelve months. In response, the Group restructured and
consolidated its operations to strengthen the balance sheet. By now the Group
consisted of a number of related but diverse businesses, ranging from The Irish
Sugar Co. which was 'very much steeped in the semi-state idiom' to Odlums 'a
traditional fish family-owned company' (IRN, 7, 1994). In an attempt to overcome
volume constraints in the sugar industry the Group had diversified into flour milling,
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malt, grain trading and fertiliser. However, once domestic operations were
strengthened one of the first developments the Group took was to expand overseas.
Two forms of internationalisation were favoured: minority stakes and acquisitions.
While the former has been largely pursued in Britain, the latter has been key to
development within mainland Europe (Address by Dilger, 1995). While greenfield
sites are regarded as an option, as the director for finance remarked: 'they do not
tend to produce as quick a shot into earnings growth... because you are buying
something largely without markets'. As a result, the Group focuses on acquiring
businesses in existing markets. As the head of strategic planning explained:
All you have to do [here] is strip out the overhead and build on the
synergies. Whereas from start to profits in a greenfield site, you could be
looking at three or four years, the first two of which you might be taking a
lot of grief. It is difficult to put that proposition to a company that is driven
by cash flow and earnings per share.
In an attempt to match the growth of their main competitors, the Group found itself
under increasing pressure to acquire. Driving the Group's acquisitions abroad have
been two attributes: the location of their main customers and return on capital
(Address by Murphy, 1992). The company's relationship with Cadbury is exemplary
in this respect. In the words of one senior executive:
We supply flour for biscuits to Cadbury's. They are going to build a big plant
in Poland, now we would ask ourselves the question 'now we can't transport
flour from freland to Poland... can we build a strategic alliance with
Cadbury's where we would buy the flour and supply them. You are not
taking a real flyer into the dark and you may reach that sort of arrangement
with them - you may not. They may say 'Okay we are prepared to take you
on board based on your record here in Dublin and if you can ensure us that
the same quality standards are going to apply we will buy in'. So, customers
are driving our acquisition policy to a certain extent.
Britain was initially avoided as a growth area given intense price wars in this market.
As an alternative Greencore examined mainland Europe. By 1994, Greencore had
completed its first acquisition of a malting business in Europe. As with CRH,
Greencore's expansion into mainland Europe occurred by default as much as by
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design. As one of the managers who was actively involved in the process recounted:
The Belgium operation came by default. Fortuitously, a phone call was
made to say this business had gone into receivership. We went out and
had a look at the business and we sent the malting guys out to have a
look at it. They came back and said 'Yes, it has potential'. We had
bought it with the intention of offloading it but then China started to
mop up huge quantities of malt and barley for no explicable reason. All
of a sudden the two plants in Belgium we bought for a song went to full
capacity. These are now servicing European markets.
What this acquisition highlights is the particular approach adopted by Greencore to
internationalisation which, is not the responsibility of development teams but of
individual operating companies. Individual businesses have a developmental role to
play, as one senior executive from head office explained: 'We have a strong catalytic
role in developing the people we have, looking at their strengths and weaknesses and
trying to eliminate their weaknesses and build on their strengths'. As part of the
change in ownership and movement towards commercial profitability each operating
company is given the brief to 'go international', in effect to grow their respective
businesses. Whereas head office could initiate the process, all potential acquisitions
are channeled down to operating companies. Motivating those individual companies
is a necessity to maintain their position within the Group. As a local manager
explained: 'If we have become uncompetitive because of lack of scale, somebody
will make a decision within Group to change direction and concentrate on another
area of operation'. Newly acquired businesses are then integrated into and managed
by those divisions.
As with the CRH case, one of the crucial criteria in Greencore's growth strategy is
the retention of management. While replete in market knowledge, there is a
recognised lack of existing managerial resources given the size of the Group. As
senior management recounted, in the build up to privatisation there was a steady
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decline in employment levels that resulted in a scarcity of managerial resources. As a
result, head office has limited ability to add management value and therefore
management is needed to remain in all companies that are acquired. Unlike the
previous case, Greencore informally contacted other Irish organisations with
operations in their target location. As one of the managers involved in the process
remarked, 'this proved to be a valuable informal contact and source of cultural
knowledge'.
Based upon this informal benchmarking process, Greencore identified a number of
key attributes to the management of overseas operations. These included: the
immediate relocation of a home country manager once the acquisition was complete,
and secondly, that the preferred home country manager would emanate from the
finance function. In so doing, the financial reporting systems would be installed and
an operation quickly integrated. The rationale for relocating a finance person is,
according to the manager of Irish operations, that they are someone 'who
understands everything that is going on in the place and can spot something which is
unusual, very quickly and run the essence of that to ground very quickly'. Finance as
a function is regarded as 'de facto number two within an organisation'. As a head
office executive explained: 'we were warned about [having a finance person in
place] repeatedly by everybody we contacted who are involved in Belgium or
anywhere else in the Continent'.
Their overall size and lack of internal resources also largely shape the size of
acquisitions pursued by the Group. In assessing acquisitions, head counts are taken
into account. For example, the person managing the process in Belgium is held in
high regard for not, in the words of one local Irish manager: 'believ[ing] in HR, he
just believes in letting people out the door as quick as he can. The head count
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numbers are tighter there'. The Group currently pursues small to medium sized
acquisitions for control reasons and there seems little incentive to acquire large
companies given current structures and what head office perceive to be a lack of
managerial resources. However, the Group is conscious of being an 'acquirer' to
avoid being acquired, given the globalising efforts in the international market place.
In the words of a Greencore senior executive, internationa' expansion has come to be
high on the Group's agenda in the 1990s (The Irish Times, 12/5, 1997). Table 7.4
summarises the key events in Greencore's internationalisation against its broader
historical evolution.
TABLE 7.4 KEY EVENTS IN THE EVOLUTION OF GREENCORE GROUP
Key Dates Key Event
1933	 Establishment as State-owned Enterprise - foundation of Sugar industry
1940	 Influx of foreign managers and secondment of key personnel overseas
1945	 WW II return of foreign managers overseas, plants fully resourced by Irish
management
SOE to become self-sufficient, investment in R&D and modernising facilities
New Leadership - focus on information, consultation and quality
1950	 Saturation of domestic market and inability to enter 'free market' due to market
domination
1960	 Diversification into food processing sector
1965	 New food project makes accumulating losses
1966	 New Leadership - group enter joint venture with Heinz major food company
Change of Leadership - separate boards and management structure for two
main companies
1969	 Change in State development policy - shift from SOE to foreign owned MNCs
1972	 All operations integrated into single structure under one board and
management structure
1974	 Ireland's entry to EU - introduction of food quota system
4 year programme of modernisation introduced
1980	 Accumulating losses
Questioning of SOE viability
Appointment of New Chairman, beginnings of move towards commercialism
1981	 Decision taken to close two processing plants
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Industrial Action & intervention by Church and local politicians
1985	 Call for Privatisation
Joint Oireachtas Committee established to review operations
Exposure to and hardening of external environment
Organisational restructuring businesses divisionalised and decentralised
1991	 SOE is privatised and newly formed company is floated
Organisational restructuring reduction to 4 divisions
Enter UK through minority shares
1992	 Complete change of top management team (TMT)
New management structure
1993	 Group directors appointed
Further decentralisation of operational responsibility
1994	 First full acquisition in Mainland Europe
1995	 Change of Leadership
Small bolt-ons in Agri-business sector
7.5 STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND CONTROL
Greencore's development is characterised by a number of organisational
restructurings. Prior to privatisation there was what the director of corporate
planning described as, 'an absolute hierarchical structure, all the way up to the
Ministry of Agriculture, who was the ultimate shareholder'. Essentially in its pre-
privatised form, the Group was structured around the core sugar business (cf. figure
7.2), with the head office located at the main Irish Sugar office. With a change in the
political climate regarding SOE's and privatisation, the company diversified into a
number of related businesses, many of which represented and 'organic' vertical
progression out from sugar. As senior head office executive explained: 'the animal
feed thing was a natural progression from the waste of the sugar process. The
amount of lime Irish farmers were putting into the ground was not sufficient so the
company thought that they would get into the quarrying business.'
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FIGuRE 7.2 ORGANISATIONAL SmucurRE OF IRISH SUGAR PLC.
Irish Sugar plc.
Sugar	 Food	 Engineering	 4gri-ChernicaI	 I Quarries
However, the movement toward divisionalisation occurred prior to privatisation.
With the appointment of a new chair in the early 1980s, there was a shift in focus
towards greater commercialism. Following the Oireachtas review of operations, all
SOEs were requested by the State to plan their businesses, differentiating between
commercial and non-commercial activities. To that end, Irish Sugar began to
examine its businesses according to commercial criteria. Individual businesses were
subsequently separated out into discrete units, producing individual accounts and
subject to individual evaluations from head office. While managed tightly from the
'centre', this was essentially the first step the Group took towards divisionalisation
and financial devolution. With privatisation, the newly formed Greencore adopted
the role of a holding company, with individual businesses restructured into main
businesses or divisions. Within its first year of operation as a commercial entity,
Greencore acquired a fertilising company and a food group. This brought the total
number of divisions to four (cf. figure 7.3).
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FIGURE 7.3 GREECORE PLC. - ORGAMSATIONAL STRUCTURE AFTER PRIVATISATION
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The opportunity to restructure management structures was taken with the highly
publicised and controversial replacement of senior management in 1991. At head
office level, two executive management committees were established to support the
main board, one focusing on Group strategy, the other on operational management.
In order to support this internal structure, a number of Group-level directors were
appointed in areas such as human resources, corporate planning, corporate affairs
and technical affairs. Correspondingly, autonomous business units were created,
reporting structures simplified and operating managers given clear accountability for
running their businesses within broad group guidelines. In the last decade, Greencore
has grown substantially by entering into new businesses while integrating these into
the four divisions (cf. figure 7.4). Further adjustments to the structure are not ruled
out. As one manager commented 'at the moment we are waiting for some people to
fall out of the system [so as] to clean up the lines'.
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FIGURE 7.4 GREENCORE PLC. - CURRENT ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
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7.5.1 Group Strategy: 'Autonomy with Financial Responsibility'
As an SOE prior to privatisation Greencore had a long background of centralised
management, with management decisions taken by the State. Following
privatisation, a more concerted attempt at decentralisation occurred, with discrete
business units encouraged to think laterally about their business. As the director of
corporate planning explained: 'up to privatisation, head office would have been seen
as the place where everything was done whereas since the change of management,
we have been trying to push responsibility back to the individual businesses'.
Since privatisation, the strategic focus of the Group has been threefold - cost
competitiveness and efficiencies, the development of internal structures, and growth
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by acquisition. According to Greencore's Annual Report of 1994:
The strategic imperatives since privatisation have been to upgrade the
efficiencies and internal structures of the Group, strengthen its balance sheet
and establish a track record with a shareholder base which has become
progressively more international.
Despite the drive towards decentralisation, local management continues to see head
office as 'the place for major strategic decisions'. The role of Greencore's centre is
said to be primarily one of co-ordination, development and advice. One manner in
which the role of the centre has changed dramatically with privatisation is in relation
to equity. Following its emergence into a publicly quoted commercial entity,
Greencore's head office became the main source of equity for capital expenditure. In
short, it became 'the bank' by eliminating the need for individual businesses to deal
with commercial banks, subject to commercial lending rates. With the restructuring
of the Greencore's operations and the establishment of directorships, a number of
new company-wide functions were established. These included Corporate Affairs,
Strategy Planning and Human Resources. Functions that remained decentralised
included information technology, marketing and sales. Past attempts to centralise
marketing and sales have failed due to a perceived lack of synergies between the
companies in these areas.
7.5.2 Control Mechanisms
Greencore's decentralised approach to financial and operational responsibility is
controlled through tight financial management systems. As one senior executive
explained, 'the achievement of these finances allows for the management of
autonomy'. Ultimately dependent on the delivery of results, the achievement of
targets results in little direct head office intervention. As a senior finance manager
explained: 'If a manager goes through the planning process, submits a budget that is
acceptable and if he keeps reporting on budget, then he will have very little interface
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with head office at all'.
Following the formation of the Greencore Group, a number of new financial
reporting procedures were introduced. One of the main financial control mechanisms
operated by Greencore is the annual budget. Containing the balance sheets and cash
flows this is designed, in the words of the finance director, to: 'focus managers on
what they have to do in the current year. Each month they have to submit their
accounts, which are integrated and put into group accounts. So that is the essential
form of control'. Aside from the annual budgetary process, individual businesses
also have to submit a five-year strategic plan. Driven from the 'bottom-up', the
underlying rationale is to give management the opportunity to examine their
business outside of a budgetary context. These plans are then presented by the
managing directors to the board. Once approved, plans are then edited further.
As with CRH, Greencore's most important control mechanism is the capital budget.
One executive explained that 'in the absence of goals it exists to ensure that
practices make sense'. As part of the revenue budget, the capital budget is subject to
critical review by head office. It focuses on how capital is spent and its likely
returns. Approval for capital projects is again dependent on the amount sought and
position held within the organisation. For example, the capital expenditure limit for
executives is reported to be around £100,000. Requests exceeding this amount
require main board approval. Capital expenditure involves a rigorous process of
approval and is driven by the cyclical nature of Greencore's core businesses. What
makes the autonomy 'real', in the words of the HR director, is the linkage between
pay and the achievement of targets. Apart from these simplified financial controls
brought in to focus the accountability of management, a calendarised system has
recently been introduced for the dissemination of information.
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In contrast, financial controls are mainly applied domestically, overseas sites face
somewhat different mechanisms. The Belgium operations, for example, which are
managed by the Irish mailing operations, finds that the controls exerted over its
operations are much tighter than between head office and Minch Norton. Due to the
remoteness and need for non-financial information, a variation of the standard
financial reports that existed was developed for the Belgium operation. As a local
Irish manager explained: 'there are a lot of things that I would instantly know what is
going on here so I do not have a formal reporting system. The same however does
not apply to Belgium. It is a much more formalised system we demand from them,
rather than what we demand from ourselves'.
This reporting system is expected to act as a model for future acquisitions. The
'report' is a hybrid of the Group model and what was 'left behind'. The operations
here are managed as much from a particular 'physical' perspective as from a
financial one. As the local managing director explained:
The first things I start looking for are not the financial numbers but
actually some of the production yields and some of the production
through-puts. Employee numbers and aspects such as that. And then,
after having gone to that, come to look at the monthly management
package, accounts package.
With regard to capital expenditure controls, a differentiated and more centralised
approach is evident. This stands in contrast to the situation Irish operations enjoy.
With the Belgian operations, capital expenditure is subject to the proof or approval
of divisional management. For purchases over £10,000, the Belgium operations
make requests to their divisional management, who review it and forward it to head
office. If approved, it then comes back to the division to be actioned.
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Greencore statements demonstrated certain limits to their decentralised approach. In
summary, these include the repatriation of profits to the centre, strict capital
expenditure controls and head office intervention in the event of non-conformity. In
the event of targets not being delivered procedures are set in place whereby the Chief
Executive will intervene, with the intention of taking corrective measures. Head
office involvement goes all the way up to the CEO if there is a problem. Again re-
emphasising the financially driven approach of the Group, senior management
explained that: 'A manager can have the quietist life by achieving his budget. Head
office only interferes when things are going badly'.
Where Greencore departs from the previous case is with respect to the incidence of
non-financial co-ordination mechanisms. Greencore's distinctive history and the
recency with which they have operated within international markets, means that few
non-financial co-ordination and control mechanisms are yet in existence. Attempts to
change the culture and pursue synergistic returns remain underdeveloped. Apart
from quarterly operations executive meetings, no formalised managerial networking
occurs. Rather these operational meetings review broad trends within the business
environment, with the stated aim of 'accounting for the performance of the business
to [their] peers'. Membership to these meetings includes local senior management.
Furthermore, this would be the location where pertinent HRM issues are addressed.
While not attempting to standardise or homogenise structures, their intention is,
according to the HR director, 'not so much in terms of trying to standardise practices
but to gain the benefits of different perspectives of it'.
Greencore consists of a mixture of ex-semi-state companies, mature businesses and
companies within growth sectors. Simple synergy is seen to come from putting
people from these very different backgrounds together in one room, with no formal
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agenda. This Group argues that they are 'not about a corporate culture' and therefore
prefer head office to appear anonymous in the process of disseminating corporate
values. Rather, what they do is actively seek to get different companies together to
pool stories and ideas. Again, in examining the relationship with overseas operations
a differentiated approach between home and overseas operations is apparent. In
relation to overseas operations there is a monthly management meeting which senior
management from Ireland attend to review performance. On an informal basis, day-
to-day communication occurs.
Similarly any attempt to benchmark across divisions is externally driven. Given the
diversity of its companies, local backgrounds and markets, Greencore currently resist
internal benchmarking, seeing little to be gained from it. This view is echoed by
local management who perceive the difference between Greencore's markets as
prohibiting any significant benchmarking. Externally, however, the picture is
somewhat different. Given that a number of their main customers are large MNCs,
Greencore are finding that as their customers seek financial economies, their
operations are increasingly subject to external benchmarking. It is often only through
this external benchmarking process that some of Greencore's individual businesses
gain the opportunity to see similar practices in other companies. As a local Irish
manager explained, 'we sell a lot to Guinness who would sit down on a cost-plus
basis with us. This involves a fair amount of benchmarking with other people'. It is
thus through their main customers that individual businesses would be aware of
specific industry developments and practices. While developments towards
benchmarking are limited, both local and head office management note that the
industry as a whole is consolidating and that benchmarking will increasingly become
a prerequisite for survival. As another local Irish manager noted:
We are now dealing with an industry which is consolidating at a rapid rate.
As they consolidate, their purchasing practices become far keener and if you
are not staying pace with that development, we will become enslaved very
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quickly.
Rather than going down CRH's more formal approach to developing synergies,
Greencore have adopted a very informal and ad hoc approach to synergistic pursuits.
However, as the following chapters will demonstrate much of this departure is
explicable in terms of the differences with regard to the recency of Greencore's
internationalisation and its relative size.
7.6 APPROACHES TO THE MANAGEMENT OF IR AND HR
Shaping Greencore's approach to the management of employment relationships is a
deliberate attempt to move away from a traditional highly centralised approach to the
management of IR. Subsequently, their current situation represents a juncture
between a highly centralised and a decentralised approach (albeit with limitations to
that decentralisation). As the HR director explained:
The Group has moved away from its historic centralised approach to
employee relations towards a system based on local management at the
operating company or individual plant level.
Under its pre-privatisation structure, with its Irish Economic development
orientation, all IR and HR issues were centrally managed and essentially within the
remit of the Government. As an SOE, employment related issues often had a wider
political agenda, with sites frequently maintained for employment rather commercial
reasons. Moreover, the provision of HR departments across sites was ad hoc and
varied. Under the 'pre-privatisation' structure, the former Irish Sugar head office was
effectively the centre from which all JR and HR issues were managed. As the
following section will demonstrate, much of Greencore's current approach is shaped
by attempts to move away from this.
Following privatisation, the structure and role of FIRM within Greencore has
203
changed dramatically. The appointment of a Group HR director in 1991 set in
motion a process that saw the establishment of Group guidelines and policies, along
with the decentralisation of the management of JR to local levels. A number of
structural changes followed. These included the resourcing of all newly acquired
businesses with HR departments. As part of the drive to decentralise, head office
developed a composite HRM manual to inform and monitor operational
responsibility. This was designed to introduce accountability and manage growing
diversity. The manual consisted of policies ranging from industrial relations,
communication and salary approval to annual leave, recruitment, sexual harassment
and late attendance. As the then CEO outlined in the preface of the manual, the
rationale was that:
Given the large number and diverse nature of companies which make up the
Group, there is a need to provide a set of policies/guidelines which give us a
comprehensive approach to the treatment and handling of employee
conditions and the relationship throughout the Group. The primary purpose is
to provide clear guidance and not to restrict the operating companies in the
day-to-day management of their business.
Through a set of clearly defined guidelines Greencore outlined procedures and legal
requirements for local management that, in most cases, involve consultation with or
approval from head office. In the case of employee dismissal, for example,
Greencore's policy states that no suspension or dismissal can take place without the
direct involvement of executive responsible for HR and the approval of the local
chief executive. In addition, all cases involving suspension or dismissal are to be
brought to the attention of the head office HR function. Similarly, with recruitment
of non-managerial staff, each company is requested to submit a 'recruitment request
form' containing detailed information on the qualifications sought and salary levels
to head office. Salaries of £25,000 and above require the approval of the head office
HR director. While covering most Irish operations, these polices do vary across
national borders. For instance, in the case of third party intervention, Greencore's
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policy within Ireland is that employer representatives may represent the company,
while in the UK the use of council at tribunals is favoured.
7.6.1 Management Development: 'From Tillers of Soil to Men of Commerce'
With the change in Greencore's focus away from rationalisation and divestment
concerns to the professionalisation and resourcing of managerial levels, one of the
key functions of Greencore's HR function has become the 'management of
managers'. In a similar vein to CRH, the main responsibility of the HR function,
according to the HR director, is:
The critical responsibility of this function here is to ensure that group-wide
we have essentially the management resources to carry this company into the
next millennium. That is the primary responsibility of not just me but all the
senior people here.
In the years leading up to privatisation Greencore had focused largely on the
rationalisation of operations and the culling of employment levels. However, by the
early 1990s the Group found itself faced with succession problems and a lack of
skilled managers. The high turnover of senior management during privatisation had
led to difficulties in retaining key senior personnel. As a result, Greencore
introduced a succession plan in 1993, one of the key components of which was the
development of managerial capabilities. Periods of simultaneous growth and
rationalisation had also resulted in gaps in the managerial demography of the Group.
As a head office director explained: 'We have very few people that can be freely
released and sent out to manage these businesses'. This leanness of management
resources was to shape Greencore's prerequisite for management retention in new
acquisitions.
By the early 1990s, Greencore found that the age profile of management was either
skewed towards the 'highly mobile but young and inexperienced' or the 'older
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highly experienced but immobile' managers (HR director). As a result more
emphasis was placed on the training and development of existing management. The
main shortfall identified in skills of a professional business or managerial nature.
The need for such skills drove the development of a tailored MBA programme. As
the HR director explained:
After I joined and we were looking at this whole question, we said we had a
huge amount of technical expertise in the organisation - what we did not
have was a business side to that, which takes the technical skill and harnesses
the natural business skill that we all have. So, we devised a Masters
programme. Rather than taking the standard MBA route we said 'give us the
academic bits of the MBA that are good, that built bricks and put down this
foundation for learning and take projects created by us'. They came up with
35 projects, which took the group two years to complete, some of which have
paid for the programme six times over. It developed our managers into
business people and led to greater understanding amongst managers of other
functions that they interface with.
Another head office initiative was the introduction of an externally sourced
leadership training programme. While this programme was initially focused on
senior management, it is intended to filter down to lower managerial levels. The HR
director commented that:
The most critical thing that CEOs have to be are leaders. So we set out and
sourced the market and found a company doing leadership training. We put it
to the fifteen CEOs and said 'try it if it works you do it for your managers. If
you do not like it tell us and we will go find somebody else'.
Another factor underpinning Greencore's movement towards commercialism
concerns performance management strategies. In an attempt to change the ethos of
the firm from 'a non-accountable, non-performance driven' culture, to one where
there was full individual accountability, Greencore has linked the remuneration
packages of senior management to the performance of individual businesses. This
cultural change was promoted by targeting performance and setting objectives to
maximise the efficiency and the cost competitiveness of each business. In so doing,
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Greencore's approach has changed from managing tasks to 'management by
performance'. As the HR director explained:
At the time of privatisation you had a group of managers who were not very
well paid, the ethos was one of security. That ethos has changed and with that
came a change of message to management, a message that we would
introduce performance-based reward. What we set out to say to people is
what we have here is a very profitable business and we are prepared to
reward people to make it even more profitable on a personal level. If you
manage this business for this company and you deliver profits then
progressively you will share in those profits.
These are, however, limits to this devolved responsibility. For example, the situation
differs for lower level managers. For all managers below senior management level,
pay recommendations are sent to head office for review. This, the HR director
explained, is 'to ensure fairness':
It was built in as a check. The managers felt that check was necessary
because it avoids a Chief Executive getting to a situation where he may
favour somebody for whatever particular reason, whereas somebody else may
not be. We have no particular contacts with the Group companies that would
lead us to have a bias of any particular individual, so we look for the standard
normal distribution of bonuses, of salary increases and we go through a
questioning process with them rather than dictate.
All managerial redundancies, promotions or pay increases also require the
notification and approval of head office.
Since changing to a commercial entity, Greencore have focused on performance
management in an attempt to 'bring home' to managers the importance of profit
targets. As a senior finance manager explained: 'you set the objective guides because
this is all we want at the end of the day. All we want is the delivery of the profit
target'. Defined by the HR director as a 'classical performance management system',
this works from the premise that individual business targets are set from the top
down, starting with the CEO. These targets are then broken down and translated into
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processing and production targets that are linked to monitors of the finance function.
Collectively, all the targets add up to the Group's total target. As with other
strategies, the performance management programme was devolved to local
management. As the HR director explained, this increases 'ownership':
They understood what their performance was all about and how they had to
manage the guy above them. They also understood how to manage the other
people who were reporting to them and that has helped enormously in the
process. They actually feel that they control the performance management
system and that they have ownership of the damn thing because we do not
want it - it is too cumbersome.
Managerial performance is reviewed on a monthly basis, while the CEO formally
reviews the performance of managing directors bi-annually. Individual performance
is more regularly reviewed on an informal basis (RN, 26, 1994). The non-delivery
of profit targets would not just result in head office intervention and the withdrawal
of bonuses for the individual managers concerned.
7.6.2 The Management of JR
Attempts to break away from their historical centralised approach to collective
bargaining have also shaped Greencore's approach to the management of JR. A
senior trade union official described the JR climate at the time of Greencore's
privatisation as 'embedded'. Prior to privatisation, all negotiations were conducted
centrally as a single bargaining unit and all were conducted by the 'National
Executive Negotiating Committee' who negotiated for the entire Group. The
rationale, as a head office executive explained, was that 'given that we were all one
outfit, it made sense to centrally negotiate rates of pay'.
At the time of privatisation, the main trade unions negotiated to maintain these
collective arrangements. As one trade union official explained: 'While there was a
time when producing sugar was a license to print money the unions were aware that
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their quotas were not 'set in stone' and therefore vulnerable to being bought out by
large overseas food groups'. In 1991, a privatisation agreement was eventually
reached that held that IR issues would be negotiated centrally with Greencore as one
single bargaining unit. Enshrined in the privatisation agreement was collective
bargaining rights for the employees of pre-privatisation organisational structures.
Furthermore, it provided for the application of uniform terms and conditions to all
employees of the companies contained in the pre-privatisation structures. This
collective arrangement was agreed by management, counter-signed by the Labour
Court, the Labour Relations Commission (LRC) and the Irish Congress of Trade
Unions (ICTU).
Much of the Greencore's current approach to the management of JR is influenced by
attempts to move away from the uniform 'rigidity' of this privatisation agreement.
Management see the trade unions as trying to 'strongly hold on to the collegiality' of
the agreements, which they view as no longer practical to the Group as a whole. As a
senior executive explained:
The unions' interpretation was that we agreed that privatisation would
change nothing and they say that means forever and we would say no. You
cannot compare across Greencore's three companies, they are not the same
but under the agreement a pay increase in one means a pay increase across all
the businesses.
In contrast, the unions view recent attempts by the Group to decentralise as a breach
of the 'spirit if not the letter of the privatisation agreement'. Since privatisation,
there has been a move to decentralise negotiations and to break negotiation links
between the pre-privatisation companies. As a result, the threat of 'sell-offs' has
become greater and job security has become an increasingly important issue for the
trade unions. Thus, attempts to decentralise collective bargaining are currently being
met with resistance from the trade unions. The Group's attempt to decentralise the
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management of IR and trade union resistance has recently manifested itself in
industrial action. In 1996, strike notice was served on the Greencore Group over
their failure to negotiate as a Group concerning claims arising from a grading review
(IRN, 6, 1996).
In brief, the Irish Productivity Centre (IPC) conducted a review of grading structures
in 1994. Their findings recommended that the existing eight-grade structure be
replaced with a five-grade structure. A dispute arose over the allocating of values for
different grades. Much of the tension centred on the issue of pay. The Group are
regarded by the trade unions as a low payer, who believe that historically such low
pay rates have been 'tolerated' by workers because as a SOE the Group met certain
'community' or 'social' aspects of local needs. This dispute highlights the tension
resulting from the changing role that the Group currently adopts. While the trade
unions sought the uniformity of terms and conditions under the privatisation
agreement, Greencore sought individual negotiation rights for each of its companies
based upon their local requirements. The Group rejected the link between the three
pre-privatisation companies (Irish Sugar, Em Foods and Glenstone Quarries) on the
grounds that they operated in distinct markets, with different influencing factors, and
thus argued that there were no grounds for across-the-board pay increases (RN, 2,
1997). Subsequently, contrary to the privatisation agreement the Group refused to
negotiate on a group-wide basis and challenged the collective nature of that
agreement. Industrial action intensified and by April of 1996 the Group were forced
to source sugar from their UK operations.
Initial Greencore offers toward a settlement were rejected by SIPTU on the grounds
that as an SOE the Group had low wage rates but now that the 'game had changed'
management needed to bring rates of pay 'up to those of good employers'. (IRN, 4,
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1997). Intervention by the Labour Court ensued following the placing of an ICTU
sanctioned all out strike picket on Irish Sugar premises. The strike action lasted eight
weeks until it was eventually resolved with pay rates agreed for the new five-grade
structure. Workers agreed to separate the rates of pay between companies but
retained the right to review and make representation for the re-establishment of
parity (IRN, 5, 1997).
During the industrial action, pressure was also being exerted on the Group from
farmers to increase prices paid for beet (The Irish Times, 2/28, 1996). As the
Group's main suppliers and as, in many instances, key customers for some of the
Group's products, the refusal by Greencore to respond resulted in a boycott of their
produce by growers and their representative body which severely hurt the Company.
This and the strike action described above highlights Greencore's strategic attempts
to reduce its dependence on traditionally powerful groups from within Ireland.
Despite reports of growth and high profits, the ensuing disruptions have adversely
affected Greencore making their perceived need for change even stronger.
Greencore's movement to decentralise the management of JR has been reinforced
with the recent introduction of a number of structural changes to local arrangements.
The Group has now moved to prevent any future inter-company trade union linkages
by keeping all post-privatisation businesses discrete and free-standing with respect to
JR and HR. All businesses acquired post-privatisation are now fully resourced in HR
terms. This is coupled with on-going attempts by senior management to replace old
pre-pri vatisation employment contracts with generic Group contracts. Greencore' s
decentralised approach is further reinforced by Greencore's refusal to engage in
direct negotiations with union officials on any issue outside the terms and
boundaries of the privatisation agreement. At present, there are no direct
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negotiations between head office and the main trade unions.
Despite this decentralised approach there are limits to the degree of local autonomy.
Whereas, traditionally, a combination of Group and local management negotiated
with the union, with the recent strike, that position has changed. The unions noted
the attendance and leading role played by the FIR director at the recent strike
negotiations. The resulting process was, in the word of one trade union official 'one
step removed from direct negotiations'.
While refusing to negotiate directly with the unions, head office intervention also
occurs through the close monitoring and direct communications in discussing any
claim lodged against an individual company in the group. Adopting what a senior
executive described as a 'sounding board, consultancy or third party hearing', head
office HR take the company through different scenarios. Given the links between
businesses, strike action in one business would be seen as having far greater
consideration beyond that business, hence management felt justified in their degree
of involvement. As the HR director explained:
If one company goes on strike you have considerations far wider than that,
you have the farmers outside, you have the profits of the overall Group, you
have a huge company who supply chemicals to the farmers etc. So it is not an
issue for one company alone, it is an issue on a much wider scale.
However, head office reject claims that these recent developments constitute
attempts to marginalise trade unions. As the HR director pointed out:
There appears to be difficulty in getting across the fact that we want to
communicate more with our employees. It is seen as bypassing the trade
unions... It is important for our individual companies to build relationships
with the trade union movement because they are a fact of life, they are not
going to go away. This is the persuading that we try to do, to say 'you have to
sit down with the shop stewards and explain to them what you are doing'.
I'm not saying that you have to like or dislike it but it's a fact of life.
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Finally, Greencore's attempted to decentralise the management of JR have been
accompanied by an increase in corporate communication and 'voice' mechanisms.
Such measures were introduced to ensure 'greater sharing of financial information is
used by managers in their negotiations with companies'. In response, the trade
unions perceive the erosion of their position particularly within those areas of the
business that have steadily been rationalised. Given that no new staff have been
recruited into an ever-rationalising Irish Sugar company in the last ten to fifteen
years (the unions estimate that employment figures for that negotiating unit have
declined from 1600 to 370 in 1996), the main trade unions now represents an
increasingly aging workforce. Head office has opted not to go down a strict legal
approach to JR. Instead, they describe their focus as being to 'put in front of any of
the unions the wider group dimensions and to ensure that they have to take this into
consideration'.
7.6.3 Trade Unionisation
As a SOE until relatively recently, Greencore has traditionally been heavily
unionised, even among senior management levels. Similar to the other case
companies examined here, the overall level of unionisation in domestic operations is
estimated by management to be 75%. While exact figures are not obtainable,
overseas unionisation levels are described by the FIR director as low, largely due to
the 'smallness of these operations'. In examining the distribution of employment, it
can be shown that overseas employment levels are relatively small with only 8% of
total employment located overseas.
Industrial relations issues play a definite role in the growth strategies of this Group.
In assessing potential acquisitions, head office examines the 'staffing and the costs
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of labour versus what we are doing here', as the HR director explained. Management
expects that an IR assessment would take on greater importance within labour-
intensive acquisitions. For instance, as a senior executive explained:
One would take a slightly different view if for example we were going into a
country like Poland where every business is labour intensive...labour
becomes a particularly critical element in looking for example at a flour mill
in Poland...it is not a difficult exercise but we would have to look carefully at
the labour side. We would look at the trade union implications in another,
say look at France, we would ask ourselves is this a situation whereby labour
unions are going to fight us job-by-job because if it is then we are going to
seriously question if this is worth the effort.
Recent growth in mainland Europe has further highlighted the role of JR legislation.
As one of the local managers involved in Greencore's recent European acquisitions
explained:
The bulk of JR legislation in Belgium is absolutely horrific, compared to
here. The cost of employing someone is 38% in Belgium as compared to
12.2% here... if you make someone redundant, you may not increase your
workforce within the next two years without first giving that person first
option on any job you want to bring in, unbelievable.
Resistance by management to negotiate collectively is further evidenced by
Greencore's refusal to introduce EWCs, on the grounds that employment levels
within mainland Europe are too low. This combined with management's assertion
that figures are kept low in overseas sites suggests that the Group will continue to
resist EWCs until such time as a large European acquisition is made. As part of the
their attempt to drive a decentralised approach to the management of IR,
employment levels are kept low in mainland Europe. By doing so the Group can
maintain a position below the EWC requirement. As the HR director explained:
Part of the reason for three [operating sites in Belgium] is to keep the number
of employees in each down. If it gets up above a certain level - I think it may
be 30 or 40, if you get above that, you are into a works council - and a works
council with teeth.
214
Substituting for EWC involvement in domestic sites is what is referred to as 'safe
link committees for normal IR interaction'. There is no formal contact among union
officials across borders. While informal structures exist for the informal sharing of
information within union, there are no such channels currently being employed by
trade unions across national borders. The unions foresee the movement toward EWC
as facilitating such a move. However, according to Greencore's head office JR
remains a very parochial issue dependent upon national factors and local JR issues.
7.7 CoNcLusioN
What the Greencore case highlights is the role and impact that the movement to
commercialism on an international basis has had on the management of employment
relationships. Again, driven out of a need for corporate survival, this MNC emerged
from a previously state-owned enterprise that sought to expand overseas. This
change in ownership structure has resulted in the Group's adoption of a centrally
defined approach to the management of managers and a new approach to the
management of JR. Driving this is an attempt to breakdown traditional arrangements,
toward a more localised focus. Greencore's approach to HRM has subsequently
become somewhat fragmented, incorporating the drive to decentralise the
management of IR, while at the same time pursuing a highly centralised approach to
developing head office HR functions concerned largely with the management of
managers. Unable to maintain the collegiality of traditional approaches to collective
bargaining, Greencore have moved to decentralise negotiations and dismantle
collective arrangements. Such an approach has been reinforced by the full resourcing
of local companies with their own HR departments and a refusal by head office to
enter into direct discussions with trade unions. The aim is that industrial conflict will
become ultimately localised.
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Despite the drive to decentralisation, head office maintains a highly centralised
approach to the management of this 'devolved responsibility'. While largely
focusing on the 'management of managers' decentralised arrangements are also
closely monitored by the head office HR function and tightly defined guidelines set.
This dual approach has devolved responsibility and accountability while
simultaneously maintaining centralised control though limited autonomy. The
implication is that it is harder for the unions to influence Greencore's corporate
agenda. In conclusion, this case study would suggest a movement towards the co-
existence of different approaches to the management of JR and the management of
managers. Moreover, the current approach to the management of JR represents a
juncture position between a traditional centralised approach and a more recent drive
by management to decentralise collective bargaining.
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CHAPTER 8
CLONDALKIN GROUP PLC.
Clondalkin Group plc adopts a highly decentralised approach to the management of IR. This is shaped
by a number of factors - the financial arrangements between the Group and individual operations, the
impact of previous industrial action and the form of internationalisation pursued. The Clondalkin
Group pursues a financial economies route. In contrast to the previous cases, subsidiaries of the
Clondalkin Group are financially independent, particularly with respect to their individual financial
plans. As this case demonstrates, the approach to the management of JR is strongly shaped by a very
tight financial-driven approach to the management of operations. Distinct from the other case
companies, this MNC has no designated HR function at head office or local level HR departments.
The management of JR is ultimately driven by local line management, which is monitored by head
office through the financial reporting system. Operating within sectors traditionally characterised by
strong craft trade unionism, recent technological advances have resulted in dramatic changes to this
industry.
8.1 INTRODUCTION
In reviewing the case of the Clondalkin Group, four key themes become apparent.
These are: a highly decentralised, financially-driven approach to the management of
JR in the absence of any centralised HR function; the inter-relationship between the
Group's current structures and co-ordination mechanisms; the role of JR in shaping
internationalisation; and, the influence of two major turning points in the evolution
of this Group in shaping current practices. This case highlights a highly decentralised
approach to the management of IR, supported by the organisation's structures.
Unlike the previous case companies there has been no recent 'layering' of a central
HR function focused on the management of managers. Hence, the approach adopted
by Clondalkin is best understood in light of a number of key junctures in the
formative years of the Clondalkin Group - key events that shaped current practices.
Despite a hard financial-driven approach, the influence of the management of JR is
somewhat underestimated in the Group's growth strategies.
8.2 COMPANY PROFILE
Clondalkin Group plc is an international producer of specialist print and packaging
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products with manufacturing operations in freland, the UK, mainland Europe and the
United States. The Group employs 3,500 people at more than 50 different
operations. The majority of these employees are situated outside Ireland with the
largest percentage of employees located in the UK (Clondalkin Annual Report,
1998). Group sales have grown dramatically in recent years from IREEI52 million in
1997 to WEE391 million in 1998. Mainland Europe is the Group's largest
geographical sales area, accounting for 43%, followed by the US with 25%, the UK
with 20%, while Ireland accounts for just 12% (The Irish Times, 2/18, 1998). In the
last decade, Clondalkin has spent in the region of Euro 315m on capital projects, the
majority of which have been acquisitions. Most of the Group's sales (72%) are
located within the packaging division (Clondalkin Annual Report, 1998).
8.3 THE NATURE OF COMPETITION
The Print and Packaging industry has traditionally been a strong indigenous sector
within Ireland. This strength is again primarily due to the virtual 'non-tradedness' of
the industry. 23
 As O'MalIey (1985: 22) writes: 'there is a substantial degree of
natural protection against foreign competition in the domestic print and packaging
market because of the advantages of local knowledge and contract and flexibility and
speed of response to local demand'. However, the nature of competition for
Clondalkin has changed dramatically in recent years. The print and packaging
market is no longer a 'sheltered' sector, the Group has moved to diversify in product
and geographical terms. This has placed them in direct competition with MNCs from
other countries. Their Irish operations currently face stiff competition from UK-
based printing firms. In employment terms, for example, the Print and Packaging
industry is one of Ireland's largest sectors.
23 O'Malley (1985) argues that the paper industry was not afforded the same protection given the domination of
a few large firms overseas. This led to import penetration and a decline in employment during the 1970s.
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Figures for 1993 highlight the output at almost IRE1,250 million within the
industry. In 1994, the sector employed 18,267 workers and had a turnover of
WE1,317 million (Business and Finance, 1994). A total of 622 firms employ
approximately 19,000 people (FAS, 1994 - cf. table 8.1). Within Ireland, small to
medium-sized companies account for 75% of total employment in the print and
packaging sector. Foreign-owned companies account for just 22%. The thirty
foreign-owned firms operating in the industry tend to be large, and concentrate on
the packaging and printing sub-sectors. Heavily reliant upon imports and labour-
intensive processes, firms attempting to relocate operations in low cost labour
countries are increasingly subject to intense price competition from foreign
manufacturers. The domestic market accounts for 75% of Clondalkin's total sales,
while exports to the UK are valued at over IREE14O million annually, representing
80% of the Group's sales overseas.
TABLE 8.1 OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT IN ThE PRINT, PAPER AND PACKAGING
SECTORS
Subsector	 No. of Firms	 Output IREm	 Employment
Printing	 281	 330.5	 6,540
Packaging	 102	 420.3	 4,567
Paper	 44	 165.3	 1,312
Pre-Press	 85	 35.9	 819
Newspapers	 46	 217.6	 4,163
Services	 64	 73.5	 1,162
Total	 622	 1,243.1	 18,563
Source: FAS Print and Paper Industry Survey (1994).
Intensifying competition by the early 1980s resulted in a decline in Irish employment
levels within this sector. Despite this, the print, paper and packaging industry has
grown more, on average, than total manufacturing since the early 1980s. This growth
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is largely attributable to the demand for computer-manual printing by computer
software firms. The main drivers of change are global technological change, the
move towards world class business (WCB) and Total Quality Management (TQM)
initiatives, environmental issues and changes in market requirements. WCB and
TQM techniques have provided the industries with new opportunities for
implementing information technology - through better production control, database
management systems, telecommunications and new high-tech approaches to
publishing. These advances have radically transformed the production process and
customer choice within these industries. The industry has recently undergone a
shake-out in terms of uncompetitive firms, who have not invested in, or modernised,
their production technology and new approaches such as imaging, CD-ROM, EDI
and electronic banking are reducing demands on hard-copy business forms, security
printing and print media. One factor that has been claimed to have resulted in radical
change of the industry is the introduction of digital technology. Facilitating greater
automation, standardisation and economies of scale, these advances are thought to
result in a decline of craft activity. Commentators believe those Irish companies
operating without adequate technological specifications will face increasing
constriction of competitiveness (Lynch and Roche, 1996).
8.4 HIsToRIcAL EVOLUTION
The origins of Clondalkin Group can be traced back to the operations of the Paper
Mills company during the 1930s. Having grown modestly from this point until the
1960s, Clondalkin Group consisted of the Paper Mills, Guys of Cork, Bailey Gibson
and C.B. Paper Sacks. The Group employed 600 people at that time and was large by
Irish standards. 24 However, it was not until the 1970s that geographical and product
diversification became an issue of serious concern for Clondalkin. During this
24 Of the 600 people employed by the Group 400 were located at the Paper Mills (interview notes).
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period, the Group faced a number of debilitating dependencies. With the bulk of raw
materials sourced domestically within freland, Clondalkin was highly exposed to
currency fluctuation. In addition, local energy costs were rising and demand levels
falling. Also, by the mid 1970s their had been a build up in industrial unrest at
Clondalkin. 25
 What followed was a major for the Group. As one of the directors
explained, it was a situation that has shaped Group policy ever since:
The strategy is based on the bad experience we had on one site, too many
employees employed in one location and too strong a union, no control over
the dollar, the bulk of raw materials being bought in one currency, and very
high energy costs. These dependencies that we had mid-1970s all came home
to roost. When we finally got out from underneath this burden, the policy
was never to repeat the same sin.
Senior management grappled with steering the Group through rising costs and
falling production during the 1970s (Business Plus, March, 1998). What followed
was a key juncture in their development towards internationalisation.
Largely 'grown' under tariff protection, Clondalkin watched the demise of the paper
business in the 1970's. Producing paper for the Irish market had become increasingly
uncompetitive by the 1980s (The Irish Times, 6/7, 1996). Faced with these
conditions, Clondalkin decided to diversify into the higher growth sectors of print
and packaging. By 1981, the Group took the strategic decision to divest out of paper
manufacturing and concentrate on print and packaging in. The decision to close the
Paper Mills, which employed 450 people, was taken by Clondalkin on the grounds
of 'non-viability'. Vehemently opposed by the workers, Church and Government of
the day, the decision resulted in an acrimonious and protracted dispute that took over
three years to fully resolve (The Irish Times, 6/7, 1996). For more than a year,
25 There was a nine-month strike in the paper mills in 1969. The Group attempted to move from a three to a four
shift system that mirrored the continuous shift system that characterised the paper industries in the US at that
time. Negotiations broke down, a nine month strike ensued and the Mills never moved to a continuous shift
system.
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workers occupied the mills while two employees went on hunger strike demanding
the business be saved. The conflict lasted until the Government intervened, agreeing
to back the purchase of the mills by a third party. 26 It was what the CEO described as
a 'protracted affair' that took until 1985 to get out 'from under the weight'. Once the
dispute was resolved, the Group began to actively source overseas investment. The
closure of the paper mills was the first step the Group took in moving out of the
cyclical paper producing industry and into the more profitable print and packaging
activities. It was to be the beginning of a decade of growth, diversification and
internati onalisation for the Group.
By the 1980s, the Clondalkin Group was still relatively small with few opportunities
for local growth. As a senior director explained 'because the fish economy was
reasonably small, the only big growth opportunity was to invest externally'. In an
attempt to reduce the dependencies outlined above, to spread both financial and
geographical risk and enter new growth sectors, the decision to diversify along
geographical and product lines emerged in the early 1980s. In the words of one of
the directors, there was a belief at that time that 'the only way to get balance was
through major currency exposure to balance related currencies with the dollar'. The
Group engaged in 'financial risk balancing' in an attempt to control currency
exposure. To this end, the Group began to 'avoid distressed regions and mature
markets that [were] less responsive to management action' (Clondalkin Annual
Report, 1990).
The US was targeted as a potential growth area with relatively low overheads. The
first acquisition into the US and UK occurred in 1986, thus enabling the spread of
26 The Government agreed to back the purchase of the mills by the FDI International Group.
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risk between products and regions. 27 The Group's diversification strategy focused
not just on the geographical location of operations, but also on the Group's products,
resulting in substantial diversification of markets, products and technologies. At the
same time, Clondalkin attempted to reduce domestic dependencies on high
commodity content products by investing in value-added products in growth sectors.
Expansion in the UK and US continued until 1991 at which point the Group shifted
its focus to the rationalisation and upgrading of operations. Through a series of
acquisitions and expansion programmes, a broader style of management was
introduced to its operations. 28
The 1990s signalled a new phase of development for Clondalkin. By 1991, the
domestic market was exhibiting flat demand placing increasing pressure on price
reductions, but low raw material prices and low cost inflation. The Group took this
opportunity to invest heavily in some of the faster growing segments of the printing
industry and expand their customer base to protect against economic downturns
(Davy Report, 1992). At the same time, the Group streamlined their businesses,
reduced employee numbers and divested what were seen to be 'poor performers',
giving the Group a 'sharper focus and definition of objectives'.
In response to increased competition and further currency crises, the Group
restructured its operations in 1993. Establishing geographically defined divisions,
Clondalkin Group separated out the UK from domestic operations. This resulted in a
reshuffle of senior management across national borders and a redefinition of
reporting lines. This was to pave the way for the Group's first entry into mainland
27 In 1986 the Group acquired The Cavendish Press in the UK. Owned by three people, of which one wanted to
retire another who through illness wanted to realise his capital, while another for no particular reason sought to
realise his capital. The decision was taken to sell to Clondalkin who persuaded the third director to remain on a
three-year contract as CEO. That owner-entrepreneur remained and has since moved to a Group role.
28 Between the years 1986 to 1991 seven acquisitions were made.
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Europe in 1994 (The Irish Times, 6/1, 1998).29 While expanding into mainland
Europe, the Group also implemented cost-cutting exercises and investment
programmes in the US. Allied to the Company's investment strategy was a
redundancy programme that resulted in a 10% reduction in staffing levels.
Clondalkin is expected to continue to expand overseas and to engage in further
organisational restructuring (The Irish Times, 2/18, 1998). While future acquisition
opportunities are believed to be outside freland, management do not contemplate
expanding outside their current bases of the US, UK and mainland Europe.
However, as the managing director claimed 'Clondalkin Group has bigger fish to
fry' than those in freland (The Irish Times, 6/7, 1996). Table 8.2 summarises the key
events in Clondalkin Group's internationalisation against its broader historical
evolution.
TABLE 8.2: KEY EVENTS IN THE EvoLUTION OF THE CLONDALKIN GROUP
Key Dates Event
1930	 Foundation of the Group
1969	 Strike action in mills over changes in shift system lasted nine months
1978	 Change in Leadership (new CEO)
1980	 Decision taken to grow through overseas investment
1981	 Decision taken to close paper mills on grounds of non-viability
1982	 Worker occupation of mills, hunger strike by two protesters, intervention of
Church and State
1983	 Decision taken to exit paper and diversify into higher growth areas of print
and packaging
1984	 Government intervention backing purchase of mills by third party
1985	 Final resolution of strike action
1986	 First acquisitions in the UK and US
1987	 US acquisition
1988	 US acquisition
1989	 US acquisition, UK acquisition
29 Two acquisitions were made in Holland and Switzerland in 1994.
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1991	 Rationalisation programmes leading to reduction in employee numbers in
Ireland and US, US acquisition
1993 Reorganisation of operations, divisionalisation of operations and separation
of UK from Ireland, Reorganisation of senior management across borders,
Introduction of redundancy programme resulting in 10% reduction in staff,
Divestment of US plant
1994	 First acquisitions into Mainland Europe, reorganisation of US management
structures, Cost-cutting exercises and investment programme in the US
1998	 Change in leadership (change of CEO), Rationalisation of operations cross
border and reduction in employee numbers
8.5 STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND CONTROL
Clondalkin's intemationalisation has largely been shaped by the nature of their
products. The print, paper and packaging sector is an industry 'whose products are
long established, labour-intensive and face mature or declining markets'. It faces
high import-penetration levels and produces non-traded goods that 'incur high
logistic costs and are not readily exported' (Lynch and Roche, 1996: 91). As a result,
a location 'close to market' is a key competitive factor. This explains why the UK is
Clondalkin's main destination, accounting for 80% of total sector exports. Due to
high transport and logistical costs, Clondalkin's core products are not conducive to
export across national borders. In contrast to the expectations apparent in the MNC
literature, it is not the location of their main suppliers that drives Clondalkin's
growth but the 'localised' nature of their products.
Consequently, Clondalkin pursues a mixed strategy of organic growth and
development through business acquisitions, with a clear geographical division. The
majority of this Group's organic growth occurs within Ireland and the US, while
acquisitional growth strategies are the main means through which the Group has
grown in mainland Europe (Clondalkin Annual Report, 1995). There is also a clear
division between the 'initiators' of corporate development. Those driving organic
growth strategies tend to be local managers, who are described by head office
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executives as 'encouraged to bring forward organic development opportunities'. In
contrast, acquisitions are the responsibility of a dedicated team whose remit is to
'identify and evaluate a sizeable number of investment opportunities'. As the CEO
explained: 'We always have a few at various stages of negotiation, the more deals
we do the more opportunities present themselves'. Having now earned its 'place' in
international markets, Clondalkin is continually active on the acquisitional front and
clearly defined acquisitional criteria have emerged (cf. table 8.3). These criteria
include an evaluation of the strength of trade unions on sites being considered.
TABLE 8.3 AcQuismoNAL CRITERIA
• Sales of up to $200m
• Low-cost, profitable producer
• Management retention
• Good asset condition
• A Weak or No trade union
• Broad customer spread
• Maximum payback period of 4.5 years
Source: Interview Notes.
As demonstrated above, the drivers of locational decisions are both new growth
regions and the need to spread dependencies. However, within these constraints,
cultural similarities or 'fit' and taxation considerations also shape the location of the
Group's overseas operations. As with CRH, Clondalkin's decision to locate within
the Netherland's, for example, was influenced by perceived cultural similarities
between the Dutch and Irish. As a senior executive explained:
The Dutch culturally are very close the Irish and English in their whole
approach. The Dutch for a long time have had to trade internationally so they
are very receptive to foreign ideas. Whereas you will not find that to the same
degree in any other country of Europe.
The Group perceived similarities such as a shared history of trading, their
226
international orientation as a nation, their ability to accommodate different cultures
and the same approach to dealing with foreigners as having influenced their decision
to expand into the Netherlands.
This criterion is combined with more financially and market oriented factors. As
Clondalkin's financial director explained: 'the Dutch have some tax breaks, in
Germany your consideration is deducted, and in Switzerland the tax rates are low.
The Dutch have good treasury locations'. One difference they do note is, in the
words of a senior executive, that 'the one thing we have noticed is that the
Continental companies we looked at always look outward. While the Irish and UK
look inward. So each time you come across a new approach, we try to assess whether
it has any relevance to what you're doing'.
With increased competition and a currency crisis in 1993, Clondalkin Group
restructured their operations into geographically defined divisions (cf. figure 8.1).
Through the establishment of geographical divisions, Clondalkin separated out the
UK operations from domestic ones and assigned geographical heads. This
dichotomy also broadly reflects different product lines, with the majority of the
Group's packaging operations located within Ireland and all the printing operations
situated in the UK. Coinciding with the restructuring of the Group, there was a
reshuffling of senior management into geographically defined management
structures. What resulted was a very flat organisational structure that was clearly
reflected in their main reporting lines.
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FIGURE 8.1: CL0NDALKIN GRoUP STRUCTURE
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According to senior management, the current organisational structure is expected to
change given their rate of growth. Key to the anticipated change is the current
pressure being exerted on reporting arrangements. Management expects that as the
reporting relationships expand it will become more difficult to continue with
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existing structural arrangements. A senior executive claims that 'there will be no
question but to introduce another layer in the structure'. It is anticipated that the
Group will move towards a more divisionalised structure with the introduction of
divisional heads rather than existing geographical heads. Clondalkin also expects to
recruit managers with particular expertise as it expands. They expect that as more
European operations are acquired, the need to understand other banking arrangement
relationships will become greater. As the finance director explained: 'we can no
longer manage our banking relationships out of the fact that we know five or six
bankers very well. That is grave. We put in resources because you come to
understand that the potential for error now is much higher.' The Group expects to
appoint a local divisional head for their European operations that they anticipate will
become extensive.
The flatness and simplicity of this Group's organisational structures is
understandable given lean management resources. Of all the case companies
examined, this MNC has the smallest head office. Clondalkin employs fourteen
people across two defacto group head offices, one in the US and one in Dublin. The
CEO is located within the US and manages that geographical region. Headquartered
in Dublin, the 'centre' employs eight people. Group functions are split across the
two head offices. Through the use of electronic technology and the networking of
operations, the accounting function has been relocated closer to the CEO in the US.
All financial reports are sent direct to the head office in Dublin and on to the US. All
other treasury matters are handled out of the main head office in Dublin.
The main role of the head office is, in the words of a regional director, to 'focus
management's attention on the items which from experience impact on the bottom
line'. Rather than adopting what they title a 'collaborative approach to managing
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managers' they focus on those issues which directly impact on the bottom line
performance of operations. Another role adopted by head office is to ensure that
practices in one company do not adversely affect another. As a senior executive
outlined: 'the group monitoring requirement is to ensure that one company, say, in
one location does not do something silly and leave the others vulnerable to its
consequences'.
Furthermore, the Group has moved to centralise particular functions at higher levels
within geographical regions in an attempt to achieve financial economies of scale.
While marketing and sales are the responsibility of the local sales manager, the
Group recently introduced the concept of a Group sales and marketing manager in
freland. As the head of the Irish operations explained: 'each of the units
independently was so small, we could not sustain the cost of sales and marketing.'
As a result, the Group appointed a Marketing Manager whose function is to
'professionalise' the sales function of the company. The introduction of this is what
head office describes as 'a pragmatic response', rather than any generic Group
philosophy.
To summarise, the role of the head office at Clondalkin is one of co-ordination,
control, strategy formulation and approval. Ensuring that practices in one site do not
have an adverse effect on another has also become a key role adopted by the centre.
With increasing intemationalisation the role and responsibilities of head office have
steadily increased.
8.5.1 Group Strategy: 'Autonomy with Financial Responsibility'
The Group adopts a highly decentralised approach to the management of operations,
which is reinforced through tight financial management structures. From the early
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1990s, this hard financially driven MNC has had one clear strategic objective - 'to
create shareholder value by growth in earnings per share' (Clondalkin Annual
Report, 1996). This is effectively achieved by maintaining low cost producer status,
the development of new markets and the improvement of competitive positions. To
these ends, each operating company is designated profit centre, with its own fully
resourced management team comprising a general, production, sales and finance
managers. HRM is ultimately the responsibility of each general manager and there
are as such no local HR departments. Each company within the Group is said to
operate autonomously in its own market sector and geographical location. However,
the autonomy is totally dependent on the achievement of continuous performance
improvement. Strict financial disciplines and continuous evaluation are constantly
applied from the centre. As a local Irish manager remarked 'if you produce the goods
you will be given the autonomy'.
In keeping with this approach, there is no attempt by Clondalkin to standardise
management practices or structures across sites, in an attempt to minimise diversity.
This MNC adopts a highly localised approach. As a UK-based executive explained:
'you adapt to the local culture because the management is local. They are the ones
who best understand the employees and the potential of the operations. The Group
cannot really add anything to the equation in terms of instructing them on how to
handle their business or make executive decisions on a day-to-day basis'. While
recognising the merits of maximising economies of scale, senior management insists
that the autonomous bottom-line approach be maintained first and foremost. In
effect, homogenisation is seen to add little value to Clondalkin. It is rather seen as a
threat to local autonomy and operational responsibility. As the finance director
noted: 'if the autonomy is diluted in any way then that will undermine the whole
culture of the organisation'.
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Adopting standardised practices or structures is seen to dilute local autonomy and
undermine the 'localised' culture of particular sites and, consequently, the Group as
a whole. For instance, the Group had an opportunity to introduce some synergistic
economies to their operations but decided against this on the grounds that to do so
would have diluted the autonomy and changed the culture. As the financial director
explained: 'For instance, all of the subsidiaries have their own bank facilities. If
those facilities were combined to one centralised clearing unit, I have no doubt that it
would save us. But we readily forego that cost, to make the subsidiaries responsible
for their own affairs otherwise their own performance does not count any more, it
would get lost and we do not want it to get lost.' Again, the main difficulty
highlighted by head office in pursing synergistic routes is the high degree of
diversity between businesses. The manner in which this MNC manages diversity is
through simplified country-neutral financial messages that are constantly re-
emphasised by the head office. As a senior regional director explained:
The beauty of having a very simple objective is that it loses nothing in the
translation from Group to local management. If you ask any of the local
managers what are they trying to do, they will tell you, 'Improve profits'.
There is nothing else.
Not surprisingly, there is little integration between individual Clondalkin companies
given a highly decentralised and hard financially driven approach. Their lack of
integration, particularly in production terms, is reflected in Clondalkin's particular
history. A 'near death experience' which occurred in the 1980s with two plants
sharing one site arose out of what management views as a lack of autonomy. This
has become a reinforcing and shaping element in their current approach. As a senior
executive elaborated:
We nearly went down the tubes in the early 1980s. It could have brought the
Group with it but due to management skill it did not. Because the company
suffered a trauma it never again will we be one unit, one band. We will be 20
or 40 little companies instead.
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Dissuaded by these experiences, inter-company arrangements have so far been
largely avoided. Furthermore, the Group is cautious to avoid customers seeking
volume discounts. However, given the pace of growth the Group is currently
reviewing the possibilities of future co-ordination and synergy. Until such a change
occurs, the current approach is very much focused on full accountability for
performances, with little integration between companies within the Group.
8.5.2 Control Mechanisms
This highly decentralised and hard financial-driven approach is communicated and
reinforced through the financial control system. Operating companies are responsible
for putting forward capital plans, maintaining their own administration and
developing local banking and professional relationships. To that end, operating
policies are geared towards the management of such performance-driven factors as
cost control, productivity and working capital management.
There is one group-wide management control system around which all else revolves
- the financial management system. This includes monthly operating reports
(MORs), standard financial statements (SFSs), budget setting and capital
expenditure processes. Each has a particular role to play in the overall control
system. The MOR is a statement of key indicators that measure current competitive
positions. They provide head office with a condensed view of factors seen as within
'the control of management'. These include employee costs, payroll costs, material
costs, debtors' days and stock days. Employee costs are measured in terms of a total
percentage of sales, redundancies and flat overtime rates. Reporting procedures are
standardised and automated. Initially sent into the centre, they are subsequently
transferred electronically to the CEO in the US, which, in the words of one
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interviewee, is where a 'full and immediate disclosure effect on poor performance
becomes evident'. In contrast, the SFSs are a broad overview of each individual
company's financial details. As the year progresses, forecasts are adjusted and run
alongside budgets. These forecasts act, according to the financial director as 'either a
reminder to companies of out-performance or as a check against under-
performance'.
The CEO and his senior management team work to achieve an annual budget that is
drawn up in consultation with local management. This Group budget specifies the
performance expected of each segment of the business. Each operating company is
then responsible for putting forward an annual plan to head office for approval. Part
of the plan involves the setting of their budget, which is based on the simple
premise, according to the FIR director, of 'you have to do better and faster, otherwise
we are going backwards'.
Given pressures to grow, each company is requested to quantify their objectives.
These quantifiable objectives then become the basis for subsequent assessment by
head office. The process of quantifying targets drives down the line a message of full
accountability and transparency. As the finance director explained, 'the role of the
Group is communicated beyond local management so that the sales staff, in
particular, understand that interest in their targets goes beyond local management'.
In their assessment, head office examine such performance measures as sales activity
levels, selling prices, margins, costs, profit, working capital, cash-flow, capital
expenditure and bonds. These measures are seen as the vital signs of any given site
and provide head office with early warning signs of poor performance. To ensure
accuracy of returns, Clondalkin also operates an internal audit. Senior management
sees the annual budget as the main 'motivational device'. As the director of
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corporate planning manager explained: 'The Group likes to consider the budget to be
an obtainable target but difficult to achieve, so that we can satisfy ourselves as a
Group that everything is working at full stretch. That is our form of motivation'.
Budgets are set late to make them more realistic to market conditions and assessment
occur through a process of negotiation with head office. The 'centre' has the right to
request a reassessment of a company budget and, should 'sites not enter the fray
ambitiously enough' it is further understood that the request would be forthcoming.
Companies are managed on a 'zero terms basis.' 3° This bottom-up approach to
budget setting reflects an on-going negotiating process between individual
operations and the centres' top-down financial targets.
The final area where strict Group control is exercised is capital expenditure. While
each of the operating companies are, unlike the previous cases, requested to
independently source capital for expansion plans, the Group considers requests for
capital expenditure. The main board deals with all major capital projects and
allocates capital on the basis of performance levels. Even though capital expenditure
requests are submitted to geographical heads for prioritisation, the decision
ultimately rests with the CEO. There is competitive tender for capital projects and,
as the finance director explained, 'the best one wins'. Unlike the financial report
there are no standardised forms to fill in for capital expenditure requests. The
procedure is that local management submits a detailed proposal to head office
explaining the rationale, financial consequences and benefits. The payback principal
for capital expenditure is three years or less.
Similar to the previous two cases, Clondalkin employs a 'post-acquisition control
model'. Once a new company is acquired, an integration process begins for the
30 Each year's performance is compared against that of the previous year's results that provide the baseline that
the company must improve upon.
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Group. Again, similar to other Irish IvlNCs, the first system introduced is that of the
monthly operating report, followed closely by the standard financial statements.
There is also no attempt to by Clondalkin to impose a generic Group-wide culture.
As the director for corporate planning explained: 'if you impose a culture, you are
changing what you have just bought. The reason you bought it is because it has
performed well as it is. Why change the culture?'
In the case of non-delivery of performance targets Clondalkin's approach is to 'try
and support the local management', particularly in situations where overall
conditions are favourable. According to one Irish-based manager, this roughly
equates 'to discuss, analyse, identify the problem and come up with the solution'.
However, in situations characterised by what head office perceive to be 'poor
management', executive decisions are taken and local management 'instructed' to
implement them. As the head of one region pointed out:
If a company has not performed, there are two possible outcomes. One is
there is light at the end of the tunnel, you just have to put things right. Even if
we do put things right, this company maybe does not have great prospects
and in the latter case, it is into the closure route.
Beyond these strict financial controls, there are certain non-financial mechanisms
that Clondalkin has recently introduced to influence and monitor performances.
Supplementing strict financial controls are such personal control mechanisms as
monthly operational management meetings, ad hoc management conferences,
informal site visits, internal auditing processes and Group-wide league tables. In
order to encourage internal competition, the Group recently introduced working
capital league tables. Circulated on a monthly basis, these tables cover a whole range
of issues, such as profit, productivity, working capital and performance. Presented in
an index format relative to size, head office sees these league tables as being 'truly
comparable between one company and the next'. As a senior executive explained,
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the message communicated is one that states: 'there are genuine differences across
boundaries but we remind sites that this is the cost of doing business in Ireland
versus doing it in the US. It is not an excuse for poor performance. It costs the
group'.
Providing information on the performance of other companies within the Group,
these league tables act as internal benchmarks. Emphasising internal competition,
the league tables provide exposure to poor performers and maintain pressure.
Designed, as the finance director explained, 'not so much as to complement some
but to embarrass others', league tables are perceived by head office as highly
effective in exerting informal peer pressure on sites. 'It is amazing the effect that it
has', he went on to say. 'If a company finds itself near the bottom of the league table,
on say, working capital and performance, over about four months you suddenly find
that they are getting up into the top quartile'.
A further way that Clondalkin influences and monitors performance is through a
system of monthly management meetings. These monthly management meetings
occur within every company and follow a fixed format of sales, production,
investment and capital. In some cases, head office management also attends overseas
monthly management meetings. Despite the formality of these practices,
management spoke of the informality process that operated around these meetings.
As head of one of Clondalkin's regions remarked: 'there are occasions where we
have just arrived, we sit down, there is a comfortable, relaxed, casual pre-meeting
chat, where you might actually cover matters that are far more important than the
agenda themselves'. Furthermore, in a similarly ad hoc way, the Group conducts
management meetings to coincide with their Annual General Meeting. While
attendance varies, these meetings usually take the form of a one-day conference
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where head office concerns are voiced. 3 ' As one of the managers explained: 'If the
meeting has say 20 people getting up to talk about the same topic, at around about
number 15, there is a sense of 'I have heard it all before' and it conveys Group
concerns'. The rationale, from a head office perspective, is that issues high on the
Group agenda are conveyed without detracting from local autonomy.
Apart from the somewhat informal agenda operating around management meetings
as described above, there is little evidence of collaborative management. The
Clondalkin Group does not have any formal arrangements for managerial
networking. Contact between head office and local management is infrequent, which
local management acknowledges can lead to isolation. The focus is again placed on
the informality and ad hoc nature of managerial networking. While there have been
infrequent occasions where senior fish management have met socially, no formal
attempt to network management on an international basis or to equate practices
across national borders in order to achieve certain economies has been made. At
times, and again largely 'by default', certain best practices are highlighted through
the internal auditing processes. As part of the financial reporting system, the internal
auditing process conducted by senior management is designed to provide feedback
and to encourage cross-fertilisation. As a UK-based manager explained: 'From time
to time, it brings ideas and solutions that have been devised in one subsidiary to
another'. With these reports sent to local managers, the finance function,
geographical heads and the CEO and the regional head, this environment of 'full
exposure' is further reinforced.
8.6 APPROACHES TO THE MANAGEMENT OF JR AND HR
In keeping with their overall strategy and approach to operations, Clondalkin
' In 1995 all the managers from right across the group came to a meeting at HO in Dublin. Prior to that a
number of Continental European, US and Irish managers attended a get-together.
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operates a highly decentralised approach to the management of JR. The Group
operates without either a head office designated FIR function or fully resourced local
HR units. The management of employment relationships is treated as an operational
issue and therefore the responsibility of local line management. Local line
management are responsible for bottom-line performance and all factors that impact
on that performance, including what head office sees as IR and HR issues.
8.6.1 Management Development
Despite the absence of HR representation at head office, the management of senior
managers is a key responsibility of each regional head. The 'management of
managers' in this particular group is focused on the remuneration and development
of senior local management. The latter is examined first. Clondalkin have recently
initiated a drive towards professionalising local management as a result of their
recent growth and a focus is now being placed upon the development of 'home-
grown' managers rather than seeking managers externally. The Group has recently
established a graduate management programme largely arising from issues of
succession planning that came to the fore in the early 1990s. Recruiting a number of
highly qualified graduates, participants were exposed to different functions across a
number of sites for specific periods of time. Many of those original 'recruits' now
occupy senior management positions. The main benefit of the programme is,
according one of the participants, the informal managerial networking that takes
place: 'I can ring most companies in Ireland, some in UK and US. I know who to ask
for - they know me and that is very important'.
Clondalkin's overseas operations also tend to recruit and train locally. Given
localised approaches to the recruitment and training of management, there are very
low levels of managerial mobility within the Group. In tightening labour markets,
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such as the printing industry in the UK, Clondalkin Group has recently introduced
placement schemes in an attempt to entice young graduates into the industry. Their
predisposition toward the internal development of key management levels is
attributable to a highly decentralised approach, emphasising the importance of
devolved responsibility.
Performance-related pay (PRP) is a key component of the Group's disposition
toward devolving responsibility to senior management. The remuneration of
managing directors is linked to the performance of their individual business. As a
senior executive explained: 'in our plc environment, shareholders do not understand
anything other than a 45-degree angle, so we convey that pressure in a manner which
subsidiary managers enjoy'. No formal performance appraisal schemes operate
within this Group and assessment is measured in terms of individual company
performance. With the move towards higher levels of profitability for the Group as a
whole, there has recently been increasing pressure on local management to extend
PRP to other management levels and to link it to the achievement of pre-defined
goals. Much of the pressure is emanating from local levels. For example, all local
salary reviews are based on recommendations from a general manager and referred
to geographical heads for approval.
In short, Clondalkin adopts what is often labelled a 'hard' approach to the
management of IR, in which human resources are viewed in terms of 'costs'. Again,
albeit in a less formal manner than was apparent in the previous cases, their has been
a recent refocusing upon the strategic development of managers at the highest levels.
However, Clondalkin Group has not established of a head office-designated HR
function, opting instead to devolve all but the most strategic of HRM issues to
regional management. The Group's management of IR consequently remains highly
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decentralised. As the case highlights, while much of this Group approach is
attributable to its smallness in employment terms and leanness of management
structures, it can also be attributable to the tight financial management approaches
they have adopted.
8.6.2 The Management of JR
Clondalkin Group pursues a highly decentralised approach to the management of IR.
This is shaped by two main factors: their industrial relations history and their current
hard financial-driven approach to the management of operations. Historically, the
Group is better known for a highly acrimonious closure of its paper mills than for its
earnings per share. As a result of the 'strangle-hold' that JR issues had over the
Group in the early 1980s, the Group sought to adopt a highly decentralised approach
to collective bargaining, wherever possible. As a senior executive explained: 'the
Group has a history of industrial relations where workers went on hunger strike and
where one of the problems was the stranglehold that the whole JR scene created.
Since then the Group's experience has changed'.
Clondalkin's pursuit of a traditional decentralised approach to the management of JR
within domestic and extended markets has been largely shaped by what management
refer to as their 'historical JR baggage'. Given the union-employer relations within
Ireland and the UK they see it as difficult to move beyond this 'historical baggage'.
As a directors remarked:
One of the problems is that the union—employer experience in Ireland and
the United Kingdom has been very adversarial and it is very hard to back out
of that historic baggage. If you have a company that has been in operation for
60 or 70 years and the industrial relations practices have grown up over that
period, it is very hard to get rid of them.
The management of JR remains wholly within the remit of local management. Head
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office intervention occurs only when a problem arises through the financial reporting
system, for instance the erosion of production. In such situations, head office would
look to local management for reasons and attempt to redirect local management
thinking. As one regional head outlined, the focus in on the questioning of
approaches:
It is dialogue in terms of 'what are the circumstances that gave rise to that
situation?' Why do we have to approach it this way, why can we not do that
way? The local culture may give you a response that says, 'You cannot do it
that way'. There are state regulations as to why you cannot do it that way.
But at least, by dialogue, you get the message across.
As a result of past IR experiences and exposure to overseas IR regimes, the Group
has a preference for non-union environments. As a senior executive explained:
Part of the equation is exposure to other economies and how people get on
with their lives in other countries has had a great impact. In the United States
unionisation is very, very light over there. And, even in Holland, when we
were acquiring the company, the unions [the works council had the right to
give their advice] did not mention pay or conditions once. They mentioned
investment, they mentioned sales growth, what were we going to do with the
company, so their agenda was different.
This does not, according to head office, amount to an 'aversion to unions'. As one
senior executive explained 'We do not mind dealing with unions as long as pay and
conditions is not the first and last item on the agenda'. The difference they see in
their approach is, as one senior executive explained;
In making the due diligence process we would take a look at the industrial
relations history, say, over five years. We look at pay settlements, relative to
the national level settlements, to see whether management was able to
manage the situation adequately, that they were getting relatively good deals
or relatively poor deals.
The Group's tight financial management also approach informs their decentralised
approach to IR. As the manager of an Irish subsidiary explained: 'In terms of
industrial relations, all negotiations are on the basis of: 'if we have to pay more, we
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must get more out'. It's a simple equation. All decisions are taken, subject to the
objective of increasing earnings per share'.
The inter-relationship between the financial reporting system and the management of
IR has resulted in the close monitoring of decision making at local levels. When cost
discrepancies emerge, operating sites are immediately questioned by head office.
This highlights a certain limitation to local management autonomy. While it might
seem that local management has full autonomy in the management of JR. closer
examination reveals particular limits to this. While the management of JR is largely
devolved to operating companies, its management is monitored closely by regional
heads through the financial control systems. Conscious of a need for consistency and
control, these heads 'take a very close management role in pay negotiations or
negotiations in relation to working conditions'. As a senior UK executive
commented:
The reason for that is because you are a member of a Group and because the
majority of the companies in the printing industry in the UK are unionised.
You cannot do some things in South Wales and do something different in
Leicester. So you have to be careful you are consistent if you are going to
make any redundancy arrangements, etc.
Other examples of limitations to local decision-making include the Group's
approach to employer association membership. Here consultation with regional
heads is always required. Similarly, head office intervention remains a 'final' but
very real option in the case of threatened industrial action. Again, despite a highly
decentralised approach, the role of the centre in the management of managers
remains to the fore - albeit in an indirect manner.
Prior to the introduction of national centralised negotiations, sectoral level
bargaining occurred within Ireland through the Irish Printing Federation. Despite
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abiding by national wage agreement, Clondalkin management has moved toward
more informal company level negotiation. If management wants to secure a
productivity deal they do it locally. As one manager remarked: 'I have had memos in
the past which say any wage increase outside of the national wage agreement for
anybody needs to be approved by Head Office but like everybody else I ignored it. I
have got something better to do than to ring head office to ask if I can give someone
a £5 a week wage increase'. Head office claims that the decision to 'hold back on
collective bargaining practices' lies ultimately with local management. However,
there appears to be a different policy with regard to some overseas operations.
Movement toward trade union amalgamation in the UK, for example, is seen to have
eased negotiations here.
Overall, Clondalkin management acknowledges a gap between IR policy and
practice and call for more IR expertise in the industry as a whole. As a local manager
explained:
A lot more expertise is needed in Industrial Relations systems, especially in
the printing and packaging industry. The official line is one thing, it's
generally policy or guideline but where the deals are made and where
practices are made is another thing.
8.6.3 Trade Unionisation
Levels of unionisation vary across national borders with highest levels of
unionisation in domestic operations and low levels in their US operations. As head
of the Irish operations explained, unionisation in the US is very low, whereas in
Europe they found the trade unions to have a very different agenda. Operations in
Ireland are multi-unionised with four main unions operating in some sites. Levels of
unionisation for Clondalkin have been influenced by changes within the industry as a
whole. The introduction of technological advances, periods of rationalisation and
changes to work arrangements have dramatically altered the demography and skill
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base of the print and packaging industry. As a result of technological advances and
structural changes, the printing industry has transformed from a craft-based to a
signs-based industry.32
The introduction of new technology has radically reduced employment numbers
within the sector and also changed the nature of the work itself. Clondalkin
management in the UK argues that the level of trade unions in their sites have
declined due to technological advances and structural changes to the UK Print and
Packaging industry as a whole. For instance, a local UK manager noted that: 'the
department which was dealing with [hot-metal setting] had about three times the
number that is in the department today and produced half the amount of work'.
Similarly, the Irish unions note a general decline in employment numbers within
freland due to changes in technology and what they see as a general movement out of
the more labour-intensive sides of the business. As one trade union official
observed: 'In but a short span of time, the highly skilled typesetter who had built his
skills up over a lifetime at work was replaced in just one decade by the 23 year old
graphic graduate, who produces twice as much work in half the time'.
As a result of reduced employment numbers and a changed demography,
management believes that the power of the trade union has decreased. In the UK, the
print union has over the past decade, in management's eyes, been 'knocked into
shape'. Moreover, changes to customer bases have placed pressure on companies to
move towards continuous work operations. This, combined with technological
advances, has shifted the power of trade unions.
32 In the print and packaging industry, shop stewards are known as 'Fathers of the Chapel'. As one of the local
manager's explained 'In the old days a lot of the printing was done in chapels, so basically the Father of the
Chapel was the Shop Steward'.
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Local Irish management spoke of introducing redundancies in highly trade unionised
environments as the 'only' option to move beyond traditional adversarial
approaches. As one local manager explained:
The history was that the unions ran the place. In 1993 we made 20 to 25
redundancies and scaled back the business to sort things out. It was blatantly
obvious that there were a lot of things going on that should not have been
going on. There comes a time when you have to say stop and that time came
in June 1992. There was a whole series of issues that nobody had ever
tackled. I saw these and basically made a 'hit list!' We did not go for them all
at once, but gradually and as a result we did not lose our 'no strike' record.
As part of the 'due diligence' process of any potential acquisition, the trade union
history is reviewed by Clondalkin management to assess local management's ability
to 'handle local JR issues'. As a senior executive explained:
In the due diligence process we would take a look at the industrial relations
history, say, over five years. We look at pay settlements relative to national
level settlements to see whether management was able to manage the
situation adequately. Our theory is that if you make poor deals, they come
home to roost. Each individual unit will get its blip and it is at those stages
that bad JR decisions always come back to roost.
The role of JR in shaping acquisitional growth decisions, combined with differences
between levels of unionisation across geographical operations suggests that, while
Clondalkin may not have an explicit approach to the avoidance of trade unions, the
industrial relations history and the strength of trade unions has a critical role to play
in the Group's international development.
In keeping, the Clondalkin Group is strongly opposed to the introduction of EWC
directives and to any move towards the provision of employee consultative
structures. (However, senior management's attitudes to EWCs involvement on the
Continent are different given what they see as the different approaches of trade
unions there). Clondalkin management suggest that given the long history of
adversarial collective bargaining in their Irish and UK operations, EWCs are not
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applicable to them.
As local managers explained, Clondalkin has a long traditional of 'not divulging
information' and therefore the introduction of EWCs would involve a complete
change in direction. Given their current approach of minimal employee involvement,
the introduction of EWCs is viewed as too radical a route to pursue. Moreover,
similar to the CRH case, the introduction of these pan-European structures is seen to
threaten the Group's localised approach. The introduction of EWCs would, in
management's view, lead to inter-company trade union linkages, an outcome
management does not wish to facilitate. In response, the Group's approach is to
maintain low level of on site employment in Ireland. As a head office executive
explained, 'Things like hiring and firing of staff is certainly left to the individual
company. They could take on 50 people, but it will show up in the monthly reporting
in terms of staff numbers, and there would be strong questions asked. There is a
pretty strict, unwritten law about staff numbers'. While broadly accepting the right to
be advised, local management believes such consultative arrangements would be
over-shadowed with a focus on pay and conditions. Management envisages that
EWCs would amount to 'talk-shops' with no right of veto.
8.7 CoNcLusioN
This thesis seeks to investigate the impact of Irish patterns of industrialisation in
understanding the formation of Irish-owned MNCs and their approaches to the
management of employment relationships. This case, and the two that precede it,
clearly demonstrate that the approach adopted by Irish-owned MNCs to their
employment relationship may be best understood in light of key historical events
shaping the evolution of the group and the strategies and structures that have
developed in response to these. The formative years of the Clondalkin Group
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demonstrate a number of 'push' factors that eventually led to the intemationalisation
and product diversification of the Group into higher value-added sectors.
Consequently adopting a highly decentralised and tightly defined approach, it gains
expression from and is reinforced through a number of financial controls. Any
attempts to standardise or equate practices in the pursuit of synergies threaten this
Group's highly devolved approach. Ultimately, the route to homogenisation runs the
risk of a build up of 'dependencies', a situation Clondalkin Group seeks to avoid at
all costs. As pervious sections have shown, these factors and the ensuing corporate
strategies have shaped Clondalkin's approach to the management of JR and HR.
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CHAPTER 9
AIB GROUP PLC.
This case study examines the approach adopted by the MB Group towards the management of IR and
FIR, focusing particularly on their International Retail Banking Division. This Group runs contrary to
those previously reported in that it operates a highly centralised approach to the management of IR
and HR. Under increasing competitive pressure, the Group has had to devolve autonomy to improve
its responsiveness and have recently established business units 'clusters' at local levels. AIB is also
distinct in that recent industrial disputes and competitive pressures have facilitated a movement
towards a more partnership-like approach to the management of JR. However, as with the other case
companies, this has been matched with a greater focus upon the development of managers.
9.1 INTRODUCTION
While the development of the ATE Group exhibits a number of features common to
the previous three cases, it is also the Irish-owned MNC that most obviously stands
apart. In this sample ATE is distinctive in the manner with which they have
intemationalised. In contrast to the previous case companies, ATE have pursued a
much slower and more deliberate intemationalisation strategy. Initially entering
overseas markets through the acquisition of minority shares, they have gradually
increased their initial stakes from this point. Once their confidence has been built up
in a business and ownership is secured, each acquisition becomes the basis from
which further expansion takes place. However, in recent years the Group has moved
more toward acquisitional growth. Whilst the previous cases were decentralised in
their approach to the management of IR, ATE adopt an approach which is highly
centrali sed.
Given the highly competitive environment within which ATE operates and its long
history of acrimonious industrial action (Roche, 1998a), this case suggests that
pursuing a traditional low-trust adversarial approach is no longer a viable strategy
for a service sector MNCs. Located within a dynamic sector that has recently been
deregulated, there has been growing pressure on the AIB Group to decentralise
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responsibility to local levels. However, maintaining strong co-ordination and control
over operations is still seen by the Group as paramount. In response to increasing
competitiveness and the need for local responsiveness, Affi are seeking to develop a
highly centralised approach to the management of JR while moving toward more
local level representation.
9.2 COMPANY PROFILE
Affi is the largest financial services company operating within Ireland. With total
assets of $53,830 million, the Group is ranked 124th in the Financial Times Top
1000 world banks (FT, July, 1998). Amongst the largest employers in Ireland, the
A Group comprises 15,100 staff, of which half are located within Ireland, 15% in
the UK and 35% in the Rest of the World (Affi Publications, 1996). Affi have a total
of 461 branches Group-wide, 70% of which are located within Ireland. The Group
operates a diversified range of business within the financial services sector, the
largest of which is retail banking.
The structure of the Group reflects a number of dimensions, more notably legal and
tax considerations, administrative requirements and historical concerns. The Group
is divisionalised into four operating divisions: AIB Bank (retail and commercial
banking in Ireland and the UK, along with Irish Life Assurer), Capital Markets
(Treasury, Investment Banking and Corporate Banking), United States (retail
banking) and Group (60%-owned Polish subsidiary and Other) (Riada, 1998). The
Retail Banking division, with which this case study is specifically concerned,
encompasses operations in Ireland, the UK, Poland and a number of outlying
international consultancy operations. The management structure reflects five main
trading areas: Ireland, Northern Ireland, the UK, direct banking and a life insurance
company in Ireland (cf. figure 9.1).
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FIGuRE 9.1: A GROUP STRUCTURE
9.3 THE NATURE OF COMPETITION
The Irish banking industry consists of thirty-four licensed banks in the Republic,
four of which are associated banks. The remainder are either merchant or industrial
banks. In addition, there are two savings banks. Two major players, in terms of
number of branches, deposits and advanced market share, dominate the retail
banking market in Ireland. Largely composed of merged groups, retail branch
banking in Ireland saw a wave of rationalisation during the 1950s, which resulted in
the formation of the four main associated banks.
During the 1980s, the Irish retail banking industry went through a 'financial services
revolution' due to increased competition (Bourke and Kinsella, 1988). In
anticipation of additional competitive pressure from European banks in particular,
Irish banks sought to strengthen their competitive position by undergoing major
restructuring and modernisation programmes (Peat et a!., 1982). The deregulation of
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financial markets, advances in technology, increasing internationalisation, an
intensification of competition and national industrial strike action brought about
major changes within the industry. The introduction of the Building Societies Act of
1989 led to a significant deregulation of this industry, which effectively eliminated
traditional competitive demarcation lines. As a result, building societies and savings
banks began to enter retail markets that had traditionally been the domain of banks.
More particularly, the building societies and savings banks began to enter the
personal loans and deposits markets, while simultaneously the major banks moved
into the mortgage, credit cards and life assurance markets. The disappearance of
traditional demarcation lines resulted in an intensification of competition and an
acceleration of innovation (Bourke and Kinsella, 1988). Technological
developments and external competitive pressures led A and others in the banking
industry to redirect their focus to the marketing and selling of financial products and
services. The Irish Banking sector is currently witnessing increasing integration of
banking and insurance sectors. In light of this, some argue that one of the main
challenge for banking trade unions is to 'raise their profile in the new banking and
insurance services, such as call centres where unionisation rates are low' (EIRR,
1999: 32). This issue will be addressed in full detail later in this case.
Approximately 60 percent of the Irish workforce are currently employed within
service-related activities, and the international financial trading sector is one of the
fastest growing areas of the Irish economy. Exports for the sector amounted to
IRE2.3 billion in 1992 (12% of total Irish GNP). 33 However, the Irish market is
small in comparison with its British and European counterparts. Most Irish-owned
financial services institutions have limited structural links with European institutions
which is regarded as one potential competitive weakness in the integrated market
660,000 people are employed in service-related businesses (Government Publications, 1990).
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that is currently emerging (Government Publications, 1990).
Since the establishment of the Irish Financial Services Centre (IFSC) in 1987, the
financial sector has become an important growth area for Ireland. As a Government
strategy paper (1999: 1) on the development of the international financial services
industry recently stated that:
International financial services have become a jewel in the crown of Ireland's
economy over the past decade. The International Financial Services Centre,
which was born on a patch of urban decline in 1987, has been the driving
force behind the development of the sector.
In 1998 it was reported that more than 6,500 people were directly employed in the
IFSC. Furthermore, half of the world's top banks, accounting for £68 billion in total
assents, have operations in the IFSC.34
One of the main challenges now facing the Irish retail banking sector is the drift
towards the consolidation of the global banking industry (Lynch and Roche, 1996).
International trends point to increasing merger activity as European and American
banks battle to extend their global reach. Increased competition from non-traditional
suppliers such as the supermarkets has further challenged what was traditionally a
highly sheltered sector of the economy (The Irish Times, 11/6, 1998). Other issues
facing Irish banks are ongoing developments in technology, the cost of operating
extensive branch network structures and the impact of the low interest rate
environment on savings. In the light of these forces for global change, the primary
challenge for Irish banks is to hold on to their customer base in the domestic market
as the needs of this market change. For example, as the large Irish food companies
begin to relocate part of their cost base to the UK, Irish banks become open to
The OECD reports that 'The extension of the 10 percent corporate tax rate from the manufacturing sector to
international financial services has attracted a large number of foreign enterprises since the early 1990s'
(OECD Economic Surveys - Ireland 1997).
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competition from British banks for their customers. Acquisition by one of the larger
overseas banks is also a very real threat for smaller indigenous Irish banks. To date
such a threat has largely been countered by Affi's high earnings and the regulatory
controls imposed by the Irish Central Bank. However, these circumstances may not
hold in the future.
9.4 HIsToRIcAL EVOLUTION
Affi was formed during a period of consolidation in the Irish banking industry
during the 1960s. Initially established through a merger of three long-established
banks. 35 It was not until 1972 that total integration of the Group as it now stands was
complete. During the 1970s, the Group expanded its operations into the UK,
Northern Ireland and the US, with a mandate to extend banking facilities to large
Irish emigrant populations and to Irish companies operating within overseas
markets. 36 By the early 1980s, domestic markets were dominated by two main
players, with limited opportunities for further growth. The smallness of the Irish
market, coupled with the increasing saturation of domestic personal and corporate
markets; and a lack of sophistication in Irish capital markets eventually led to a need
to diversify overseas (Murphy, 1989).
To minimise dependency on domestic and UK markets, AIB diversified
geographically. By this stage the UK operations had exhausted their growth
AIB's origins can be traced back to three separate banks: the Munster and Leinster Bank Limited (founded
1885), the Provincial Bank of Ireland Limited (founded 1825) and the Royal Bank of Ireland Limited (founded
1836). When the three banks amalgamated to form AIB limited in 1966 they continued to trade as separate
entities until 1968 when a decision was taken to integrate operations. The amalgamation is said to have
occurred in an attempt to take advantages of businesses that were complementary in terms of geographical
distribution and the nature of their activities (AIB Publications, 1996).
36 Entry in the UK for the banks was through greenfield sites. From 1966 onwards, approximately twenty
managers were sent to the UK and told to obtain deposits from the expats who were doing very well from the
boom of the 1960s and 70s. This led to the setting up of a branch in Kilburn a largely Irish populated area,
from which a branch network grew and the bank diversified out into different related areas. In the late l980s
the banks grew into 'yuppie banks' and diversified into financial services. The bottom eventually fell out of
that and the bank narrowly escaped closure. Thus the IBOA expanded into the UK when the banks expanded
to service a largely extended Irish market (Interview Notes)
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possibilities and further expansion was regarded as not providing the Group with
sufficient diversification of risks. This left the Group with two feasible regions for
expansion - mainland Europe or the US. However, European markets, with their
highly developed indigenous banking operations, were viewed as non-responsive to
overseas banks. This, combined with a lack of local cultural and language
knowledge, led to the strategic decision to diversify into the US market. At that
stage, the International Banking Act of 1978 was still in its infancy in the US and as
a result the AIB Group believed the climate to be right for entering. 37 An
examination of potential sites began in the early 1980s.
The criteria employed for sourcing acquisitions were: a reasonable spread of risks,
proven record of sound management, significant shares of existing markets, the
ability to provide a quick return and the receptiveness to Affi's overall corporate
governance approach. In 1983, AIB acquired its first US Company - the First
Maryland Bancorp, a company of similar size to Affi. 38 An initial stake of 43% in
the company was acquired, with an option to take majority holding within four years.
This was increased to 50% by 1988, and after seventeen consecutive quarters of
increased earnings, Affi purchased the outstanding shares in 1989. First Maryland
became the basis for further acquisitions within the US market. In a very slow and
deliberate manner AIIB continued to search for new business and acquisitions, taking
ten years to consolidate their major position in the US market.
The early 1990s saw renewed interest in operations closer to domestic markets. In
1991, Affi merged with the TSB Northern Ireland to become the third major banking
group within Northern Ireland, with a combined strength of 1400 employees and 100
' A branch of AIB had been established in New York from 1978. In much the same way as the Group's entry
into the UK, this mandate of this branch was to offer banking services to Irish and British companies operating
in the US.
An American regional bank founded 170 years previously.
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retail outlets. Further business diversifications continued, and in 1996 ATE entered
Eastern Europe with the acquisition of share holding in a Polish bank. As the Group
grew the size of the companies acquired also grew. In early 1997, ATE made the
largest ever acquisition by an fish company when it acquired the US-owned
Dauphin Deposit Group for £900m. This moved the Group into a different league,
upgrading their debt ratings and promoting their ranking against US financial
institutions (The Irish Times, 1/22, 1997). Following this acquisition, ATE set about
diversifying their shareholder base by enticing foreign institutions to invest in their
shares. As a senior executive explained: 'we wanted to diversify the shareholder
base to reflect the fact that it had become an international company after the US
acquisition. But the bank was not well known. It involved knocking on doors and
trying to get their ears'. Overseas investors now hold half of the Group's shares (The
Irish Times, 1/22, 1997).
AIB's approach to internationalisation and form of geographical expansion differs
from the previous cases. Until its recent large acquisition, this MNC effectively grew
by entering extended domestic markets, such as the US and the UK; or alternatively,
through the acquisition of minority stakes which are expanded over time. As a senior
executive explained:
In looking at the history of the development we have only really advanced
our business deliberately in the areas where we believe that there was
continuous fit between what we traditionally represent and areas where that
would be valued.
As a result, mainland European markets have been largely avoided and, apart from a
representative outlet in Brussels, this remains the situation today.
In recent years, ATE's strategy has moved toward greater geographical expansion.
This has occurred due to two main factors. Firstly, their maturity in national terms -
as one manager highlighted: 'in a sense ATE is out-growing Ireland'; and, secondly,
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management see an ability to build on their nationality abroad as something they are
now keen to take advantage of. As a senior executive involved in corporate planning
claimed:
AlE represents the best of 'Irish-ism' and the fact that we have moved
beyond that to presenting ourselves as business people. If you are based in
freland, then you represent the best of what Ireland is but you then also
embellish that with what AIB stands for.
More recent changes to their overseas growth strategy are attributable to this
reputation and positive 'image' overseas. Partially based on Ireland's perceived
economic success during the past decade, the Group has recently shown success in
their bid for international business. As a senior executive commented:
We recently tendered for international consultancy work. There was
something like 31 people bidding on the first flash of the tender which was
put down to a short list of five. At that stage, we were up against an UK
bank, a Swedish bank, an Italian bank and a German bank. And we won. We
found that the regard people have for the name AlE International is very
strong. Strangely, the regard they have locally is a heck of a lot less!
Am's head office regard this positive 'national image' as having facilitated their
entry into new overseas sites like Poland. As a manager involved in the Group's
expansion into Eastern Europe commented:
Ireland has become known to be successful internationally. We have the
highest growth economy in the OECD countries, the highest among the
European Union countries. We are very strong and very positive. On the back
of that, we are seen as a progressive player in the Irish marketplace.
This newfound international success has led to, what one senior manager regarded
as, a 'strange anomaly in terms of the perceptions held in Ireland'. Strangely,
management find that domestically they are not regarded as progressive or
successful in international terms.
As AIB grows, their management believes that their size has become increasingly
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restrictive from a domestic sense. As a head office senior executive remarked: 'being
an MNC based within Ireland, the parish politics very often can be inhibiting,
particularly in relation to executive salaries. This sense of begrudgery and moaning
decries what Affi stands for internationally'. Furthermore, as one of the largest
indigenous employers, the Group perceives their responsibilities as being broader
than other Irish companies. In the words the director of corporate planning:
You have to be responsible in terms of both providing the service and also
the employment. I think there are a lot of responsibilities on institutions like
ourselves. There is a big expectation from Government, for example, that we
will act responsibly, that we will act fairly, that we will provide leadership
and guidance to the industry.
Unlike the other cases investigated here, there are no head office or locally
designated development or acquisitional teams operating within the Group. In the
words of one senior executive: 'there is no monopoly on opportunism'. Propositions
generally emanate from overseas operations, which are then subjected to a vetting
process and evaluated. The involvement of the head office HR function is confined
to those acquisitions where industrial relations issues are 'evident'. As a senior FIR
manager explained: 'the FIRM implications would not be the first item on the
strategic agenda when it comes to acquisitions, but there has to be someone who
says hold on a second have you thought of such and such? That is the way it operates
to a large extent'.
AIB are presently known to be 'in the market' for acquisitions. However, the Group
is also aware that it is itself increasingly susceptible to take-over. As a head office
executive explained: 'the only question one has to ask in the background is that it is
fine being on the hunt but what about being hunted?' Despite this threat, there are
features particular to the Irish market that the bank regards as obstacles to overseas
players. These include the invasiveness of the State, through interest and price
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controls, and high taxes. As a senior finance manager explained:
The features of banking which pertain in freland, which do not pertain across
other parts of Europe, would be the invasiveness of Government because of
the fact that we are subject to interest and price control. We are the second
country in Europe to be subject to price control and we are the only country
in Europe to be subject to interest rate control.
Table 9.1 summarizes the key events in AlE's internationalisation against its broader
historical evolution.
TABLE 9.1: KEY EVENTS IN THE EVOLUTION OF AlE
Key Dates Event
1966	 Merger of three separate banks to form the AlE Group plc
1972	 Total integration of operations
Operations set up in Northern freland and UK
1978	 Bank Branch set up in New York
1980	 Decision taken to enter the US rather than mainland Europe
1983	 Enter the US market through minority stakes
1988	 Full acquisition of US bank
1989	 Acquisition of small US bank and minority stakes in another
1991	 Merge with bank in NT to create third major banking group in NI
1996	 Further acquisitions in US
Acquisition of Asset management group in UK
Associate status within Polish banks
1997	 Increase in Polish interest to gain control
Biggest ever acquisition of Irish company - acquisition of US bank
1998	 New era in internationalisation?
9.5 STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND CONTROL
AlE's structure reflects its historical evolution into a highly formalised and
bureaucratic form of organisation. In contrast to the previous cases, the AlE Group
has a large 'centre' with 1,500 people employed at head office. Referred to as 'bank
centre', the role of head office is two-fold. Firstly, it represents the strategic 'centre'
of the Group; secondly it acts as the 'steering and clearing' house of Irish and British
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operations.
Head office supports encompass five main functions: central services, information
technology, financial control, human resources and strategic development (which
includes marketing). There are fifteen members in the main senior management
team, most of which are Dublin-based and heads of geographical businesses. The
senior management team meets once a month as a means of guiding the strategic
direction of the Group as a whole, in which they review businesses and examine
performance indicators. A one-to-one relationship between board representation and
the main businesses does not exist, primarily due to the area structure within the
Republic.
The structure of this MNC has constantly changed as its strategy has evolved. As
part of an overall drive to localise responsibility, Affi recently introduced a business
unit structure at local levels. The underlying rationale is that a fully resourced
'collegiate of branches' will manage the implementation of policies. Through the
establishment of locally resourced units, more development and management occurs
at local levels. Unable to completely restructure their highly centralised and
bureaucratic structure, the Group chooses instead to circumvent obstacles by
initiating change from the 'ground up'. Accompanying the introduction of local
business units have been changes in the roles and responsibilities of local
management. With the devolving of responsibility and, the effective replacement of
regional management with local management, greater emphasis has subsequently
been placed on the management of performance. As a result, head office has
established closer reporting links with local management in an attempt to monitor
their development, push accountability down the line and encourage more 'initiative-
taking'.
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9.5.1 Group Strategy: 'Devolved Responsibility with Limited Autonomy'
Am's approach to the management of operations has been shaped by their
geographical locations, organisational structure and industrial developments. While
the Irish retail banking operations are treated in a homogenous manner, the UK
operations are managed differently. In every case, however, no absolute authority is
devolved. Local senior management must seek authority and explain the
consequences of actions back to the centre. The overall management team is, in the
words of a FIR manager, a 'Big melting pot'. However, this is tightly controlled. As
a senior executive concerned with corporate planning explained:
Once they have degrees of autonomy in terms of their responsibility and
authority, they have got to seek authority to do certain things. If the central
bank decides to change the liquidity policy, I cannot argue with that, I have to
implement that. But I have then got to explain the consequences back to
business and work with the businesses to say, 'Look, the implication of this
is the following'. Everyone has to understand their rules and responsibilities.
The culture of the Bank has become far more competitive at local levels in recent
years and the maintenance of a centralised approach at head office to the
management of JR facilitates the decentralisation of some HR issues. The ATE
Group regards itself as a 'people-focused' organisation and, as such, does not pursue
a hard financially driven approach which, according to the HR director, can 'turn
people into overnight failures'. However, shaping head office expectations are stock
prices, shareholder concerns, rating agencies and public expectations. These
measures are in turn quickly translated down to local levels in order to keep diversity
'on track'.
9.5.2 Control Mechanisms
As we have seen, financial control is at the core of Am's business with each branch
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bank regarded as a cost centre. Largely driven by volumes of business, branches are
managed through the technological networking of branches. This MNC pursues a
centralised approach to collection of information that ensures consistency, accuracy,
speed and monitors irregularities. The introduction of recent technology, most
notably site networking, has enabled the Group to devolve responsibility to local
areas. In effect, the introduction of technology has enabled senior management to
maintain a tighter control over operations and to manage an approach of devolved
responsibility. Head office provides local branch management with monthly targets
and plans. The only HRM information collected is profits per head and overtime
costs. Local business volumes are feed back into head office who provide volume
reports on a daily basis thus enabling branches to see the status of their balance sheet
at any given time. This process of 'full transparency' places greater pressure on
branches to increase their product and customer base.
Am subsequently employ a concept known as the 'balance sheet score card'. This
provides the Group with the means to collect information on a variety of issues such
as volumes, products, margins, profits and costs - in effect, all the aspects that
managers or business units are responsible for. Affi effects control through a system
that has consistency in terms of its product descriptions. 39 Branch banking is semi-
autonomous, but reports directly into the financial control function at head office.
Other operations, including the UK, report to their respective finance directors who,
in turn, report back into the head office finance function, described by senior
management as 'the ultimate divisional controller'. The planning process begins
with bank branches bidding into head office with volume estimates. Those balances
are then forecast to the end of the trading year and incremented on a monthly basis,
with the provision for seasonality to forecast the next twelve months. Pricing
AIB head office provides standard descriptions of products to ensure consistency.
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structures are 'applied for' from head office or 'central bank'. At this stage, branches
are also alerted to forthcoming product campaigns in an attempt to, in the words of a
senior executive involved with corporate planning, 'heighten the profile of certain
products'. Having taken all these considerations on board, volume estimates are
again 'bid in' to head office, having worked through cost controls, inflation, salary
and supplier side, depreciation and formulated an acceptable plan. Once complete, it
is then put forward to central bank - if it is not acceptable then 'a bit of bargaining
goes on at the edges'. From a financial control outlook, head office specifies
direction and expectation.
The business planning and the financial planning processes run tangentially. Local
management has no autonomy over capital expenditure. The provision of capital
expenditure comes from the central services and information technology functions at
head office, who provide branches with premises, maintenance services and so on.
Requests for capital rests, in the words of the finance director, upon a:
'demonstrative business case or sufficient reason being given to warrant why that
capital should be provided'. In the event of non-conformity, the gravity of the
situation would determine the readiness and level of involvement from head office.
Non-financial co-ordination and control mechanisms are employed by the Bank as
an attempt to control across their large size and the dispersion of their branch
network. In order to increase competition and maintain local management focus,
AIB has recently introduced a system known as 'best in class' within Ireland. As
opposed to the strict definition of benchmarking, under this initiative head office
identify best practices against which other branches can measure themselves. As
head office management relay, 'it produces a do or die situation'. Peer pressure is
seen as one of the most powerful tools operating within the bank. As a senior
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manager explained: 'individuals do not want to be last in the league. We are being
open and sharing information across the business so that if people can see their
relative performance, they can see their absolute performance'. In the UK the
situation differs somewhat. In the UK the Group have introduced an ideal type or
super-branch, which outlines the attributes of an ideal branch from which all
branches can benchmark against.
In addition, in an attempt to consolidate recent growth, Affi have recently introduced
a 'homogenous' value system called 'AlE 2000'. Designed to lay the foundations of
a common value system, the programme outlines the future constituents of the
businesses. Other means through which synergistic returns are sought and values are
transmitted include a strong emphasis on sports and social activities. As a local
manager explained:
Sport creates team values and respect for the individual. It allows for
individuality in play style. With a lot of these homogenizing training
programmes, there is a degree to which corporations will try and enforce
their values, whereas our method is much more about giving freedom to
enable styles and approaches, within a broad set of guidelines in which to
develop.
However, AlE still seeks to maintain standard styles and approaches.
9.6 APPROACHES TO THE MANAGEMENT OF IR AND HR
The Irish retail-banking sector has a long and checkered history of industrial
disputes. The first major strike can be traced back to the formation and entry of the
first trade union - the Irish Bank Officials Association (IBOA) - into Irish banks in
1919.° The eventual recognition of the IBOA resulted in the establishment of
separate minimum salary scales for males and females, pension schemes and the
provision of holiday leave (McMullan, 1979). The 'war years' of the 1930s to the
4° McMullan (1979) noted that membership grew from 2,400 in 1919 to 4,844 by 1931. For a fuller explanation
of the 1919 strike cf. McMullan (1979).
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1950s, were characterised by a number of disputes concerning the improvement of
employment conditions (IBOA, 1988). Extended strike action during the mid-1960s
saw the introduction of a modern salary structure, with the retention of a single-tier
recruitment system.4'
The first major strike action to occur in Irish banks, in 1970, resulted in a significant
change to the nature of industrial relations across the industry. The dispute centered
on issues of pay. In 1968 the banks and the IBOA drew up an agreement for a fixed
term of two years. Within a year there was increasing pressure on the banks to
approve a pay increase. These events unfolded against a background of national
discussions on wage restraint and price controls and general trade union unrest. The
ensuing dispute went to arbitration which found against the IBOA claim. In response
the union called for restricted working hours from its members. Working hours were
eventually reduced to the point of closure. In total, 787,000 working days were lost
during the 1970 dispute, one of the greatest losses in working days in the economy at
that time. As McCarthy (1973: 184) relates:
At the beginning of February 1970, all the offices of the clearing banks in the
Republic of Ireland began working restricted hours because of an industrial
dispute. By 1 May, they had closed completely and did not open again until
mid-November; it was not until the middle of February 1971 that full
banking hours were resumed and full services restored; that is to say.
business was disrupted for a whole year and the banks were closed
completely for over six months. It was the most prolonged and
comprehensive stoppage in banking yet recorded for any country in the
world.
The 1970 strike had a profound effect on employees, many of whom were forced to
depart for work in the UK. Its resolution heralded a 'new era' in industrial relations
within the banking sector, particularly through the establishment of a Joint Industrial
41 This stands in contrast to the introduction of the two-tiered recruitment system that was introduced later. In the
single-tier recruitment system all new recruits would enter the organisation at the same point with the capacity
to reach managerial positions.
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Council. 42 The admonishment of poor industrial relations and the legacy of
bitterness between the two sides were to remain common features of Labour Court
recommendations in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The second strike that would shape Affi's current approaches occurred in 1992. This
was the first bank strike in freland for sixteen years and its outcome had major
implications for the conduct of IR since. The dispute, which lasted ten weeks,
initially centered on pay issues but widened to include other terms and conditions of
employment. The dispute arose out of a 6.5% wage claim by the unions, based on
the view that senior management wage increases had been upwards of 15%. The
claim became broader when the Banks' negotiating team sought to resolve the issue
of extended opening hours, an issue that had been on the agenda for twenty years, at
the same time. Thus, the dispute came to incorporate wider issues of representation
and worker's rights in the face of a more 'determined management culture', to quote
a prominent trade union official.
The 1992 strike marked a departure in the traditional strategies adopted by both the
banks and the trade unions. Directly targeting the Banks' management as opposed to
customers, the IBOA introduced the incremental and protracted style of action of
withholding bank charges. While the Bank of freland, the National Irish Bank and
the Ulster Bank, through their representative body the Banks Standing Relations
Committee (BRSC), were content to penalise staff with a 20% pay cut, the Affi took
an unprecedented action of suspending 600 staff. Just as the dispute markets a
departure in the tactics employed by both sides, it also heralded a new perception of
bank disputes. Two factors shaped this. The development of technology and the pre-
42 Established under the Industrial Relations Act of 1946 its object 'is the promotion of harmonious relations'
and 'if a trade dispute arises between such workers and their employers a lock-out or strike will not be
undertaken in support of the dispute until the dispute has been referred to the association and considered by it'.
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emptive move by the banks to introduce merit pay into managerial ranks. The
computerisation of branches enabled the banks to remain open throughout the
industrial action (cf. table 9.2). This was to signal a fundamental change in the
nature of JR within the retail banking industry. Secondly, the introduction of
performance-related pay (PRP) secured the commitment of management to the banks
and eventually led to their expulsion from the union. 43 The introduction of PRP in
effect tested the loyalty of managers. As noted in the commentary of the time, the
tougher approach adopted by more 'proactive' personnel chiefs in the banks had
begun to erode the strength of the IBOA (IRN 42, 5/11, 1992). Following the
resolution of the dispute, the JBOA joined the Irish Congress of Trade Unions,
which afforded them a direct role in the national agreement and pay bargaining
processes.
TABLE 9.2: EMPLOYMENT, BRANCHIES AND ATMs OF ThE 'BIG FouR' Th4 1992.
Employment	 No. of Employees	 No. of Branches	 No. of
(Republic of Ire.)
	
ATMs
AIB	 8,000
	
366
	
300
Bank of Ireland	 6,000	 300	 280
Ulster Bank	 1,700	 109
	
55
National Irish Bank
	
800	 51	 17
Source: Irish Independent, March 13, 1992.
The final recommendations by the Labour Court were seen to be 'largely a
vindication of the bank's position', in that the recommendations endorsed the
fundamental aspects of the bank's position. These included the extension of opening
hours, payment of the full 3% of PESP as well as the 3% local productivity clause, a
lump sum of £750, an extra day's annual leave, a review of the technology and
change agreement and a review of the industrial relations climate. Largely viewed as
Of the 4,000 members expelled from the IBOA, an estimated 1,000 were managers, assistant managers or
senior officials.
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a major loss for the IBOA, the resolution of the dispute was followed by the
expulsion of 4,000, mostly managerial, members from its ranks (cf. table 9.3). In
response, the IBOA noted the entry of about 700 new members during the dispute
mainly from the new lower entry grades.
TABLE 9.3: IBOA MEMBERSHIP LEVELS (1993-98)
1992	 1993*	 1994	 1995	 1996	 1997	 1998 1999**
19,000	 15,399	 14,971	 14,585	 14,387	 14,340	 14,259	 19,000
Notes: * 1992 Expulsion of 4,500 members. ** Estimate (interview notes).
Source: IBOA Annual Reports (1990-98)
The end of the strike signaled what many believe to be the drawing to a close of one
era and the 'dawning of a new and uncertain industrial relations future in the major
Irish banks' (IRN, 15, 1992). For the banks, the strike was akin to the 'crossing of
the rubicon' in that many of the branches managed to remain open with normal
working conditions while hurting profits. From the perspective of the IBOA, the
tactics pursued by the banks, and Affi in particular, were seen as an attempt to 'break
the Association'. Subsequently, the unions believe that the strike reintroduced a
radicalising influence on the membership. In sum, the 1992 dispute was a watershed
in bank and staff relations (IRN, 17, 1992). As an industrial correspondent (Irish
Independent, 3/10, 1992) remarked:
While the public's perception of bank disputes may be lock outs and
closedowns and striking staff traveling abroad for long spells, both the
bank's management and the IBOA by their conduct of the present row
recognise that the ball game has totally changed.
As part of the resolution, the Labour Court recommended a review of the conduct of
industrial relations within the banking industry following what it regarded as a deep
and fundamental mistrust in the managementlunion relationship. The sporadic nature
of industrial action enforced the need for change from traditional adversarialism.
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Recent developments have seen the banks move towards a 'partnership-based'
approach, something the unions see as enabling 'a consensus of the language'
between the interested parties. The factors that IBOA cite as having facilitated to this
change of direction include the retirement of a number of the 'old personalities',
greater exposure to competitive forces, and also that the industrial relations climate
has changed somewhat. Following the breakdown of the BRSC in 1994, both
management and the union went to Denmark to examine their participative model.
As a result of this initiative both the language and dialogue changed and a deliberate
policy of engagement was agreed between the parties. This partnership approach to
the management of JR is subsequently embodied in 'seven core principles of
partnership'. The proposed next step is that the 'principles of partnership' will be
brought down to the joint committees and business unit levels.
9.6.1 Management Development
HR within Affi is a 'critical function'. Traditionally, the Group's provision of HRM
revolved around three discrete departments - training and development, staff
relations and personnel. According to a senior HR executive, this led to 'a scattering
of decentralised decisions which resulted in conflicts and personal politics so instead
it was put working together under one roof'. The Group has recently begun to
integrate and consolidate the provision of FIRM. As a result the FIR function has
been streamlined to a total of eight people.
In recent years, Affi have, according to the HR director, actively sought to devolve
more responsibility for certain HR issues to local levels - but within very tightly
defined limits. In order to facilitate an increase in local decision-making, direct
reporting lines were set up between local management and the HR function at head
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office. Local managers view this autonomy as being synonymous to 'hiring and
firing powers'. Despite this, recruitment and selection practices are, according to the
FIR director, controlled and managed from the centre 'for consistency's sake'. Thus,
the approach AlE pursues is one of devolved responsibility with limited autonomy.
In the future, head office expects that local management will take responsibility for
certain HR issues. This is, however, expected to occur 'within limited standards and
limited areas of activity'. One such activity envisaged as becoming decentralised to
local management is staff planning and the day-to-day administration of staff. While
head office insist that the primary function of local management will be to manage,
develop and deal with staff, they insist that issues such as selection, recruitment,
dismissal, relocation, promotion will remain firmly at head office level. The
rationale they offer is that such a centralised approach is applicable to their highly
distributed workforce.
As the nature and structure of the retail banking business has changed so too has the
role of FIRM. Traditionally, contact with head office was driven by a need-by-need
basis and the general approach was, according to the FIR department, one of
'reasoning as to why this could not be done'. Given a perceived need for greater
flexibility and facilitation, the role of the head office HR function has changed to
one that is focused on 'creating an environment to enable the businesses to do what
it is that they need to do'. Pursing an in-house consultancy role, the HR function is
still largely concerned with the formulation of policies. Emerging from a
bureaucratic history, all policies have traditionally been fully documented and made
available to branches through their networked system.
Given the pace of development, an increasingly important role for the HR function is
to keep pace with the new needs brought about by this change. As a senior HR
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executive commented: 'when a lot of the policies were written it was years ago. It
stood there like the Ten Commandments. The problem is that the world changed and
so one of our roles became to initiate change sometimes'. However, the main role of
the HR function across all areas is to set standards derived from 'best practices',
which act as the means for businesses to benchmark themselves against. Domestic
operations are thus treated as homogenous and practices are standardised regardless
of the legislative environment. As one manager explained:
The fact that the legislative environment is different in one place to another
should not interfere with the standards applied to the organisation. Our view
of standards is that we want to go beyond what is the code of practice,
whether that is the legislative code or business practice - we want to be the
best at it.
However, by 'defining standards in such a way that they are not controlled', AlE see
themselves as moving from a control-driven approach to one which is more coercive
in its orientation. As a senior HR executive explained:
[These standards] do not provide straight-jackets for managers. Rather they
are designed so that managers will take a look at that and say 'it will not
interfere with the way that I am doing my business but I can understand that
these are the sort of things that I should be thinking about if I want to do this
job properly'. Now, that is the way we have to think about our standards.
Within AlE, distance from the centre has shaped the level of autonomy at local
levels. In general, the Group adopts a more decentralised approach to their UK
operations. Within the UK, responsibility for recruitment and selection is devolved
to branches, with the involvement of a local HR person to maintain local standards.
This variation is largely attributed to the number of HR professionals located at UK
branch level and the small size of the UK operations in comparison with Ireland.
Hence, the HR function in the UK reports to head office HRM, by way of a 'dotted
line'. In the first instance, reporting to a Group general manager with the facility to
'leverage off' head office expertise at any given time. Apart from retail banking,
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other autonomous businesses do not report into the central HR function. Instead, a
number of HR managers meet regularly throughout the year with members from
each of the businesses 'who are largely brought together under the Group umbrella'.
These meetings focus more on Group-wide strategic issues than operational concerns
in an attempt to 'get some more synergy'.
9.6.2 Management Development
Traditionally, Affi operated 'lifetime work guarantees'. Staff were recruited directly
from second-level education and progressed along a clearly defined and highly
visible career path. Promotion to senior positions came from within and seniority the
main criterion for promotion. However, due to low levels of staff turnover a serious
imbalance, or 'grade drift', occurred in staff grading profiles by the late 1980s. By
1989, over half of the branch staff were situated on a higher bank official salary
scale while conducting routine junior-level tasks (cf. table 9.4). This system of
automatic progression also resulted in major imbalances in labour costs. In an
attempt to maintain competitiveness, Irish banks set about reducing labour costs by
reorganising their staffing grades. In 1988, one of Affi's main competitors
introduced a new bank assistant grade. This had lower starting salaries (new recruits
started on between IREC7000 and 11RE8OOO), with limited and slow promotional
opportunities. Despite initial outrage, the new grade was eventually introduced
across all the 'Big Four' (IRN, 5, 1992).'
Staff were recruited to this new grade using a form of selection known as 'Biodata',
devised to screen in candidates whose biographical attributes matched that of the
Criticism of this new career structure came unexpectedly from the Church. Fr. Michael Cleary stated that the
Bank had acted as a 'ruthless monster' by indulging in a cynical exercise in giving 'dead end' jobs to young
people with the Bank's profits doubled. Likewise the Bishop of Galway commented that it saddened him that a
major Irish business like the Bank of Ireland would eliminate 2,000 well paid, well structured jobs and replace
then with relatively poorly paid jobs offering very limited career prospects.
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Scale 2
Scale 3
SBO
Accountant
Manager
Grand
Total
13,244
	
12,868	 12,868 13,027 13,171
OG
AM
OG
AM
16
26
1,611
5,897
466
1,504
389
364
1,417
36
21
37
1,756
6,105
449
1,509
318
319
1,464
32
25
51
1,712
5,843
451
1,513
274
283
1,401
26
27
36
1,772
5,977
450
1,504
297
303
1,428
28
20
20
1,573
5,724
452
1,492
452
393
1,566
50
new grade. New recruits came to be referred to as 'yellow pack workers'. 45 The
introduction of the new bank assistant grade and the realignment of staff grades led
to a two-tiered recruitment structures (Roche and Murphy, 1992). The introduction
of this grade saw a corresponding reduction in senior level grades through voluntary
redundancies, early retirement and career breaks.
TABLE 9.4: STAFF BY GENDER AND OCCUPATIONAL LEVELS IN THE BANKS (IRE.).
Level	 Gender 1971	 1985	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989
Scale 1
	 Male 1,539	 572	 390	 344	 495	 514
	
Female 2,506	 1,093	 656	 474	 806	 915
Male
	
Female	 319
	
Male	 12
	
Female	 506
Male 1,076
	
Female	 69
	
Male	 920
	
Female	 5
	
Male	 868
	
Female	 0
7,820
Total	 Male 4,415	 5,674	 5,571	 5,543	 5,509 5,617
	
Female 3,405	 7,570	 7,297	 7,285	 7,518 7,554
Notes: [1] Accountant Grade - replaced by two other grades, Officer Grade COG) and Assistant
Manager (AM); [2] SBO - (Senior Bank Official)
Source: Irish Banks' Standing Committee, (1992).
The perceived need for change and flexibility in response to new global challenges is
u 
'Yellow pack' referred to cheap own brand goods introduced by the retail service outlets in Ireland.
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evident in the differentiated approach adopted by Affi towards training and
development. For non-unionised managerial employees, training remains a centrally
managed function. However, for non-managerial employees, training is devolved to
the local regions. As a senior HR executive explained:
The main movement on the training side is away from a centralised
approach. We are trying to get closer to 'just-in-time' training, where they
can have it on the spot or where they need it. We have put regional trainers
out in the branches to do cash, wages, accounts control. They go out with
their Bible of standards, from the quality standards unit here and teach them
to everybody and share the best practices as they go around.
In this new structure, a branch in any given geographical area is fully resourced to
conduct training for a number of local branches. One HR manager claimed that this
resulted in: 'shorter, snappier more relevant training... The fact that it is done in
smaller numbers as well makes the impact better.'
Historically, Affi wage increases were determined along age rather than
responsibility lines. However, changes in staff structures have brought about changes
to salary scales. In recent years, the banks have moved from a short fixed scale to a
sliding pay scale and the basis of promotion has changed from seniority and years of
service to a merit-based system. Through the introduction of PRP for management,
managerial pay determination was effectively removed from the collective
bargaining arena. While not just focusing local management on local performance
levels, the introduction of PRP has ensured the commitment of managerial staff to
the Group.
The situation differs slightly in the UK. In contrast to the main industry trend of the
unilateral introduction of PRP, Affi (UK), in collaboration with the IBOA and in
joint consultation with ACAS (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service), has
introduced PRP for all non-managerial employees. As a local UK manager noted:
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We wanted to get into performance-related pay but not at the price of
alienating our staff and imposing it upon them. So, we reached an agreement
with the union and staff. It was a fairly complex process and took over a year
to negotiate.
As Affi have adopted a more devolved approach, they have also changed the
emphasis on the measurement and management of performance. As a local manager
explained, the current approach 'is now very much one where they actively look for
advice from head office only to know the options'. Historically, 'hard' factors such
as productivity levels and labour costs were measured. Promotion was based on the
delivery of volumes, with little to no concern for the way in which staff were
managed. This resulted in 'enormous industrial relations issues'. The approach has
since changed to one which is designed to, as a 1-IR executive explained: 'educate
and to provide backup support and assistance to make sure that the soft gets
measured because you find that what gets measured gets done'. 'Softer' issues that
are now measured include performance reviews and appraisal systems,
communication processes, frequency of meetings, customer service and employee
attitude, while other two-way processes that have been put in place to elicit the
views of employees. Having secured the commitment of management from trade
union ranks, the bank are pursuing an approach that devolves greater operational
responsibility to line management, within tightly defined standards.
Correspondingly, a greater emphasis is now being placed on the re-education of
managerial approaches.46
9.6.3 The Management of IR
In contrast, AIB adopt a highly centralised approach to the management of JR and
collective bargaining in particular. One of the biggest changes to take place in recent
years has been the breakdown of the industry level bargaining forum in 1994,
46 The banks have begun to send their senior business managers to Harvard in the US for senior executive
development.
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following the 1992 dispute. Prior to this, the banks bargained collectively, operating
a type of monopolistic cartel in JR terms, through the mechanism of the BSRC. From
1994, and the breakdown of the BSRC, the banks began to negotiate and operate on
an individual basis. While much of this decentralisation is related to the 1992 strike,
the unions would also attribute recent developments as attempts by the banks to
follow cost-reduction strategies. From an JR viewpoint, the break-up of the cartel
signaled the end of collective bargaining at an industry level. This is particularly
evident in the individual course of action that Affi took in suspending staff during
the 1992 dispute. Despite the breakdown of industry-level bargaining, the banks
maintain informal contacts to ensure adherence to informal industrial norms and, as
one executive explained: 'to ensure that we are not messing each other up'. The
Group now has a single union agreement with the IBOA who represent the majority
of bank employees. Annual pay settlements and redundancy terms are centrally
agreed, and advice or guidelines are provided on most other issues.
Attempts by head office to, in the words of a senior HR executive, 'get managers to
manage', has seen the devolution of responsibility for some local JR issues. Affi's
approach operates within clearly defined guidelines and policies, and there is a direct
reporting line between local management and the staff-relations function at head
office level. However, branch management is now given 'the latitude to do what thy
think locally applicable'. The underlying rationale is to decentralise the process so as
to localise the solution. Local management, on the other hand, views such an
approach as feasible until, as one local manager noted: 'it blows up in your face then
head office start to ask questions'. Thus, local management remains reluctant to take
full responsibility for the management of local JR.
Local JR culture within Affi remains one of mistrust in light of the recent industrial
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action. Branch management describes it as 'one of distrust'. While acknowledging
this, management perceive 'a general awakening of staff, a questioning of what
unions are doing. It is not a new dialogue, it is an awakening', in the words of one
local manager. However, the biggest problem the trade unions see following the
1992 strike is the management of 'the people who stayed in' - in many cases non-
unionised staff. Initially the banks established 'link-in' groups that met regularly.
'Partnership-based' meetings have since superseded these. However, non-unionised
employees are no longer represented here. According to a trade union official, 'those
who lost the most were the non-unionised group of employees'. The Group's recent
HR initiatives include the movement towards flexible work options. Under the
heading 'Affi Choice', the bank have introduced four options designed to provide
staff with a range of flexible working options, these include job-sharing, new career
breaks, special short-term breaks and personalised hours. Options are subject to their
'ability to accommodate the request based on local conditions' and strict conditions
of eligibility apply (EIRR, 271, 1996).
9.6.4 Trade Unionisation
Trade union membership levels within major fish banks rose from 1942 to 1981,
but have been declining ever since (cf. figure 9.5). Female trade union membership
levels overtook male membership in 1975 and this has remained the situation ever
since (cf. table 9.5). Despite the amount of change that has taken place, levels of
trade union density remain relatively high in both the Irish and UK operations of
A. Although management notes a decrease in unionisation in the last eight years,
about 60% of employees in the Republic of freland are still unionised. Across the
industry membership figures stand at 19,000, with 16,000 located in the Republic of
freland (cf. table 9.6). Historically, capital markets and information technology staff
' This is only open to permanent staff with a minimum of six years of service.
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were non-unionised.
TABLE 9.5: TRADE UNION MEMBERSHW FIGURES FOR MAJOR IRISH BANKS (1942-90)
Year
	
Membership (Total
1942	 5593
1943	 5666
1944	 5776
1945	 5751
1946	 5792
1947	 5874
1948	 5965
1949	 6095
1950
	
6142
1951	 6210
1952	 6308
1953	 6402
1954	 6448
1955	 6554
1956	 6779
1957	 7008
1958	 7234
1959	 7463
1960	 7625
1961	 7935
1962	 8474
1963	 8666
1964	 8915
1965	 9031
1966	 9321
1967	 9818
1968	 10502
1969	 11238
1970	 12213
1971	 13121
1972	 13712
1973
	
14618
1974	 15856
1975	 16232
1976	 16309
1977	 17141
1978	 18199
1979	 19925
1980	 21145
1981	 21411
1982	 21343
1983	 19373
1984	 19208
1985	 18358
1986	 18554
1987	 18969
1988	 18841
1989	 18687
1990
	
18665
Source: DUES, University College Dublin, (1992).
Female
	
Male
	
686	 4907
	
767	 4899
	
893	 4883
	
905
	
4846
	
944	 4848
	
1016	 4858
	
1105	 4860
	
1202	 4893
	
1266
	
4876
	1 24	 4886
	
1387	 4921
	
1448	 4954
	
1484	 4964
	
1612	 4942
	
1731
	 5048
	
1892	 5116
	
2031	 5203
	
2174
	
5289
	
2237
	
5388
	2 73	 5562
	
2604	 5870
	
2710	 5956
	
2793	 6122
	
2867	 6164
	
3138	 6183
	
3409	 6409
	
3883	 6619
	
4317	 692!
	
4932	 7281
	5 63	 7758
	
5787	 7925
	
6395
	
8223
	
7379	 8477
	
8202	 8030
	
8335	 7974
	
8798	 8343
	
9524	 8675
	
10716	 9209
	
11619
	
9526
	1 777	 9634
	
1177!	 9572
	
10937	 8436
	
10757	 845!
	
10217	 8141
	
10347	 8207
	
10714	 8255
	
10744	 8097
	
10682	 8005
	
10586
	
8079
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TABLE 9.6: BREAKDOWN OF TRADE UNTON MEMBERSHIP LEVELS (1998)
Great Britain	 Northern Ireland Republic of Ireland
%	 %
Staff	 80	 90	 70
Management	 50	 70	 30
Source: Interview Notes (1999)
The importance of consultation and information sharing has increased in light of
recent industrial action and the drive to devolve operational responsibility. Part of
the bank's strategy is to increase communication at local levels through regular
meetings between local management and staff. Trade union representatives also
meet regularly at branch level, with or without management. However, some of the
local managers have moved to counter-act this situation where staff meetings are the
only meetings taking place. As part of a general strategy to overcome the limitations
of a formalised hierarchical structure, Affi recently introduced a number of
initiatives that formalise their 'voice mechanisms'. In order to monitor developments
at a local level, the Group has recently introduced a 'link-in' team. Its role is to co-
ordinate staff feedback, which is then presented to management on a monthly basis,
to bring about more informed two-way communication. Since the recent strike, the
HR function at head office regularly holds workshops with groups of staff. These
consist of people from across-the-board and focus on feedback on a number of
issues. AIB has also moved to 'formalise the grapevine' which they see as an
accurate indicator of the IR climate. In the last few years, the Group has taken a
number of layers of middle management, bringing senior management level much
closer to local levels. Facilitating this process, the Group appointed an independent
staff advisor to advise staff and represent if them necessary to increase the level of
trust.
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9.7 CoNcLusioN
The strategy of this Group has moved from that of a traditional and conservative
credit and debit facility toward the selling of a wide range of financial products and
services. The sector within which it now operates is highly competitive and national
boundaries are becoming less of a barrier to foreign competition. As a result,
companies in this industry must provide service of a consistently high quality in
addition to competitive cost structures. In keeping, factors such as management and
employee commitment, consistency and an awareness of local concerns are
heightened. In light of this recent shift in focus, and the Group's checkered JR
history, this MNC has seen little option but to embrace a more innovative approach
to the management of JR.
While much of this stands in contrast to the previous three cases, AlE are typical
within the banking industry in their highly co-ordinated and centralised approach to
the management of HR. This centralised approach co-exists alongside policies that
are directed towards the refocusing of local management ethos, while facilitating the
decentralisation of greater operational responsibility. Recent reports suggest that AIB
are beginning to explore a more partnership-based approach between management
and trade unions. Both management and the unions acknowledge that there is little to
suggest that this approach is being adopted at local levels. AIB is clearly seeking to
adopt a dual approach that enables centralised control at the hub of a decentralised
network. As AlE enters a new phase of international development, the most
immediate threat for this Group is the likelihood of a take-over.
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CHAPTER 10
THE BEHAVIOUR OF IRISH-OWNED MNCs
having surveyed the entire population of Irish owned MNCs and examined in greater depth the
behaviour of four case companies, the following two chapters examine and analyse key attributes of
Irish-owned MNC behaviour. In addressing the primary focus of this research, this chapter compares
across the case companies to outline points of variation and identify the key attributes of Irish-owned
MNCs practices, particularly with respect to the management of managers and the management of IR.
Building on this, chapter eleven will compare this framework against key expectations of the
literatures reviewed in chapters two and three to address the secondary focus of this research - an
examination of the distinctiveness of Irish-owned MNC behaviour.
10.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter is the first of two analytical chapters that draws upon the previously
documented survey and the case study material. The aim of this chapter is to
ascertain the extent to which any common characteristics are exhibited across the
survey and case companies. While acknowledging key points of variation, chapter
ten identifies shared patterns of Irish-owned MNC behaviour, particularly with
respect to their management of managers and the management of IR. Following this,
chapter eleven explores the distinctiveness or 'particularity' of Irish-owned MNC
behaviour by comparing these findings with key expectations of the literature
reviewed.
This chapter reviews the data previously presented in chapter five through to nine, in
a manner that relates to the schema established in chapter four. The section that
follows examines the patterns of internationalisation pursued by Irish-owned MNCs.
The dimensions examined include: the impetus to internationalisation, paths of
overseas expansion, forms of growth and the strategic role of IR dimensions in
growth strategies. Section two identifies common strategic and structural attributes
of Irish-owned MNCs and key control mechanisms. More particularly, it examines
the role of the centre, the size of head offices, and the adoption of financial and non-
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financial control mechanisms. These sections provide the context for analysing the
third sphere - the approach of fish-owned MNCs to the management of managers
and the management of JR. Each section accounts for the differences between the
case companies, before identifying key similarities. The final section draws together
these key common attributes toward a framework of Irish-owned MNC behaviour,
an outline that provides the foundations for further analysis in chapter eleven.
10.2 PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONALISATION
As the survey data and case studies have clearly demonstrated, the
internationalisation of Irish-owned companies is a relatively recent occurrence. In
short, Irish MNCs are 'late internationalisers'. The following sections examines
some of the more salient patterns of Irish-owned MNC behaviour, with regard to the
factors influencing and routes taken to internationalisation, their acquisition
processes and the role played by JR considerations in evaluating potential
acquisitions.
10.2.1 Routes to Internationalisation
While much of the somewhat anecdotal commentary has alluded to the late
internationalisation of Irish companies, this research identifies two particular waves
of internationalisation among Irish-owned MNCs. The first, the early 'pioneers', as
exemplified by the CRH case, paved a route for other Irish companies to follow
during the 1970s. This second wave of accelerated internationalisation occurred
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, spurred on by an expanding Irish economy
and increased cross-border corporate activity. The Clondalkin and the Greencore
Groups provide examples of the more recent wave. The cases suggest that a diverse
range of factors have led to the internationalisation of these companies. Factors such
as the saturation of domestic markets, high logistical costs of exporting, the need to
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reduce financial risk through geographical diversification and, in the case of the
earlier pioneers, the need to overcome increasing economic dependencies during the
1970s, all shaped the decision of Irish companies to expand overseas. In short, many
Irish companies intemationalised for reasons of corporate survival. Moreover, as the
individual cases suggest the process of internationalisation has been largely by
default rather than by design.
As the previous chapters clearly show, differences are apparent in the 'timing' and
the 'routes' to intemationalisation for each of the case companies. For example, the
CRH Group simultaneously entered both the UK and the US markets in the mid-
1970s. However, it was not until the mid-1980s that the Group ventured to any great
extent into mainland Europe. Similarly, the AIB Group extended their domestic
markets into the UK during the 1970s. Again, it was not until the 1980s that AIB
entered the US markets and, more recently, Eastern European markets. For
Clondalkin, the decision to internationalise was taken in the 1980s with their first
acquisitions into the UK and US markets. Similarly, it was also not until the mid-
1990s that Clondalkin extended into mainland Europe. In contrast, the Greencore
Group did not venture overseas until the early 1990s. It was, again, the mid-1990s
before they entered mainland Europe and only recently that they entered the US
market. While each case highlights different timings to internationalisation, much of
this variation can largely be attributed to the length of time the companies have been
established as chapters six to nine demonstrate.
Despite the variations, what is apparent from the case studies is that the 'path' to
internationalisation has been broadly similar for all Irish-owned MNCs. All of the
case companies entered the UK markets in the first instance, and for most this was
accompanied by and co-ordinated with an entry into US markets. Similarly, it can be
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noted that the entry of fish-owned MNCs into mainland and Eastern Europe has
been a very recent departure. In an attempt to minimise the risk involved in
geographical diversification, many of the cases were found to target potential growth
regions in similar business environments, where both language and business culture
were familiar - thus indicating why both the US and the UK markets were the first
destinations for the Irish MNCs examined. Moreover, this adds to an understanding
as to why it is only in the recent past that the case companies have entered mainland
Europe, in leveraging off established holdings in the US and UK.
Variation is also evident in the form and experiences of internationalisation for each
of the case companies. For instance, the CRH Group has predominantly grown by
acquisitional growth strategies. Within the US market, the Group have pursued a
particular type of acquisition - that of small family-owned businesses with
succession difficulties, where the owners are willing to remain in situ. This form of
internationalisation may, in part, be explained by their earliness to overseas markets.
In much a similar vein, the Clondalkin case highlights the pursuit of acquisitions
where the retention of senior management is crucial. As will be seen later in the
analysis, this has become a key criterion for Irish-owned MNCs. Similar to the other
case companies, Affi has also pursued acquisitional growth strategies. This,
however, has also been supplemented with the acquisition of minority stakes in
larger companies. Similarly, the Greencore Group has grown both by acquisition and
minority stakes, with the latter means of growth acting as the stepping stone to
increase ownership over time.
In addition, the CRH Group managed the initial process of internationalisation by
assigning key executives overseas. Akin to missionaries, their brief was to 'go forth
and acquire' well-managed companies. Similarly, when AIB extended their domestic
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markets, key personnel were also sent to areas in London frequented by Irish
emigrants. Their brief was to acquire businesses within these predominantly Irish
communities. It was from these origins that bank branches were eventually
established within areas known for their large Irish populations, such as Kilburn in
London. Adopting a somewhat different approach, international development in the
Greencore case is devolved to each of the local domestic businesses whose brief is to
develop internationally. This 'late internationaliser' exhibits an interesting new
practice: prior to entering the Belgium market senior management informally
contacted other Irish MNCs operating within similar overseas regions. Through an
informal benchmarking process the Greencore Group were able to leverage off the
experiences of other Irish MNCs.
Despite the variations, the case studies add weight to the findings of the survey. In
particular, they confirm that acquisitional growth strategies are the preferred means
of growth for Irish-owned MNCs. In addition, they suggest that minority stakes are
an increasingly popular form of growth, particularly for more recent MNCs.
Pursuing 'paths' of cultural and business familiarity, the cases suggest that the initial
process of internationalisation is managed in a very definite manner: first, through a
highly localised approach to Group development and second, through the relocation
of key personnel overseas.
10.2.2 The Acquisition Process
While the case studies clearly highlight differences in the acquisitional criteria
employed, a number of common attributes are also discernible. While CR11 employ
very broad but definite acquisitional criteria relating to size, business activity and
owner retention; the acquisitional criteria of Greencore are still emerging. In a
similar character to the CR11 case, the Clondalkin Group employ formalised
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acquisitional criteria that include strictly defined financial returns, the retention of
management and the incidence of weak or no trade unions 'on site'. The criteria that
Affi distinctively employ includes compatibility in corporate governance and
cultural terms. Despite points of difference between the individual case companies, a
number of core criteria are identifiable across the cases. These include a preference
for: small to medium sized 'bolt-on' acquisitions; similar linguistic, cultural and
business activities; the ability of the acquisition to generate a quick financial return;
and, the chance of being able to retain senior management. In addition, two of the
case companies were explicit about their concern to acquire non-unionised
operations or companies where the trade unions involved were weak.
One of the strongest patterns of Irish-owned MNC behaviour to emerge, particularly
amongst the CRH, Clondalkin and Greencore cases, is an approach that could
broadly be termed a 'post acquisition control model'. Key to the integration of newly
acquired businesses is the transfer of the financial reporting and control systems
from Group head office. For the Clondalkin Group, these systems are the first and
only structures to be transferred from the head office to newly acquired companies.
As a result, the staffing of these positions are regarded as 'strategic' in the
integration of new acquisitions and thus tend to be staffed by Irish managers. In the
Greencore case, for example, once the financial control system was established and
the delivery of bottom-line results secured, head office intervention declined. In
general, positions that tend to remain staffed by host country nationals include the
CEO, production, sales, marketing and HR. The rationale offered is that these
positions require local knowledge and therefore are best staffed by local
management.
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Thus, key to the acquisitional growth strategies employed by the case companies is
the retention of senior management. There are a number of factors that contribute to
this situation, including a desire to maintain employee and customer loyalty and
ensure historical continuity. There is also widespread belief among Irish-owned
MNCs that the 'top job' should never be cut off from the people who have grown up
with the business. Moreover, given the size of Irish-owned MNCs and their lack of
managerial resources, management retention is a key means of overcoming obstacles
to late and fast internationalisation. In sum, a very definite trend has emerged
amongst Irish-owned MNCs, where 'strategic' finance and quality functions are
staffed with home country managers, and where the CEO, marketing, FIR and
production positions remain staffed by host country managers. In effect, this would
suggest that Irish-owned MNCs manage their overseas operations through key
international assignments and the careful cultural staffing of 'strategic' positions in
overseas sites.
Finally, there is evidence to suggest that Irish-owned MNCs view their 'nationality'
as a source of competitive advantage as they grow overseas. A key theme to emerge
from the case analysis was the 'popularity' of their national image. Both Affi and
CRH spoke of their success in bidding for international business as being related to
their image of Ireland as a smaller, 'neutral' and non-impositional country, as
opposed to UK or US companies for example. This is further enforced by the
attention placed on their home bases as the 'source' of their key resources, such as
Irish managers. The rationale for this is highlighted later in the analysis.
10.2.3 The Role of IR in Internationalisation
While the attention paid by Irish-owned MNCs to IR dimensions in the process of
internationalisation varies greatly between the cases examined, a number of cases
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were explicit in highlighting the role that IR considerations play in their
internationalisation strategies. For the Clondalkin and Greencore Groups, an
assessment of trade union density levels and the IR history are key components of
the pre-acquisition evaluation process. The other case companies noted the fit of the
acquisition with the 'overall strategy and culture'. While both Clondalkin and
Greencore would argue that their approach is not one of union avoidance or
marginalisation, the strategic role of IR in the process of internationalisation remains
evident in their practices. An important caveat is that a number of the case
companies highlight low levels of unionisation overseas, even within sectors that are
believed to be highly unionised, such as those applicable to the Clondalkin and CRH
case.
Moreover, the historical evolution of each of the cases highlighted the role of key IR
events in the intemationalisation and behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs. Each of the
case companies was found to have a history of industrial action characterised by
protracted, public and highly acrimonious disputes. For the Clondalkin Group, the
paper mills strike during the 1970s, which resulted in the State intervention, plays a
key role in shaping their current approach to the management of IR. Furthermore, the
resolution of this industrial action also coincided with their decision to diversify out
of paper production and into overseas markets. Similarly, for the CRH Group the
resolution of the 1970s cement strike was to result in the formation of the Group and
the active pursuit of geographical diversification strategies. Notwithstanding these
differences, a residual effect of a shared history of industrial action is evident from
the cases, particularly during the 1970s.
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10.3 STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND CONTROL
The survey results reported in chapter five support the view that the corporate
strategy, structure and control mechanisms employed by MNCs shape the conduct of
JR. Thus, in order to understand the HRM behaviour of Irish MNCs in greater depth,
a perspective that was broad enough to incorporate the influence of these issues was
sought in the case studies. To this end, the internationalisation, strategic and
structural aspects were examined in addition to the approaches to the management of
JR and HR. The cases presented in chapters six through to nine indicate a number of
common characteristics, with respect to the manner in which Irish-owned MNCs are
structured and the internal control mechanisms employed. The following paragraphs
highlight the more salient trends.
10.3.1 Strategy and Structure
Irish-owned MNCs have small tightly controlled head offices with lean management
structures (with the exception of the Affi Group whose large head office adopts a
dual role of corporate 'centre' and clearing house for domestic retail banking). The
rate and pace of growth recently experienced by Irish-owned MNCs has led to a
corresponding increase in the responsibilities undertaken by their head offices of
Irish-owned MNCs. The case narratives demonstrate that as Irish MNCs have
intemationalised, new key functions have been established at head office levels.
For the CRH Group, increased expansion overseas led to the decentralisation of the
business development function to major growth regions. At the same time, in an
attempt to accommodate and manage the pace of growth, the Group also moved to
establish key strategic functions at the centre, including an HR function to deal with
the management of managers. Similarly, for Greencore the movement toward
commercialism was accompanied with the establishment of a head office HR
289
function. For Clondalkin, who largely view attempts to centralise as a threat to their
highly localised approach, recently centralised the sales and marketing function in
the pursuit of synergies within geographical regions. The financial costs of
maintaining decentralised sales and marketing functions in small subsidiaries led to
pressures on head office to centralise the function and obtain the resultant synergies.
In keeping with financial sector practices, the Affi case provides a contrast in their
recent move to consolidate the FIR function at head office. Traditionally the HR
function consisted of three separate functions - training, staff relations and
personnel. In order to provide a more integrated approach, departments were
consolidated into one integrated function. Despite the differences between cases,
these illustrations highlight an increase in the role and responsibilities of their head
offices. Representing the 'centres' of Irish-owned MNCs, the head offices in each of
the cases are located at the pinnacle of the corporate pyramid with a clear sense of
hierarchy and order.
A further pattern of behaviour to emerge among the cases is the pressure for
decentralised MNCs to centralise in the pursuit of economies of scale, and for
centralised MNCs to decentralise in the search for greater autonomy. The cases
clearly demonstrate that for highly decentralised Irish-owned MNCs, the pressure to
pursue synergistic economies has led to the centralisation of key functions.
Conversely, for those MNCs that adopt a highly centralised approach, there is
increasing pressure on them to obtain financial economies through the process of
decentralisation. In short, as Irish MNCs have internationalised, increasing forces
have come to bear on them to adopt elements of both centralised and decentralised
approaches and by implication both synergistic and financial routes to globalism.
While practices vary, all Irish-owned MNCs studied here appear to be moving
toward practices of 'centralised decentrali sation'.
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Reinforcing the results of the survey, the case studies highlight the divisionalisation
of Irish-owned MNCs along product and/or geographical lines. For some, this
divisionalisation has being accompanied by a decentralisation of decision-making
and financial responsibility. For others, such as Affi, divisionalisation operates
alongside a highly centralised approach. Emanating from a highly centralised and
formalised bureaucratic history, the A Group have come under increasing pressure
from local management and from changes in the nature of competition to devolve
decision-making to local levels and facilitate local market responsiveness. In
response, the Group have created clusters of business units at local levels which
devolve responsibility to local management. While the establishment of this business
unit structure represents an attempt to localise responsibility, the Group has at the
same time limited the degree of local autonomy, through the use of guidelines and
constant referral to head office for authorisation. The devolution of responsibility has
thus resulted in only limited degrees of actual autonomy. Hence, the embracing of
divisionalised and decentralised approaches has generally been accompanied by new
forms of control as the next section will explore.
Similarly, for the CRH Group, a tension has emerged in recent years between the
need for global integration and the need for local responsiveness. In response, the
Group has moved to a federal-like approach that combines decentralised approaches
with centralised co-ordination and direction. Due to increasing geographical
diversification and exposure to international practices, pressure has been exerted
internally on head office to adopt a more centrally co-ordinated approach. Moreover,
certain I-IR issues arising from the rapid internationalisation, such as succession
planning, management development led to the establishment of a HR function at
head office.
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Despite the variations described above, a number of strategic and structural patterns
of behaviour are readily identifiable. These include the small size of head offices, a
growth in the importance of the 'centre', moves towards divisionalisation and
pressures to adopt both centralised and decentralised approaches. While it is difficult
to classify the approaches adopted by these companies in any definite manner, the
cases clearly delineate that Irish-owned MNCs are increasingly moving toward the
adoption of both centralised and decentralised approaches, in the pursuit of both
financial and synergistic economies. There are however, as the following section will
further highlight, limits to the levels of autonomy actually afforded by these
decentralised approaches.
10.3.2 Financial Control Mechanisms
Another pattern of behaviour to emerge from the cases which supports the findings
of the survey, is the management of autonomy through tight and extensive financial
controls. The case narratives suggest that the movement to decentralisation has been
accompanied by a heightening of sophisticated financial control mechanisms. These
include standard financial statements, monthly operating statements, five-year plans,
half-year ends, annual budget setting processes, and capital expenditure requests.
Exerting the strictest control over local autonomy are the capital expenditure
systems. Within the cases operating sites are required to submit requests for approval
by the Group board and/or CEO, outlining the impact of capital expenditure on the
market and operating costs. Moreover, it was found that the level of financial
autonomy is highly dependent on the level of capital sought. In the CRH, Clondalkin
and Greencore cases, these autonomy levels are indicated by 'threshold' levels of
capital expenditure, beyond which authorisation from head office is required. Often
managers regard these threshold figures as reflective of their status within the Group.
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In contrast, AIB, for whom financial control is at the core of its business, ensuring
consistency, accuracy and speed of performance information is critical. In the Affi
case control is effected through the technological networking of sites.
The prevalence and extensiveness of the financial controls employed by the case
companies suggests a hard financial-driven and performance-orientated approach
adopted by Irish-owned MNCs. Local autonomy is secured through the delivery of
bottom-line results which is linked to senior management pay. Head office
intervention occurs in the event of non-compliance or non-delivery of financial
expectations, and in certain cases this can result in the replacement of senior
management. Despite this emphasis on financial returns, instances of divestment are
rare for Irish-owned MNCs. Local overseas management identified this avoidance of
divestment as a characteristic attributable to an 'Irish style of management' - a
further factor contributing to Irish-owned MNCs being favoured by potential
'acquirees' (cf. section 10.2.2).
The case studies ratify the results of the survey in indicating the regular collection of
performance information through Irish-owned MNCs financial control systems.
Fortifying an environment of accountability, the regular collection of financial
information for use in resource allocation decisions is a crucial element in the
management of local autonomy for Irish-owned MNCs. The implication of these
linkages is that Irish-owned MNCs can closely monitor site performance through
such standardised systems. Moreover, these reporting systems generate quantitative
data that facilitate in the comparison of site and managerial performance and input
into financially based resource allocation decisions. Essentially, such arrangements
allow for the quantification and exposure of bottom-line contributions. Furthermore,
the networking of sites in technological terms has increased the speed with which
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these MNCs can collect and disseminate information back down to local levels.
While the cases highlight the variability of technological arrangements within Irish-
owned MNCs, there exists a general movement towards the greater utilisation of
technology to effect control given new centralisedldecentralised structures and
strategies.
10.3.3 Non-Financial Control Mechanisms
Supplementing highly decentralised and tight financial management approaches
adopted by the cases, are a number of informal personal, social and cultural co-
ordination mechanisms. In the absence of head office defined guidelines, particularly
in relation to their highly decentralised approaches, Irish-owned MNCs have adopted
control mechanisms that facilitate the development of an 'organisational glue'.
Mechanisms found to prevail include the networking of managers, the identification
and dissemination of 'best practices' and the internal benchmarking of management
practices and processes. The following paragraphs consider the use of these
mechanisms within Irish-owned MNCs.
For the CRH Group, the introduction of a homogenous centralised system, manifest
through the imposition of standard guidelines, is seen to not just detract from local
accountability but also to impinge upon the Group's ability to attract acquisitions. In
effect, CRH's highly localised approach to the management of subsidiaries and the
subsequent absence of any centrally defined homogenous practices is seen as critical
to their growth strategies. In addition, this growth strategy is dependent on the
attraction of family-run businesses where the retention of senior management is a
pre-requisite. Thus, the introduction of head office defined HR guidelines, for
example, might be seen to threaten this.
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Consequently, in an attempt to obtain some form of synergies without impinging
upon local autonomy, CRH have introduced initiatives to network managers,
primarily through annual management conferences. Through these conferences head
office identify and disseminate 'best practices' throughout the Group.
Another means through which CRH has pursued 'synergies' is through the
introduction of product focus groups, where again the focus is firmly placed on the
identification and sharing of best practice. Similarly, for Clondalkin the emphasis is
on maintaining an environment of full exposure and accountability. Despite their
hard financial-driven approach, the Group employs a number of formal non-financial
mechanisms. These include the provision of ad hoc management conferences,
management operational meetings, league tables and internal audits. In the case of
the league tables and internal audits the focus is on creating a 'culture of
accountability'. For Greencore, whose current structure represents a juncture
between a traditional centralised form and increasingly decentralised approach, the
use of non-financial synergistic mechanisms is a recent occurrence. Besides
conducting regular operational management meetings where the emphasis is on the
sharing of practice, the identification of 'best practice' occurs primarily by default,
through the external benchmarking of their major food customers.
The case company to place the greatest emphasis on informal personal and cultural
co-ordination is the Affi Group. Supplementing a highly centralised approach, and as
an attempt to devolve operational and financial accountability, the Group have
introduced initiatives which they term 'best in class' for domestic operations and
'super branch' for UK operations. The former acts as a league table for branches to
measure their performance, while the latter represents what local management sees
as an ideal type with which to measure such indicators as employment size and sales
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volumes. The 'super branch' represents what AIB perceives as 'efficient operational
indicators' that can then be passed on to other AlE companies. The Group has also
recently introduced a homogenous value system that outlines the core values of the
future organisation. This has been accompanied with extensive dissemination
sessions across sites. As a means of networking a largely dispersed workforce, ATE
place a great emphasis on sports and social activities. These also act as a form of
informal leadership and team working training.
The provision of managerial networking varies greatly across the case study
companies. However, for the more decentralised Irish-owned MNCs the provision of
managerial networking provides the means for heightening an environment of
accountability amongst peers. In contrast, 'benchmarking' initiatives are a more
widespread form of corporate 'glue' in Irish-owned MNCs. The impetus for the
introduction of such measures emanates from internal sources, and also from
suppliers who increasingly request pan-European deals in their search for financial
economies. A general resistance against employing head office-imposed policies or
advanced forms of external benchmarking is evident from the cases, where they are
perceived by managers as involving the loss of local competitive knowledge and
competitive advantage. It is also worth noting that the post-acquisition policy of
placing Irish managers into key strategic positions into overseas sites (cf. 10.2.2)
also enables Irish-owned MNCs to diffuse a 'corporate ethos', as opposed to more
mechanistic forms of control across sites.
Having outlined a number of characteristics common across the Irish-owned MNCs
examined, the following sections focus on the approaches adopted by the case
companies to the management of managers and the management of IR. The
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approaches will be shown to be consistent with the commonalties identified in
sections 10.2 and 10.3.
10.4 HRM IN IRISH-OWNED MNCs
Despite individual case differences, the research clearly demonstrates that Irish-
owned MNCs adopt a fragmented or 'dual' approach to the management of their
employment relationships. For MNCs such as the CRH, Greencore and Clondalkin
Groups a highly decentralised approach is adopted to the collective management of
non-managerial employees. For these companies, the management of IR is regarded
as an operational issue and is thus devolved to local line management. This is an
approach which the following sections will show has been recently reinforced
through structural arrangements. 'Layered' on top of these traditional adversarial
arrangements is a more centrally co-ordinated and sophisticated approach to the
management of senior managers. Through the recent introduction of HR functions at
head office level, Irish-owned MNCs have focused on managerial issues arising
from their rapid internationalisation. As the following sections will highlight,
managers are increasingly been seen as a 'strategic resource' in the control of local
autonomy. This dual or fragmented approach has enabled Irish-owned MNCs to
achieve a decentralised and localised approach to collective bargaining and a more
strategic and centralised focus on managerial resourcing. The decentralisation of IR
to local levels facilitates an environment of full local accountability. A more
strategic and centralised approach to managerial resourcing enables Irish-owned
MNCs to focus on the development of future managerial resources. The following
sections deals with each approach separately.
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10.4.1 The Management of Managers
Just as the previous sections highlighted a growth in the importance of the 'centres'
of Irish-owned MNCs, the four case companies correspondingly show an increase in
the importance and role of HRM at head office level. Within Irish-owned MNCs the
rate and pace of internationalisation has been accompanied by an increase in the role
of HRM at the centre. This role has been heightened by the rapid geographical
dispersion of Irish-owned MNCs placing increasing pressures on their traditionally
lean management structures. The approaches adopted by Irish-owned MNCs to the
management of managers reflect these particular concerns. Given the smallness of
these Groups and their lean management structures, issues such as management
development, retention, succession, mobility and opportunities for repatriation have
increasingly become key concerns, as they have expanded beyond national
boundaries.
In response to these developments, both the Greencore and CRH Groups have
established head office designated HR functions. For the Clondalkin, CRH and
Greencore Groups, the perceived inability to meet increasing future managerial
demands has resulted in the retention of managers becoming a vital element of their
growth strategies. Even for the A Group, whose HR function is well established,
the recent consolidation and integration of 1-IRM roles and responsibilities signals a
reorientation of the function on the provision of future needs. This emphasis on
management retention is being combined in Irish-owned MNCs with an increased
emphasis on management development programmes in an attempt to broaden the
skill base of existing managers. A focus on the training and development of
managers has arisen due to a number of factors, namely the need to staff 'strategic'
overseas positions and the need to disseminate head office approaches without
imposing on local autonomy. Given the rapid international expansion of Irish-owned
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MNCs, management development has come to the fore of HR agendas at head office
level. In addition, initiatives such as managerial networking and management
conferences have enabled Irish-owned MNCs to reinforce an environment of
accountability, while at the same time shaping local agendas.
Irish-owned MNCs adopt an active role in managing the performance and
remuneration of senior management. Local autonomy and devolved decision-making
is managed through the linkage of local performance levels with senior managerial
pay. In each of the cases examined, the use of performance-related pay (PRP) at
senior local levels is evident, albeit for varying reasons. For Clondalkin and CRH,
the introduction of PRP was a means of reinforcing the decentralisation of financial
responsibility and a results-driven focus for management. In contrast, for AIB and
Greencore PRP was explicitly employed as a mechanism to change 'the old ethos'
that was perceived to prevail among local management. More particularly, in Affi
the introduction of PRP to managerial grades represented a deliberate attempt to
change their approach to the management of managers. Its introduction provided
head office with the means with which to secure management consent and in effect
'buy' management out from the IBOA and historical collective bargaining practices.
Similarly, for the Greencore Group the move to privatisation and devolved financial
responsibility was accompanied with the introduction of PRP, in an attempt to
change the ethos and culture of management from 'civil servant' to that of
'commercial manager'. Across all the cases examined, PRP was largely confined to
managerial levels.
Despite the variations, the introduction of PRP at managerial levels is an attempt by
Irish-owned MNCs to fortify an environment of accountability. One of the main
implications for local management is that autonomy is dependent on the ability of
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individual sites to not only generate quantifiable bottom-line contributions, but also
to continually improve on those contributions. With the exception of the AIB Group,
where branches are treated as cost centres, this environment of 'transparency'
implies that sites and managerial staff alike are managed not by the tasks they
perform but by the tangible financial results they produce. By defining in financial
terms the expected returns from sites, the contribution of each site and their
managerial staff are expressed in terms of the financial 'value' they 'add' to the
Group. Greater autonomy has, in effect, led to greater accountability. This
'management by performance' approach, rather than by task, is reinforced by the
active role that head office adopt in managing the performance and remuneration of
senior management.
10.4.2 The Management of IR
In general, fish-owned MNCs pursue a highly decentralised approach to the
management of JR. For the Clondalkin and CRH Groups, the management of JR is
treated as an operational issue and decentralised to local line management. The case
of the Greencore Group differs slightly in that their current approach represents a
juncture between a traditional centralised approach characterised by collective
bargaining agreements and a more recent decentralised approach to bargaining. In
contrast, Affi adopts a highly centralised approach to collective bargaining, with
head office involvement evident both domestically and within extended domestic
markets. Furthermore, Am's recent entry into dialogue with the JBOA signals the
pursuit of more partnership-like approaches, given that traditional adversarial
approaches to JR or whole-scale de-unionisation are no longer viable options.
Furthermore, it is evident that for some of the cases strong financial controls play a
key role in shaping not just the management of local autonomy, but also their
approach to the management of JR. This is exemplified by Clondalkin's approach to
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collective bargaining, which is subjected to the achievement of financial returns. As
one Clondalkin manager remarked the guide is: 'if we have to pay more, we must get
more out of it'.
The highly decentralised approaches adopted by the Clondalkin, CRH and, more
recently, the Greencore Groups have been fortified through a number of structural
arrangements. First, resisting the tendency to impose a generic Group identity, these
companies have retained the local identity of newly acquired companies. As a result
these Groups have been able to maintain a low-key role in local IR issues, promote
local employee loyalty and localise industrial conflict. Secondly, these MNCs
operate a definite policy of actively avoiding collective agreements and centralised
discussions with trade unions at a head office level. This is most apparent in the
recent strike action within the Greencore case. Governed by traditional collective
bargaining arrangements under the privatisation agreement, the Greencore Group has
made concerted efforts to move towards the decentralisation of collective
bargaining. Finally, the unions believe that reinforcing the decentralisation of
collective bargaining is the extensive usage of subcontracting and the dis-
aggregation of businesses into separate businesses. This has resulted in a decline in
trade union levels. The maintenance of local identities, coupled with head office
policy of refusal to negotiate directly with trade unions have, thus far, reduced the
likelihood of inter-company trade union linkages.
Substantiating the results of the survey, it was found that despite average national
trade union membership levels of approximately 41% (DUES, 1996), the level of
trade union membership is high within the domestic operations of Irish-owned
MNCs. In contrast, the level of trade union membership in overseas operations was
reported to be significantly lower, despite the sites concerned often operating within
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highly unionised sectors. This begs the question as to whether Irish-owned MNCs
are deliberately seeking low or non-union environments. While this is difficult to
clarify without cross-company longitudinal trade union density data, when estimates
of overseas levels are combined with the role of JR dimensions in acquisitional
processes an implicit strategy of trade union avoidance or weak trade unionism could
be conjectured. The attitudes of these companies to EWC influences may be seen to
corroborate such a conclusion. Another key pattern of behaviour to emerge from the
case analysis was the strong opposition by Irish-owned MNCs to the introduction of
EWCs which are regarded as potential 'threats' to their highly localised approaches
to the management of operations. Some of the case companies were found to
strongly oppose the introduction of EWCs by actively maintaining low employment
levels in overseas sites.
At first sight, it would appear that the fragmentation or duality of approach lies on
the basis of employee categories. However, as a closer examination highlights, these
dichotomous lines are becoming somewhat blurred with respect to their stance on
the introduction of European employment legislation. To illustrate, the CRH Group
recently adopted a strong interventionist role in relation to the introduction of the
European Works Directive. Seen to threaten existing decentralised approaches and
largely 'inappropriate' given their organisational structure, the HR function at head
office played a highly active role in shaping the introduction of an EWC pre-emptive
procedure. Other case companies note head office intervention in the event of
threatened industrial strike action. While it appears that negotiations remain the
remit of local management, head offices play a key role in the background, coaching
local management through negotiations. In short, there are definite limits to the
widely reported decentralised approaches to the management of JR.
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10.5 CONcLUSION: TOWARD A 'MODEL' OF IRISH-OWNED MNC BEHAVIOUR
This chapter set out to highlight patterns of behaviour common to Irish-owned
MNC, particularly with regard to their management of JR and the management of
managers. While the analysis has identified a number of key points of variation
between the case study companies, it has indicated that these may be explained by
particular differences with respect to sectoral characteristics, the recency of
evolution, size or company history. While these differences have been
acknowledged, a number of commonalties shared by Irish-owned MNCs have been
drawn.
In line with Roche's (1998) logic with regard to the nature of theory development
outlined in chapter four, the ensuing attributes that make up the 'framework'
presented here should be regarded more as 'loosely related propositions' toward a
greater level of understanding about the Irish-owned MNCs, rather than a deductive
model or 'formal explanatory theory'. In keeping with the line of argument presented
here, and building upon the 'key features of Irish-owned MNCs as indicated by the
survey findings' (cf. table 5.18), these commonalties have been arranged according
to three levels of analysis. It is argued that in order to understand the approaches
adopted by Irish-owned MNCs to the management of JR and the management of
managers, the context within which this takes place (i.e., these MNCs approaches to
internationalisation and strategy, structure and control), must first be understood.
Hence, the findings of this chapter are presented within three sections in table 10.1.
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TABLE 10.1 KEY ArrRIBums OF IRISH —OWNED MNCs
PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONALISATION
fish-owned MNCs tend to:
• have internationalised relatively recently;
• have been led to internationalise as a response to factors including the
saturation of domestic markets and other 'crippling' local dependencies;
• internationalise organically through acquisitions;
• have a preference for acquiring in areas that demonstrate cultural and
business-type familiarity;
• have a 'localised' approach to corporate development which includes the
informal benchmarking with other Irish international companies;
• maximise their non-impositional and/or non-divesting national Irish
identity/management style as a means of giving them a competitive advantage
when seeking to acquire;
• employ acquisitional criteria that pay attention to IR dimensions impacting
upon potential sites;
• adopt a post-acquisition control model.
CORPORATE STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND CONTROL
Irish-owned MNCs tend to:
• have small head offices with lean management structures;
• have been led to increase the role and importance of head office as they
internationalise;
• have established of a number of head office designated functions, including
HR as they have internationalised;
• find themselves under increasing pressure to pursue combined centralised and
decentralised approaches;
• be divisionalised along national or regional as opposed to global lines -
however, this does not necessarily result in the decentralisation of decision-
making;
• manage autonomy through tight financial controls, the tightest of which was
found to be capital expenditure;
• regularly collect performance indicators for use in resource allocation
decisions;
• supplement financial controls with a number of informal personal and social
co-ordination mechanisms which include the networking of management, the
identification and dissemination of 'best practices' and internal
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benchmarking;
• use the 'strategic placement' of key home country managers into host country
operations as a means of quietly spreading corporate ethos rather than
imposing group-wide policies from the 'top-down'.
Tiu MANAGEMENT OF MANAGERS
hi sh-owned MNCs tend to:
• exhibit an increase in the role and importance of HRM following
internationalisation;
• recognise the development of managers as key to their ability to continue to
internationalise;
• place greater emphasis on the management of managers and the creation of
head office designated FIR functions to meet those needs;
• subsequently adopt centralised approaches to the management of managers;
• manage local autonomy through the linkage of local performance levels with
managerial pay, thus seeing local managers as key to maintain control without
this control being seen to be imposed from the top-down.
TIlE MANAGEMENT OF IR
Irish-owned MNCs tend to:
• adopt a highly decentralised approach to the management of JR (however,
their decentralised approaches are becoming increasingly 'blurred' with the
threat of the introduction of European legislation seeing head-office becoming
more involved in 'managing' JR issues on a group-wide basis),
• structurally reinforce decentralised approaches through refusal of head office
to engage in trade union discussion, the maintenance of local company
identities and the movement toward the subcontracting of workers;
• have high levels of trade union density domestically but lower levels of
unionisation overseas, which, combined with the acquisitional criteria listed
above, might suggest an implicit strategy of internationalising to reduce local
dependencies and to appreciate the benefits of lower unionisation overseas;
• strongly oppose to the introduction of EWCs which are seen to threaten
existing localised and decentralised approaches.
• However, factors such as changes in the nature of competition and
products/services may lead Irish-owned MNC's (e.g. Affi) toward adopting
the 'ideology' of partnership-like approach to the management of IR to
ensure the provision of greater service quality.
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Building on these findings, chapter eleven analyses these attributes of Irish MNC
behaviour against the literatures reviewed in chapter two. This will enable us to
determine the extent to which the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs conform to the
expectations suggested by the globalisation literature, or the extent to which our
understanding of them might be better informed by the NBS or small countries
literature. Finally, those attributes that seem particular to the Irish case are related to
the Irish context outlined in chapter three to see if the variation can be related to
national defining characteristics.
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CHAPTER 11
IRISH-OWNED MNCs: THE CASE FOR PARTICULARITY
At the outset of this research two questions were posed: firstly, what approaches do Irish-owned
MNCs adopt to the management of JR and HR?, and secondly, how distinctive or particular to the
Irish case are these approaches? Chapter ten provided propositions with regard to the first question.
While it is well established that MNCs vary, this chapter, building from the findings of chapter ten,
extends the analysis toward establishing the extent to which Irish-owned MNCs vary from other
MNCs. It does so by employing two comparators: the expectations of the globalisation literature and
the expectations that may be derived from the Swedish case, as representative of the small countries
literature. Having isolated the attributes that appear particular to Irish-owned MNCs through this
process, the chapter concludes by investigating whether these particularities can be related to Irish-
owned MNCs country or company contexts.
11.1 INTRODUCTION
This second analysis chapter examines the distinctiveness or particularity of Irish-
owned MNC behaviour. Chapters two and three highlighted a number of reasons that
would lend us to believe that small to medium-sized, late-internationalising MNCs
from a small late industrialised country such as Ireland, would exhibit distinctive
patterns of behaviour. The survey results reported in chapter five, and the subsequent
analysis of the case companies summarised in chapter ten, proposed a number of
attributes characteristic of Irish-owned MNCs. Taking that framework, this chapter
extends the analysis toward an understanding of the extent and degree to which these
practices are distinctive or particular to the 'case' of Irish-owned MNCs by
comparing it with the expectations outlined in the literature review chapters.
The globalisation literature posited that the movement toward internationally
integrated organisational and managerial structures and the subsequent shedding of
national particularity broadly informs MNC behaviour. In contrast, the small
countries literature (in keeping with the NBS perspective) suggested that MNCs are
mostly influenced by the size of their domestic economy and that national origin
therefore still shapes MNC behaviour. Chapter three examined the impact of patterns
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of industrialisation on the development of fish industry and identified certain
contextual factors, such as the late industrialisation and 'clustering' of indigenous
industry, as potentially shaping Irish-owned MNC behaviour. This chapter examines
the extent and degree to which Irish-owned MNCs are being informed by these
different expectations. Are Irish-owned MNCs adopting the key attributes of 'global'
forms?; or has the small size of the Irish economy shaped their behaviour?; or is
their behaviour particular to indigenous companies that have developed within the
Irish context of late industrialisation and internationalisation?
Toward this aim the chapter is structured into three sections. It begins by examining
the attributes of Irish-owned MNCs proposed in light of the expectations set out in
the globalisation literature. Section two, drawing on the account of Swedish MNCs
contained in chapter two, investigates the degree to which Irish-owned MNCs
approximate to key components of the small countries literature. Finally, section
three delineates the case for distinctiveness or 'particularity' and examines the extent
to which this particularity can be attributed to the Irish 'country' or 'company'
contexts.
11.2 IRIsH-owNED MNCs AS GLOBAL FoRMs?
As chapter two outlined, notions of organisational restructuring along a global basis
inform the behaviour of MNCs. The spread of large, multi-divisional,
internationally-integrated organisations and its impact on the conduct of JR and HR
are important facets of the research literature. However, the extent and degree to
which Irish companies have been influenced by this debate has largely gone
unquestioned. In particular, little to date has shown the manner in which Irish-owned
MNCs 'mediate' such globalising pressures. In light of this, chapter eleven begins by
identifying points of similarity and variation between key expectations of the
globalisation debate and the main attributes proposed as characteristic of Irish-
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owned MNCs. Particular attention is paid to the adoption of integrated
organisational forms, the routes to globalism (economies of scale or synergies?), co-
ordination and control mechanisms, changes in the nature and form of the 'centres'
of MNCs and the movement to a borderless state where national identity becomes
irrelevant. Beyond this, subsequent JR and HR factors will be examined.
11.2.1 Internationalisation, Strategy, Structure and Control
A pervasive theme within the globalisation literature is the notion that MNCs are key
participants in a general trend of corporate restructuring. In response to the
integration of economic markets, it is suggested that MNCs are increasingly moving
from polycentric or multi-domestic organi sational forms towards internationally
integrated horizontal structures (Ferner and Edwards, 1995). Moreover, in the search
for economies of scale, MNCs are reported be integrating their production systems
along international lines. As the findings of the previous chapters illustrate, while
Irish-owned MNCs are party of this broad trend of corporate restructuring, there has
been little uptake of global forms. The recent restructuring of Irish-owned MNCs
and the adoption of divisionalised structures has been along national or regional
lines, as opposed to along international or global lines. There is little evidence to
suggest that Irish-owned MNCs are moving toward the adopting of internationally
integrated organisational structures or the emergent network-like structures as
purported in the globalisation literature.
Also purported in the globalisation literature is the notion that MNCs are
restructuring in an attempt to secure some form of economies of scale. However, this
research shows Irish-owned MNCs to be pursuing financial economies but also
synergestic benefits through internationalisation. This finding supports the more
subtle analysis of the likes of Marginson et a!., (1995) who have demonstrated that
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there are in fact two routes to globalism taken by MNCs - financial and synergistic;
and Edwards et al., (1996) who suggest that these two routes co-exist rather than
oppose one another. This is particularly borne out, as chapter ten has highlighted, in
Irish-owned MNCs seeking to concurrently adopt a combination of centralised and
decentralised structures. In keeping, while most of the case companies were found to
adopt a hard centralised and financial-driven approach, this is now supplemented
with less coercive and seemingly decentralised co-ordination and control
mechanisms that do not directly impinge upon achieving synergies.
In terms of co-ordination and control in the light of this, the literature suggests that
the restructuring of organisations encompasses a shift away from traditional
bureaucratic administrative controls toward more implicit of less-obvious modes of
internal 'co-ordination'. Through the use of benchmarking, league tables, the
collection and utilisation of information MNCs have been found to engage in
coercive comparisons that exert indirect control over managerial behaviour (Coller,
1996). Similar to Edwards et at. (1996), traditional bureaucratic controls (as
evidenced in the extensive financial controls adopted by the case companies) were
found to co-exist alongside the recent introduction of personal and social implicit
control mechanisms within Irish-owned MNCs. As chapter ten outlines these include
managerial networking, the identification and dissemination of best practices and
internal benchmarking.
A further contention of the globalisation thesis is that the movement toward
internationally integrated organisational forms involves the replacement of hierarchy
structures with flatter, more flexible and horizontally integrated heterarchy structures
(Hedlund, 1986; 1994). The globalisation literature posits that such a movement
results in the dispersion of power, co-ordination and decision-making across
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geographically disperse sites. In the case of fish-owned MNCs there is evidence to
suggest that the decentralisation of corporate functions such as business
development has occurred in an attempt to increase local responsiveness (and
advance the synergistic sharing of 'best practice'). However, a point of departure
from the literature's expectations occurs in relation to the actual decentralisation of
power and decision-making. The Irish case companies examined indicate that the
decentralisation of financial responsibility and decision-making does not necessarily
led to a dispersion of power or co-ordination. Moreover, the Irish cases clearly
underline the limits to local autonomy. In brief, Irish-owned MNCs are lean and flat,
but there are still clear lines of hierarchical structures as evidenced through the
reporting lines. The cases also clearly indicate that it is the head offices not the
divisions of Irish-owned MNCs that drive international policies.
The globalisation literature proposes that an MINC's route to globalism involves a
decomposition of the head office into a 'constellation' of geographically-spread
centres. Under the 'new global order', it is posited that the head office of MNCs will
shrink and that there will be a shift in the role and responsibilities from co-
ordination and control to knowledge creation and dispersion. While this research has
shown that Irish-owned MNCs do operate overseas regional offices, there is little to
suggest that their head offices are being disaggregated into geographically dispersed
'centres'. Moreover, in stark relief to the notion that head offices will shrink in size
and responsibilities, Irish-owned MNCs were found to be increasing and growing
their centres, particularly through the creation of head office designated HR
functions. Furthermore, there is little to suggest that a change in the role and
responsibilities of head offices has taken place. In contrast, the case studies
demonstrate that the head offices of Irish-owned MNCs remain the centre of
decision-making, particularly with respect to resource allocation.
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Relatedly, the central axis of the 'globalisation thesis' rests on the assumption that
increasingly MNCs are 'shedding their national identity' as they operate under a
'new global logic' (Ohmae, 1990; Reich, 1991). Questioning this notion, Irish-
owned MNCs were found to be maximising their national identity as they
'globalised'. The case companies clearly highlight the crucial role that their 'Irish'
identity renders in their continued growth. Critical to their ability to attract and
secure the acquisition of small family-run businesses (CRH) or large national
maltsers (Greencore) is their 'national' image of being open, friendly, 'non-
conquering' and non-impositional in their approach. Furthermore, the case studies
demonstrate that Irish-owned MNCs see the constant supply of highly qualified,
internationally mobile and culturally socialised professional Irish managers as key to
their future international development. Thus, crucial to the continued growth of
these companies and their future managerial resources is their national position and
identity. This is clearly seen in the case of the CRH Group who regard their national
identity and position within Ireland as the main factor in attracting high-quality Irish
managers. Similarly, for the Affi Group their 'Irishness' is seen as critical to staffing
overseas sites and in servicing extended domestic markets. Attributes such as the
'non-conquering' approach of Irish managers were cited as attributing to their
success in overseas markets. Indeed in each of the cases examined their 'Irishness' is
in some way linked to either their sourcing of employees or raw materials. In short,
there are no indications to suggest that Irish-owned MNCs are shedding, or will in
the future, shed their 'national shackles'. In stark contrast to the central axis of the
globalisation debate, Irish-owned MNCs were found to be maximising their national
identity. Questioning the globalisation thesis, this research suggests that MNCs may
remain closely affiliated with their national identity and dependent upon their
domestic bases.
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11.2.2 The Management of IR and HR
In examining the impact of global forms and practices on HRM a number of
expectations were highlighted from the globalisation literature. Firstly, a key
contention is that the movement toward integrated organisational forms is
accompanied by an adoption of a centrally managed homogenous HRM approach. It
is posited that MNCs mediate the interplay of global and local forces through the
creation of standardised international policies and guidelines that are administered
by head office. In keeping with to the globalisation literature, this research shows
Irish-owned MNCs to be mediating global and local forces through their
management of JR and HR. However, the response of Irish-owned MNCs to the
forces of globalisation is not one of homogenisation but rather one of fragmentation.
Adding weight to the contentions of Roche (1998a), the findings of this study clearly
show that Irish-owned MNCs are pursuing a dual or fragmented approach. The case
studies particularly demonstrated how Irish-owned MNCs have recently 'layered' a
more centralised approach to the management of managers onto a highly
decentralised approach to the management of JR.
For highly decentralised (or decentralising) Irish-owned MNCs, the adoption of
homogenous or common approaches to HRM is seen as an anathema to their
corporate approach of 'devolved responsibility'. These organisations subsequently
regard the collective management of non-managerial employees as a local line
management responsibility. Local managers are free to make their own decisions in
this respect, so long as they do not negatively effect their company's ability to
achieve the Group's financial targets. Irish-owned MNCs have put in place a number
of structural arrangements to reinforce their highly decentralised approach to the
management of JR.
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Furthermore, in contrast to the literature there is little to suggest that Irish-owned
MNCs are homogenising their FIR practices through the introduction of head office
defined HR guidelines on an international basis. Where FIR guidelines do exist, as in
the case of Greencore Group, they are confined to domestic operations and apply
only to the allocation and distribution of financial and other tangible resources,
rather than a common set of business values or generic culture. Moreover, the
introduction of international guidelines is regarded as a threat to the growth strategy
of these companies. In keeping with their strategy of maximising their positive non-
impositional 'national identity', Irish-owned MNCs regard their ability to acquire
companies as inter-related with their decision not to impose generic forms of
management practice. In short, given their growth strategies and hard financial
driven approach to the management of subsidiaries, Irish-owned MNCs both seek to
and can actively avoid the introduction of homogenous or common approaches to
HRM. However, this is not to suggest that some degree consistency or
standardisation is not sought by Irish-owned MNCs though other HR means. As the
following paragraphs will highlight Irish-owned MNCs management of managers
does influence local agendas.
There is general belief within the globalisation literature that the management of
managers is a critical component in the co-ordination or 'corporate glue' of MNCs.
The findings outlined in this study suggest that Irish-owned MNCs are placing a
greater emphasis on the management of managers in response to the impact of rapid
internationalisation on their managerial resources. For a number of Irish-owned
MNCs this is manifest in the creation of a HR function at head office level, or in the
case of Affi in the further consolidation of the HR function. A further contention in
the literature in this respect is that MNCs are increasingly managing dispersed
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operations through the development of a cadre of international managers. What the
Irish case studies suggest is that unlike the global model MNC, where the focus of
management development programmes are of an international nature, Irish-owned
MNCs are focused more on the development of management within national borders
and appear less interested in trying to develop strong cadres of managers from many
different nations. Given the leanness of management structures, Irish-owned MNCs
were found to manage this situation through the acquisitional pre-requisite of
management retention, and then 'supplement' host country through the development
and deployment of Irish managers into key positions as a means of 'spreading an
ethos' without imposing a homogeneous approach or culture. Other means through
which Irish-owned MNCs influence local agendas through HR initiatives include the
networking of HR managers and the identification and sharing of 'best practices',
and in the case of CRH Group, the internationalisation of corporate values via the
assignment and participation of newly recruited professionals to the business
development role.
To summarise, in contrast to expectations of the movement toward homogenisation,
Irish-owned MNCs have adopted a more fragmented approach to HRM. On the
whole, Irish-owned MNCs have centralised the management of managers through
the recent location of HR functions at head office levels. At the same time, they have
structurally reinforced a decentralised approach to the management of IR through
measures such as locating fully-resourced HR units at local levels. This dual or
fragmented approach is in keeping with the broader centralised-decentralised
strategies and structures adopted by these MNCs as a whole. In addition, as with
their broader corporate strategies, Irish-owned MNCs manage the HR and IR
autonomy granted by greater levels of decentralisation through impose tight financial
targets upon local subsidiary managers and through more subtle means of 'co-
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ordination'. Maintaining this fragmented approach to JR and HR is seen by Irish-
owned MNCs as crucial to their international growth strategies, as evidenced in the
interventionist role that many are beginning to play in opposing the introduction of
the EWC policies and directives.
11.2.3 Summary
In conclusion, it can be seen that Irish-owned MNCs are evolving in line with the
expectations expressed in the globalisation literature in a number of respects. These
include: the movement toward product divisionalisation; the pursuit of financial and
synergistic routes to globalism; the linkage of performance levels to remuneration
levels; the supplementation of traditional controls with informal personal and social
controls; and an increased emphasis being placed on central HR issues with the
establishment of HR functions at a strategic head office level to oversee the
management of managers. However, a significant number of the attributes of Irish-
owned MNCs cannot be accounted for by the globalisation thesis. These include
their: being organised along national or regional lines with little integration of
production systems; expanding head offices, maximising their national identity as an
implicit part of their intemationalisation strategies; not developing an international
cadre of mobile senior managers but preferring instead to retaining management in
new acquisitions and make strategic assignments to new acquisitions; and, a
fragmented approach to the management of JR and the management of HR. In light
of this, the following section examines the extent to which these particularities are
informed by the fact that Irish-owned MNCs have emerged from within a small
economy.
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11.3 IRIsH-owNED MNCs AS A CASE OF SMALL COUNTRY EFFECTS?
Research has shown that MNCs from small countries have internationalised at an
earlier stage, and to a greater extent, than MNCs from larger countries (Andersson et
al., 1996), and that the most highly international companies subsequently emanate
from small industrial bases (Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995). This early
internationalisation and degree of internationalisation is attributed to the size of the
domestic market from which these MNCs emanate. There is, therefore, a general
consensus in this literature that the impetus to internationalisation of MNCs from
small countries is the small size and the increasing saturation of their domestic
market (Andersson et al, 1996; Olsson, 1993).
In keeping with the main axis of the small countries thesis, the case studies
demonstrate the role of small and increasingly saturated domestic markets in shaping
the decision of Irish-owned MNCs to internationalise. Due to the smallness of
domestic markets, many Irish companies embarked down an international route,
driven out of a sense of corporate survival in a globalising marketplace. However,
while the small countries literature places a strong emphasis on the role of small
domestic markets, the cases presented here clearly identify a number of other factors
embedded within their historical and economic contexts that shaped Irish-owned
MNCs internationalisation. Factors such as protracted industrial action resulting in
the intervention of the Church and State, rising dependencies on single products and
single currencies during the 1970s, high transportation and logistical costs and, more
recently, the relocation of major customers to new markets. Moreover, while the
small countries literature suggests that MNCs from small economies are earlier to
internationalise, the case of Irish-owned MNCs stands in contrast. What this research
has confirmed is that Irish-owned MNCs have only very recently entered
international markets with the earliest wave of internationalisation found to occur in
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the 1970s.
It is further suggested by small countries theorists that a set of factors (including the
small size of domestic markets, narrow supply bases, proximity to main actors,
linkages between firms, the involvement of financial institutions and the State, and
their tendencies to pursue vertical integration strategies or advanced forms of
international division of labour) have led to an industrial relations environment
characterised by a 'bargaining dynamic'. The suggestion is that within small
industrial bases the concentration of power lies in a small number of MNCs which
creates the environment for centralised bargaining.
As a result, MNCs from small economies are thought to develop corporatist political
arrangements domestically. Parallels can be drawn between the broad contention of
corporatist arrangements and 'a JR bargaining dynamic' in the literature and the case
of Ireland. However what is inconclusive from the data contained here is whether
there is a direct causal link between the two. This would be worthy of a separate
piece of research in itself.
In comparing the experiences of Irish-owned MNCs against those of the Swedish
case a number of important points of variation are also apparent. While a review of
the Swedish case in chapter two showed the Swedish economy to be characterised a
small number of large and highly internationalised indigenous MNC, a review of the
Irish context in chapter three highlighted that the Irish economy is dominated by
large overseas MNCs. The Irish-owned MNCs is a recently emerging form within
the landscape of Irish industry. Furthermore, while the origins of Swedish MNCs can
be traced back as far as the 1870s when Swedish industnalisation began (Lundstrom,
1986), Irish industry only embarked on a global route in recent decades. Relatedly,
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and in contrast to the Swedish case, fish-owned MNCs are still both small in
numbers and in size.
In tracing the evolution and development of Swedish MNCs a number of shaping
factors were highlighted in the literature. These include the active involvement and
investment of financial institutions, particularly the role of leading indigenous banks
in driving the internationalisation of Swedish industry in the 1870s. While not
disproving the possibility of its application to the Irish case, such a connection is not
evident from either the cases or the survey presented here. What comes more to light
in the Irish case is the active intervention of the State, under the leadership of
Lemass, in the early foundation of a number of these companies as the vehicles of
the early industrialisation of the Irish economy.
Furthermore, much has been written of the form of internationalisation among
Swedish MNCs and their ability to initially operate as exporters. As late-corners to
international markets, Irish-owned MNCs, with their preference to expand either
through acquisitions or by developing minority stakes, stand in contrast. Further
characteristic of Swedish MNCs is their movement from 'mother-daughter'
structures towards the emergence of overseas centres. Through what is termed
'internationalisation of the second degree', Swedish MNCs have dispersed power
and the responsibility of key functions to overseas centres. As an earlier paragraphs
in this chapter have highlighted, there is little to suggest a similar development
within Irish-owned MNCs. Generally structured around traditional divisional
structures, Irish-owned MNCs display little evidence of the dispersed responsibility
and power.
Finally, a key finding of the Swedish JR literature is the widely reported drive by
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large Swedish MNCs to dismantle centralised wage agreements and decentralise
collective bargaining to local levels. Occupying a large power base in national terms
and through the 'vehicle' of the main employers association, Swedish MNCs have
attempted to diverge from wage agreements and increase pay levels. In an attempt to
introduce flexibility and counter difficulties with the recruitment and retention of
skilled employees, Swedish MNCs have led a campaign for the decentralisation of
collective bargaining in recent times. There is little to suggest that fish-owned
MNCs, smaller in size and in number than their Swedish counterparts, are or would
drive a similar campaign to dismantle existing tripartite arrangements. Regarded by
the trade union officials interviewed as operating with relatively low wage
structures, Irish-owned MNCs would not seem to be actively seeking an arrangement
to pay higher than existing national wage increases. According to trade union
officials, financial flexibility for the Irish-owned MNCs is secured through overtime
arrangements instead.
As with the globalisation thesis a number of the expectations of the small countries
literature are borne out in the Irish case. However, the above paragraphs show that
there are still many attributes of Irish-owned MNC behaviour that cannot be
accounted for by the small size of the domestic market from which they emerged.
Working from the framework of Irish-owned MNC behaviour in chapter ten, this
chapter has demonstrated Irish-owned MNCs to be distinctive from a number of the
underlying assumptions of the literature. This chapter now reviews the degree to
which Irish-owned MNCs are particular or distinctive and examines the extent to
which this particularity can be related to Irish and company contextual factors.
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11.4 IRISH-OwNED MNCs AS PARTICULAR TO COUNTRY AND COMPANY
CONTEXTS?
What is apparent from this chapter and earlier findings is that Irish-owned MNCs are
partially adopting some of the more salient practices of global organisational forms
and practices. This partial uptake of global structures and practices suggests that
Irish MNCs are in part responding to the forces of globalisation. However, as the
cases highlight Irish-owned MNCs while pursuing global route are not evolving
toward a predetermined end state. At the same time, the analysis has also shown
Irish-owned MNCs to adopt structures and employ practices that are equally distinct.
In short, this research questions the key assumptions that underpin the globalisation
thesis, without disputing that the routes to globalism. While the globalisation
literature outlines part of the picture, it does not come close to explaining all of the
attributes of Irish-owned MNCs.
Moreover, while sharing some common attributes with MNCs from other small
countries, significant points of variation remain. While the small countries literature
identifies characteristics such as the smallness of domestic markets as the impetus to
internationalisation it also only partially informs the case of Irish-owned MNC
behaviour. While there is evidence of a 'small country effect' on Irish-owned MNCs
there are also a number of points of variation to suggest the interplay of factors
explicable outside of the small countries thesis. It is to those factors that this analysis
now turns. In short, this research suggests that while responding to globalising
pressures, Irish-owned MNCs are also pursuing an approach that reflects the
particular trajectory of their indigenous development and traditions. The next section
examines the factors to which this particularity can be attributed.
Having taken a number of key expectations of the globalisation thesis, tenets of the
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small countries literature and the case of Swedish MNCs and compared them with
the results of this research with regard to Irish-owned MNCs, a number of points of
distinction or variation were identified. A review of the Irish context and the
development of Irish industry contained in chapter three and the individual Group
histories outlined at the start of the case study chapters identifies a number of factors
shaping the distinct trajectory of Irish-owned MNCs and their practices. These
include: the influence of country and company history; the impact of the small size
or Irish-owned MNCs; sectoral effects; recency effects; and, cultural characteristics
or what may, for want of a more academic word, be termed 'Irishness'. The
following paragraphs review these factors individually.
Variations in the structures and practices of Irish-owned MNCs from global and
other small-country forms can, in part, be attributed to the historical development of
these companies within a wider industrialisation process. At a company level, their
historical evolution has also shaped their approach to the management of JR. As the
case studies clearly delineate key JR events, such as industrial action has shaped the
direction of these companies. Their decentralised approach to the management of JR
is a case in point. In tracing the evolution of each of these case companies, it was
found that each was subject to major protracted industrial action involving the
Church and/or the State. Moreover, it was found that the resolution of these strikes
coincided either deliberately or by default with their diversification overseas
(Clondalkin Group even acknowledge that intemationalisation represented an
attempt to reduce dependencies on highly unionised sectors).
Furthermore, the partial uptake of global structures and practices by Irish-owned
MNCs can also be viewed in terms of the size of these companies in combination
with the smallness of the Irish economy as a whole. The previous section outlined
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how freland's small size drove many Irish companies to internationalise. In addition,
the case studies suggest that the small size of these groups in international terms has
been a defining role in the form of internationalisation adopted. More particularly,
the smallness of their head offices and leanness of management structures have
clearly influenced the growth strategies and their approach to the management of
managers of Irish-owned MNCs. Due to a scarcity of managerial resources, a lack of
international market knowledge and pressures for quick returns on investment, Irish-
owned MNCs predominately pursue acquisitional growth strategies. Small head
offices and a lack of repatriation opportunities at the centre have shaped a number of
their acquisitional criteria, more notably local management retention. Moreover, the
small size of Irish companies, combined with the rate and pace of
internationalisation, has also shaped the recent adoption of a centralised approach to
the management of managers. For the CRH Group, for example, their traditionally
lean management structures and rapid internationalisation has led to a crisis of
succession issues as original 'management retained' reach maturity and the staffing
of overseas sites became a real problem. In response the Group moved to establish a
head office designated HR function to focus on developing managers from within.
Related to issues of size and history is the role of sectoral locations that Irish-owned
MNCs occupy in explaining the particularity of Irish-owned MNCs. As chapter three
indicated and as the result of the survey presented in chapter five confirmed Irish
industrialisation patterns have shaped the concentration of Irish industry and Irish-
owned MNCs into a number of particular industrial sectors. Adding weight to the
results of O'Malley (1985) this research suggests that the lateness with which Ireland
industrialised resulted in a concentration of Irish industry into 'naturally sheltered' or
'non-traded' traditional sectors. Subsequently, it has been argued that this pattern of
industrialisation has led to a predominance of certain structural forms at different
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stages of Ireland's industrialisation (Leavy 1993), and in tracing the historical
evolution of a number of Irish-owned MNCs it was found that the structural forms
that they currently adopt can be traced back to different phases of industrialisation.
The predominance of Irish-owned MNCs in mature product lines or the processing
of raw materials rather than high-tech sectors, and their having evolved out of co-
operatives and SOE's, may explain why they have not adopted the sorts of
organisational forms advocated in the globalisation literature. In short, the particular
sectoral location of Irish-owned MNCs was found to be shaped both by their
strength within a sheltered domestic market and also by the 'niche' markets they
tend to occupy overseas.
It can also be inferred from the results of this research that variations in approaches
to the management of JR and HR reflect sectoral differences. As Roche (1998) posits
the maintenance of traditional adversarial approaches in combination with the
layering of more global HR approaches, can in part be explained by the historically
shelteredness of these companies from the 'full force' of competition, particularly
domestically. This research adds to weight to this hypothesis, in finding the ATE case
to be the only case where changes in the nature of competition have led to the
movement toward a more partnership-like approach to the management of IR. In all
other cases traditional adversarialism was still found to prevail. ATE was the only
case company operating within what might be seen as a high-tech service sector
(indicative of the small proportion of Irish-owned MNCs not in traditional primary
produce based sectors).
Another cogent factor that is highlighted in a review of the Irish context is the
'recency' with which Irish industry as a whole, and Irish-owned MNCs in particular,
have intemationalised. Characterising all of the cases examined was a lateness or
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recency to international markets. As chapter three outlines the first wave of
internationalisation by indigenous industry occurred in the 1970s as a number of
Irish-owned MNCs pioneered a route into UK and US markets. A second wave was
noted in the late-1980s and early-1990s as Irish-owned MNCs began to expand into
mainland Europe and beyond. Moreover, the recent wave of internationalisation is
characterised by an increase in the pace and size of acquisitions now being made by
Irish-owned MNCs. What this suggests, and what the findings of this research
confirm, is that Irish-owned MNCs have adopted a number of practices to overcome
this lateness to internationalisation. In particular, Irish-owned MNCs have opted to
acquire overseas concerns than to grow through the establishment of greenfield sites.
Pressures for rapid returns on investment and a leanness of managerial resources
have further shaped these growth strategies. The retention of existing management
teams with strong local product knowledge could also be viewed as an attempt to
overcome local obstacles or barriers to competitiveness.
Furthermore, the recency with which Irish-owned MNCs have internationalised can
also in part explain the fragmented approach adopted by Irish-owned MNCs to
HRM. Adopting a highly decentralised approach to the management of JR there have
been a movement by three of the case companies to layer on top a centralised
approach to the management of managers. Unable, as latecomers, to develop a large
cadre of international managers to match their internationalisation, Irish-owned
MNCs have opted to manage their overseas sites through the assignment of key
managers. Management retention has thus become a crucial part of acquisition
strategies, and local host country managers are only supplemented with key
international Irish assignments. In short, the lateness with which Irish-owned MNCs
have entered international arenas has meant that they are unable to mimic practices
of the 'giants' or 'long established' MNCs - they have had to develop alternative
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strategies.
Irish-owned MNCs appear to be fortunate in this respect in that they are able to draw
from and accentuate a national identity that is highly regarded internationally in their
developing of alternative approaches. The cases highlighted the way in which Irish-
owned MNCs see their 'Irishness' - which is generally related to a more laid back
and 'likeable', less impositional or directive style of management - as a key
component in their acquistional growth strategies. This, combined with
complementary 'softer' forms of co-ordination and control, has meant that Irish-
owned MNCs have been able to succesfully acquire good companies (often in
competition with MNCs from larger countries like the US or UK) and then
appreciate the economies and synergies that result from having overseas companies
within the group, without being compelled to impose a head-office mind-set or
minimum standards that might stifle such gains. This was seen to filter through to a
desire for Irish-owned MNCs to not want to be seen to be imposing collective or
group-wide IR arrangements. Rather than shedding their national identity, Irish-
owned MNCs seem to be doing very well by maximising it.
11.5 CoNcLusioN
By comparing the proposed attributes of Irish-owned MNCs developed from the
findings presented in chapters five through nine, and summarised in chapter ten,
against the expectations from the literature reviewed in chapter two, this chapter has
shown Irish-owned MNCs to be a particular case. Moreover, the particularity of
these attributes has been related to the country and company contextual factors
pieced together in chapter three and at the beginning of the case chapters. While
these findings subsequently disprove the globalisation thesis with regard to the
development of Irish-owned MNCs and the management of HR and IR, they also
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indicate that Irish-owned MNCs are responding to the forces of globalisation and
partially adopting certain aspects outlined in the globalisation literature. Similarly,
while this study has shown that the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs cannot simply
he explained by the small size of the Irish economy, many of the expectations
outlined in the small countries literature can be seen to account for certain attributes
of this behaviour.
Subsequently, in the light of these findings, this research would argue that the best
means of understanding Irish-owned MNCs behaviour is through an eclectic
appreciation of all the literatures reviewed in this work. Indeed, it may have only
been through the combination of the insights from the different literatures that many
of the findings of this research surfaced. For example, to see the way in which
managers of Irish-owned MNCs are distinctive in their self-reflexive maximisation
of national identity, may not have been fully understood without an understanding of
all the literatures drawn upon in this thesis. Thus, while this thesis would advocate
down-playing the influence of globalisation on MNCs from countries such as
Ireland, it would caution against disregarding the expectations that underpin it -
these may be shaping MNC practices even if these are nationally distinctive. The
following concluding chapter will now turn to an examination of the implications of
these findings.
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CHAPTER 12
CONCLUSIONS
This final chapter summarises the main findings and contributions of this research. These are, firstly,
that Irish-owned MNCs are characterised by a 'fragmented' approach to the management of IR and
FIR - namely, a highly decentralised approach to the management of IR and a recent layering on of a
highly centralised approach to the management of managers. Secondly, that Irish MNC behaviour is
distinctive from the expectations of the globalisation and small countries literatures. Their
particularity can be linked to their recent internationalisation, their smallness, their individual
company histories, their maximisation of national identity and Ireland's pattern of late
industrialisation. Understanding this particularity is best achieved by appreciating that the
globalisation, small countries and Irish industrial history literatures all provide insights into the way
that Irish-owned MNCs have developed. Chapter twelve describes these conclusions in more detail,
assesses their significance, examines the implications for theory and practice and, subsequently,
outlines areas for future research that may build upon the contributions of this research.
12.1 INTRODUCTION
The aims of this exploratory research were to investigate the approaches adopted by
Irish-owned IvINCs to the management of JR and HR and to assess the
distinctiveness of Irish-owned MNC behaviour. Adopting a head office-centred
approach, this thesis examined the broad demography of Irish-owned MNCs and the
factors shaping patterns of behaviour within them, with regard to the management of
JR and HR. To this end, a questionnaire-based survey and case-based analysis of
four representative companies were employed. In this final chapter, the main
findings and contributions of this research are summarised, the implications of these
findings are identified and areas of future research outlined.
12.2 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE
In contrast to the expectation of homogenisation outlined in the globalisation
literature, this thesis has found that Irish-owned MNCs adopt a fragmented or dual
approach to the management of JR and HR. In relation to the collective management
of non-managerial employees, Irish-owned MNCs were found to adopt, or be
moving towards, a highly decentralised approach. This approach is structurally
328
reinforced through the maintenance of local company identities, a refusal to enter
direct discussions with trade unions at a head office level and by the movement
toward the use of subcontracting. In examining approaches to the management of
HR it was found that Irish-owned MNCs are concerned with the co-ordination and
development of managerial resources from a head office perspective and have
recently 'layered' highly centralised approaches to FIR on to decentralised
approaches to the management of IR. While the Affi case may be an 'outlier' in its
combining of a partnership approach to the management of non-managerial staff
with a more centralised approach to the management of managers, this behaviour
can be linked to specific sector within which they operate.
In short, this thesis suggests that in an attempt to mediate globalisation (and maintain
highly decentralised financially-driven approaches to the management of sites),
Irish-owned MNCs have 'fragmented' their approach to FIRM. Rather than
supercede their traditional highly decentralised approach to the management of JR. a
more strategic and centralised approach to the management of mangers has been
added to it. Moreover, this thesis found that this dual approach becomes 'blurred'
when the decentralised approach to IR is threatened. For example, in relation to the
introduction of European-wide employment legislation such as the EWC, it was
found that the head offices of Irish-owned MNCs are adopting a highly
interventionist role in the preventing or 'managing' of its introduction. In effect, the
movement to a more homogenous approach to HRM for Irish-owned MNCs is seen
to constitute a threat to their internationalisation strategies by impinging upon the
cost and synergistic benefits provided by encouraging 'diversity' across Groups.
The second main finding of this research is that the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs
is distinctive from the expectations of the globalisation and the small countries
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literatures reviewed in chapter two. The particular attributes of Irish-owned MNCs
can be linked to country factors, highlighted in chapter three, and company factors
delineated in the case studies. To summarise, the globalisation literature highlighted
a number of expectations or contentions that were not borne out in Irish-owned
MNCs. While Irish-owned MNCs were found to be engaging in the widely purported
global trend of organisational restructuring, there was little to suggest their
movement toward global forms or along global lines. Reflective of their histories,
Irish-owned MNCs are structured along multi-domestic or regional lines. The
globalisation thesis also contends that MNCs pursue synergistic routes to globalism.
However, confirming more recent research by Edwards et al. (1996), Irish-owned
MNCs were found to be concurrently pursuing both financial and synergistic 'routes'
to globalism. Also, in stark contrast to claims made in the globalisation literature,
Irish-owned MNCs are increasing and growing their 'centres', particularly through
the recent establishment of head office FIR functions. Finally, this research questions
the contention that MNCs 'shed' their national identity as they internationalise. This
thesis clearly demonstrates that Irish-owned MNCs are, on the contrary, maxirnising
their national identity. Indeed, this was identified by many managers as key to their
growth strategies and may subsequently be seen reflected in Irish-owned MNCs'
centrali sed-decentrali sed structures, their control mechanisms and their approach to
local IR autonomy.
This thesis also found the behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs to be significantly
different from the expectations outlined in the small countries literature and, in
particular, the case of Swedish MNCs. In contrast to a broad premise of this
literature, Irish-owned MNCs were found to be late to enter international markets.
While Sweden is characterised by a small number of large long established MNCs,
Irish MNCs are small in number and size and moreover, did not internationalise until
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the 1960s at the earliest. Furthermore, while it was found that the smallness of
freland's domestic market was an impetus to the intemationalisation of many Irish
companies, tracing the development of these case companies highlighted other
factors, such as the rising negative local economic dependencies and JR problems in
the 1970s, as shaping the development of Irish-owned MNCs. A review of the
current Swedish JR system highlighted the drive by Swedish MNCs to decentralise
bargaining to local enterprise levels. Leveraging off their strong 'power' base within
SAF, Swedish MNCs have actively campaigned for the decentralisation of collective
bargaining. In contrast, Irish-owned MNCs were found to largely comply with the
norms established within centralised agreements. In short, in contrast to the Swedish
case there was little to suggest that Irish-owned MNCs are attempting to break
through current wage constraints.
In accounting for these distinctive attributes, the particularity of Irish-owned MNC
behaviour was found to be linked to the influence of a number of country factors
reviewed in chapter three and company factors described in the case study
backgrounds presented in chapters six through nine. At the company level, it was
found that particular historical developments, especially key JR events, have shaped
FIRM within Irish-owned MNCs; that the small size of these companies is a defining
factor in shaping the form of intemationalisation pursued, their acquisitional criteria
and their adoption of a centralised approach to the management of managers.
Moreover, it was found that the recency with which Irish-owned MNC have
internationalised influences, in particular, the pre-requisite of management retention
in newly acquired companies and the assignment of key managers to 'strategic'
functions overseas, as Irish-owned MNCs attempt to overcome barriers to late
intemationalisation. In addition, a key theme to emerge in this research was the
manner in which an 'Irish' management style and national 'image' has influenced
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the development of fish-owned MNCs to the point where this style is now either
implicitly or explicitly influencing their internationalisation strategies, their
structures, their control mechanisms and their approach to IR and HR. In addition,
two country factors were found to be shaping the behaviour of Irish MNCs. The
research findings suggest that patterns of late industrialisation have given rise to the
particular sectoral clusterings and organisational forms of Irish-owned MNCs.
Subsequently, the key attributes emanating from the concentration of Irish-owned
MNCs within traditional or resource-based sectors has shaped the form of their late
internationalisation and the degree of their IR fragmentation. Hence, in support of
Roche's (1998b) thesis, this research suggests that it is the degree to which these
traditionally sheltered sectors have opened up to forces of competitiveness that has
shaped the fragmented approaches of Irish-owned MNCs. This is particularly evident
with the Affi case, where the recent deregulation of the industry has, at least in
ideological terms, resulted in the movement toward a partnership-like approach. In
short, it was found that a combination of late industrialisation, 'recency' to
internationalisation, smallness of company size, sectoral location, historical legacies
and national identity account for the particularity of the Irish case.
What seems certain from this research is that Irish-owned MNCs are both global and
local (cf. Hyman, 1999). While acknowledging the forces of globalisation, the
results of this research question the 'globalisation thesis' and the notion of a 'global
model' towards which all MNCs are evolving. Moreover, as with the globalisation
literature, while the small countries literature in part explains the case of Irish-owned
MNCs, it fails to account for many of Irish-owned MNCs' specific attributes. This
research subsequently argues that an understanding of the manner of the interplay of
global and local forces in MNCs can best be achieved through an examination of the
specific impact of company history, country and company size, sector, recency to
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internationalise and industrialisation. It concludes that an understanding of national
and company contextual features must compliment an understanding of existing
global and/or small country generalisations if one is to fully appreciate the complex
forces impacting on MNC behaviour. Hence, this thesis argues for an eclectic
approach where the benefits of drawing from many different literatures are
appreciated.
The research contributions of this thesis may consequently be summarised as
follows. Firstly, this work marks out a territory hitherto unexplored, namely the
nature and behaviour of fish-owned MNCs and demonstrates that their approach to
the management of IR and HR is distinct from foreign-owned MNCs which have
thus far been the focus of attention. It proposes a tentative framework of the
behaviour of Irish-owned MNCs and their approach to the management of JR and
FIR, a framework that can be built upon and developed in future research.
Secondly, it adds weight to a literature that questions applicability of the
'globalisation thesis' to the approaches adopted by MNCs to the management of
their employment relationships, particularly those originating from small countries.
Much of the literature on HRM within MNCs focuses on the experiences of large,
long established MNCs from large advanced economies. In contrast, this research
highlights the importance of investigating small to medium-sized and recently
internationalised JvlNCs from small, late industrialised economies, such as Ireland,
as a means of providing new insights. For example, this research has shown that
Irish-owned MNCs promote their national identity as a means of achieving the
corporate benefits of globalisation without meeting with the sort of resistance
associated with MNC from larger countries with more 'abrasive' management styles.
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Finally, this thesis further adds to the literature by highlighting the importance of
historical factors, in particular significant IR turning points, in shaping an
understanding of approaches to the management of IR and HR. Thus, it indicates
that current models of global forms of MNCs are simplistic in their failure to capture
the complexity of particular histories in shaping the organisational forms adopted by
MNCs. At best, these typologies serve to suggest the motivations driving routes to
globalism. However, this research questions notions of the inevitable evolution of
MNCs toward a homogeneous 'end state' where national particularities become
irrelevant, as suggested within the globalisation literature. The Irish case shows
MNCs to pursue different paths to globalism - paths that may involve the
maximi sation of national identity.
12.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE
As the paragraphs above have already indicated the findings outlined here have a
broad range of implications. These are summarised in this section in relation to
academic debates concerning globalisation and FIRM, research on FIRM in Ireland,
implications for Irish policy makers (and potentially policy makers from other small
countries), and managers and employee representatives involved in Irish industry.
In terms of the broader debates, this research, while acknowledging the impact of
forces of globalisation and the motivations driving or underlying the management of
MNCs, questions the main contentions of the globalisation thesis by outlining the
differing paths taken by Irish-owned MNCs to globalism. Irish MNC behaviour
suggests the co-existence of traditional forms of control with globalising
motivations. Hence, it supports the view that theorists need to get beyond a number
of debates that have focussed on polarisations that seem no longer appropriate. The
findings of this research suggest that this would not only include 'global versus
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local' arguments, but also debates that see the achievement of cost and synergestic
benefits as contradictory, centralisation as distinct from decentralisation, and HRM
practices as homogenising or remaining nationalistic.
In relation to current HRM debates within Ireland, this research, in keeping with the
above, appears to confirm current notions of fragmentation (Roche, 1998a). This
would imply a need for current debates with regard to Irish IR and HR practices to
move beyond notions of convergence versus divergence and towards an examination
of the manner in which Irish companies 'manage the tension' between forces of
globalisation and local pressures.
The findings presented here also have implications for Irish policy makers,
implications that could also be utilised in other small countries. This research has
confirmed that the policies 'toward equilibrium' (cf. chapter three), implemented
over the past decade, have been well founded and are beginning to bear fruit. Irish-
owned MNCs have quickly grown in size, stature and in terms of their contributions
to Irish economic development. Also, it confirms that Irish-owned companies are a
particular case and have different strengths from other MNCs.
The main implication for Irish-owned MNCs and their management is the
importance of not disregarding either the global model or Irish traditions but rather
to explore individual approaches for mediating the tension between global ambitions
and local concerns and necessities within their given contexts. For Irish managers
this research suggests developing an appreciation of their 'distinctiveness' as a
means of competing in international markets. Hence, for Irish MNCs who view the
globalisation 'recipe' as the panacea to low growth rates, these results serve caution
against the wholesale adoption and acceptance of models or 'best practices' which
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have little in common with local attributes. However, in light of their 'recency',
Irish-owned MNCs are in a position to utilise and adapt (without mimicking) the
'best practices' of larger, longer established MNCs - they are in a position to learn
and capitalise from the mistakes of the 'giants'. These findings would also argue
against Irish MNCs 'shedding' their nationality - it appears that keeping a strong
head office and operational presence within Ireland is key for Irish-owned MNCs in
maintaining their competitive advantage. Through the identification and further
exploration of the 'particularity' of the Irish case, key attributes of Irish models (such
as the post-acquisitional control model described in chapter ten), can be highlighted
and leveraged off.
For employee representatives and trade unions the challenge is one of maintaining
local and national influence on the agendas of not just these MNCs but also on
industrial policy as MNCs come to be regarded as increasingly important to national
development. With regard to changes in JR approaches, this research demonstrates
the ability of Irish MNCs to secure low levels of unionisation overseas as part of
their drive to become more 'globally competitive'. While this research is not
conclusive on whether this is an explicit policy of 'regime shopping' in the light of
high unionisation and past industrial tensions in Ireland, or a form of international
division of labour in light of a lack of production integration, employee
representatives need to remain abreast of these developments and lobby government
and public bodies accordingly. They may, for example, benefit from promoting
awareness about the importance of Irish-owned MNCs maintaining a strong local
presence and identity. However, this research also highlights the impact of changing
competitive forces in forcing or facilitating a movement toward more partnership-
based approaches in particular cases (cf. chapter nine). Employee representatives
may be able to use this development to their advantage as examples of 'best
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employment relations practices'.
12.4 AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In conclusion, the findings of this research constitute a firm basis for recommending
a number of future research trajectories. Given that this research is exploratory in
nature, there is scope for further studies to test out and confirm the propositions
made in chapter ten and eleven here on a broader rather of in-depth cases. In light of
the sectoral differences highlighted in this work further studies of this nature might
look in more detail at sectoral effects, perhaps toward developing variant models
within the broad attributes of Irish-owned MNCs. A great deal more study could also
be done into one of this work's key findings - that particular company and country
contextual factors influence the management of IR and HR. Along these lines, and in
the light of the difficulty encountered in constructing a picture of Irish industrial
development in relation to organisational and JR and HR development in chapter
three, there is a need for a more comprehensive history of Irish JR to be written with
regard to the impact of this history upon the shaping of Irish companies and an Irish
style of management.
This thesis has indicated that while the effects of globalisation are manifest in MNC
development, the actual picture, within Ireland in any case, is a far more complex
mix of global and local forces than is often reported in the globalisation literature.
More research into how MNCs from different national origins reconcile these
tensions would further add to an interesting stream of research. Furthermore, while
the small countries literature has been shown to provide a number of useful insights,
the Irish case reported here would encourage more studies into different small
countries so as to mediate the biases that may occur in extrapolating from a largely
Scandinavian based set of generalisations.
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Finally, this study would encourage picking up on one particularly interesting
dimension in data presented here. This is the manner in which an intangible 'factor
endowment' (to borrow from Dicken, 1998) such as a 'sense of Irish-ness' may be
'used' as a competitive advantage that enables companies to grow internationally.
This would suggest two new avenues for research that could be carried out either in
Ireland or in other small countries or indeed in a general sense. These would be,
firstly, to investigate how a sense of nationality can be capitalised in order to achieve
globalising outcomes, particularly for those MNCs from small countries. Secondly, a
critical perspective could be taken to examine how a small, 'open and friendly'
country like Ireland may find its culture being appropriated by managers in order to
facilitate the achievement of global ambitions. Developing an awareness of how this
may be happening would provide interesting substance for trade unions concerned
with the increasing persuasiveness of globalisation rhetoric and the subsequent
marginalisation of local interests.
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APPENDIX 1
Public Relations Officer,
Company X,
23 Upper O'Connell Street,
Dublin 1.
3rd. Feb. 1994.
Dear Sir/Madam,
I am an Irish student from the Warwick Business School undertaking doctoral studies
into the industrial relations and human resource practices of Irish-owned
Multinationals operating in Europe.
At present I am attempting to identify organisations that meet those requirements and
wonder would it be possible for you to send me an annual company report or any
related publications from which I could extract this information. I would really
appreciate your assistance in this matter as access to this type of information in
Warwick is extremely limited.
I will, of course, be more than willing to meet any expenses that you might incur in
the process.
Many Thanks in Advance,
Noelle Donnelly
Doctoral Researcher.
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APPENDIX 2
Mr. R. O'Brien,
Deputy Chairman,
Irish Printing Group,
Caseway Road,
Stillorgan,
Dublin 2.
11th. August 1994
Dear Ronan,
I wish to seek your support and co-operation regarding research activities at the
Graduate School of Business, University College Dublin.
Ms Noelle Donnelly is currently undertaking a doctorate at the University of
Warwick, with the support of the Michael Smurfit Graduate School of Business, into
the human resource and industrial relations policies of Irish-owned multinational
companies. Your organisation has been identified as one which meets her research
criteria.
This research addresses a need to understand the competitive position of Irish-owned
multinational companies at a European or World-wide level and I feel that your
support would make a valuable contribution. Ms Donnelly will be contacting you over
the coming week and would welcome the opportunity of discussing this further with
you. She would also be delighted to furnish you with a summary report of her findings
when completed.
Thanking you in advance for your time and support.
Laurence Crowley
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APPENDIX 3
Monday 3rd. October.
Dear Mr. O'Brien,
I am writing to you in connection with some research activities I am currently
undertaking. Laurence Crowley had suggested I contact you in order to seek your
assistance in relation to this matter ( please see attached).
The research I am conducting seeks to examine the human resource and industrial
relations policies of Irish-owned multinationals and would involve a brief interview
covering three main areas:
• Organisational Structure and Business Activities,
• Employment Structure,
• Human Resource and Industrial Relations Policies
This interview would take, at most, one hour to complete. Having processed this data,
I would be delighted to furnish you with a summary report of the findings. I would
like to assure you that full confidentiality will be preserved. As such, this study is
interested in patterns of policy-making rather than individual company policies and
therefore no individual company would be readily identifiable from the findings.
I enclose some background information which explains in more detail what this
research is about and would welcome the opportunity to discuss this further with you.
At this stage I would like to take the opportunity to thank you for your co-operation
and appreciate the time and effort that you have given.
Yours sincerely,
Noelle Donnelly.
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APPENDIX 4
Sample of questions requiring more detailed information
The following is a sample of questions, extracted from the main questionnaire, which
require information of a more detailed nature. I would be most grateful if you would
complete these questions and return them, with your comments, to me at the following
address:
Noelle Donnelly,
Business Research Programme,
Graduate School of Business,
Blackrock,
Co. Dublin.
If you have any queries I can be reached at Tel: 01 - 706 8992.
Fax 01 - 706 8007.
Once again I would like thank you for your co-operation and support in this matter.
I
Organisational Structure & Business Activities 	
I
7. Does your company have subsidiaries/sites elsewhere in Europe, as well as in
Ireland?
D Yes
U	 No
8. If Yes, how many?
9. If Yes, in which of these European countries?
(please tick as many as apply)
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________ 
YIN __________ Y/N
Belgium______ Austria	 ______
Denmark_______ Iceland	 ______
France______ Norway	 ______
Germany______ Sweden	 ______
Greece	 ______ Switzerland	 ______
Italy______ Finland ______
Luxembourg______ _______________ ______
Netherlands ______ Eastern Europe ______
Portugal______ ______________ ______
Spain______ ______________ ______
Britain______ ______________ ______
Employment	 I
1. Approximately how many employees does the enterprise employ world-wide?
Number.......................................................................................................................
2. Approximately what number (% ) of the total are within Ireland?
Number(or %) ............................................................................................................
3a. Approximately what number (%) of the total are based elsewhere in Europe?
Number(or %) ...........................................................................................................
3b. What percentage of the European figure is based in the UK?
Number(or %) ...........................................................................................................
I Industrial Relations/Human Resource Policies & Practices 	 I
14. Taking the Irish operations are all, most, some or none of the sites unionised?
Li	 All
Li Most
Li Some
Li None
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15. If unionised, what proportion of the total Irish workforce are unionisation?
16. If unionised, what are the three largest unions representing employees in the Irish
operations
1
2
3
26. For which of the following issues is information collected by the parent head
office on a regular basis from operating sites in Ireland ?
Movements in rates of Pay	 _____
Overall Labour Costs
Strikes & forms of industrial action
	 _____
Overtime Working	 ____
Numbers Employed	 ____
No. of Resignations and nos. recruited _____
Absenteeism	 _____
Dismissal & Disciplinary cases 	 _____
Labour productivity	 _____
Accidents & injuries	 _____
Occupation Health	 _____
Training received
	 _____
Gender composition of workforce
Age composition of workforce	 _____
Other_(please_specify)	 _____
11. For which of the following issues is information collected by the parent head
office on a regular basis from operating sites in Europe?
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Movements in rates of Pay	 _____
Overall_Labour_Costs	 _____
Strikes & forms of industrial action	 _____
Overtime Working	 ____
Numbers Employed	 ____
No. of Resignations and nos. recruited
Absenteeism	 _____
Dismissal & Disciplinary cases	 _____
Labour_productivity	 _____
Accidents_&_injuries 	 _____
Occupation Health	 _____
Training received
Gender composition of workforce
Age composition of workforce	 _____
Other_____
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APPENDIX 5
IBackground Information	 I
This research is part of a doctorate being undertaken at the University of Warwick in the UK
and with the support of the Business Research Programme, Graduate School of Business,
University College Dublin. The main aim of the research is to examine the human resource
and industrial relations policies and practices of Irish-owned multinational companies, from
which it is hoped insights can be made into their competitive position within the European
market.
The motivation for this study is twofold: firstly, the majority of research on multinational
companies has been driven by associated policy issues such as industrial policy or job
creation while little attention has been given to examining management processes or
practices. Secondly, within Ireland much of the focus has been on overseas multinational
companies operating within the country while there is a dearth of empirical work into the
operations of Irish-owned multinational companies, collectively. Therefore, this research is
exploratory in its attempt to address this imbalance.
It is envisaged that, at most, this questionnaire would take about 40 minutes to administer and
that, at the end of the process, a two-page summary report of the findings be made available.
All information will be treated with the strictest of confidence. As such, this research is
interested in patterns of policy-making rather than individual company policies and therefore
no individual company will be readily identifiable from the findings.
I would like to thank you for your co-operation and appreciate the effort that you have given.
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An Exploratory Study into the
Human Resource & Industrial Relations (HRIIR) Policies
of Irish-Owned Multinationals
This study is an exploratory analysis into the JR/HR practices of Irish-owned Multinationals
(MNCs). This questionnaire is divided up into three sections: Organisational Structure &
Business Activities which attempts to look at the overall business structure and activities of
the company; Employment which attempts to examine the employment structure of the
company and finally the IRJHR Policies & Practices which sets out to assess the formation
and implementation of IR/HR policies in Ireland and elsewhere in Europe.
IOrganisational Structure & Business Activities	 7
This section covers issues regarding the organisational structure, ownership and activities of
the company in Ireland and elsewhere in Europe.
1. Would you describe your company as:
U	 Wholly or majority Irish owned
U	 Irish and overseas owned (50:50)
U	 Wholly or majority overseas owned
UOther (please expand)................................................................
2. Where is the parent head office based?
3. If Irish-Owned does your company have subsidiaries/sites in Ireland?
U Yes
U No
4. If Yes, how many?
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5. Taking the structure of the Irish operations, would you say that the organisation is:
U	 divided into separate business units
U	 divided on the basis of products / services
U	 divided on the basis of functional structures
U	 divided on the basis of region
U	 a mixture of the above
U other (please specify) ..........................................................................
6. What is the nature of the relationship between different sites located within Ireland:
U	 Service provision to product market is networked across different sites
U	 Production is integrated across sites
U	 Sites supply each other at internally-administered prices across sites
U	 Sites supply each other in competition with external suppliers
U	 No trading relationship between different parts of the Irish enterprise
7. Does your company have subsidiaries/sites elsewhere in Europe, as well as in Ireland?
Li	 Yes
U No
8. If Yes, how many?
9. If Yes, in which of these European countries?
(please tick as many as apply)
________ Y/N __________ YIN
Belgium	 _____ Austria	 _____
Denmark______ Iceland	 ______
France_____ Norway	 _____
Germany	 _____ Sweden	 _____
Greece	 ______ Switzerland	 ______
Italy______ Finland ______
Luxembourg______ _______________ ______
Netherlands ______ Eastern Europe ______
Portugal______ _______________ ______
Spain______ _______________ ______
Britain______ _______________ ______
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10. Were the European subsidiaries established through:
(Please tick as appropriate)
(apply)	 (most prevalent)
U	 U	 the acquisition of local companies
U	 U	 a merger / joint venture with an other company
U	 U	 an investment in new or greenfield sites
UU	 a mixture (please specify)..........................................
11. Taking the structure of the Overseas operations, would you say that the organisations is:
U	 divided into separate foreign subsidiaries
U	 divided into international product divisions
U	 divided on the basis of functional structures (eg marketing/production)
U	 divided on the basis of territory (eg home & overseas operations)
U	 a mixture of the above
U other (please specify) ..........................................................................
12. Taking the enterprise World-wide, would you describe it as a:
U	 single business	 (90% of sales from one business)
U	 dominant business	 (70% of sales from one business)
U	 related business	 (no business contributes 70% or more to sales)
U	 conglomerate	 (many related businesses)
13. Do different sites make/produce:
U	 the same product/service
U	 different products/services
U	 some, but not all sites make the same product/service
14. Which of the following best describes the nature of the relationship between the parts of
your enterprise in Ireland and elsewhere in the world?
U	 Provision of service to product markets is networked across locations
U	 Production is integrated across different locations
U	 Locations supply each other at internally-administered prices
U	 Locations supply each other in competition with external suppliers
U	 No trading relations between different parts of the enterprise
364
Employment
This section attempts to examine the employment practices and policies of the company both
in Ireland and elsewhere in Europe.
1. Approximately how many employees does the enterprise employ World-wide?
Number.......................................................................................................................
2. Approximately what number (% ) of the total are within Ireland?
Number(or %) ............................................................................................................
3a. Approximately what number (%) of the total are based elsewhere in Europe?
Number(or %) ............................................................................................................
3b. What percentage of the European figure is based in the UK?
Number(or %) ............................................................................................................
________	 (%)_orNo.
Ireland ____________________
Europe __________________
UK______________
Outside __________________
Total	 100%
4. How many employees currently work at the parent head office?
5. Taking the other member states of the EU, excluding the UK, do any of these wholly
owned national operations employ 100 or more people?
Li	 Yes
U No
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6. If Yes, in which of the following EU countries?
________ YIN
Belgium	 ______
Denmark______
France______
Germany______
Greece______
Italy______
Luxembourg ______
Nether! ands ______
Portugal ______
Spain______
7. Taking the UK a!one , do any operations employ 100 or more people?
D Yes
D No
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I Industrial Relations/Human Resource Policies & Practices 	 I
This section attempts to examine the human resource and industrial relations policies of the
company firstly within Ireland (its home operations) and elsewhere in Europe (its overseas
operations).
Taking first the Irish Operations
1. Is there an executive responsible for IR/HR issues on the main board of the company?
U Yes
U No
2a. Is there a specialist personnel or industrial relations function at the parent head office?
U Yes
U No
2b. If Yes, how many people are employed in this function ' .............................................
3. If No, do any management staff spend a significant proportion of their time on personnel or
industrial relations matters?
U Yes
If yes, how many people
U No
4. How would you describe the role of the parent head office in connection with the JR/HR
function:
(please tick as many as apply)
Li	 To offer internal consultancy,
U	 To develop and promote broad policy initiatives,
LI	 To issue guidelines on key personnel and industrial relations matters,
Li	 To review and approve local proposals,
Li	 To collect and monitor data on industrial relations indicators,
LiOther (please specify)........................................................................
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5. Taking relations between the parent head office and other Irish operations, in connection
with each of the following issues does the head office:
Instruct establishments as to what to do
Advise establishments as to what to do
Give the establishments broad guidelines as to what to do
Give establishments total autonomy
_______________________ Instruct Advise Guidelines Autonomy Other
Membership of
employerassociation	 ________ _______ ___________ __________ ______
Unionrecognition	 ________ _______ ___________ __________ ______
Design of payment
systems_________ ________ _____________ ____________ _______
Numbersemployed	 ________ _______ ___________ __________ ______
Structures for consulting
and involvement	 ________
Negotiation of annual
paysettlement	 ________ _______ ____________ ___________ _______
Termsof redundancy	 ________ _______ ___________ __________ ______
Length of working
week
6. Does the company have meetings between personnel responsible for JR/HR at head office
and personnel responsible for JR/HR at other sites within Ireland ?
LI	 Yes
U No
7. If Yes, how frequent are these meetings?
8. Would you say the purpose of these meetings is to:
U	 define policy on issues covered with negotiations with management
U	 define some issues but primarily an exchange of views
U	 exist only to share information
U Other.....................................................................................................
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9. Do meetings of a consultative nature take place between management and employee
representatives across the company within Ireland?
D Yes
U No
10. Are these employee representatives:
Li	 Unionised
U	 Non-unionised
U	 Other (please specify)
[1. If Yes, how frequent are these meetings?
12. Would you say the purpose of the meetings is to:
U	 define policy on issues covered with negotiations with management
U	 define some issues but primarily an exchange of views
Li	 exist only to share information
Ii Other....................................................................................................
13. If you were to broadly divide the workforce within the Irish operations, would you say
the main groupings are:
Li	 Manual
Li	 Non-Manual
U	 Managerial
U Other (please specify).......................................................................
14. Taking the Irish operations are all, most, some or none of the sites unionised?
U	 All
Li	 Most
Li	 Some
U None
15. If unionised, what proportion of the total Irish workforce are unionisation?
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16. If unionised, what are the three largest unions representing employees in the Irish
operations
1
3
17. Are Trade Unions recognised for the purpose of the collective negotiation of pay and
working conditions?
U Yes
U No
18. In the last 5 years has the policy on trade union recognition changed?
U Yes
U	 If yes, has it been partially/wholly withdrawn
U	 If yes, has it been extended to new sites! groups of workers
U No
19. If Yes, for what reason(s)?
20. Does the company belong to an employers' association within Ireland?
U Yes
U No
21. If No, for what reason(s) did the company decide not to affiliate?
22a. If Yes, what role does the employer's association play?
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22b. Does this role include the negotiation of pay and working conditions?
Yes
J No
23. In the last 5 years has this policy on employer association membership changed?
U Yes
U No
24. If Yes, for what reason(s)?
25. Does the enterprise have a network for handling data communications within the Irish
subsidiary companies?
U Yes
U No
26. For which of the following issues is information collected by the parent head office on a
regular basis from operating sites in Ireland ?
Movements in rates of Pay	 _____
Overall Labour Costs 	 _____
Strikes & forms of industrial action 	 _____
Overtime Working	 ____
Numbers Employed	 ____
No. of Resignations and nos. recruited _____
Absenteeism	 _____
Dismissal & Disciplinary cases	 _____
Labour_productivity	 _____
Accidents_&_injuries	 _____
Occupation Health	 _____
Training received	 _____
Gender composition of workforce	 _____
Age composition of workforce	 _____
Other (please specify)	 _____
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27. For what purpose is the information used?
U	 As input into decisions on allocation of investment funds
U	 As input into decisions on divestment
U	 As input into the evaluation of the performance of site managers
U	 As input into the evaluation of the performance of the IR/HR function
U	 To provide information to the JR/HR function
U	 To make comparisons between operating sites
U	 Other(please specify).........................................................................
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Taking the European Operations
1. Does the enterprise have a general approach to employer association membership within
their European operations?
U Yes
U No
2. If Yes, is the policy of the company towards employer association membership elsewhere
in Europe for the purpose of multi-employer bargaining?
U Yes
U No
U	 Other (please specify)
3. Taking relations between the parent head office and the European operations, in connection
with each of the following issues does the head office:
Instruct establishments as to what to do
Advise establishments as to what to do
Give the establishments broad guidelines as to what to do
Give establishments total autonomy
_______________________ Instruct	 Advise	 Guidelines	 Autonomy Other
Membership of
employer association	 ___________ _________ ______________ ____________ ______
Union recognition	 _________ ________ ____________ __________ _____
Design of payment
systems___________ _________ ______________ ____________ ______
Numbersemployed	 _________ ________ ____________ __________ _____
Structures for consulting
andinvolvement	 __________ _________ _____________ ___________ ______
Negotiation of annual
pay settlement	 ___________ _________ _______________ ____________ _______
Termsof redundancy	 _________ ________ _____________ ___________ ______
Length of working
week________ _____________ ___________ ______
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4. Are there meetings between personnel managers drawn from overseas European
subsidiaries?
J Yes
LJ	 No
5. If Yes, how frequent are these meetings?
6. What is the purpose of these meetings?
7. Do you know if there are meetings of employee representatives across European
subsidiaries?
U Yes
U No
8. If Yes, how frequent are these meetings?
9. Does the head office communicate with overseas operating sites via links from a
mainframe or PCs at head office ?
U Yes
U No
10. If No, how does the head office communicate with its overseas operating sites?
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11. For which of the following issues is information collected by the parent head office on a
regular basis from operating sites in Europe?
Movements in rates ofPay
	 _____
Overall Labour Costs
Strikes & forms of industrial action
	 _____
Overtime Working	 _____
Numbers_Employed	 ____
No. of Resignations and nos. recruited
Absenteeism
Dismissal & Disciplinary cases	 _____
Labour_productivity	 _____
Accidents & injuries 	 _____
Occupation Health
	 _____
Training received
Gender composition of workforce
Age composition of workforce
Other_____
12. For what purpose is the information used?
As input into decisions on allocation of investment funds
As input into decisions on divestment
As input into the evaluation of the performance of site managers
As input into the evaluation of the performance of the IR/I-IR function
To provide information to the 1RIHR function
To make comparisons between operating sites
Other(please specify)........................................................................
Li
U
U
U
U
LI
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